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Thesis Summary 
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Philippians 
Candidate: James Andrew Smith 
Philippians is used by Paul to create a sense of ease about his imprisonment and thus also 
about his gospel. He finds his impetus for this activity within the constraints of his social 
discourse. The thesis presents Paul in terms of the Greco-Roman psychagogue as a 
means to understand the culturally constrained, cognitive procedures present to him. 
The immediate effects of this are the usual ones; Paul can only think and say what the 
language and structures of his culture allow. The implication is that Paul's `theology' can 
only ever be based upon a logocentric pre-text: the immanent features of his social 
discourse. Thus, the thesis attempts to describe assumptions associated with the moral 
philosophers as the cultural pre-text for Philippians. 
This then operates as the context for another activity: Phil 1.12-18a holds within itself a 
crisis, since Paul attempts to both affirm and deny the metaphysics of presence within re- 
citations of the gospel. The approach by commentators has been to gloss the problem 
with a hierarchy in which Phil 1.18 governs Phil 1.15-17. This only succeeds in 
exacerbating the problem, leading to another crisis. The thesis seeks to argue that the 
text itself appears to be written deliberately to create a point of undecidability in which 
the text deconstructs itself while leaving the ethical imperative of proclamation unscathed. 
This then is shown to demonstrate that there is more going on in Philippians than is 
typically thought to be the case. Paul is using Philippians to secure his ideo-theological 
agenda at Philippi. This subtextual activity is first seen in the disclosure formula in Phil 
1.12, which is at once an opening and a closing of the epistle's semiotic activity; it thus 
becomes (dis)closure. This hidden activity is shown to work its way underneath the text 
until appearing in Phil 1.18a, where Paul erases the essential lines of difference between 
&? ij9EUa and 1rp&jx oLS. 
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The Last Word First: An Introduction 
These are the last words I am writing for this thesis. I have spent some five years working 
on it, although for two of those years I actually suspended my research, since I moved 
countries, took a full-time job, and became a father all at once. What drove me to write 
this thesis was a burning question that had nagged me ever since I took a prison epistles 
course as an undergraduate: how can Paul say that he is able to `rejoice' in proclamation 
regardless of whether it is done in truth or in pretext?! 
In my undergraduate years I had developed an interest in the nature of rhetoric, 
and then for my master's thesis I wrote on the `rhetoric of power' which was an attempt 
to read Acts in light of critical theory moving from structuralism to poststructuralism. 
My interest in critical theory was well-piqued by that project. Naturally, the biblical 
studies department at the University of Sheffield presented itself as an ideal place to go 
and do research on the Bible and critical theory. I was most elated, then, when upon my 
arrival I discovered that Stephen Moore had been drafted by the department, and even 
more delighted to discover that he would be my supervisor. 
As I began my research I suddenly became aware of an awful truth: there were not 
very many people who cared very much about critical theoretical approaches to the Bible. 
With much lamenting, I almost gave up. My supervisor, Stephen Moore, indicated to me 
that the real problem was that not many people doing critical theory were taking seriously 
the work of the historical critics (easily the primary `order of knowledge' in biblical 
studies) and were thus being dismissed by the major body of biblical studies. This led to 
a decision whereby I attempted to integrate the critical theory that I had been doing with 
historical criticism. (It is interesting to note that a large portion of those doing critical 
theoretical type works in biblical studies are people whose pedigree was historical 
criticism and who then made the `shift'. ) 
The results of my decision to interact my interests in critical theory with historical 
critical approaches are largely manifested in this thesis. In some ways, I have taken some 
risks that I'd rather not have taken in my attempt to weave in and out of both disciplines. 
The degree to which that has been successful, will only be known by its readers. 
Naturally, there are points where it seems that one discipline is winning out. All I can say 
to that question is that my argument in this project is long and slow, so the `weaving' is 
hardly `ducking and diving', it's more like `a sway to the left and a sway to the right'. 
On another note, Pauline studies is one of the few real strongholds of the 
historical critics into which critical theorists seldom dare to go. I am acutely aware of the 
hulking mass of Pauline studies and Pauline theology and of the volumes of brilliant work 
which that institution has turned out. So, it is with great fear and trepidation that I 
embark on this project, and dare to offer a critical squeak inside the cavernous halls of 
Pauline scholarship. 
ýý 
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Chapter One 
The Marks of an Apostle: Writing about Paul 
The Philippian Epistle may be taken to exhibit the normal type of the 
Apostle's teaching, when not determined and limited by individual 
circumstances, and thus to present the essential substance of the Gospel. 
Dogmatic forms are the buttresses or the scaffold-poles of the building, 
not the building itself. 
J B. Lightfoot' 
Words block up our Path. -Wherever primitive men put down a 
word, they thought they had made a discovery. How different 
the case really was! -they had come upon a problem, and, while 
they thought they had solved it, they had in reality placed an 
obstacle in the way of its solution. Now, with every new piece of 
knowledge, we stumble over petrified words and mummified 
conceptions, and would rather break a leg than a word in doing 
so. 
Friedrich Nietzsche2 
1. Introduction 
Within Paul's letter to the Philippians there resides a crisis. Or, perhaps it would be more 
accurate to say that a solution resides in Philippians and that this is precisely the problem. 
Paul expresses `splendid magnanimity' and `large heartedness' and `magnificent 
optimism', to list a few of the descriptions of scholarly surprise at Paul's solution in Phil 
1.18a: `whether by pretext or by truth, Christ is proclaimed'. 
At first glance, it appears that the solution in Phil 1.18a to the crisis stated in Phil 
1.15-17 is of little consequence, confined to a small, forgettable section of the Pauline 
corpus and to an even smaller and less memorable section of Pauline theology. However, 
upon further investigation, it appears that the ease with which readers have dealt or not 
dealt with this text is not representative of an ease with the semantic content of the text 
itself but an ease with the art of glossing. To be sure, a number of scholars have drawn 
attention to some of the peculiarities of this passage, and many have confessed their 
surprise at Paul's comments, but most3 fail to take Paul `seriously'. 4 The trend is rather 
Lightfoot, J. B, Saint Paul's Epistle to the Philippians, (rev. ed.; Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 
1953), ix. 
2 Friedrich Nietzsche, Dawn of Day (trans. J. M. Kennedy; vol. 9 of The Complete Works of 
Friedrich Nietzsche; Edinburgh: T. N. Foulis, 1911), §47. 
3 These will be noted as the argument develops. 
4 On `seriously', see pp. 34,39ff. 
10 
to observe an apparent theological discord between Phil 1.15-17 and Phil 1.18a, and then 
quickly retool Phil 1.15-17 into a harmonised comment on what becomes in Phil 1.18 a 
flash of Paul's recently acquired magnanimity. 
To excavate the `truth' or `meaning' of this text, is to unearth a fracture within the 
unity of the historical excavating process, namely the hermeneutical processes by which 
we prise from the text its `meaning' or `significance'. After having discussed the two 
kinds of preachers in 1.15-17, Paul then says, `What does it matter? 5 Except that in every 
way, whether by6 pretext (iipöjaoiS) or by truth (&? 9ELa) Christ is proclaimed and in this 
I rejoice'.? The striking point is that Paul is willing to affirm or even validate a gospel 
proclaimed through motives and intentions which are inherently contrary to it: a gospel 
proclaimed in/by pretext (1TpöxaoLS). 
To state the thesis of this project, Paul writes the letter to the Philippians in order 
to encourage them at a time when they themselves were suffering for the faith that they 
had placed in Paul's message of Christ, namely the gospel. 8 His own imprisonment 
served only to exacerbate their trials, since they could hardly take comfort in the 
knowledge. Paul therefore attempts to head off any disillusionment that the Philippians 
may have had towards the gospel which he had proclaimed among them, and towards 
himself as one whose words are equal to his life and deeds. 9 Paul does this by inserting a 
5 Unless oth rwise stated, all translations from the Greek New Testament are my own and 
are based on the NA 
7. TL yap here functions as an exclamatory question. See the comments in 
BDF §299 (3): `What does it matter? or What difference does it make? '. 
6 While the locative tends to be the received rendering, it seems more appropriate to 
understand the dative as representative of the means, since it highlights the process of 
proclamation: by means of truth or by means of pretext Christ is proclaimed. 
TL ycGp; Tr? d1v "TL TravtiL ipölIQ, FUGE TrpOc&QEL FUGE 
&?. ijeEL , 
XpwtÖS Katay'YEÄ, A. EtaL, Kal, EV 
TOUT xaLpW. The text-critical issues here are minor: P46, K, A and several other uncials and 
minuscules support this text; whereas B omits ir)Lrjv, while D and YJ omit ötL. P46 and boms insert 
ix)U before the clause, Kai EV Kid.. (clearly as a balance to the final clause). Apart from these rather 
minor deviations, there is nothing which offers a significant alternative to Paul's comment; more 
importantly, there is nothing which seems to mitigate it. 
8 This is stated explicitly in the text (1.27-30) and is commonly noted by commentators. 
9 Greco-Roman philosophy was overtly ethical in nature (all philosophy was eventually 
moral philosophy) and as a result there was an emphasis on the psychagogic principle that a 
philosopher's deeds ought to match his words. For Seneca, `God' is an ever-present witness to our 
words and deeds (Ep. 83.1, De Vita Beata, 20.5); for Musonius Rufus, the teacher's conduct 
should match the principles he teaches and demonstrate with his own body the lessons of his 
philosophy (82.28-30); and being good is the same as being a philosopher (104.36-37). See also 
Cicero De Finnibus 1.7.25; Tusculan Disputations, 5.24f; De Officiis, 1.43.153. 
-f 
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discourse into the situation which would cause the Philippians to understand the events in 
a way favourable to both the gospel he preaches and to himself as their spiritual leader. '0 
This power play is unearthed when we dig beneath the surface of the text of Phil 1.12-18, 
and of Phil 1.18 in particular. I would further suggest that the evidence indicates that 
Paul is perceiving the problem along the lines drawn by Greco-Roman moral 
philosophical ideals. That is, it appears that the Greco-Roman moral philosophical topic 
of flattery and friendship is operative here as a cohering factor in Paul's understanding of 
potential problems and in his attempt to resolve them. 11 Finally, I suggest that Paul 
performs a radical, critical manoeuvre, the effects of which ripple through the eventual 
production of Pauline theology. 12 
In this chapter, I begin the task by considering contemporary writing practices and 
their impact upon the way we write about Paul. Chapters Two and Three then pursue 
the necessary background information pertinent to understanding the context of this 
passage of Philippians. The goal of those chapters is to locate Paul, the Philippians and 
the letter itself in their critical and social frameworks. The point of such an undertaking 
is not to present a definitive argument on all matters pertaining to these issues, rather I 
have in view the attempt to demonstrate something of those constraints placed upon Paul 
which necessarily precede his thought and thus his writing. Finally, in Chapter Four, I 
begin a re-writing of commentary on this text by attempting to follow the text down into 
its moments of impasse and allow its difficulties to operate within the commentary. The 
goal here is to show how commentary has failed to take Phil 1.12-18a `seriously', and has 
overlaid a problematic hierarchy onto the text, which glosses the real, undecidable 
problems of the text. In revealing that gloss and tracing the contours of the text as it 
deconstructs itself, we actually gain far more than we have lost. 
10 I invoke here Lloyd F. Bitzer, `The Rhetorical Situation', Philosophy and Rhetoric 1 
(1968): 1-14. 
11 While there are numerous references in the moral-philosophical literature of the relevant 
period to the difference between flattery and frank speech, or between a flatterer and a friend, 
Plutarch has dedicated an entire discourse to it (`How to Tell a Flatterer from a Friend') and I use 
that discourse as paradigmatic. 
12 1 discuss the ramifications of this in Chapter Four. 
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2. Writing about Paul's Writing 
While there are some micro-level13 debates over such things as the identity of Paul's 
opponents and the nature of the Christ-hymn in 2.6-11, the macro-level interpretation of 
Philippians has not been something over which biblical scholarship has endured much 
angst. Philippians has rather been classified quite typically by the institution of Pauline 
studies. When discussing Pauline literature, the `great epistles' 14 or the Hauptbriefe 
(Romans, Galatians, 1&2 Corinthians) if not explicitly stated, lurk in the background as 
a dominant and delimiting force. 15 This `lurking' occurs not simply by virtue of the fact 
that the term both normalises and marginalises the respective Pauline texts, but also by 
virtue of the way in which that normalising process writes itself into the institution of 
Pauline Studies at the very point which provides the possibility of discussing Pauline texts 
as something in particular. 
2. a. The Hauptbriefe and the Construction ofa Pauline Point ofReference 
By no means do I intend to articulate a history of the interpretation of Paul. What 
I seek to do here is to consider briefly the fact that some of Paul's writings are privileged 
in the discussion about `what Saint Paul really said'. 16 The problem of privileging in the 
Pauline epistles is hardly an obvious one, but I shall demonstrate later17 how it effects 
commentary on how Phil 1.18 is either (re)presented as theology or forgotten altogether. 
13 By `micro-level' I refer to the fact that these are sub-sections of the letter's general 
theological interest, and do not imply `insignificant' or `simple'. 
14 For all practical purposes this privileging process started with F. C. Baur although he 
bases his own discussion partly upon on Eusebius' history and analysis of the formation of the 
canon in which there were said to be two classes of Pauline epistles: the Homologoumena and the 
Antilegomena. `In the Homologoumena there can only be reckoned the four great epistles 
(`Hauptbriefe 'l p. 276 of German edition) of the Apostle, which take precedence of the rest in every 
respect namely the Epistle to the Galatians, the two Epistles to the Corinthians, and the Epistle to 
the Romans' (F. C. Baur, Paul, the Apostle of Jesus Christ: His Life and Work, His Epistles and His 
Doctrine. A Contribution to the Critical History of Primitive Christianity [trans. Rev. A. Menzies; 2nd 
ed.; London: Williams and Norgate, 1875], 1.246, also 247). 
15 It is far more common these days for people to employ the phrase `undisputed epistles' 
and by that title refer to Romans, Galatians, 1&2 Corinthians, Philippians, 1 Thessalonians, and 
Philemon. We note, however, that the title `undisputed' refers primarily to authorship and not 
perceived value. The idea of a `big four' remains a somewhat prominent feature on the noetic 
landscape of Pauline studies, both theological and historical. 
16 An interesting phrase borrowed from the title of N. T. Wright, What Saint Paul Really 
Said (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1997). 
17 See the later discussion on `Sur-prise', pp. 188ff. 
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The opening statement in the article on Romans in the Dictionary of Paul and His 
Letters claims that, 
Romans is both the least controversial of the major NT letters and the 
most important.... It is most important as being the first well-developed 
theological statement by a Christian theologian which has come down to 
us, and one which has had incalculable influence on the framing of 
Christian theology ever since-arguably the single most important work of 
Christian theology ever written. 18 
The question I entertain here is the degree to which the rather common working 
assumption that Romans is no less than `the single most important work of Christian 
theology ever written' influences our treatment of other Pauline texts. The study of the 
theology of Paul has traditionally privileged Romans in a way that is good neither for the 
study of Romans nor for that of Paul. The privileging of Romans has a good pedigree. 
Note, for example, F. C. Baur's own panoptical vision of Romans: `only from the 
standpoint of the Epistle to the Romans do we survey the rich treasures of the spiritual 
life of which the Apostle was the depositary and the organ'. 19 Dunn calls Romans our 
`prompter and plumb line'; 20 Günther Bornkamm understands it to be `Paul's last will 
and testament'; 21 Kümmel labels the epistle as `the theological confession of Paul'. 22 
Calvin Roetzel offers a well stated caveat. His contention is that `once Romans is 
established as the goal and quintessential expression of Paul's theology, then every other 
letter of Paul can be read as a preliminary or provisional statement of a Pauline theology 
that receives its most adequate expression in Romans. This letter then becomes the 
canon of Paul's mature theology'. 23 An example of this is the classic centralising of 
certain theological topics which subsequently place inappropriate demands on our 
18 M. Reasoner, `Romans', DPL, 838. 
19 Baur, Paul, 2.308. 
20 James D. G. Dunn, The Theology of Paul the Apostle (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1998), 
26. 
21 Günther Bornkamm, `The Letter to the Romans as Paul's Last Will and Testament', in 
The Romans Debate (ed. Karl P. Donfried; rev. ed.; Peabody, MA: Hendrickson, 1995). Also see 
Günther Bornkamm, Paul (trans. M. G. Stalker; New York: Harper & Row, 1971), 88-96. 
22 Werner Georg Kümmel, Introduction to the New Testament (trans. Howard Clark Kee; 
rev. ed.; Nasville: Abingdon, 1975), 312-13. 
23 Calvin Roetzel, Paul: The Man and the Myth (Minneapolis: Fortress, 1999), 93. 
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reading of the Pauline epistles in general. Although there have been challengers, 24 
historically, for the Protestant churches at least, 25 the predominant theological influence 
has been located in the treatment of justification by faith in Romans as the centre of 
Pauline thought. 26 This is quite clear in Bultmann's existential anthropotheological 
reading of Paul as the founder of Christian theology which refers not to a centre as much 
as to a `basic theological position' which is `more or less completely set forth in 
Romans'. 27 That position is, suggests Bultmann, the one which Paul developed as a 
response to his `conversion' to the Christian faith and subsequent rejection of salvation by 
human accomplishment; namely justification by faith. Hence Bultmann's student Ernst 
Käsemann's synthesizing statement: `The epistle to the Romans subsumes the whole of 
the preaching and theology of Paul under the one head-the self-revealing righteousness 
of God. In so doing, it undoubtedly gives to the unique Pauline message a nucleus and a 
name which bring its own peculiar nature into the sharpest possible relief against the 
background of the rest of the New Testament'. 28 
The problem here is primarily with the way Paul's letters, and Romans in 
particular, are thought to function. It is not with the answers theologians have 
24 Wrede had a somewhat indignant reaction to the way the Reformation had enculturated 
theology with justification by faith as the Pauline point of reference. See William Wrede, Paul, 
(trans. Edward Lummis; Lexington, KY: American Theological Library Association Committee on 
Reprinting, 1962), 122-23. Schweitzer argued that `by taking the doctrine of righteousness by 
faith as the starting point, the understanding of the Pauline world of thought was made impossible' 
and that the modern use of the doctrine was an `unconscious' adaptation (Albert Schweitzer, The 
Mysticism of Paul the Apostle [trans. William Montgomery; London: Adam & Charles Black, 1967], 
220; but see the whole discussion, 219-26). 
25 `The tendency among Catholic scholars has been to identify the center in Pauline 
theology with Christ the Son of God' (Joseph Plevnik, `The Center of Pauline Theology', CBQ 51 
[1989]: 462). 
26 Plevnik, 461. 
27 Rudolph Bultmann, Theology of the New Testament (trans. Kendrick Grobel; 2 vols.; New 
York: Scribner's, 1951), 1.190. 
28 Ernst Käsemann, New Testament Questions of Today (trans. W. J. Montague; New 
Testament Library; London: SCM, 1969), 168. Käsemann represents something of a climax for 
the `justification by faith' approach, see the rest of his chapter `The Righteousness of God in Paul', 
pp. 168-82; see also his chapter `Justification and Salvation History in the Epistle to the Romans' 
in Ernst Käsemann, Perspectives on Paul (London: SCM, 1971), 60-78. Käsemann, notes that it 
has been observed that justification by faith is simply Paul's attack on Judaism; however, he then 
suggests that this is no reason to subordinate it to other Pauline theological concepts. In fact doing 
so, in Käsemann's mind, is to provoke schism between modem protestantism and the reformation 
itself (in so far as the reformation itself reflects a particular theology or interpretation of Paul), see 
Käsemann, Perspectives on Paul, 70. 
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produced, 29 it is rather with the questions being asked-not prior `theological' 
assumptions, rather prior assumptions about Paul and the nature of his letters. Hence 
the significance of Stanley Stowers' observation in the opening of his A Rereading of 
Romans, `Romans has come to be read in ways that differ fundamentally from ways that 
readers in Paul's own time could have read it. More than any other writing of earliest 
Christianity, Romans, especially in the West, came to bear the major economies of 
salvation. These systems of sin and salvation reshaped the frame of reference that 
determined the reading of the letter'. 30 
The problem with privileging Romans is not a superficial one; after all, Romans is 
clearly a majestic epistle and a magnificent outworking of Paul's gospel in terms of certain 
issues present to him during its composition. There is, therefore, a great need for us to 
consider the reality of a difference between what has come to be the normal or 
institutionalised way of reading Paul's letters and the way Paul would have expected his 
letters to be read. A good starting point for this discussion is Dunn's recent work, The 
Theology of Paul the Apostle. 31 
In a discussion on how we can move toward a theology of Paul, 32 Dunn posits a 
question which is not really a question at all because the answer is already engraved upon 
the cornerstone of institutional Pauline Studies. Nonetheless, Dunn feigns that `one final 
point needs to be decided before embarking on the enterprise, that is, where one should 
best locate oneself within the flow of Paul's thought in order to begin the dialogue with 
it'. After a relatively short discussion, given the size of the book, the answer is said to be 
easily made, `for there is one letter of Paul's .... And that is Romans'. Now this is 
perfectly legitimate in many respects; after all, as Dunn well states: 
[Romans] was written to a church which was not his own founding. It was 
written at the end of a (or, better, the) major phase of Paul's missionary 
work (Rom. 15.18-24), which included most of the other undisputed 
letters. It was written under probably the most congenial circumstances of 
29 How could we question the skill with which the likes of Bultmann crafted ingenious 
responses to the questions presented to them? 
30 Stanley K. Stowers, A Rereading of Romans: , 
justice, Jews, Gentiles (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1994), 1. 
31 Dunn's status within the realm of Pauline studies, the proliferation and excellence of his 
writing and thinking on Paul allows him to be used as representative of traditional Pauline studies. 
It should therefore also be noted that the subsequent focus on Dunn's work is really a focus on the 
institution of Pauline studies and not on Dunn in particular. 
32 Dunn, Theology, 23-26. 
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his mission, with time for careful reflection and composition. And, above 
all, it was clearly intended to set out and defend his own mature 
understanding of the gospel (Rom. 1.16-17) as he had thus far proclaimed 
it and as he hoped to commend it both in Jerusalem and beyond Rome in 
Spain. In short, Romans is still far removed from a dogmatic or systematic 
treatise on theology, but it nevertheless is the most sustained and reflective 
statement of Paul's own theology by Paul himself. 33 
However, a complex of assumptions has led Dunn to the same point to which 
many others have come and which I find to be problematic. To begin with, let us observe 
that Dunn's ultimate goal is `first of all ... to get inside the skin of Paul, to see through 
his eyes, to think his thoughts from inside as it were, and to do so in such a way as to help 
others to appreciate his insight and subtlety and concerns for themselves'. 34 We may note 
here that Dunn's ultimate goal is indeed the ultimate goal of virtually everyone who 
approaches Paul, since it is well-noted that culture, time, and language conspire to create 
a significant, perhaps impenetrable, barrier between us and understanding Paul on his own 
terms. The fact that this is Dunn's primary `endeavour' exposes the problem with his 
attempt to provide a defence of Romans as the means for beginning this endeavour; that is, 
Dunn gets ahead of himself, he puts the hermeneutical cart before the exegetical horse. 
Note for example, the statement and question, `one final question needs to be decided 
before embarking on the enterprise. That is, where one should best locate oneself within 
the flow of Paul's thought in order to begin the dialogue with it'. 35 The problem terms are 
those italicised; they represent a rhetorical difference between a question of where Dunn 
says he wants to begin and the fact that this has already been decided and the 
conversation begun. 
Dunn wants `to get inside the skin' of the Apostle in order to locate himself in 
some Pauline primordium, and the suggestion is that Romans is the doorway through 
which he plans to enter into that activity, but herein lies our problem. What Dunn 
actually attempts to `defend' is whether Romans is a sufficiently stable text which 
represents a `statement of Paul's own theology by Paul himself'. 36 He does not defend 
Romans as the point through which he may enter into and begin to possess Paul's corpus. 
He in fact assumes it and thus makes a classic bid for (interpretive) power over the 
33 Dunn, Theology, 25. 
34 Dunn, Theology, 24. 
35 Dunn, Theology, 25 (emphasis added). 
36 Dunn, Theology, 25. 
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corpus, which is not a simple claim that `my interpretation is better than yours'. By 
locating himself within the apostle as his hermeneutical starting point, Dunn seeks to 
rebuild Paul from the toes up, to precede other interpretations, and he spends 737 pages 
re-constituting someone/thing called `Paul the Apostle' (a subtle set of institutional 
power-relations are thereby called into being37). There is an important and crucial 
difference here: it is not a given that the status of Romans as a stable text and its function 
as a privileged, primordial hermeneutical doorway are the same thing. The fact that 
Dunn assumes or suggests that they are is a problem, since at the very point of real 
decision in this process, the point at which even Dunn thinks a reading of Paul is made 
possible, he glosses the most important question with a statement on the text's apparent 
relative lack of historical interest. We shall return to Dunn, but for now, with respect to 
commentating upon objects of criticism, we ask, What is the role of the gloss?, or What is 
the role of concealment? Such queries are Hinterfragen, but nonetheless necessary. 
2. b. Hinterfragen 
`When we are confronted with any manifestation which someone has permitted us 
to see, we may ask: what is it meant to conceal? What is it meant to draw our attention 
from? What prejudice does it seek to raise? and again, how far does the subtlety of the 
dissimulation go? '38 Do we think Nietzsche has gone too far with his suspicion? Must we 
look at texts and see nothing less than sleight of hand? Freud believes that he has 
observed the most prestigious prestidigitation, nothing less than the Levitical legerdemain 
of the Hebrew Bible's ancient redactors, J. E. P. D. The redaction, the glossing, was a 
priestly act of mediation, a sanctified distortion, an act of biblical commentary, of 
replacement, of dominance, of power, and, observes Freud, this `distortion [Entstellung] 
of a text is not unlike a murder. The difficulty lies not in the execution of the deed but in 
the doing away with the traces [Spuren]'. 39 
`Entstellung' (distortion) is an important word for Freud, and became a technical 
term for later psychoanalysts. It is a reference to `the modification of forbidden thoughts, 
37 A set of Nietzschean micrological power relations.. 
38 Nietzsche, Dawn of Day, §523. `Hinterfragen' is translated in various ways, here I prefer 
`insidious questions' (see the German version, of Morgenröte in Friedrich Nietzsche, Werke in drei 
Bänden [ed. Karl Schlechta; vol. 1; Munich: Carl Hanser, 1954], 1010-1279). 
39 Sigmund Freud, Moses and Monotheism (trans. Katherine Jones; The International 
Psycho-Analytical Library 33; London: Hogarth, and the Institute of Psycho-Analysis, 1951), 70; 
also note that the German text is from Sigmund Freud, `Wenn Moses ein Ägypter war .. . 
', Imago: 
Zeitschrift für Psychoanalytische Psychologie, Ihre Grenzgebiete und Anwendungen 23 (1937) : 411. 
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impulses, or experiences to make them more acceptable to the ego', 40 or `the disguising or 
modification of unacceptable impulses so that they can escape the dream censor'. 41 The 
important point is that alteration precedes manifestation. For example, `forbidden wishes 
are frequently expressed in disguised or symbolic form: The innocent act of walking 
upstairs is more likely to pass the censor set up by the superego than the guilt-laden act of 
intercourse which it represents'. 42 Freud himself notes that he desires to bring into our 
understanding of his use of the term `distortion', `the double meaning to which it has a 
right.... It should mean not only "to change the appearance of", but also "to wrench 
apart", "to put in another place". That is why in so many textual distortions we may 
count on finding the suppressed and abnegated material hidden away somewhere, though 
in an altered shape and torn out of its original connection'. 43 
Nietzsche's suspicion of `any manifestation which someone has permitted us to 
see' is bound up with Freud's `distortion'. What Nietzsche suspects in a given 
manifestation is a prior distortion of something that was unsavoury or `unacceptable' and 
thus was altered or disguised so as to sneak pass the censor, who would otherwise sound 
the alarm, and has now manifested itself as `acceptable'. Indeed, Nietzsche's entire 
genealogical project is precisely the attempt to locate the points of what Freud calls 
`distortion' and demonstrate the dependence of current `acceptable' manifestations upon 
acts of distortion, that is, upon lies. 
Is not biblical criticism very much `distortion', our commentary writing in 
particular? Does not the commentary seek to isolate difficulties and smooth them over so 
as to represent, or `manifest' the text as comprehensible and coherent? Does not the 
commentary seek to precede the text, to displace and eventually replace the text in favour 
of itself? Does not the commentary require a `dissatisfaction with the work (conscious or 
unconscious)', 44 `conceal an aggression' towards the work, 45 manifest a desire `to replace 
40 Robert M. Goldenson, ed., Longman Dictionary of Psychology and Psychiatry (New York: 
Longman, 1984), 229. 
41 j" P. Chaplin, Dictionary of Psychology (2nd ed.; New York: Laurel, 1985), 134-35. 
42 Goldenson, 229. 
43 Freud, 70. 
44 Susan Sontag, `Against Interpretation' in Aesthetics (eds. Susan L. Feagin and Patrick 
Maynard; New York: Oxford University Press, 1997), 253. 
45 Sontag, 251. 
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it by something else', 46 invoke a `radical strategy for conserving an old text, which is 
thought too precious to repudiate, by revamping it'? 47 Is it not a classic manifestation of 
the Nietzschean will to power? It must surely be since `no critic can evade a Nietzschean 
will to power over a text because interpretation is at last nothing else'. 48 It must surely 
also be Freudian `distortion', since, through acts of replacement, it `distorts' the ancient 
original. Could we go so far as to say that it is `murder'? If so, of whom? Plato 
complained (through Socratic citation) that writing can be read and re-read by anyone 
while the `father' of the ideas represented in writing is absent. Plato's fear is of a loose, 
pubescent text in the hands of an oily interloper, who, replacing (and forgetting) the 
father, produces ideas which the father never raised it to produce. `Every word, once it is 
written, is bandied about, alike among those who understand and those who have no 
interest in it, and it knows not to whom to speak or not to speak; when ill-treated or 
unjustly reviled it always needs its father to help it; for it has no power to protect or help 
itself . 49 Socrates' desire is for paternal control over the text, and he suggests that the 
text, with a sense of its heritage, also desires to be controlled. The act of reading is then 
constructed as an act of paternal replacement, a violent act upon the text and the father, a 
patricidal act. The Socratic fear of patricide and the desire to possess and master drives 
the Socrates character to castigate the possibility of a loss of power over the text through 
what appears to him as the possibility of a bastard text, 50 a text that does not know its 
father: writing. Ultimately, however, the problem is the possibility of, indeed, the need 
for, commentary. Commentary seals the father's fate. 
Commentary is an expression of the will to power; it seeks to replace the text with 
itself; it thus desires a paternity over its readers. Commentary seeks to assist and guide, 
solving aporiae, bridging gaps, translating the unacceptable into the acceptable; thus 
commentary is an act of Freudian distortion. It therefore gives rise to Nietzsche's set of 
46 Sontag, 253. 
47 Sontag, 251. 
48 Harold Bloom, `From J to K, or the Uncanniness of the Yahwist' in The Bible and the 
Narrative Tradition (ed. Frank McConnell; New York: Oxford University Press, 1986), 21. 
49 Plato, Phaedrus, 275E [Fowler, LCL]). Phaedrus then, following Socrates' lead, goes 
on to announce that the written word (ö yeypaµ L voO) is merely the `image' (Et& Xov) of the `living 
and breathing' (CWVi(X Kai E44ruxov) word (Plato, Phaedrus, 276A). 
50 Plato has Socrates argue that only speech is the legitimate child (yvijoLoc) and writing 
desires a father, but has no one to help it (Plato, Phaedrus, 275E-267A). 
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`insidious questions': `What is it meant to conceal? What is it meant to draw our 
attention from? What prejudice does it seek to raise? and again, how far does the subtlety 
of the dissimulation go? '. 51 Thus, Jameson devotes an essay to the need for 
`metacommentary', a `heightened and self-conscious' state in which `we observe our own 
struggles and patiently set about characterizing them'. 52 It is to create a `translation' that 
is always aware of its inability to transport, `to carry to heaven ... without death'; 
53 to see 
past the illusion `that there exists somewhere, ultimately attainable, some final and 
transparent reading'. 54 
To say it yet another way, commentary is an act of consumption and thus of 
destruction. The attempt to `bag' the text, to weigh and measure it, to tag it, and 
commentate upon it in the belief that we can mark out its territory, is, at the same time, 
to transform it, since, to cite Herman Rapaport's summary of Trinh Minh-ha, `the 
approach of the Other prevents the real from being disclosed as merely something in 
itself . 
55 That is, just as critics came to recognise that there is no such thing as mere 
history, we also recognise that no real thing can ever be disclosed as merely something in 
itself. Metacommentary becomes, therefore, a prerequisite activity since, `all thinking 
about interpretation must sink itself in the strangeness, the unnaturalness of the 
hermeneutic situation; or to put it another way, every individual interpretation must 
include an interpretation of its own existence, must show its credentials and justify itself: 
every commentary must be at the same time a metacommentary as well'. 56 Is this even 
possible? Culler suggests, yes: `even if in principle we cannot get outside our conceptual 
frameworks to criticize and evaluate, the practice of self-reflexivity, the attempt to 
theorize one's practice, works to produce change, as the recent history of literary criticism 
51 Nietzsche, Dawn of Day, §523. 
52 Fredric Jameson, `Metacommentary' in Situations of Theory (vol. 1 of The Ideologies of 
Theory: Essays 1971-1986; Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1988), 4. 
53 OED, 3371. 
54 Jameson, 4. 
55 Herman Rapaport, `Deconstruction's Other: Trinh T. Minh-ha and Jacques Derrida', 
Diacritics 25.2: 98-103,108. 
56 Jameson, 5. 
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amply shows'. 57 Self-reflexivity, a form of suspicion about the self, another kind of 
Hinterfrage is required if we are to progress. For now, we investigate some acts of 
patricide. 
`The writing of a commentary is a conspicuous (and sometimes dazzling) act of 
ministry to the church of Christ. But it is done inconspicuously'. 58 So goes Eugene 
Peterson's description in his introduction to an invitational symposium on writing 
commentaries. Before the symposium even begins, it is already troubled by a description 
of commentary writing as both `conspicuous' (not hidden) and `inconspicuous' (hidden). 
Precisely what does Peterson mean by this? Commentary writing, which has now become 
institutional interpretation, is conspicuous in that commentaries have a visible life within 
the Church. What is inconspicuous about commentaries is that `no one watches the 
commentator at work'. 59 Peterson's concern here about the commentator's hiddenness is 
whether people get to know the `real' commentator or not. Our question is whether the 
people get to know the `real' text. 
These essays on commentary reveal little self-reflexivity, and a good deal of 
totalisation. Pheme Perkins displays a desire for commentary as `translation': `like 
translating, writing a commentary demands that one decide the meaning of every word 
and phrase'. 60 The commentary provides `a framework for our field of vision.... Those 
who write commentaries do so because ... we would like to enable other people to share 
our view'. 61 F. Dale Bruner bypasses Perkins' slightly self-reflexive, though still paternal, 
phrase `our view' and goes straight to saying that commentating is `saying something 
about what God has said-responding ("what does God mean by this?! ")'. 62 Bruner 
recants a little later pointing out that `there is simply no such thing as coming to a text 
objectively'. 63 But wherein lies the answer to the problem of interpretative subjectivity? 
57 Jonathan Culler, On Deconstruction: Theory and Criticism after Structuralism (London: 
Routledge, 1982), 154. 
58 Eugene, H. Peterson, "`Preface": Symposium: On Writing Commentaries', ThTo 46 
(1990): 386. 
59 Peterson, `Preface', 386. 
60 Pheme Perkins, `Commentaries: Windows to the Text', ThTo 46 (1990): 395. 
61 Perkins, `Commentaries', 398. 
62 F. Dale Bruner, `The Why and How of Commentary', ThTo 46 (1990): 399. 
63 Bruner, 400. 
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It is not within increased independence, but within the increased dependence upon the 
`communio sanctorum'; 64 that is, upon a text-forming community whose own communal 
patricide is held up as the real text simply because it is born of the community. Bruner 
quickly divests himself of his communal policing, though, and returns later in the essay to 
`the sheer delight ... [of] rummaging 
in the thoughts and words of God'. 65 
Suddenly ... a new idea occurs to him one day, his idea; and the entire blessedness of a great personal hypothesis, which embraces all existence 
and the whole world penetrates with such force into his conscience that he 
dare not think himself the creator of such blessedness, and he therefore 
attributes to his God the cause of this new idea and likewise the cause of 
the cause, believing it to be the revelation of his God. How could a man 
be the author of so great a happiness? ask his pessimistic doubts. But 
other levers are secretly at work: an opinion may be strengthened by one's 
self if it be considered as a revelation; and in this way all its hypothetic 
nature is removed; the matter is set beyond criticism and even beyond 
doubt: it is sanctified. 66 
Such a patricide is unworthy of us, the author-god is dead and we have killed him, 
and `who will wipe this blood off us? ', cries Nietzsche. 67 The response: `we will'. But 
how? We must ourselves become gods simply to be worthy of such a crimej68 That is, we 
must be able to engage in acts of (re)creation, and this is precisely what the commentary 
does and is. 
2. c. Two Exemplary Reasons for Hinterfragen 
Some acts of patricide are more subtle yet more aggressive than others. In his 
review of Dunn's Theology, Matlock obliquely observed that Romans is obviously not the 
only choice we must make in constructing a theology of Paul and that `a different choice 
would in turn bring different matters into prominence'. 69 This is a simple comment to be 
sure, but the simple fact of its legitimate possibility undermines the stability of Dunn's 
product and certainly calls into question the definite article employed in Dunn's title: 
64 Bruner, 400. 
65 Bruner, 401. 
66 Nietzsche, Dawn of Day, §62. 
67 Friedrich Nietzsche, The Joyful Wisdom (trans. Thomas Common; vol. 10 of The 
Complete Works of Nietzsche; Edinburgh: T. N. Foulis, 1910), 5125. 
68 Nietzsche, The Joyful Wisdom, §125. 
69 R. Barry Matlock, `Sins of the Flesh and Suspicious Minds: Dunn's New Theology of 
Paul', JSNT 72 (1998): 68. 
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`The Theology of Paul the Apostle'. This is especially true when Dunn himself alludes to 
the possibility of progression in Paul's thought, 7° which naturally causes him to resist a 
synoptic approach to structuring Paul's theology which would produce a `mishmash-not 
the theology of Paul as he would have owned it at any particular time'. 71 Romans is then 
said to be precisely this observable occasion in which Paul reveals his own theology, being 
`the most sustained and reflective statement of Paul's own theology by Paul himself .... ' 
Hence the leading question, `how to write a theology of Paul, then? Paul's letter ... to 
Rome is the nearest thing we have to Paul's own answer to that question.... Romans 
provides us with an example of the way Paul himself chose to order the sequence of 
themes in his theology'. 72 Romans is the `mature theology of Paul' and we cannot do 
better than to use Romans as a `kind of template on which to construct our own 
statement of Paul's theology'. 73 
The fact remains, however, that Romans remains structured by its occasional 
reality, as is every letter written by Paul. Yet Dunn suggests that Romans is special, being 
written at the end of a major phase of Paul's missionary work, and probably under the 
`most congenial circumstances of his mission, with time for careful reflection and 
composition'. 74 Certainly we can agree that Paul is probably already thinking of what he 
plans to do after he delivers the Gentile gift to Jerusalem, and even agree that perhaps a 
lot of the surface level tensions are in fact removed during the writing of the letter. Yet 
Dunn himself acknowledges that Romans is a `defence' of Paul's understanding of the 
gospel, 75 a feature of Romans which should alert readers of Romans to the presence of a 
sub-surface rhetorical agenda. The implication is that the structuring forces of the 
rhetorical situation upon the form of the text are not a problem, or at least not as much of 
a problem in Romans. I would venture to say at this point that it is precisely when the 
occasion seems to be less intrusive that it is most intrusive because it is less obviously so. 
70 Dunn, Theology, 25. 
71 Dunn, Theology, 25. 
72 Dunn, Theology, 25. 
73 Dunn, Theology, 26. 
74 Dunn, Theology, 25. 
75 Dunn, Theology, 25. 
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My point here is similar to the one made by Jane Schaberg in her commentary on 
Luke. It is precisely when things seem to be most congenial that they have the potential 
to be the most dangerous. 76 Schaberg's name for this process is `seduction'. The fact is, 
ideological or `interested' texts such as those found in the Bible, philosophy and history 
are always doing something and they are never innocuous. The prudent hermeneutical 
posture to assume is thus one of suspicion, not a jaded expectation, rather a posture in 
which we suspect that in fact something else may be going on than what is immediately 
apparent. While it is not necessary to employ a hermeneutic defined by and cohering 
around `suspicion', I suggest that suspicion is a necessary part of the hermeneutical 
process. 
For Ricoeur, suspicion is `the critical instrument of de-mystification' by which he 
means that it is the process through which one analyses the product of socially discursive 
illusory forces manifested within the individual but certainly originating prior to and thus 
enabling the thought of the individual. Ricoeur refers to this as `false consciousness', a 
term mainly derived from Marx, but, as he notes, easily applies to Freud and Nietzsche. 77 
The `hermeneutics of suspicion' is simply a way of reading so as to elicit certain forms of 
knowledge which were hitherto concealed. It is not meant to be a comprehensive 
hermeneutic, nor is it an attempt at totalisation given that the nature of the form of 
knowledge uncovered is not necessarily `essential'. Its function is rather a part of 
something which would resemble something like Schleiermacher's vision of a 
hermeneutical circle: `knowledge always involves an apparent circle, that each part be 
78 understood only out of the whole to which it belongs, and vice-versa'. 
76 Jane Schaberg, `Luke', in The Women's Bible Commentary (eds. Carol A. Newsom and 
Sharon H. Ringe; Louisville, KY: Westminster/John Knox, 1992), 275; see also the later discussion 
of Schaberg on p. 138f. 
77 See his discussion in Paul Ricoeur, `The Critique of Religion', USQR 28 (1973): 
205-206. 
78 Friedrich Schleiermacher, Hermeneutics: The Handwritten Manuscripts (ed. Heinz 
Kimmerle; trans. James Duke and Jack Forstman; AARTTS 1; Missoula: Scholars Press, 1977), 
113 (the word `complete' is deliberately omitted from the beginning of this quote). This concept, 
however, is better stated by Heidegger in whom we can already see the beginnings of 
hermeneutical suspicion. For example see Martin Heidegger, Being and Time (trans., John 
Macquarrie and Edward Robinson; New York: Harper & Row, 1962), 153, and then later worked 
out in Gadamer (see Hans-Georg Gadamer, Truth and Method [New York: The Seabury Press, 
1975], 235ff. ). 
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When Matlock presents Dunn with the observation that there is a lack of 
suspicion in his work on Paul, 79 Dunn responds by asking if Matlock is suspicious enough 
of suspicion. 80 Dunn's perception of `suspicion' is therefore shown to be something more 
like linear, Cartesian doubt, rather than the genealogical, ideological, and illusional 
question of origins suggested by the Nietzschean, Marxist, and Freudian sense of 
suspicion catalysed in Ricoeur's hermeneutics of suspicion. 81 Dunn then goes on to state 
that he prefers the `old term "criticism" which involves the attempt to take into 
consideration all that has gone into the making of the text ... without excluding a due 
degree of suspicion'. 82 Who could ask for more? Well, the fact is that phrases like `due 
degree' in this statement belie an uncritical, worthy-of-suspicion `will to power' or 
totalising force on Dunn's part that articulates rather nicely the conditions upon which 
much of traditional or `institutional' biblical studies is founded. This is indeed a 
delightful display of Nietzsche's idea of `micrological power', elucidated by the simple 
question, what is the actual content of the phrase `due degree'? Who decides where the 
boundaries for `due degree' are, at what point is the degree not enough and at what point 
is the degree too much? The answer is of course, Dunn decides, or rather the subtle, 
micrological forces which Dunn has failed to observe as founding the conditions upon 
which he constructs his own knowledge decide for him. 
The way in which this will to power works itself out in an attempt to master 
`deviant' forms of inquiry is conveniently demonstrated for us in Dunn's response to 
Matlock, in which he points to Matlock's omission of specifying `the meaning or 
perspective or method implied [by suspicion] '83 and then proceeds to use the very same 
word in his critique of Matlock prefaced, however, by this empty and thus dangerous 
phrase `due degree'. `Due degree' in Dunn's response becomes the locale from which 
ubiquitous, and thus `institutional' relations of power can operate in such a way so as to 
maintain proper surveillance over interpretive practices and thus also separate one set of 
79 Matlock, `Sins of the Flesh', 68-70. 
80 James D. G. Dunn, `Whatever Happened to Exegesis? In Response to the Reviews by 
R. B. Matlock and D. A. Campbell',, JSNT (1998): 113. 
81 See Paul Ricoeur, `Two Essays by Paul Ricoeur: The Critique of Religion and The 
Language of Faith', USQR 28 (1973): 205-12. 
82 Dunn, `Whatever Happened to Exegesis', 113-14 (emphasis added). 
83 Dunn, `Whatever Happened to Exegesis', 113. 
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interpretations from another. The most important feature of Dunn's power play is the 
fact that, to cite Dunn's own complaint, `the meaning or perspective or method is never 
spelled out' . 
84 
What Dunn does here is not even slightly unusual, it is, in fact, quite the norm. 
Francis Watson, in his programmatic paper on `The Scope of Hermeneutics', 85 says that 
he is articulating a `view of hermeneutics as theoretical reflection on interpretive 
practice'. 86 He qualifies this by suggesting that `contemporary theological hermeneutics 
must take as its main subject matter the distortions arising out of inappropriately drawn 
disciplinary boundaries, thereby mediating between the separated disciplines of biblical 
interpretation and Christian theology'. 87 In his argument, he places a great deal of weight 
upon the final form of the biblical ('canonical') text, since `one of the tasks of theological 
hermeneutics is ... to establish the reality of the canonical form of the texts, and to 
defend its integrity against interpretative practices that undermine it. Two such practices 
may be described as archaeology and supplementation'. 88 Watson's citation of the word 
`archaeology' resonates with Foucault's, but of course as one follows Watson down 
through his excavation of the word, one finds that Watson has left Foucault at the 
surface. Watson uses the Foucauldian term `archaeology' as a reference to getting back to 
`origins'. 89 However, when Watson then says that the problem with this process is that it 
creates a situation in which the text is `no longer fit for its customary uses'90 he fails to see 
that this is precisely the point of such a process and that `customary use' is exactly what is 
being called into question. That is, the whole idea of `customary use' is a potentially 
hegemonic concept that needs to be called into question; it is also a concept that attempts 
to represent a sense of stability and thus a sense of stable origins, but we want to know 
what the nature of that origin is before we talk about `customary use'. As with Dunn's 
84 Dunn, `Whatever Happened to Exegesis', 113. 
85 Francis Watson, `The Scope of Hermeneutics', in The Cambridge Companion to Christian 
Doctrine (ed. Colin E. Gunton; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997). 
86 Watson, `Scope of Hermeneutics', 78. 
87 Watson, `Scope of Hermeneutics', 79. 
88 Watson, `Scope of Hermeneutics', 76. 
89 Watson, `Scope of Hermeneutics', 76. 
90 Watson, `Scope of Hermeneutics', 76. 
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`due degree', we find that `customary use' is an empty and dangerous phrase which 
reserves for itself the determining principle of what is and what is not `customary'. 91 Who 
decides what is customary? Watson does. 
Watson uses another word in conjunction with `archaeology' which also resonates 
with French philosophy, namely the `supplement'; a word used by Rousseau and then 
picked up by Derrida. Watson has in view a slightly different version of his `archaeology' 
here, in that `supplement' refers to the incorporation of the socio-linguistic milieu of the 
biblical text into what we would presume to be the `customary' performance/use of the 
biblical text. In Watson's attempt to supplement the scope of hermeneutics he uses 
`supplement' in precisely the same way Rousseau used it and thus practically begs us to 
apply Derrida's subsequent deconstruction of Rousseau's supplement. Derrida's argument 
ends up demonstrating that by virtue of Rousseau's attempt to resign writing to be a 
`supplement' of speech he demonstrates the incompleteness of speech-the presence of a 
lack in speech which of course for Derrida becomes the lack of presence-and that what 
was at one point only `supplementary' (in Rousseau's case `writing') shows itself to have 
always been essential to it. Thus by virtue of the supplement, Derrida is able to implicate 
writing in the construction of speech. 92 
Nonetheless, `supplement' is innocent in Watson's view, because to `abstract the 
biblical texts entirely from their original environment would be to treat them docetically, 
as originating directly from above without the mediation of historically and culturally 
located human agency'. 93 It becomes that dangerous supplement, however, when it 
`undermines the integrity of the biblical texts in their canonical form'. 94 How is this so? 
Well, `the integrity of the text may be threatened by the quantity of the information with 
which it is supplemented'. 95 Watson began with the assumption that the biblical text 
naturally needs to be culturally contextualised in some way, and anyone interested in 
91 If indeed we did excavate Watson's phrase here we would find that `customary use' is 
always a use of the very origins that Watson prefers to suppress under the glossy, canonical final 
form. 
92 Derrida's discussion of Rousseau's supplement may be found in Jacques Derrida, Of 
Grammatology (trans. Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak; Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 
1976), 141-64; but see also the later comments on p. 192. 
93 Watson, `Scope of Hermeneutics', 77. 
94 Watson, `Scope of Hermeneutics', 77. 
95 Watson, `Scope of Hermeneutics', 77 (emphasis added). 
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what the actual writers were saying would want to strongly affirm that. When Watson 
subsequently looked into the biblical text and saw the world behind it, he was not 
prepared for what he saw: a vast, endless sea of context and thus also endless disruption 
to `customary use' (hence Watson's earlier call for a defensive hermeneutic96). 
The problem with context is that as different signifying, and thus iterable, units 
are perceived with respect to what may be called a focalizing event the event which 
brings into existence a context around itself, as every perceivable event does-they appear 
to be in a given and immediate context of interpretation. However, the possibility of 
distinguishing between the event and its context, and of distinguishing between relevant 
and irrelevant contextual units also enables new contextual units to be joined to them or 
replace them in the break between event and interpretation. The result is that 
interpretation changes with new information. Again, the possibility of change nonetheless 
prevents closure from ever taking place, and this possibility is also continuous because 
context itself is continuous. Derrida makes a contextually relevant comment here; `no 
meaning can be determined out of context, but no context permits saturation'. 97 That is, 
meaning requires a point of reference, but there can never be a final decision regarding 
what that point of reference might be, since `meaning is context-bound, but context is 
boundless'. 98 Each time one demarcates the so-called `relevant' context, another context 
immediately appears along the borders of the demarcation. This new context was there 
all the time, but it becomes known through a process of differentiation brought into play 
by the line of demarcation. Thus, the context of any event is always beyond every 
description of it; thus Watson's hope for a comfortable, delimited, easy to handle context 
that sustains `customary use' is a hope relying on the success of rhetoric and not upon the 
nature of context at all. 
Like Dunn's `due degree', we have in Watson's argument another dangerously 
empty structure, `quantity': `the integrity of the text may be threatened by the quantity of 
96 The biblical text needs something `to defend its integrity against interpretative practices 
that undermine it' (Watson, `Scope of Hermeneutics', 76). 
97 Jacques Derrida, `Living On: Border Lines', in Harold Bloom et al., Deconstruction and 
Criticism (New York: Continuum, 1979), 81. Derrida makes a similar comment in Jacques 
Derrida, `Signature Event Context', in Jacques Derrida, Limited Inc (Evanston, IL: Northwestern 
University Press, 1988), 18; 1 use this translation of the essay and hereafter refer to it as SEC. 
98 Culler, 123. 
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the information with which it is supplemented'. 99 The implication is that if you add too 
much you are a poor hermeneut, but if you add the right amount, you are a good one. 
Whence comes this knowledge of good and evil? The fact is that the empty structure is 
inhabited by Watson, who becomes the one who distinguishes between good and bad 
hermeneutics. 
There is indeed a need for suspicion when it comes to thinking about Paul, 
namely because Paul's own significance has produced so much writing that it has become 
difficult to distinguish between the writing and Paul. Again, we do not need a suspicion- 
for-the-sake-of-suspicion, 10° rather one that simply respects the fact that agendas develop, 
that history is ideologically `interested' and is never `pure'. The tradition of writing about 
Paul's writing is a tradition that bears the interests of the writing parties. 
2. d. The Activity of Writing and `Interpreting' Paul 
It has long been observed that understanding Romans as a complete outlaying of 
Paul's theology is untenable, '0' primarily because it does not actually include all of Paul's 
theology. The problem lies in the subtle shift from observing Romans as the out-working 
of Paul's thoughts on the gospel to using Romans as the occasion to observe what Paul is 
trying to do. There has been a fundamental hermeneutical failure to recognise the 
difference between function and information in the writings of Paul. 102 The problem that 
this introduces to Pauline studies has been observed before (albeit in other terms); note 
Furnish's comment: `It is important to observe that the vast majority of works devoted to 
Pauline thought have sought to find its center in some particular theological doctrine. One 
must ask whether the diversity of proposals concerning that doctrinal center is not due at 
least as much to the character of Paul's thought and preaching as to the theological 
perspectives of Paul's interpreters'. 103 What Furnish observes is a preoccupation with 
arriving at theology, or `information', and not with what Paul might actually be trying to 
99 Watson, `Scope of Hermeneutics', 77 (emphasis added). 
100 Reading for the sake of suspicion alone is not to be considered as an invalid approach 
to the text, namely because the nature of language and communication affirms a multiplicity of 
readings. The fact is, however, that this is just one reading of many and holds currency only for 
like-interested parties. 
101 See Kümmel, Introduction, 312. 
102 See the discussion on function and writing in the ancient world, pp. 121ff. 
103 Victor Paul Furnish, `Pauline Studies', in Eldon Jay Epp and George W. MacRae, eds., 
The New Testament and its Modern Interpreters (Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1989), 335. 
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achieve through his rhetoric. Note also Beker: `we universalize ... [the Pauline letters] 
and abstract them away from their immediacy into a set of propositions or doctrinal 
centers'. 104 
In the attempt to renegotiate some of the impasses we have encountered in the 
study of Paul, it is becoming more common for scholars to focus on Paul's `theology' as 
the result of his apostolic activity and not as the starting point ('theologising' rather than 
'theology'). For example, Roetzel attempts to understand Paul's thought not by trying `to 
plot a progressively rising trajectory in Paul's theology so much as ... to get some 
idea of 
the way Paul's thinking emerged through conversations with his readers. Regarded in this 
way his theologizing is an interactive process, dynamic and flexible'. 105 Thus also, P. 
Meyer suggests that `instead of assuming most of the time that Paul's "theology" or 
"convictions" are the resource or starting point from which he addresses the issues placed 
before him, may one rather, as a kind of "experiment in thought", think of them more 
consistently as the end-product and result, the outcome to which he arrives in the process 
of his argument, his "hermeneutic", or his "theologizing"'. 106 
Engberg-Pedersen takes it to the next step (whether consciously or not). That is, 
he argues for this very thing, namely Paul's theologising as `dynamic and open-ended', a 
`symbolic universe in the making, not a fully worked out, static, and final one'. 107 Thus he 
comes close to a functional approach to Paul when he argues that `whatever system we 
shall be able to discover in his letters will lie not in a fully worked out set of ideas but 
rather in Paul's handling of his theological conceptions in the different situations he is 
addressing'. 108 It is the reference to `handling'l09 that is of interest here. The goal of 
Engberg-Pedersen's argument is to put forward a case for a more dynamic and less static 
104 J Christiaan Beker, Paul the Apostle: The Triumph of God in Life and Thought 
(Philadelphia: Fortress, 1984), 35. 
105 Roetzel, Paul, 93. 
106 P. W. Meyer, `Pauline Theology: Some Thoughts for a Pause in Its Pursuit', in Society 
of Biblical Literature 1995 Seminar Papers, (ed. Eugene H. Lovering, Jr.; Atlanta: Scholars press, 
1995), 697. 
107 Troels Engberg-Pedersen, `Proclaiming the Lord's Death: 1 Corinthians 11: 17-34 and 
the Forms of Paul's Theological Argument', in Pauline Theology: 1&2 Corinthians (vol 2; ed. 
David M. Hay; Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1993), 106. 
108 Engberg-Pedersen, `Proclaiming the Lord's Death', 106. 
109 On which Engberg-Pedersen himself places emphasis. 
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view of Paul's theology. However, in so doing, he (along with the others attempting to do 
the same thing) necessarily shifts the emphasis from product to process. That is, he 
moves from a focus on the traditional search for pure information to a focus on how that 
information is produced. 
The contention in this project is that once the focus has been removed from an 
already-established Platonic structure, 110 and fixed back onto Paul's dynamic activity as a 
letter writer, we are then free to advance in our understanding of Paul's thought. I ll The 
particular argument here is that we must continue along the lines established by those 
who see Paul as a `theologiser' rather than a theologian, but not stop with that 
observation. That is, when Paul's `activity' comes to the fore of our analyses, our 
attention is naturally drawn to what he sought to achieve by virtue of that activity; 
furthermore, only by incorporating the goals of Paul's `theologising' may we understand 
more fully the content of that `theologising'. In other words, if we are to be concerned 
about theology, then let us be concerned with a theology that arises out of the functional 
effects of a text rather than amputating the rhetoric at the level of the text. 
It is the preoccupation with `theological doctrine' that has clouded the fact that 
Paul was a man in history trying to achieve a very specific set of goals and that his writings 
were written as a means of reaching those goals. It is the gradual realisation that we 
cannot sustain such a preoccupation that causes Engberg-Pedersen to sigh with relief that 
`scholars have gradually come to realize that in addition to the manifest meaning of Paul's 
statement as importing information and responding to the particularities of the letter 
situation at the level of direct communication, these statements have a number of 
functions that are more indirect, but no less important for that'. 112 He further suggests 
that `functional aspects of Paul's statements are also part of the meaning of these 
statements simply because Paul is engaged in a specific communicative act between 
particular people'. 113 1 would suggest that it is only after we discern the function of Paul's 
110 Note, for example, the comments in Engberg-Pedersen, `Proclaiming the Lord's 
Death', 107. 
I 11 See the later discussion on p. 48 in response to Furnish's call for `new models'. 
112 Troels Engberg-Pedersen, `Stoicism in Philippians', in Paul in His Hellenistic Context 
(ed. Troels Engberg-Pedersen; Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1994), 258 (emphasis added). 
113 Engberg-Pedersen, `Stoicism in Philippians', 259. 
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texts can we even begin to consider issues of significance or 'theology'. 114 I would in fact 
suggest that a teleological (though not necessarily eschatological) approach to Paul's 
writing gives us the coherence we need to create an integrated approach to Paul's writing 
in general. I would further suggest that while Romans and the rest of the Hauptbriefe have 
been useful sources for thinking about Paul's thought, their academic treatment has in 
fact distracted us from the fundamentally important issue of what Paul himself was trying 
to do. Finally, it should be noted that a glaring problem in contemporary hermeneutics is 
the lack of appreciation for what the writers of antiquity were thinking when they 
themselves put texts together. It appears that ancient writers may have been more 
attuned to what their texts were intended to do as opposed to what they were intended to 
mean. 115 
3. Writing Performance as Logocentric Citation: 
Cite-Seeing with Derrida and Austin 
Language is given its value by virtue of its operation as the means by which we encounter 
and articulate `reality'. Language resides `above' us as a system prior to and thus 
structuring our experiences and `below' us as a system reinforced by our collective use of 
it. As a collective, we use language to describe and prescribe our social realities and thus 
make language a social construct; its most important function is to enable us to achieve 
our social goals. That is, the social nature of language is a performative one. Thus Berger 
and Luckmann note that language is basically referenced by our `pragmatic motive'. 
`Language originates in and has its primary reference to everyday life; it refers above all to 
the reality I experience in wide-awake consciousness, which is dominated by the 
pragmatic motive (that is, the cluster of meanings directly pertaining to present or future 
actions) and which I share with others in a taken-for-granted manner'. 116 
A highly operative factor in the ancient perception of what a letter was doing was a 
sense of how the letter was appropriate for the particular set of social realities present to 
114 Since I affirm that content and function are in a reciprocal relationship, I therefore 
agree with Engberg-Pedersen when he states that `the meaning of a Pauline letter should be 
construed as a sort of conglomerate resulting from the interaction in it of all the different types of 
"saying and doing" that are active in Paul's statements' (Engberg-Pedersen, `Stoicism in 
Philippians', 259). 
115 See pp. 121ff. 
116 Peter Berger, and Thomas Luckmann, The Social Construction of Reality: A Treatise in 
the Sociology of Knowledge (New York: Anchor Books, 1967), 38. 
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the letter's writer and reader. Critically attending to the function of a letter is necessarily 
attending to the rhetorical situation which gives occasion for the letter in the first place. 
The implications for this are similar to those found in the speech act theory of J. L. 
Austin. 117 The primary feature applicable here is the observation that the direction of 
critical interest is reversed. Typically, intentionality is accounted for by assuming that 
`the meaning of a text be grounded on what is in the text'. 118 That is, the final point of 
critical analysis is the text. Speech act theory, however, sees the final point of critical 
analysis as the social realities impacted by the text; `thus studying a text as a speech act 
involves taking into account something which is not in the text, and yet is a part of the 
communication of meaning by that text'. 119 
It is important to clarify the fact that what is not in view, for Austin, is simply any 
impact occasioned by the text. He rather has a sense of a performance realised by the text 
through the previously existing structures (social norms and institutions) which are 
understood and utilised by the speaker. The point is that it is not the text alone or the 
thing/person being impacted alone rather that these are a part of the performance of a 
larger communicative structure. Thus, Austin has not marginalised the material text, he 
has simply erased the traditional boundary around it, in order to consciously incorporate 
those features of which it is necessarily a part. 
Speech act theory is a helpful voice to include in the chorus of biblical criticism. 
It is perhaps prudent at this point to lay out Austin's basic thoughts on the matter, and 
then to introduce Derrida's reading of Austin. Yet before that, let us restate the problem 
of the thesis120 in terms appropriate to Austin: Why is it that Paul seems to think that an 
utterance spoken in a `non-serious' mode (pretext) has the same value as one spoken in a 
`serious' mode (truth)? This is a problem because the philosophical opposition between 
the serious and non-serious use of linguistic acts, as articulated by Austin, seems so 
fundamental to a theory of meaning, primarily because the notion of authorial intention, 
the possibility of a text meaning only what the author intended it to mean, is put in 
117 Wittgenstein had already observed that language had a performative quality. Note for 
example Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations (trans. G. E. M. Anscome; New York: 
Macmillan, 1953), %491,493,498; II: ix-x. 
118 Daniel Patte, `Speech Act Theory and Biblical Exegesis', Semeia 41 (1988) : 90. 
119 Patte, `Speech Act Theory', 90. 
120 See opening statement, p. 9. 
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question. Yet, as we closely follow the textual contours of Philippians, we find that the 
traditional concept of the relationship between an author's intention and the text is 
indeed undermined. 
3. a. Reversal and Displacement in Derrida and Austin 
As I shall argue later, both Paul and Derrida re-write the difference between 
serious and non-serious utterances. But how far does this relationship go? In one simple 
move, Paul does away with the hierarchical structure altogether, whereas Derrida makes a 
few more preliminary and duly cautious moves. Derrida initiates, or intervenes with, a 
reversal and displacement of the two opposites. The hierarchy of the oppositional 
structure non-serious/serious is reversed so that it becomes serious/non-serious, showing 
the serious to be a special case of, or derived from, the non-serious. The hierarchy is then 
displaced to become (non) serious. For his part, Paul presents the two modes of speech in 
Philippians as in opposition, but also pragmatically suspended from cancelling each other 
out, displacing them in the Derridean sense. 
This displacement is one side of a two-sided, yet single, deconstructive move: 
reversal or `re-placing' and displacement. Reversal is the overturning or inverting of 
hierarchical oppositions (speech/writing to writing/speech), and is an `indispensable 
phase' of deconstruction. 121 Derrida finds justification for this action in terms of the 
`violent' nature of hierarchies. That is, since one side of the philosophical binary 
opposition suppresses, marginalises, governs the other, Derrida sees no reason not to re- 
introduce (by reversal or replacing) the suppressed element back into the discourse 
allowing, momentarily, the governed to govern. 122 Reversal on its own, however, is rather 
pointless since it leaves the problem of violent hierarchies in place; thus, displacement of 
the hierarchy is also a necessary part of this single but structured/stratified process. 
Displacement prevents the hierarchy from operating, it `intervenes', `disorganises', 
`neutralises', the hierarchy. It suspends the two elements, intervening in the production 
of yet another violent hierarchy. 123 Thus, the process of deconstruction is one whereby 
binary opposites are re-written through a process which Derrida terms `bifurcated 
121 Jacques Derrida, Dissemination, (trans. Barbara Johnson; London: The Athlone Press, 
1981), 6. 
122 See, Jacques Derrida, Positions (trans. Alan Bass; Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1981), 41. 
123 See Derrida, Positions, 41-42. 
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writing', 124 so as to allow both to operate in the text, albeit in mutually excluding acts as 
each opposite continuously effaces and is effaced by the presence of the other. 
Deconstruction must therefore, through this bifurcated writing or 
double gesture ... double science ... practice an overturning of the 
classical opposition and a general displacement of the system. It is only on 
this condition that deconstruction will provide itself with the means with 
which to intervene in the field of oppositions that it criticizes, which is also 
a field of non-discursive forces.... Deconstruction does not consist in 
passing from one concept to another, but in overturning and displacing a 
conceptual order, as well as the non-conceptual order with which the 
conceptual order is articulated. 125 
It is also important to note here that Derrida's desire for deconstruction is not born of 
malice. Derrida understands his use of Heidegger's Abbau and Destruktion as not 
referring to a destruction, and characterizes his relationship to the texts he deconstructs as 
`loving jealousy and not at all ... nihilistic 
fury'. 126 In fact, Derrida actually sees 
deconstruction as a positive and `not a negative operation'. 127 
3. b. Austin's Deconstruction of Constative/Performative 
To inscribe Derrida's point, we must note Austin's own deconstructive behaviour 
which Derrida mimics in a classic display of deconstruction. 128 In his well-known book, 
How to do Things with Words-an outworking of the William James Lectures-Austin 
attempts to account for the meaning of utterances, when he discusses his distinctions 
between locution (actual utterance), illocutionary force (the performance of the 
utterance) and perlocution (the consequences of illocutionary force) . 
129 As Culler points 
out, Austin makes similar moves to those of Saussure. In the same way that Saussure 
sought to account for acts of signification, his parole, by describing the system which 
124 Derrida, Positions, 42. 
125 Derrida, SEC, 329. 
126 Jacques Derrida, Ear of the Other: Otobiography, Transference, Translation (trans. P. 
Kauruf and A. Ronell; ed. C. V. McDonald; New York: Schoken Books, 1985) 86-87. 
127 Jacques Derrida, `Letter to a Japanese Friend', in Derrida and Differance (eds. David 
Wood and Robbert Bernasconi; trans. David Wood and Andrew Benjamin; Evanston, IL: 
Northwestern University Press, 1988), 3. 
128 1 introduce Austin here, but I take up Derrida's interaction with him later, see pp. 39ff. 
129 J. L. Austin, How to do Things with Words (2nd ed.; Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1976), 98ff. He also presents a discussion on the distinction between meaning and force, since 
there is already a question about the relationship of meaning and force set up in this description of 
his goals. 
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makes parole possible, his langue, 131 Austin poses a system of speech acts to account for 
illocutionary force. 131 But Austin's arguments are also in the vein of the later 
Wittgenstein. Both Austin and Wittgenstein sought to untie the knots that logical 
positivism had tangled, not only around meaning and language but also around the very 
investigation of meaning and language. Indeed, Austin is specifically contrasting his work 
with the logical positivists when he suggests that `it was for too long the assumption of 
philosophers that the business of a "statement" can only be to "describe" some state of 
affairs, or to "state some fact", which it must do either truly or falsely'. 132 Such a 
programme did not provide much, if any, space for the philosophical or critical 
discussions of aesthetics, religion, and ethics which were thought to contain an `emotive 
meaning as opposed [to] cognitive or scientific meaning, and were held therefore as 
unamenable to a (further) philosophical assessment'. 133 Austin disagreed with the idea 
that if an utterance did not come under the category of 'statement'-that which can be 
verified either truly or falsely-then it was somehow less rational. 
After pointing to the dogmatic practice of Western philosophers to exclude 
anything that was not classed as `statement'. Austin set about developing an argument for 
a distinction between what he termed the `constative' and the `performative', and then 
later for a deconstruction of the distinction. 134 However, during the course of the 
lectures, or, in our case, the re-citation of the lectures in book form, Austin repeatedly 
comes up against the problem-of which he was not unaware135-of not being able to 
draw effectively a line of distinction between performatives and constatives. The trouble 
lay in the fact that the distinctions kept disappearing, since either one of the oppositions 
130 See Ferdinand de Saussure, Course in General Linguistics (eds. Charles Bally and Albert 
Sechehaye, with Albert Reidlinger; trans. Wade Baskin; New York: Philosophical Library, 1959; 
repr. New York: Mcgraw-Hill, 1966), 7-17. 
131 Culler, 111. 
132 Austin, 1. 
133 Stanley Cavell, Philosophical Passages: Wittgenstein, Emerson, Austin, Derrida (Oxford: 
Blackwell, 1995), 50. 
134 Austin, 1ff. for the distinction; 135ff. for the blurring of the distinction. 
135 Austin, 91,146f, 152; also see Gordon C. F. Beare, `Derrida Dry: Iterating Iterability 
Analytically', Diacritics 25 (Fall 1995), 4-5. 
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could/would masquerade as the other. 136 Thus Bearn comments, somewhat nihilistically, 
that Austin `determined to strip the masks from the masqueraders ... 
found behind each 
mask another one, ' as `the distinction between constatives and performatives vanished 
twice, finally disappearing into a hall of illocutionary mirrors'. 137 Yet Derrida sees within 
these points of impasse the promise of Austin's work, characterising it as an `analysis that 
is patient, open, aporetic, in constant transformation, often more fruitful in the recognition of 
its impasses than in its positions'. 138 
Performatives are utterances which cannot be described as simply true or false, 
rather there is only a performance-a particularly interesting perspective in light of 
Derrida's own desire to suspend the hierarchical forces operating within binary 
oppositions. In this case, the opposing structure true/false is suspended from causing new 
hierarchical striations to arise within utterances. 139 An example of a performative 
performing is the minister officiating at a marriage ceremony saying, `I name you husband 
and wife'. The minister's words are an official act and are a part of the action of 
marrying. Such an utterance conforms to Austin's two conditions for performatives: `A. 
they do not "describe" or "report" or constate anything at all, are not "true or false"; and 
B. the uttering of the sentence is, or is a part of, the doing of an action, which again 
would not normally be described as, or as "just", saying something'. 140 That is, 
136 See Beam, 4-5. Beam does not include the possibility that Austin came to see that a 
blurring of the distinction, a deconstruction of the two opposing categories, was in fact an 
appropriate conclusion to the project. 
137 Beam, 23,5. Beam's article is concerned with analytically defending the basic premise 
of Derrida's SEC. The article suggests that Beam relies on a success/failure oppositional structure 
remaining intact in the argument of SEC, whereas it seems to me that such a structure is precisely 
the sort of structure upon which Derrida is not relying and indeed is interested in deconstructing in 
SEC. Since Beam's entire article presumes this structure, it ends up being a logocentric overlay 
which exposes the contours of the surface argument of SEC but which glosses over the cracks in 
which Derrida's argument really takes place. 
138 Derrida, SEC, 322 (emphasis added). 
139 See Austin, 9-11 for a discussion on the relationship of performative statements to the 
true/false structure. He uses a quote from Euripides' Hippolytus, i yX oa' ö µ'[10X', Ti & 4p7Jv 
avwµot6S, which he translates `my tongue swore to, but my heart (or mind or other backstage 
artiste) did not', to imply a metaphysical disjunction `between saying and intending' (Cavell, 62). 
Interestingly, Cavell, in an essay generally suspicious of Derrida's SEC, points to the fact that this 
`classic expression', as Austin calls it, is also cited in both Plato's Symposium and Theatetus, as well 
as in Aristophanes' The Frogs, thereby highlighting the operation of citationality or iterability. For 
Derrida on the suspension of hierarchical forces, see Henry Staten, Wittgenstein and Derrida 
(Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1984), 114. 
140 Austin, 5. 
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performatives do things; they are in themselves actions and not reports of actions or of a 
given state of affairs. According to the philosophers against whom Austin wrote, such 
utterances did not have the same rational value as `constative' statements which report on 
actions or a given state of affairs. 
Austin further suggests that constatives, namely `historical references', 141 are 
merely abbreviated forms of performatives. 142 That is, a constative is supposedly a 
statement in which one describes a state of affairs. For example, the statement `my 
computer is made by Compaq' is a constative statement on the surface, but Austin shows 
that it is really an abbreviated performative statement implying a performative verb, such 
as `I affirm, ' or `I tell [you]'. 
By moving away from the positivistic notion that statements are only valid if they 
state a fact or describe something Austin began to dismantle the metaphysical structures 
ensnaring the Western philosophy of language-inadvertently deconstructing the 
traditional philosophical hierarchy which privileged constatives over all other kinds of 
statements (`pseudo-statements' 143) . He demonstrates, on the one hand, that the 
opposite is actually the case ('reversal'), insofar as these constatives are dependent upon 
or derived from the category of pseudo-statements, or his `performatives'. On the other 
hand, he prevents a new hierarchy developing (`displacement'), by preventing the 
true/false opposition from participating in the illocutionary force of performatives by 
showing that constatives are a special case of performatives. Thus, Wolfgang Iser was later 
led to call for a general doing-away with these structures and `replace ontological 
arguments with functional arguments, for what is important to readers and critics alike, is 
what literature does, and not what it means'. 144 Iser maintains an oppositional dichotomy 
between meaning and function here which may not be altogether confluent with his own 
desire for a functional approach, but the point is that Austin opened up a crack in the wall 
which many have tried clambering through in order to escape the oppression of the 
metaphysical in language and the question of meaning. 
141 Austin, 6, n. 2. 
142 Austin, 135ff. 
143 Austin, 2,3. 
144 Wolfgang Iser, The Act of Reading: A Theory of Aesthetic Response (Baltimore: Johns 
Hopkins University Press), 53. 
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3. c. Derrida's Deconstruction ofAustin: Serious/Non-Serious 
But Austin, like Saussure, in offering a critique of the logocentric moves typically 
made by Western philosophy, and upon which traditional Western philosophy 
relies-acts of excluding and privileging elements of binary oppositions which thereby 
create violent hierarchies-does not himself move beyond logocentrism, rather he 
(necessarily) stays within it. Every critique of logocentrism will, at the same time, rely 
upon it; `even a theory based on difference does not escape logocentrism but finds itself 
appealing to presence, not only because some concepts of analysis, demonstration, and 
objectivity involve such reference but also because in order to identify differences 
responsible for meanings one needs to treat some meanings as if they were given, as if 
they were somewhere `present' as a point of departure'. 145 And we find Derrida affirms 
this when, in preparing to argue his case against Austin's text, he says that `I must take as 
known and granted that Austin's analyses permanently demand a value of context, and even 
of an exhaustively determinable context'. 146 That is, in order for Derrida to critique an 
argument he must acknowledge that there actually is an argument which can serve as the 
point of reference for a deconstruction of the text. Thus, Derrida does not himself claim 
to be beyond the problems of logocentrism. He necessarily works within logocentric 
structures in order to critique them. This has been a common misconception of Derrida. 
Lionel Abel thinks that because Derrida uses logic to question truth and logic, his 
deconstructive project is consequently invalidated. 147 But, as Sherwood points out, 
Abel's criticism is ironic since `by exposing the double logic at work in Derrida's texts ... 
[he affirms] with him the universality of deconstruction'. 148 This is a part of the reason 
why deconstruction always employs the existing structure of the text to operate, and why 
Derrida is always having problems with his critics not remaining within the text. 149 
Derrida discusses Austin's How to do Things with Words in SEC and, in the second 
section of the essay, deconstructs the difference between serious and non-serious, the 
145 Culler, On Deconstruction, 110 
146 Derrida, SEC, 322 (the first emphasis is added). 
147 See Lionel Abel, `Jacques Derrida: His `Difference' with Metaphysics', Salmagundi 25 
(Winter 1974) : 3-21. 
148 Yvonne Sherwood, The Prostitute and the Prophet: Hosea's Marriage in Literary- 
Theoretical Perspective (JSOTSup 212; Gender, Culture, Theory 2; Sheffield: Sheffield Academic 
Press, 1996), 153-54. 
149 See Derrida, Of Grammatology, 24; also Derrida, Ear of the Other, 86-87. 
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original and the citation. Derrida repeats or mimics Austin's attack on logocentrism. 
That is, Derrida rigorously pursues the logic of Austin's text in its own terms, which 
causes his own argument to mimic or cite the turns of Austin's text as he pushes the logic 
of that text to its limits. 150 `The movements of deconstruction do not destroy texts from 
the outside. They are not possible and effective, nor can they take accurate aim, except 
by inhabiting those structures.... Operating necessarily from the inside, borrowing all 
the strategic and economic resources of subversion from the old structure'. 151 Indeed, 
`deconstruction is ... an activity of reading which remains closely tied to the texts it 
interrogates, and which can never set up independently as a self-enclosed system of 
operative concepts'. 152 We could summarise Norris by saying that deconstruction is a 
part of, or participates in, the text and is not a discussion about the text. The 
deconstructive argument is often the same argument operating within the text, and is 
performed in terms of the text, which is to say that it takes place within the text, but in 
order, as Culler says, `to breach it'. 153 Interestingly, in an exchange with Searle, who 
criticised Derrida's reading of Austin, saying that Derrida was not being true to Austin's 
text, 154 Derrida points out that Searle is not offering a serious critique because he does 
not work within the terms of the text. 155 In contrast, note that in the course of Derrida's 
reply to Searle, Limited Inc, Derrida eventually cites Searle's argument in its entirety. 
Insofar as Derrida does this, it could be said that he produces a text more `true' to 
Austin's text than Austin's own. He does this by first affirming and stabilizing the 
argument of the text through a discussion (and praise) of what Austin was attempting to 
achieve, but then he goes beyond Austin and shows the way in which the logic of this 
same text undermines that argument. That is, Derrida shows how Austin's text exceeded 
him, not to poke fun at Austin, but to demonstrate a problem of language, to 
150 'Derrida drives Saussure's project to its ultimate conclusions and seeing where those 
conclusions work to challenge the project's conventional premises'. Christopher Norris, 
Deconstruction Theory and Practice (New Accents; London: Routledge, 1982), 30. 
151 Derrida Of Grammatology, 24. 
152 Norris, Deconstruction, 31. 
153 Culler, On Deconstruction, 86. 
198-208 
1.54 See John Searle, `Reiterating the Differences: A Reply to Derrida', Glyph 1 (1977): 
155 See Jacques Derrida, Limited Inc (ed. Gerald Graff; trans. Samuel Webber and Jeffrey 
Mehlman; Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1988), e. g., 105. 
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demonstrate that language escapes our attempts to tether it to our intentions and the 
presence of our conscious will to communicate. It is the nature of language to have 
within it opposing forces and aporiae arising from within the opposition of those forces, 
problematising a text's assertions, turning those assertions against themselves. And these 
are what Derrida brings to light in his reading of Austin; again, not to show Austin's 
failures, but those within philosophical discourse in general, since `the reading must 
always aim at a certain relationship, unperceived by the writer, between what he 
commands and what he does not command of the patterns of the language that he 
uses'. 156 Thus, deconstruction leads to exposing a problem, not with an author's logic, 
but with the logic of the relationship between what an author does have control over and 
that which an author does not, that is, a problem within the logic of language itself. 157 
For Derrida, the discourse of Western metaphysics has always relied on a system 
of exclusion and the establishment of violent hierarchies. 158 The history of truth, 
according to Derrida, has been a history of maintaining the illusion created by this kind of 
oppositional exclusion and suppression; indeed, says he, it has been `the condition of the 
very idea of truth'. 159 For example, Derrida argues that 
`the privilege of the phone [the practice of exclusion] does not depend upon 
a choice that could have been avoided. It responds to a moment of 
economy (let us say of the "life" of "history" or of "being as self- 
relationship"). The system of "hearing (understanding) oneself speak" 
[s'entendre parler] through the phonic system ... 
has necessarily dominated 
the history of the world during an entire epoch, and has even produced the 
idea of the world, the idea of world-origin, that arises from the difference 
between worldly and the non-worldly, the outside and the inside, ideality 
and nonideality, universal and nonuniversal, transcendental and 
empirical'. 160 
In this comment, Derrida portrays the structure which has been laid over Western 
perceptions of reality and consciousness, and in so doing indicates a problem inherent to 
that structure: that the economies of life, history, and perceiving oneself are dependent 
156 Derrida, Of Grammatology, 158. 
157 See Barbara Johnson, `Translator's Introduction', in Derrida, Dissemination, xv. 
158 E. g., Derrida, Limited Inc, 93: `And this is not just one metaphysical gesture among 
others, it is the metaphysical exigency, that which has been most constant, most profound and most 
potent'. 
159 Derrida, Of Grammatology, 20. 
160 Derrida, Of Grammatology, 7-8 (the emphases are Derrida's, the brackets are added). 
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upon a set of oppositions for which the point of reference can be the phenomenon of 
s'entendre parler, the perceived ability to hear and understand oneself speak with no 
mediation. Since they are based on oppositions, such as presence/absence, this economy 
has been one of an illusion in which one element in the oppositional structure has been 
suppressed. It is an economy of exclusion. Moreover, this has not been an unavoidable 
structuring of philosophical discourse because these economies were founded-if I may 
be permitted to allude to an origin of sorts-on privilege and suppression. 
Austin's deconstruction of the constative/performative opposition-showing that 
the previously privileged constatives were a special class of the previously excluded, or 
marginalised performatives-is an insightful critique of the logocentric structures 
operating within philosophical discourse by virtue of his reversal and displacement 
discussed earlier. 161 However, Derrida shows that Austin himself excludes or 
marginalises non-serious language and privileges the serious. Derrida then proceeds to 
demonstrate, in the manner of Austin, that the serious is a special category of, or parasitic 
upon, the non-serious, thereby displacing the oppositional structure set up by Austin 
through revealing the mutual contamination of the two opposites. To say that the serious 
ends up as a special case of the non-serious sounds like the results of one of Zeno's 
reductio ad absurdum paradoxes. But Derrida is not saying that everything is non-serious, 
or that reality is not real, or even, with respect to Austin, that intentionality does not exist. 
In fact, Derrida is quite sober about the necessity to accept such things as necessary. It is 
only when one attempts to base an entire philosophical system on these oppositional 
structures and upon language conventions that a problem arises. 162 Here I cite Derrida: 
Above all, I will not conclude from this [the general graphematic structure 
of every `communication'] that there is no relative specificity of the effects 
of consciousness, of the effects of speech (in opposition to writing in the 
traditional sense), that there is no effect of the performative, no effect of 
ordinary language, no effect of presence and of speech acts. It is simply that 
these effects do not exclude what is generally opposed to them term by term, but 
on the contrary presuppose it in dyssemtrical fashion, as the general space 
of their possibility-163 
Thus, and again, Derrida does not say everything is non-serious, but only that the 
effects of the serious or the non-serious do not exclude what has been traditionally 
161 See p. 38. 
162 See Norris, Deconstruction, 110. 
163 Derrida, SEC, 327 (emphasis added). 
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opposed to them. He is not out to debunk intention or meaning altogether, rather to 
show what the discourse about them has excluded and suppressed throughout the last 
twenty centuries of philosophy. Derrida believes there has been a veil laid over 
philosophical discourse so that we might not look intently at that which was failing, and 
even today that same veil remains unlifted because it is only removed in the 
transcendental signified. Or perhaps it is more accurate to say that this very 
discourse-the traditional philosophical discourse of the West-has simply ignored, in 
regular, regimented, and regulating fashion, certain phenomena of language and 
communication, thereby creating an illusion of realism. And this illusion has been put 
into service as a governing norm by which the oppression of the other-the marginalised, 
the different, whether in society, philosophy, or in theology-has received validation, and 
by which the failures of this discourse have been hidden. 
3. d. Derrida's Deconstruction ofAustin: Iterability, Citationality, Convention 
At issue in Derrida's essay is the iterable, or repeatable nature of signs which 
naturally brings to the fore two other important issues: intentionality and context. 
`Intentionality' is discussed because if signs can simply be repeated anywhere, they are 
structured in such a way so as to deny the possibility of a total presence of intention in the 
(re)iteration of those signs. The relationship between iterability and intention harks back 
through the ages to Plato's comment that writing bastardizes speech, 164 which is another 
way of saying that the moment of the sign is the moment which marks the death of the 
author. The fact of a sign forces an irreconcilable space between the writer and the 
written. Thus, the sign never really belongs to the author, it is an escapee of his 
consciousness via the tyrannical passage of time and irreconcilable spacing. As sure as 
one moment is eternally divided from the next, the evolution of consciousness from 
presence to iterable sign eternally divides signum from homo signifiens. `Context' is 
introduced because the iterability of signs naturally opens up the possibility of a 
boundless context, insofar as a chain of signifiers can be continually repeated, reiterated, 
cited in new circumstances. It is important to note here that the ability of a sign to be 
repeated, reiterated, cited in new circumstances is also that which enables it to signify in 
the first place; thus, iterability is not a mere secondary significance of the nature of signs 
as if the citation were somehow less than or even other than the supposed origination, and 
this underlies Derrida's argument in SEC. 
164 See n. 50. 
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As previously mentioned, Austin argues that he will not consider non-serious 
utterances because they are `void' and `parasitic upon ... normal use; ' therefore, 
`performative utterances, felicitous or not, are to be understood as issued in ordinary 
circumstances'. 165 With this utterance, Austin thus banishes the non-serious to the same 
philosophical fringe where he found performative utterances wandering around before he 
carried them off to fame and fortune and, supposedly, to live happily ever after at the 
centre of philosophical discussion. But Derrida finds the difference created between 
normal and abnormal use, the serious/non-serious opposition, to be ripe for 
deconstruction. Specifically, he finds that the same structuring forces which afford the 
possibility of the abnormal or the non-serious are the very same which make possible normal or 
serious signification: the structuring forces of iterability. `A writing that would not be 
structurally legible-iterable ... would not be writing'. 
166 If a series of marks (aural, 
ocular, tactile) do not have within them the structure of repeatability they cannot signify, 
or we could say that they cannot constitute a form of communication. 167 Thus, says 
Derrida, for writing to be writing or communication to be communication, it `must be 
able to function in the radical absence of every empirically determined addressee in 
general. And this absence is not a continuous modification of presence; it is a break in 
presence, `death', or the possibility of the `death' of the addressee, inscribed in the 
structure of the mark'. 168 The iterability of the mark-that which enables a mark to 
function as a sign, to function socially or intersubjectively-is that structure mentioned 
earlier which enables the separation of signum from homo signifiens. 
Another aspect of Austin's work leading to Derrida's deconstruction of it, is the 
fact that Austin puts a lot of weight on convention (social iterability) in order for his 
performatives to work properly. Convention for Austin is normal or `appropriate 
circumstances'. 169 The notion of convention, however, takes us back to iterability, since 
convention is ritualistic or ceremonial, a structure of repetition, recognizable, and 
165 Austin, 21,22. 
166 Derrida, SEC, 315. Derrida here uses the name, or paleonym, `writing' in the sense of 
arche-writing. On paleonymy see also Derrida, SEC, 329; Derrida, Positions, 71. 
167 On the structure of experience in general, see Derrida, SEC, 318. 
168 Derrida, SEC, 315-16. Derrida does not mention the `addressee' here to evoke a 
discussion of the reader. 
169 See Austin, 13-14. 
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performative only because of this repetition. Convention also raises the question of the 
difference between original and copy since it finds its possibility as copy or citation. If 
Austin questions the validity of the non-serious or cited performative he finds himself in 
some contradiction in his approval of convention which is itself a citation, a non-original. 
This possibility caused by the copy is the possibility caused by the iterability of the mark. 
At the very beginning, what makes an original possible is this structure of the iterable 
mark of signification. Thus, within the original is already the copy, that is, the structure 
of the copy. This then naturally leads to a blurring of the distinction between original 
and copy, a displacement and ultimately a deconstruction of the hierarchical structure 
that has opposed them to each other. 
While maintaining his displacement of a true/false judgement of utterances, 
Austin employs what he calls `the doctrine of the Infelicities' to account for the 
`unhappy'-that is, neither true nor false, just `unhappy'-circumstances in which a 
performative goes wrong. 170 Austin offers six rules which govern the happy functioning 
of the performative and a violation of any one of which will see unhappy performative 
results. 171 However, the fact that Austin acknowledges the possibility of the 
performative's failure is one thing, but, as Derrida argues, Austin does not acknowledge 
or investigate the consequences that the possibility of failure has upon our understanding of 
language performance and communication in general. 172 If there is a possibility of 
failure, then failure becomes a necessary part of the structure of the performative because, 
as a possibility, it is always possible; thus, Derrida asks, `What is a success when the 
possibility of failure continues to constitute its structure? ' The success/failure structure of 
the performative is, therefore, considered to be `insufficient or derivative'. 173 That is, that 
which enables the success of the performative is also that which causes its failure. There 
is, therefore, a structuring of language prior to the very function which Austin analyses yet 
Austin does not consider it. Moreover, this structuring already distances the presence of 
intention from any utterance to the effect that Austin's argument-that there be a context 
170 Austin, 14. 
171 Austin, 14-15. 
172 For Derrida, this is the point at which Austin's project was doomed to fail. 
173 Derrida, SEC, 324. `Derivative' in the sense that it is derived from another, necessarily 
prior system or structure. 
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of an appropriate sincerity, or seriousness in the frame of the utterer's mind-is 
displaced. 174 
All communication relies on iterability, even if only for the very basic fact that an 
addressee must recognise the identity of the marks, or `arche-marks'-any structure of 
differentiated and thus iterable marks-in order to then decode them. 175 The notion of 
`death' is used by Derrida to communicate a sort of absolute disjunctive effect of the 
structure which iterability introduces into language. On one level, the marks which 
constitute, for example, the material aspect of the gospel, the marks of the apostle Paul, 
continue to have effect by virtue of their iterability even after Paul's death and, most 
importantly, have always contained within them this possibility as an inherent quality of 
their structure. On another level, and one that Derrida is most interested in, the marking 
of the mark marks the death of author or reader because it marks the `essential predicate' 
to all communication: absence. 176 Derrida posits two hypotheses to account for this 
essential predicate: 
1. Since every sign ... supposes a certain absence ... it must be because 
absence in the field of writing is of an original kind if any specificity 
whatsoever of the written sign is to be acknowledged. 2. If, perchance, 
the predicate thus assumed to characterize the absence proper to writing 
were itself found to suit every species of sign and communication, there 
would follow a general displacement: writing no longer would be a species 
of communication, and all the concepts to whose generality writing was 
subordinated (the concept itself as meaning, idea, or grasp of meaning and 
idea, the concept of communication, of sign, etc. ) would appear as 
noncritical, ill-formed concepts, or rather as concepts destined to ensure 
the authority and force of a certain historic discourse. 177 
Derrida's point here is not to say that writing is not communication, rather that writing 
could be held up as the genus of communication and not a species, not subordinate 
(hence `displacement') in some way. And again, not writing per se but writing as a 
reference to a structure, a structured absence. This writing-as-a-reference-to-structure is 
often referred to by Derrida as `archewriting'. Furthermore, `to write is to produce a 
mark that will constitute a kind of machine that is in turn productive, that ... [an 
174 See Austin, 14-16. 
175 See Derrida, SEC, 317-18. 
176 Derrida, SEC, 314. 
177 Derrida, SEC, 314-15. 
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author's] future disappearance in principle will not prevent from functioning and from 
yielding, and yielding itself to, reading and rewriting'. 178 
Derrida's argument against Austin's banishing of the non-serious is based on this 
prior structuring process of iterability which intrudes upon all communication with a 
measure of absence, thereby causing a general displacement of the opposition of what one 
could consider to be the original/serious/ present to the copy/non-serious/absent. I say 
`displacement' because the metaphysical assumptions which had privileged the former 
categories over the latter are neutralized by locating within the former group the very 
structure which was said to cause the latter group to be treated as inferior. This structure 
of absence is the force that allows the mark to `constitute a kind of machine' which can be 
set in operation, or turned on, without the presence of the one who assembled it; that 
enables the mark to produce effects in the general nonpresence of the author, 
for example the nonpresence of ... [the author's] meaning, of ... [the 
author's] intention-to-signify, of ... [the author's] wanting-to- 
communicate-this, from the emission or production of the mark. For the 
written to be written, it must continue to `act' and to be legible even if 
what is called the author of the writing no longer answers for what he has 
written ... whether he is provisionally absent, or if he is dead. 
179 
4. Concluding Summary 
Writing abut Paul's writing, (or commentary in general), has been a critically problematic 
endeavour when the attempt is made to commentate upon transcendent meaning. Due 
to this critical problem, we are in need of some `insidious questions' to evaluate the 
glossing behaviour of traditional commentary (Jameson's `metacommentary'), and also of 
ourselves with acts of self-reflexivity. Romans (and the Hauptbriefe in general) has been 
privileged by contemporary critics in a way that marginalises what was privileged by the 
writers of antiquity. The contemporary imbalanced focus on texts as informational or 
constative, over against functional and performative gives rise to an imbalanced treatment 
of the Pauline epistles. What I would like to suggest as something of a correction to the 
asymmetrical arrangement within the Pauline corpus is that we generate a reading of Paul 
based on the performative function of the text rather than information contained within 
it, but not to the exclusion of information. However, in considering language as 
performative, we also encounter language as iterable. We further find that the issues of 
178 Derrida, SEC, 316. 
179 Derrida, SEC, 316. 
48 
performance and iterability are located within our analysis of Phil 1.12-18. Derrida has 
demonstrated that all language, in order to perform/mean anything, must be iterable; thus 
all language must be radically separated from its origins by the spacing inherent within its 
iterability. We find, then, that the two cited iterations of the gospel in Phil 1.12-18 are 
implicated in this dilemma through their being described as 1rp6xa(nS and äa. rj9ELa 
respectively. 
It is necessary for any discussion concerning Paul to be guided by our 
understanding of the nature of texts in general, and the functional nature of ancient texts 
in particular. 180 The panoptical privileging of Romans as the Pauline point of reference is 
plagued with a disproportionate focus on significance over function. In general, I would 
suggest that we can attain a far greater sense of coherence in Paul's texts, and greater 
social product if we think in terms of function and performance over significance. This 
discussion is usually a `theological' discussion, as the title of the article in the Dictionary of 
Paul and His Letters testifies: `The Center of Paul's Theology', 181 as opposed to, for 
example, `the centre of Paul's activity or mission or work or life' and so forth. The term 
`theology' in Martin's title is parallel to such terms as `thought', `mind', and so forth, in 
that they all represent a priority of significance and a certain metaphysical arrangement 
that suggests some one-to-one, continuous metaphysical correspondence between text 
and meaning. 
While theology and meaning are needed and indeed desired, they necessarily are 
the products of a process more deferred than that suggested by the sort of theology which 
places the analysis of Paul in a questionable position by establishing a prior structure to 
the very process of asking the questions about Paul. That is, before the questions are 
even asked, they are already problematic. In view of this, Furnish comments that `if the 
advances made in Pauline studies over the past forty years are to prove worthwhile, they 
must result eventually in some new models according to which `Pauline theology' can be 
analyzed and presented'. 182 Why? Primarily because the old models were `developed 
180 See pp. 12 1ff. 
181 Ralph P. Martin, `The Center of Paul's Theology', in DPL, 92-95 (emphasis added). 
182 Furnish, `Pauline Studies', 338. While the idea of yet another `model' is somewhat 
problematic, given the plethora of models with which we are presently faced, the need for 
development is certainly a reality. 
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largely as topics of "systematic theology"'. 183 Furnish continues, `the real challenge for 
interpreters of Paul's thought lies just here: to find ways of respecting the situational and 
dialogical character of his theology without abandoning the attempt to understand its 
most fundamental convictions and its most pervasive concerns'. 184 The possibility for the 
`new models', which Furnish understands to be necessary, is slightly problematised by the 
way Furnish issues his challenge. That is, the duality of Furnish's challenge may lead to 
re-inscribing within the structure of the attempt to rise to the challenge the force of the 
`old model'. I say `may' lead because I also see within Furnish's challenge a genuine 
possibility of a new model. 
The challenge is not really about achieving one or the other of the two foci of 
`situational and dialogical character', and `fundamental convictions and pervasive 
concerns'. The challenge, of course, is to achieve them both at the same time. Again, I 
would suggest that functional readings of Paul's texts are going to achieve this goal much 
more efficiently than readings which focus on information. This will be the case since 
reading for information or significance (the `old model' focus on the ontological qualities 
of Paul's texts) is unable to reconcile two differing positions of invariant significance 
found within the one writer. This wreaks havoc with the ontological, or ideal categories 
desired by this approach. The tactic is rather to privilege one of the positions (usually on 
the basis of some historical critical argument which is affirmed by some and denied by 
others) and on that basis dismiss the other as `non-normative'-more commonly phrased 
as `un-Pauline'. 
Reading for the functional performance of Paul's letters will attempt to locate 
within Paul's letters overarching purposes of which those letters are the manifest means 
through which he attempts to realise those purposes. Such an approach maintains our 
focus on what Paul was trying to do to his readers, what actions he was trying to perform 
by writing what he wrote. It reminds us that Paul's texts are of this world and that they 
represent a person who, like all such people, was seeking to promote his personal 
ideology, but necessarily within the confines of a particular social discourse. 185 This is 
not to separate Paul's activity from his beliefs about God; the point is rather that Paul's 
183 Furnish, `Pauline Studies', 338. 
184 Furnish, `Pauline Studies', 338. 
185 By 'social discourse' I refer to the complex of norms, expectations, assumptions, 
values, and so forth which a given society or cultural group shares. 
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ontological beliefs are naturally an integral feature of his ideology. It is just that the 
activity of asking about Paul's beliefs about God, his theology, his sense of how the 
ontological realm is classified, is different from asking about what Paul was trying to do in 
this, logocentric world. In order to begin that process, we must take stock of the 
historical and social and philosophical location of Paul, the Philippians and the letter. We 
now turn to that task in the following two chapters. 
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Chapter Two 
The Historical Context of Paul, the Philippians and the Letter 
1. Introduction 
In this chapter, I seek to contextualise Paul, the Philippians and the letter in terms of their 
historical location. I shall focus on the historical situation of the letter itself and the 
particular circumstances Paul finds himself in when he writes. In view here are the 
historical critical issues of literary integrity, provenance, purposes, character, the nature of 
Paul's imprisonment, as well as the nature of Paul's opponents, all of which go to assist 
our appreciation of the rhetorical situation 186 behind the creation of this particular 
discourse. 
2. The Historical Situation ofPhilippians 
The authorial authenticity of Philippians is not under consideration here, since it is no 
longer a significant issue in contemporary criticism. However, it is worth noting that 
while the authenticity of Philippians currently enjoys a scholarly consensus, it has not 
always had the privilege. 187 
2. a. Literary Integrity 
Inquiring as to the purpose of Philippians implies a certain singularity and thus 
tends to assume the epistle's literary integrity. It is not the purpose of this project to 
account for the epistle's integrity or lack thereof. 188 The issue has had its various 
186 A `rhetorical situation may be defined as a complex of persons, events, objects, and 
relations presenting an actual or potential exigence which can be completely or partially removed if 
discourse, introduced into the situation, can so constrain human decision or action as to bring 
about the significant modification of the exigence' (Bitzer, 6.13). 
187 F. C. Baur's suspicions are treated fully in Baur, Paul, 2.45-64. They are also 
summarised in an 1849 Theologische Jahrbücher essay: `What appears suspicious to me in the 
Philippian epistle may be reduced to the following three heads: -1. The appearance of Gnostic 
ideas in the passage, ii. 6-9.2. The want of anything distinctively Pauline. 3. The 
questionableness of some of the historical data' (cited in Baur, Paul, 2.45, n. 2). 
188 For more comprehensive discussions on epistolary integrity see the major 
commentaries, also see in particular W. J. Dalton, `The Integrity of Philippians', Biblica 60 (1979) : 
97-102; Victor Paul Furnish, `The Place and Purpose of Phil III', NTS 10 (1964/64): 80-88; 
David E. Garland, `Composition and Unity of Philippians: Some Neglected Literary Factors', 
NovT 27 (1985): 141-73; Joachim Gnilka, DerPhilipperbrief (HTKNT 10.3; Herder: Freiburg, 
1968), 6-11; Robert Jewett, `The Epistolary Thanksgiving and the Integrity of Philippians', NovT 
52 
advocates for both sides since 1803 when Heinrichs suggested a juncture at 3.1-2 
representing an `exoteric' letter (1.1-3.1 a; 4.21-23) to the church and an `esoteric' letter 
(3.1b-4.20) to closer friends. 189 There was (and still seems to be) some thought that it 
really began in the sixteenth century with a comment made by Le Moyne based on an 
observation concerning Polycarp's epistle to the Philippians, in which Polycarp referred to 
Paul's own epistolary activity towards the Philippians with the plural ETricroA&S. 190 
However, it seems that the trend of attributing the division to Le Moyne has been more 
myth than fact, since it appears that Le Moyne's thinking has been misrepresented. 191 
This of course is also in view of the fact that Polycarp's use of the plural suddenly 
becomes remarkably uninteresting when compared to other Greek writings. 192 
The argument derived from Polycarp is based on the idea that when he wrote to 
the Philippian church, he seems to have referred to a plurality of Pauline letters sent to 
them (OS KaL &iid v 1')µ-LV Eyp(XlIJEV E11LQtOAäS). 193 Lightfoot has prepared an impressive 
disputation against taking Polycarp's EirtoioXäS to be a reference to more than one 
12 (1970) : 40-53; Helmut Koester, `The Purpose of the Polemic of a Pauline Fragment 
(Philippians III)', NTS 8 (1961-62): 317-32; Berthold Mengel, Studien zum Philipperbrief (WUNT 
2.8; Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr [Paul Siebeck] 1982), 191-212; T. E. Pollard, `The Integrity of 
Philippians', NTS 13 (1966/67): 57-66; B. D. Rahtjen, `The Three Letters of Paul to the 
Philippians', NTS 6 (1959/60): 167-73; Jeffrey T. Reed, A Discourse Analysis of Philippians: Method 
and Rhetoric in the Debate over Literary Integrity (JSNTSup 136; Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 
1997); R. Russell, `Pauline Letter Structure in Philippians', JETS 25 (1982): 295-306; R. C. 
Swift, `The Theme and Structure of Philippians', BSac 141 (1984): 234-54; D. F. Watson, `A 
Rhetorical Analysis of Philippians and Its Implications for the Unity Question', NovT 30 (1988): 
57-88. 
189 Cited in H. A. W. Meyer, Critical and Exegetical Handbook to the Epistles to the 
Philippians and Colossians (trans. J. C. Moore and W. P. Dickson, with supplementary notes by T. 
Dwight; New York: Funk & Wagnalls, 1885), 6. 
190 Etienne Le Moyne, Notae et Observationes, Varia Sacra (vol. 2; Leiden: Daniel 
Gaesbeeck, 1685), 343; cited in V. Koperski, `The Early History of the Dissection of Philippians' 
j7TS 
44 (1993): 599. 
191 See D. Cook `Stephanus Le Moyne and the Dissection of Philippians', JTS 32 (1981): 
138-42. 
192 See Lightfoot, 69, n. 1; Gnilka 6, n. 23. 
193 Polycarp, Philippians 3.2. 
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letter. 194 He cites texts from three different periods'95 in which the plural ETriatoXaL is in 
the vicinity of the singular ETrLotoA1j and both refer to the same letter. 196 The upshot of his 
argument is that using EnLoioXrj in the plural does not compel one to read it as a reference 
to more than one letter. The function of the plural, he suggests, is that it is employed to 
refer to `a missive of importance' when used in the prose of a given letter. That Polycarp 
may refer to his own letter, is, as Lightfoot further points out, not confluent with the 
humble tone of his letter. Lastly, Lightfoot reminds us that if there were more than one 
epistle known to Polycarp and the church at Philippi, it is hard to explain why it may be 
that this was the last word on their existence; furthermore, it appears that Polycarp's 
pupil, Irenaeus, is aware of only one epistle. 197 However, the basis of the more recent 
question regarding the literary integrity really proceeds along the lines suggested by 
Heinrichs; namely a perception of an apparent rupture in the epistle's unity at Phil. 3.1 
where the phrase iö Aoiiiöv seems to suggest that Paul is about to close the epistle, but 
instead of closing, 3.2 begins a new subject. 198 
The tradition of integrity is a strong one and is in fact becoming more commonly 
held. All extant copies of Philippians and all references to the epistle, so it appears, 
assume the epistle's integrity. The manuscript tradition has no argument against the 
epistle's integrity. P46, the principle manuscript, is dated as early as the second to third 
centuries. 199 Note also the point made by Aland and Aland that the `transmission of the 
194 See his essay `Lost Epistles to the Philippians', Lightfoot, 138-42. 
195 Thucydides 8.51; Josephus, Antiquities 12.10-11 (227-28); Alciphron, Ep. 19 (2.4) 1, 
3. 
196 See also the following list of examples in which the plural form (typically E1rtotoXäc) is 
employed as a reference to a specific letter: Euripides, Iphigeneia in Taurica 589,767; Iphigeneia at 
Aulis 111,314; Thucydides 1.132.5; 4.50.2; Polybius, 5.43.6; Lucian Amores, 47; Julian, Ep. 70; 1 
Macc 5.14; 10.3,7; 11.29; 12.5; finally, note that ETrwtoXaC in Esther 3.14 is probably a translation 
of the singular noun sn: (Lightfoot, 141). 
197 See also more recent arguments against the suggestion in Kurt Aland, `Die Entstehung 
des Corpus Paulinum' in Neutestamentliche Entwürfe (TB 63; Munich: Kaisen) 1979), 349-50. 
Aland notes the simple point that the very same Polycarp who wrote the plural ETrLotOXoic in 3.2 
seems to operate under the assumption of a singular correspondence (ETrLatoXrj) in 11.3: `derselbe 
Polykarp 11,3 vom Brief an die Philipper im Singular spricht' (Aland, `Entstehung', 349). 
198 Lightfoot accounts for this by postulating that just as Paul was about to say again the 
thing that was no trouble to say again, he was interrupted and reminded of some bad 
circumstances (Lightfoot, 69). 
199 Note the relatively recent attempt to re-date P46 to the late first century by Young Kyu 
Kim, Palaeographic Dating of P46', Biblica 69 (1988): 248-57. 
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New Testament textual tradition is characterized by an extremely impressive degree of 
tenacity. Once a reading occurs it will persist with obstinacy'. 200 The implication is that 
the fact we have no textual variants suggesting a redacted text is problematic from a 
transmission perspective. 201 While this proves little, it demonstrates a good degree of 
plausibility that the epistle is a single unit. It is important then to note that Loveday 
Alexander added further plausibility to the epistle's literary integrity through her 
demonstration that the problematic word (iö) ? oLTrov functioned in at least some `family 
letters' as a simple conjunction rather than a closing formula. 202 AoLrröv also appears in 1 
Thess. 4.1 and is typically translated the same way (`finally'), yet is nowhere near the end 
of the epistle. Alexander further cites two other family letters. The first is an early 
second century letter `Sempronius to Gaius, His Son', 203 in which A, oLTrov is employed 
clearly in the body and not the salutation and is translated by Winter as `in the future'. 204 
The second is a citation from the `Letter from a Prodigal Son'. 205 Here A. oLnöv clearly 
occurs in the mid-body of the letter and is translated by Deissmann as Im übrigen, 
`besides', `as to the rest', or `furthermore' as the English translation has it. 206 Of course, 
the significance of this is that the function of the word has been understood in a way not 
necessarily confluent with generically parallel literature, and insofar as this is true, has 
been ill-used as a means for rupturing the epistle's integrity. 
200 Kurt Aland and Barbara Aland, The Text of the New Testament: An Introduction to the 
Critical Editions and to the Theory and Practice of Modern Textual Criticism (trans. E. F. Rhodes; 2nd 
ed.; Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1989): 291, emphasis theirs; note also the rest of their discussion, 
pp. 292-97. 
201 See also the excellent discussion in Moises Silva, Philippians (BECNT; Grand Rapids: 
Baker Book House, 1992), 21-27 
202 Loveday Alexander, "Hellenistic Letter-Forms and the Structure of Philippians", 
JSNT 37 (1989) : 96-97; the following comments are derived from this article. 
203 P. Mich., 191. 
204 J G. Winter, `In the Service of Rome: Letters from the Michigan Papyri', CA 22 
(1927): 245-46. 
205 Archive no. 846 in the Berlin Koeniglichen Museen (III. ) cited by Adolf Deissmann, 
Licht vom Osten: Das Neue Testament und die neuentdeckten Texte der hellenistisch-römischen Welt 
(Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr [Paul Siebeck], 1909), 128-29, fig. 26. 
206 Adolf Deissmann, Light from the Ancient East: The New Testament Illustrated by Recently 
Discovered Texts of the Greco-Roman World (trans. from the 1909 2n German edition by Lionel R. 
M. Strachan; New York: Hodder and Stoughton, N. D. ), 177. 
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In this project, I shall be writing with the understanding that the epistle is 
probably a literary unit. 207 Even if this assumption is incorrect, it does not impact the 
objectives of this project in any significant way. The reason for this is simply that none of 
the suggested separate letters break up the first chapter, or Phil 1.12-18a in particular. 
Those who advocate a redacted epistle typically understand the redaction to have taken 
place along one of two lines: the two-epistle redaction, 208 and the three-epistle 
redaction. 209 Our passage falls into perhaps the longest unquestioned fragment, namely 
Phil. 1.1-3.1(a). 21° 
2. b. The Purposes ofPhilippians 
The `purpose' of Philippians, here is a reference to those functions which the 
epistle attempts to perform. There is a slight difference between the occasion of an 
epistle and the purpose(s) of an epistle. The occasion of Philippians is probably as simple 
as Epaphroditus' return to Philippi (Phil 2.25-30). Given this occasion, Paul now has an 
opportunity to perform some other necessary tasks. Critically speaking, the purpose of 
Philippians enjoys no scholarly consensus, although the variations are relatively minor 
ones. Furthermore, it is quite rare for someone to claim that Philippians has a single 
purpose; most scholars prefer to speak of the purposes (plural) of Philippians. That is, 
most scholars refer to a number of circumstantial complexes which caused Paul to 
perceive an exigence requiring an epistle, rather than to one single circumstance. 
Kümmel, for example, after listing four of the more obvious functions, notes that `the 
207 For further discussion, see the literature cited in n. 188, and the following select 
bibliography: Martin Dibelius, An die Thessalonicher I, II; an die Philipper, Handbuch zum Neuen 
Testament 11 (Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck), 1937); Garland, `The Composition and 
Unity of Philippians', 141-73; Ernst Lohmeyer, Der Brief an die Philipper, an die Kolosser und an 
Philemon; `Beiheft, ' by Werner Schmauch, MeyerK (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1964); 
Kümmel, Introduction; Peter O'Brien, The Epistle to the Philippians (NIGTC; Grand Rapids: 
Eerdmans, 1991); Reed, A Discourse Analysis of Philippians; Watson, `A Rhetorical Analysis of 
Philippians', 57-88. 
208 Gnilka, Philipperbrief, 10; also Gerhard Friedrich, `Der Brief an der Philipper', in 
Jürgen Becker, Hans Conzelmann, and Gerhard Friedrich, Die Briefe an die Galater, Epheser, 
Philipper, Kolosser, Thessalonicher und Philemon (NTD 8; Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 
1990), 128. 
209 See Jean-Francois Collange, The Epistle of Saint Paul to the Philippians (trans. A. W. 
Heathcote; London: Epworth Press, 1979), 6, also see 8-15. 
2 10 For discussions on the breakdown, see the cited literature in n. 188. Specifically, see 
the comprehensive lists compiled by Reed, A Discourse Analysis of Philippians, 127-30. 
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reasons for writing this very personal letter are so numerous that its origin211 is readily 
understandable'. 212 Even a recent study of Philippians by G. Peterman that tends 
towards a single purpose understands that purpose to be in conjunction with another 
more encompassing purpose. 
The major functions generally understood213 to be the complex of purpose behind 
Philippians are (1) to respond to their gift, (2) to allay fears of his own welfare, (3) to 
warn of false teachers ('opponents'), and (4) to exhort them to be steadfast and unified in 
the face of conflict. 214 The first two of these are generally contextualised in terms of an 
intimate relationship between Paul and the Philippians. 215 The latter two suggested 
purposes reflect the general tone of Paul's apostolate which pervades all of his letters. 
Given this relatively standard list, it is necessary to supplement the discussion with 
an overview of an important recent study by Peterman, who suggests that the primary 
purpose for writing was to contextualise the gift. Furthermore, for the purposes of this 
thesis, we must consider two other `purpose' elements within the epistle that clearly speak 
to the activity Paul is attempting to perform upon the Philippians, namely reassurance, 
and the creation of Christ-centred phronesis. 
2. b. i. The `Gift' Peterman's hypothesis is that the primary purpose of 
Philippians is to contextualise the gift (Phil 4.10-20) in an overarching theological 
structure which helps the Philippians understand the significance of their generosity in 
terms of Paul's mission. 216 The distinctive nature of the thanks section in 4.10-20 has 
211 It seems to make more sense to translate Entstehung (rendered here as `origin') as 
`formation'; see Werner Georg Kümmel; Paul Feine and Johannes Behm, Einleitung in das Neue 
Testament (Heidelberg: Quelle & Meyer, 1965), 232. 
212 Kümmel, Introduction, 324. 
213 Even when the epistle is partitioned these typically emerge as the major functions of 
what would be the extant Philippian correspondence. For example, when we translate Collange's 
three partitions into terms of purpose, the letters produce the same categories as stated above; see 
Collange, 6, also see 8-15; and note that the above stated four-fold purpose is stated virtually 
everywhere: example discussions are Kümmel, Introduction, 323; O'Brien, Philippians, 35-38. 
214 For example, see the summary in O'Brien, Philippians, 35-37. 
215 On the intimate character of Philippians, see pp. 75ff. 
216 G. W. Peterman, Paul's Gift from Philippi: Conventions of Gift-Exchange and Christian 
Giving (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997). 
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given occasion for some to see it as a separate ('thank-you') letter entirely. 217 Beare, who 
is somewhat typical, generates this hypothesis on the basis that `it is inconceivable' (to 
Beare) that Paul would have waited `some months' to send off his thanks for the gift 
which Epaphroditus had delivered. Thus he dismisses Scott's suggestion that Paul had 
sent an earlier letter as well as the one we find in Philippians218 as `quite untenable'. 
Precisely why this is less tenable than his own position he does not say. While Beare's 
inability to conceive the delay as normative may reflect a valid problem, it has to be 
weighed against the overarching problems associated with the redaction hypothesis in 
general. If the latter proves to be incongruent with the extant evidence, then it really 
comes down to a matter of our having to alter our expectations of normal behaviour in 
the Greco-Roman world. Whether or not we can conceive that a certain ancient act is 
adequately polite is not a basis for criticism. 219 Indeed, with reference to Beare's 
argument, and any other argument about the position and nature of the thanks in 
4.10-20, it is only on the basis of such work as Peterman's that we can make claims as to 
the appropriateness or inappropriateness of Paul's expression of gratitude in Philippians. 
Peterman's much-needed work explores the social conventions of gift-giving in the 
Greco-Roman world. He sees the Philippians' gift as adhering to the structure of Greco- 
Roman norms of social reciprocity associated with the establishment and maintenance of 
friendship. 220 Clearly, early Christians adopted established social structures to carry on 
their basic activities. Thus, when it comes to the gospel, one of Peterman's main points is 
that the structures of reciprocity are employed to the effect that the Philippians are 
partners in the gospel with Paul by virtue of their gift-giving. Peterman understands this 
social convention and its relationship to the gospel to be so deeply connected that he 
217 See, for example, Beare's commentary which was one of the earliest publications 
suggesting the partition, F. W. A. Beare, A Commentary on the Epistle to the Philippians (HNTC; 
New York: Harper & Brothers, 1959), 4, esp. 150. 
218 E. F. Scott, `The Epistle to the Philippians', in The Interpreter's Bible (ed. G. A. 
Buttrick et al.; vol. 11; New York: Abingdon, 1955), 9-11,121. 
219 Apparently independent of each other, no less than four authors suggested the 4.10-20 
partition: Beare in 1959; Walter Schmithals, `Die Irrlehrer des Philipperbriefes', Z71K 54 (1957): 
306-309; J. Müller-Bardorff, `Zur Frage der literarischen Einheit des Philipperbriefes', WZUJ 7 
(1957/58): 591-604; Rahtjen, 167-73, esp. 172-73. 
220 See his summary of conventions associated with gift-giving (Peterman, 88ff. ). 
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suggests that virtually the entire letter is a prelude to the offering of thanks in 4.10-20: `In 
a sense, 1.1-4.9 are prolegomena to the response of 4.10-20'. 221 
Peterman's argument is appreciated because it combines social realities with 
certain Pauline ideals, specifically his attention to the spread and development of the 
gospel. The only criticism to offer is that it seems Peterman gives the balance of the 
emphasis to the `thanks' section as opposed to the gospel. It seems preferable to say that 
the epistle is yet another attempt by Paul to promote his gospel; one of the ways he 
achieves this in Philippians is by recognizing and explaining the Philippians' participation 
in the gospel. This is necessary since there are other issues which do not fit into 
Peterman's reconstruction of an epistle which is nine parts prolegomena. Thus while the 
kind of reading Peterman has produced for Philippians is appreciated, the problem is that 
social reciprocity alone requires us to diminish the significance of topics within 
Philippians which have greater moment for Paul and his ministry in general. 
2. b. 11. Reassurance It is a position of this thesis that the activity of reassurance 
in Philippians is used in two different ways. 222 Thus, a discussion on whether the 
viability of reassurance is a feature of Philippians in general, and of our text in particular 
(Phil 1.12-18) is naturally warranted. The idea of reassurance involved in this letter is 
implicated in the formally rhetorical category of ethos (r Ooc). John Marshall has 
attempted to explicate Paul's development of ethos in Philippians. He argues that Paul is 
not really aware of the actual situation at Philippi and thus his ability to develop 
appropriately the logos and pathos aspects of a formal rhetorical unit is hampered. As a 
result, Paul is forced to rely more heavily on the remaining rhetorical element, ethos, 
which is developed within the speech unit. Marshall suggests that the primary way in 
which this is achieved is the usual one: identification with the audience. 223 This is 
necessarily going to be achieved in, though not confined to, the early stages of the epistle. 
221 Peterman, 103. 
222 See the discussion on pp. 139ff. 
223 John W. Marshall, `Paul's Ethical Appeal in Philippians', in Rhetoric and the New 
Testament (eds. Stanley E. Porter and Thomas H. Olbricht; JSNTSup 90; Sheffield: Sheffield 
Academic Press, 1993), 357-71. 
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We find that Phil 1.3-11 does that very thing as Paul expresses his strong personal 
affection for the Philippians. 224 
Ralph Martin has put the case for reassurance forward in oblique, but certain 
terms. He contends that `Paul's picture of the Christian life is at odds with the sectarian 
viewpoints, and this explains the undertone of firm resistance to their ideas and practices 
which runs like a thread through this letter in all its chapters'. 225 What Martin is referring 
to here is the fact that there were obvious features of Paul's present condition as well as 
the present condition of the Philippians which contradicted normal assumptions of truth, 
success, and so forth. Paul's imprisonment, for example, does not immediately present 
itself as a great success story in the Greco-Roman world-nor, for that matter, does the 
suffering of the Philippians. Martin believes that these ostensibly negative points are 
being exploited by Paul's opponents in favour of `a presentation of the believer's life in 
terms of triumphalism and present glory'. 226 Thus, Martin's suggestion is that Paul is 
creating a discourse in Philippians which is designed to `supply a rationale for the 
Christians in time of persecution'227 which subverts the discourse being presented by the 
opponents, and to reassure the Philippians that all is well with the gospel and its 
adherents. 
More specifically, however, in her research on Hellenistic letter forms, Loveday 
Alexander has demonstrated that the formal structure of the epistle itself suggests that the 
central reason for writing is all about reassuring the Philippians concerning Paul's 
situation. 228 The argument is made on the basis that a `disclosure formula' (yLVWQKELV SE 
1)µäS ßoü)Loµai), subcategory of what John White calls `informational formulas', signals the 
primary reason for writing. 229 Disclosure formulas seem to contain four standard 
features: a verb of desire such as AEXW (here ßoüXoµaL); a verb `to know' in the infinitive 
224 That the opening section, the thanksgiving period in particular, reflects Paul's 
demonstrations of personal affection is everywhere attested in the commentaries; e. g., Fee, 72ff.; 
O'Brien, Philippians, 53ff.. 
225 Ralph Martin, Philippians (NCB; London: Oliphants, 1976), 34. 
226 Martin, Philippians, NCB, 34. 
227 Martin, Philippians, NCB, 34. 
228 Loveday Alexander, `Hellenistic Letter Forms and the Structure of Philippians', JSNT 
37, (1989): 95. Note that formal analysis is a reference to analysing the features of a letter's form. 
229 Alexander, `Hellenistic Letter-Forms', 92. 
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(here yLV(OKELv); the party addressed (in accusative, here 41&S); the information to be 
known (often announced by a öi L-clause, as is the case here). 230 
Alexander begins her argument by demonstrating that Philippians subscribes to 
the formal structure of the Greco-Roman `family letter', 231 or more generally what 
Koskeniemi terms a Verbindungsbrie, f232-a letter intended primarily to convey 
information, usually between family members. What is important for the argument is 
that family letters seem to focus almost entirely on this exchange of information which, 
Alexander implies, leads to `strengthening' family ties. 233 Importantly, within that formal 
structure, Alexander locates reassurance as a common feature of these letters, pointing to 
the fact that, within at least two of the family letters discussed, 234 the disclosure formula 
`marks off this section as the information-bearing focus of the letter'. 235 Considering 
Philippians in these terms, when we add this focus to the more general features of the 
family letter, we end up with a letter `with the primary purpose of strengthening the 
"family" links between the apostle and the Christian congregation in Philippi'. 236 On the 
basis of the formal structuring of the letter, the `real business' of the letter is therefore said 
to be the `exchange of news and reassurance'. 237 
230 T. Y. Mullins, `Disclosure. A Literary Form in the New Testament', NovT 7 (1964): 
49. 
231 Alexander, `Hellenistic Letter-Forms', 90,93-6; Alexander here describes the basic 
features of family letters. For a long discussion of Philippians as a `letter of friendship', see the 
Introduction in Fee, Philippians, 1-24; also John L. White, Light from Ancient Letters (FFNT; 
Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1986), 196-79; J. L. White, The Form and Function of the Body of the 
Greek Letter (Missoula Montana: Scholars Press, 1972), 121-22; Stanley K. Stowers, `Friends and 
Enemies in the Politics of Heaven: Reading Theology in Philippians', in Pauline Theology (ed. 
Jouette M. Bassler; vol. 1; Minneapolis: Fortress, 1991), 107-14; Stanley K. Stowers, Letter Writing 
in Greco-Roman Antiquity (LEC 5; Philadelphia: Fortress, 1986), 60; George A. Kennedy, New 
Testament Interpretation through Rhetorical Criticism (Studies in Religion; Chapel Hill: University of 
North Carolina Press, 1984), 422; Mullins, `Disclosure', 44-50. 
232 Alexander, `Hellenistic Letter-Forms', 93; Heikki Koskenniemi, Studien zur Idee und 
Phraseologie des griechischen Briefes bis 400 n. Chr. (Annales Academiae scientiarum fennicae: Series 
B; vol. 102.2; Helsinki: Suomalaisen Kirjallisuuden Kirjapaino, 1956), 107. 
233 See `Hellenistic Letter-Forms', 95 where Alexander expands on the matter as it relates 
to Philippians. 
234 See White, nos. 102 and 104B. 
235 Alexander, `Hellenistic Letter-Forms', 92. 
236 Alexander, `Hellenistic Letter-Forms', 95. 
237 Alexander, `Hellenistic Letter-Forms', 95. 
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It seems clear that the letter is not written to inform the church that Paul is 
in prison ... but to reassure them that the situation is "all right" in three 
ways: first because "what happened to me has really served to advance the 
Gospel" (1.12-18); second, because death, if it should come, is not to be 
feared (1.19-23); and third and slightly contradictorily, because Paul will 
probably soon be released anyway (1.24-26). 238 
l. b. iil. Christ-Centred Phronesis According to Meeks, `this letter's most 
comprehensive purpose is the shaping of a Christian phrönesis [sic], a practical moral 
reasoning that is "conformed to [Christ's] death" in hope of his resurrection'. 239 Meeks 
has in mind that Philippians presents its readers with `models to think from'; 24° thus it 
provides a way for the Christian community to engage issues of internal unity and 
harmony, and external hostilities. 241 Meeks is entirely correct; the only problem, 
however, may be the fact that Meeks has not carried the role of the proposed phronesis far 
enough. 
Stephen Fowl, in his essay on `Christology and Ethics', encounters Alexander's 
formal analysis of Philippians, and while citing agreement on the need for such formal 
study, suggests that `too heavy a reliance on this formal analysis' may prevent the 
appropriate amount of attention being paid to the `moral and theological work Paul's 
accounts of his own situation and his expressed desires for the Philippians are meant to 
do'. 242 Fowl then cites Wansink to lend support to his position. Wansink's assumptions 
about formal analyses, however, locate them within a discontinuous relationship between 
the theology of a text and the structure of a text. For his part, Fowl agrees that `attention 
to formal analysis may be quite significant in resolving some interpretive debates 
regarding Philippians'; he nonetheless also suggests that `such analyses will [not] do much 
to advance discussions about the relationships between the christology of 2: 6-11 and the 
243 moral demands Paul makes in the epistle'. 
238 Alexander, `Hellenistic Letter-Forms', 95. 
239 Wayne A. Meeks, `The Man from Heaven in Paul's Letter to the Philippians', in The 
Future of Early Christianity (Minneapolis: Fortress, 1991), 333. 
240 Meeks, 'The Man from Heaven', 333. 
241 Meeks, `The Man from Heaven', 333-34. 
242 Stephen Fowl, `Christology and Ethics in Philippians 2: 5-11', in Where Christology 
Began (eds., Ralph P. Martin, and Brian J. Dodd; Louisville, KY: Westminster/John Knox Press, 
1998), 141. 
243 Fowl, `Christology', 141. 
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While Fowl and Wansink both warn against the perils of privileging formal 
structure, they also set up formal analysis as somehow other than the theology of a text. 
It is possible that the idea of separating the formal structure from theology is a 
problematic one. In Wansink's account, the formal analysis of the epistle, while making 
some contribution, does little more than provide details about structure; he then 
describes the results of formal analyses in the subjunctive mood, but shifts to the 
indicative when he suggests that there `is much more at stake' than what formal analysis 
suggests. 244 However, it is not the design of formal analysis to take the place of further, 
theologically orientated analysis; it is rather the case that the formal analysis is necessarily 
a part of that study by virtue of providing a critical `starting point'. 245 That is, one cannot 
have a christology of Philippians that is not in dialogue with the material means by which 
that christology is formed and presented; thus the formal analysis of an epistle is always a 
part of any theology generated by that epistle. 
After (rightly) pointing to the `potential pitfall of too heavy a reliance on ... 
formal analysis', Fowl states: 
Unlike the standard family letter, at least one of the main points of 
`business' of Philippians is Paul's attempt to get the Philippians to view 
things-such as Paul's imprisonment, God's activity in Christ, and the 
experiences of Timothy and Epaphroditus-in such a way that they 
themselves will be capable of thinking and acting in particular ways. 246 
This is clearly an accurate assessment of the situation. However, it is precisely due to the 
information provided by the formal analysis of the epistle-that reassurance is its `real 
business'247-that we are able understand the nature of how Paul works to elicit the sort 
of ethical responses Fowl sees within the text. Fowl himself points out that by creating a 
change in the way the Philippians `view things', Paul will then generate an ethical 
response. My suggestion is that reassurance is really quite a fundamental feature of the 
rhetorical ethos required to make the proposed necessary changes in the way the 
Philippians `view things'. In fact, it is this sort of rhetorical operation that is the subject 
244 Wansink, 106 (emphasis added). 
245 See Alexander's survey and discussion in Alexander, `Hellenistic Letter-Forms', 88ff., 
in which she briefly describes the role formal analyses play in how we understand the general 
movement of the epistle. 
246 Fowl, `Christology', 141. 
247 Alexander, `Hellenistic Letter-Forms', 95. 
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of my later discussion of the opening in Phil 1.1-11,248 and the (dis) closure of Phil 
1.1- 1 2ff., 249 in which I suggest, among other things, that Paul is seeking the development 
of a certain hermeneutic which would enable them to `view things' the way Paul wants 
them to. 
In an earlier work, Fowl, albeit independently, comes to the same phronetic 
orientation of Philippians as Meeks. 250 Fowl presents the Christ hymn's operation in 
terms of an `exemplar'. The story of Christ in Phil 2 is said not to be designed as a means 
by which an orthodox christology is related, nor is it even designed to present a model for 
imitation (since a Philippian Christian could hardly be required to imitate the exaltation 
suggested in Phil 2.9-11251). It rather serves to present a concrete situation from which 
the Philippians derive actual situational parallels regarding their own lives and 
consequently know how to act in those situations. 252 
Meeks and Fowl both present a perspective on Philippians which is confluent with 
the goals of this thesis. My only point of difference with them is that where they see a 
Christian ethic focussed on the salvation of the self (both the personal self and the local 
ecclesial self), I see a Christian ethic which, while based on this personal and communal 
salvation, extends to the larger pragmatic operation of the respective ministries of Paul 
and Christ. 253 As Fowl, for example, proceeds through his discussion of the relationship 
of the hymn to the earlier (Phil 1.27-2.5254) and later stages255 of the epistle, the 
Philippians are everywhere said to be exhorted to a higher ethic (steadfast unity, heaven- 
based corporate sense of activity, worshipping in the spirit, boasting in Christ and not the 
flesh) with a view to when `Christ will transform their bodies of humiliation into the body 
248 See pp. 133ff. 
249 See pp. 137ff. 
250 Stephen E. Fowl, The Story of Christ in the Ethics of Paul: An Analysis of the Function of 
the Hymnic Material in the Pauline Corpus (JSNTSup36; Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 1990). 
251 Fowl, The Story of Christ, 80. 
252 See the discussion on exemplars in Fowl, The Story of Christ, 92ff. 
253 Note the comments on Paul's obligation to the Philippians, pp. 108f. 
254 Fowl, The Story of Christ, 85-92. 
255 Fowl, The Story of Christ, 98-101. 
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of his glory'. 256 It is clear that Paul does in fact exhort the Philippians to such ethical 
activity. The only problem I have with this is that it suggests that the ethic presented to 
the Philippians is not entirely descriptive of the actual ethics of Paul himself, nor of 
Christ, for that matter. 
The Christian phronesis, and its subsequent ethic, presented here, while rightly 
located within the self, remains within the confines of the ecclesial group, and does not 
represent the thinking and practice portrayed by the simple and concrete situations of 
both Paul and Christ: Paul is willing to subordinate his interests for the greater benefit of 
others (Phil 1.21-24), Christ is willing to subordinate his interests for the greater benefit of 
others (Phil 2.6-5). This `greater benefit' is nothing short of the reconciliation of 
humanity, which is abbreviated by Meeks257 and Fow1258 as personal salvation or 
resurrection. I therefore assume that some soteriological reference is being made by the 
Christ hymn, in contrast to Fowl who contends that `there is no specific indication that 
when Christ took on a human body it was for the purpose of ultimately freeing humanity 
from its subjection'. 259 Though there is clearly no indication on the poetic level of the 
hymn itself, surely in the context of Philippians (3.7-11, for example), Paul has this very 
thing in mind, or, at the very least, it is not absent from Paul's mind as he narrates the 
Christ story in Phil 2. Indeed, given the ease with which Fowl extends the ethical 
ramifications of the hymn to the other passages, is it not equally reasonable to extend the 
soteriological ramifications of the other passages to the hymn? 
Proclamation, in the view of this thesis, is the means by which that `greater benefit' 
is actualised by Paul and the church, and thus is the ultimate ethical goal that Paul has for 
himself and thus also for his churches (the later conclusions of this thesis will bear out the 
potential viability of my argument). Thus, with respect to the presentation of the purpose 
by Fowl and Meeks, I would argue that proclamation is the ethical point of the Philippians' 
ability to `deploy their knowledge [phronesis] of the gospel in concrete situations in which 
they find themselves'. 260 However, Fowl continues this sentence in a way that, as 
256 Fowl, The Story of Christ, 101; note Meeks, `The Man from Heaven', 333,335. 
257 Meeks, `The Man from Heaven', 333. 
258 Fowl, The Story of Christ, 89. 
259 Fowl, The Story of Christ, 60. 
260 Fowl, `Christology', 145 (though he entirely agrees, Fowl is here summarising Meeks). 
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mentioned, potentially abbreviates the ethical imperative: `so that they will be able to live 
faithfully'. 261 The problem lies with the content of `live faithfully'. What I would add to 
this is that to `live faithfully' extends beyond the sense of personal unifying activity and 
personal redemption, 262 and into the larger Christian responsibility envisaged and 
exemplified by Paul throughout his ministry and, in Philippians, exemplified by the 
stories of both Paul and Christ, namely active participation in God's overarching process 
of advancing the gospel. 263 
The argument of this thesis takes its leave from the assumption that the real 
business of the epistle is to reassure, and then proceeds to describe the role proclamation 
plays in the attempt to reassure. 264 The subsequent exegetical impact of this on 
Philippians is that the issue of Christian proclamation, which I understand in a fairly 
general way to be the attempt to further what God sought to achieve through the whole 
Christ story, 265 is a subtle but substantial one. In general, it is a shift away from the focus 
on personal benefit to a focus on personal responsibility not just to the local church but to 
the greater mission of the gospel, since for Paul `everything is subordinate to the preaching 
of the gospel'. 266 
Such a reading of the immediately surrounding text would look something like the 
following: Paul's shame (1.19) would be a reference to his inability to allow God to work 
through him to bring about his greater purposes267 (achieved through the proclamation of 
the gospel). When Paul then goes on to elaborate on the relative value of life and death 
(1.21-26), he concludes that he should subordinate his own personal interests to those of 
the Philippians. He does not do this just because they are great people, but because the 
ministry of the gospel must be furthered among them, and Paul is subordinate to what he 
261 Fowl, `Christology', 145. 
262 For example, Fowl, The Story of Christ, 89; Fowl, `Christology', 148. 
263 See, for example, the discussion of the Agon motif in V. C. Pfitzner, Paul and the Agon 
Motif (NovTSup 16; Leiden: Brill, 1967), 127-29; 191-95. 
264 See for example, the later discussion where I suggest that the sort of phr-onesis found in 
Philippians is a hermeneutic Paul is attempting to give the Philippians to deal with certain kinds of 
conflict, pp. 90ff. 
265 See the later discussion on EüayyE), Lov on pp. 148ff. 
266 O'Brien, Philippians, 117 (emphasis added). 
267 See O'Brien, Philippians, 114. 
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perceives to be God's greater interests. Thus Paul presents an example of what is 
necessary for God's ministry to operate in this world, the subordination of one's own 
interests to God's. 
Paul's subsequent exhortation in 1.27ff. is an attempt to get the Philippians to 
subordinate their own interests to God's. Indeed, O'Brien contends that this exhortation 
`stands as a rubric to the whole section 1: 27-2: 18, with the subsequent admonitions and 
statements expanding and explicating what is involved in living worthily of the gospel'. 268 This 
whole section (1.27ff) begins with an interesting adverb, `only' (µövov), which delimits the 
verbal activity269 of `conduct'; thus Barth argues that the real concern of the Philippians is 
to be the `rectus cursus', namely `the prokope (advance) of the Gospel or the faith'. 270 The 
verb `conduct' (1.27) is here used by Paul not simply as a reference to membership in a 
heavenly commonwealth, but also to the responsibility that they actually have to do 
things. Here those things are to result in the progress of the gospel, and they do those 
things in an actual social/civic context. 
The contrary interests of that context mean that in order for the gospel to 
progress, a `struggle' (äyüv) develops in the same way that it has for Paul in his own 
attempt to advance the gospel. Thus the Philippians are exhorted to conduct themselves 
`in a manner worthy of the gospel'; such conduct would be manifested when they `stand 
in one spirit, with one mind (iuxrj), striving together for the faith of the gospel'. 271 The 
point of standing and striving together is to promote the faith of the gospel in the context 
of a struggle (&ywv) against the same kind of opposition Paul experiences for the same 
268 O'Brien, Philippians, 146. With respect to the ethical outliving of the importance Paul 
places on the gospel, O'Brien's reading of `gospel' in Philippians is largely confluent with my own. 
Apart from his commentary, note also the whole discussion in Peter T. O'Brien, `The Importance 
of the Gospel in Philippians', in God Who is Rich in Mercy (eds. Peter T. O'Brien and David G. 
Peterson; Grand Rapids: Baker, 1986). 
269 BAGD, 528. 
270 Karl Barth, The Epistle to the Philippians (London: SCM, 1962), 45. 
271 Taking the genitive of the phrase t rrLOTEL TOB EüayyEAiou to be one of origin results in 
the translation, `the faith which is based on the gospel' (O'Brien, Philippians, 152); as appositional, 
the result is `the faith that is the gospel' (Gordon Fee, Paul's Letter to the Philippians [NICNT; 
Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1995], 167). 
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reason; 272 thus, by so standing and striving, Paul's followers `show that their goals are the 
same as his own', namely the general progress of the gospel. 273 
As Paul continues the discussion of the exhortation to conduct oneself worthily of 
the gospel in 2.1 ff., he begins with a series of particular conditions expressing his belief 
that what is necessary for the Philippians to achieve what he wants them to achieve is 
already present among them. Importantly, when in 2.2 he comes to the apodosis of the 
series of protases, in 2.1, the last phrase completes the structure with a focus on this 
Christian phronesis: `thinking the same' or `intent on one purpose' (Ev ýpovoüvtES) . 
That 
purpose or intention, in this reading, would naturally be the proclamation or progress of 
the gospel. 274 The particular Christian phronesls Paul has in view is one which enables 
the Christians to create within them a set of conditions that enable the gospel to progress. 
This phronesis is one in which the Philippians understand that they need to subordinate 
their own interests to the progress of the gospel. Paul then, in 2.6-11, presents the story 
of Christ who did this very thing. He subordinated the privilege of his heavenly state to 
the soteriological needs of humanity, which, of course, is the gospel in that it represents 
God's overarching goal in human history. 275 
The subsequent exhortations (2.12-18) turn to how the gospel is more specifically 
worked out in the lives of the Philippians themselves. Paul's sense of the progress of the 
gospel cannot be tied to proclamation alone, it must also carry with it the outliving of the 
gospel after it has been accepted-that is, after proclamation. Furthermore, the church's 
responsibility to advance God's purposes through proclamation necessarily includes 
creating the conditions for progress as well, which is enabled by Paul's focus on internal 
cohesion; hence Meeks' comment that `the emphasis in Paul's paraenesis ... is not upon 
the maintenance of boundaries, but upon internal cohesion'. 276 Thus, the sort of 
phronesis we find in Fowl and Meeks, is clearly a necessary part of achieving what God 
272 On the äyWv motif in Philippians as a reference to a struggle for the progress of the 
gospel, see Pfitzner, 82-129,191-95. 
273 O'Brien, `The Importance of the Gospel in Philippians', 226. 
274 I briefly discuss the possibility that progress in Phil 1.13 should be defined as 
proclamation on pp. 145. 
275 See again the later discussion on EüayyEALOV on pp. 148ff. 
276 Wayne A. Meeks, The First Urban Christians: The Social World of the Apostle Paul (New 
Haven: Yale, 1983), 100. 
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wants to achieve. That is, God wants to provide salvation, but the (post-messianic) goal 
and means of that salvation is the same: people are the goal and people are the means. 
Finally, this duality is not exactly foreign to the whole concept of gospel. It is 
apparently operative within the word EüayYEXLov itself. Becker has presented EüaYYE;, Lov as 
a term which carries both a kerygmatic concept and an active concept of proclamation. 277 
This is based on his prior argument that the New Testament usage of the term is derived 
from the Greek and not from the Hebrew sense (which tended to focus on the act more 
than anything else), or LXX usage (which separated the action from the content and 
weakened the meaning). He notes that, in the Greek usage, the term maintained a sense 
of its original usage, namely a confluence of the act of bringing good news and the good 
news itself. 278 
2. c. Provenance 
The issue of provenance remains a somewhat significant issue in our critical 
appreciation of Philippians. For the purposes of this thesis, provenance has a tangential 
role in the later discussion on Phil 1.13,279 when Paul points to contextualising 
information about his circumstances that has spread throughout the `whole praetorium' 
(ÖAW 't4 1TPaLTWpLW). However, it should be noted that while I take iö TrpaLt( LOV to be a 
reference to the imperial guard in Rome, my later argument is based on the communication 
of information and not upon the specific audience to whom that information is conveyed. 
It appears to me that the weight of the evidence rests with the traditional position 
that Paul wrote Philippians from a prison280 in Rome. This appears to be the case 
primarily because it is entirely confluent with the external evidence281 and none of the 
internal evidence is against it, indeed it is wholly compatible with it. Furthermore, the 
277 U. Becker, `Gospel, Evangelize, Evangelist', NIDNTT 2: 111; also see the discussion 
on p. 149. 
278 Becker, NIDNTT, 2: 108-9. 
279 See pp. 145ff., as well as the discussion on Paul's imprisonment on pp. 77ff. 
280 Thus also, with the vast majority of scholars, I hold that the phrase is Kai' EµE is a 
reference to Paul's imprisonment, as opposed to Paul's revelation (made from non-Roman prison) 
that he is a Roman Citizen, see Collange, 9-10. 
281 The Marcionite Prologues state that the epistle was written from Rome; see Robert M. 
Grant, trans., Second-Century Christianity: A Collection of Fragments (London: S. P. C. K, 1946), 19. 
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frequently presented alternatives (Caesarea, 282 and Ephesus283), simply require a more 
strained reading than Rome. While it is beyond the scope of this thesis to provide a 
comprehensive discussion of that matter, I shall outline the basic issues and where I stand 
on them. 
On historical issues such as this, the most appropriate path to follow is to begin by 
stating the basic data upon which there is general and necessary agreement: (A) Paul 
writes from a prison (Phil 1.12-14,17); (B) the imprisonment probably poses a threat to 
Paul's well-being or even life (Phil 1.20-30); (C) there is a `praetorium' (To' Trp(XLiWpLov) 
with which he has contact (Phil 1.13); (D) there are some Christians in the purview of 
Paul's imprisonment ministry who are specifically labelled in Phil 4.22 as being `out of 
Caesar's household' (EK ufj KaL'oapoS oLKL(Xc); (E) there has been correspondence and 
travel between Paul and the Philippians (Phil 2.26; 4.18); (F) Epaphroditus, a Philippian 
envoy, is presently with Paul (Phil 2.25); (G) Timothy is presently with Paul and about to 
be sent to the Philippians (1.1; 2.19). Unfortunately, all of these data are used in various 
ways to demonstrate the veracity of the respective hypotheses. 
For example, an Ephesian provenance is typically presented on the basis of the 
suggested problem that Philippi was too far from Rome to account for the proposed 
number of correspondences (as many as seven284) between the two cities to occur within 
a reasonable time-frame. 285 Once the problem of correspondences versus time-frame is 
established, and subsequently solved by the suggestion of an Ephesian provenance, since 
Philippi is a lot closer to Ephesus than Rome, the agreed data is swiftly squared with the 
Ephesian hypothesis. Thus, the proposed visit by Timothy would fit well with the fact 
that he is known to the Ephesians (based on Acts 19) and appears to agree with Acts 
19.22, that Paul sent Timothy and Erastus into Macedonia while `he himself stayed in 
282 Initially suggested in 1799 by H. E. G. Paulus, see Kümmel, Introduction, 328. 
283 Initially suggested by H. Lisco in 1900, see Gerald F. Hawthorne, Philippians (The 
Word Biblical Commentary; vol. 43; Waco, Texas: Word Books, 1983), xxxviii. On Corinth as an 
option, see a full discussion of the issues in Hawthorne, xl-xli. 
284 Four journeys before the letter, and three proposed journeys, see Kümmel, Introduction, 
325. 
285 Suggested by Adolf Deissmann, see Adolf Deissmann, `Zur ephesinischen 
Gefangenschaft des Apostels Paulus' in Anatolian Studies Presented to Sir W. M. Ramsay (ed. W. H. 
Buckler and W. M. Calder; Manchester: The University Press, 1923); Deissmann, Light, 229, n. 1; 
230-31; Adolf Deissmann, Paul: A Study in Social and Religious History (trans. William E. Wilson; 
London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1926), 17 and the listed bibliography; for a slightly different 
version of the journeys see Collange, Philippians, 15-19; 119, n. 2. 
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Asia for a while'. The reference to the KaCoapoS OLK'aS works with Ephesus as well, since 
`according to the prevailing usage', the term should be understood not as a reference to 
the Imperial family or their relatives, but to the members of the Imperial Civil Service, the 
Familia Caesaris and their attendants. 286 The presence and travelling of Epaphroditus fits 
just as, or even more, easily into the Ephesian hypothesis as it does the Roman. 
Thus the Ephesian hypothesis appears to make use of most of the data generally 
agreed upon just as well as the Roman hypothesis does. The problem is this: the 
Ephesian hypothesis requires extending the historical references beyond the natural, or 
most simple reading of the text. In particular, the reference to iö irpaLiWpLov, while 
applicable to a Caesarean provenance, and of course to a Roman provenance, applies to 
Ephesus only under the most strenuous reading for the simple reason there does not 
appear to have been a irpaLTWpLov at Ephesus. F. F. Bruce and B. Reicke make some 
extremely helpful points here. To begin, the use of a Latin loanword (praetorium) signals 
technical usage. Furthermore, the word refers to `the headquarters of the praetor, more 
particularly the commanding officer's headquarters in a military camp'; 287 while in Rome 
it is a specific reference to the emperor's guard, outside Rome in the empire at large, it 
was a reference to the headquarters of the governor of an imperial province who had 
military forces at his disposal. 288 Bruce further states that `there is no known instance in 
imperial times of its use for the headquarters of a proconsul, the governor of a senatorial 
province such as Asia was at this time'. 289 However, due to some inscriptions near 
Ephesus bearing reference to a member of the praetorian guard (praetorianus) there is the 
natural assumption of the presence of a praetorian guard itself. However, Bruce notes 
that the `praetorianus mentioned in three Latin subscriptions was a former member of the 
286 BAGD, 557; see also Lightfoot, 171-78; James D. G. Dunn, `Caesar, Consul, 
Governor', NIDNTT, 1: 269-70; Deissmann, Light, 230, n. 3. 
287 F. F. Bruce, Philippians (NIBC; Peabody, MA: Hedrickson, 1989), 11; also see his 
discussion in F. F. Bruce, `St. Paul in Macedonia 3. The Philippians Correspondence'. Bulletin of 
the John Rylands University Library of Manchester 63 (1981): 263-65, most of which is now found in 
his aforementioned commentary. 
288 Bruce, Philippians, 11. 
289 Bruce, Philippians, 11. Reicke notes that the governor of Ephesus was at the time `not 
a propraetor, but rather a proconsul' (Bo Reicke, `Caesarea, Rome, and the Captivity Epistles', in 
Apostolic History and the Gospel [eds. W. Ward Gasque, and Ralph P. Martin; Grand Rapids: 
Eerdmans, 1970], 283). 
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praetorian guard who later discharged police duties as a stationarius on a Roman road in 
the province of Asia'. 290 
The crucial data provided by Bruce and Reicke demonstrate the strong 
unlikelihood of an Ephesian provenance, or as Hawthorne has it, `the fatal flaw in the 
Ephesian imprisonment hypothesis is that is entirely built upon conjecture'. 291 Even 
though much of the data do in fact fit, if they cannot all fit, then we are left with having to 
look elsewhere. Rome, of course, resolves any difficulty of locating a irpaLimpLov, but so 
does the only other viable option, Caesarea. Adding to the difficulty of discerning 
between Rome and Caesarea is the fact that the main problem cited against a Roman 
provenance, that it is too far from Philippi, is also true of Caesarea. However, I once 
again point to the fact that the external data supports Rome, none of the internal evidence 
is against it, so what would cause someone to elect Caesarea over Rome? 
Essentially, the difference is one of the interpretation of the cumulative effect of 
certain `small' data (while ignoring the most important piece of information). For 
example, 292 (A) there was a TrpaLrwpLov at Caesarea (note the comment in Acts 23.35). 
(B) There is a specific reference in Acts 23 to a Caesarean imprisonment. (C) Acts 24.27 
suggests a sufficient amount of time (two years), despite the distance, for a number of 
correspondences between Caesarea and Philippi to take place. (D) The reference in Phil 
1.7 to an &1TOXOy(a could possibly refer to a situation where Paul has already given a 
defence, and thus KELµaL in Phil 1.16, on Hawthorne's reading, would suggest that Paul 
lay in prison in spite of the earlier aTToAoyCa; 293 importantly all of this squares well with the 
Acts 24.24-27 account of Paul at Caesarea. (E) The strong tone of the polemic in Phil 
3.2-6, if the object is taken to be Jewish opposition and not Judaisers, fits well with the 
account in Acts 21.37-26.32 of a bitter battle going on at Caesarea between Paul and his 
Jewish opponents. (F) The reference in Philippians to a desired visit from Paul (Phil 
2.24), and his confidence that he would be released (Phil 1.24-26; 2.24) works with the 
statements in Romans (Rom 15.28) that Paul desired to get to Rome and then move west 
290 Bruce, Philippians, 12; see also Reicke, 283. 
291 Hawthorne, xxxix. 
292 Largely taken from Hawthorne, who offers a recent and comprehensive argument in 
favour of a Caesarean provenance, Hawthorne, xli-xliv. 
293 Hawthorne, xli. 
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into Spain, rather than go from Rome back eastward. All this amounts to creating a 
cumulative effect which suggests a strong viability for a Caesarean provenance. 
However, in spite of that strength, it simply does not match the cumulative effect 
of the very same data when they are applied to the traditional provenance, Rome, not to 
mention the failure to deal with the most problematic assumption: (A) while there was 
unquestionably a 1rpaLiwpLov in Rome, the reference to a 1TpaLiWpLov outside of Rome (as 
with Caesarea294) is not a reference to the personnel of a governor but to the governor's 
residence itself. 295 In Rome, however, it was a reference to the personnel making up the 
imperial bodyguard; 296 while the Acts 23.35 reference, T4 Irpait pkw toi `HpcAiöou, 
easily bears this sense of a governor's residence as opposed to personnel. Furthermore, 
and most importantly, Phil 1.13 clearly refers to a group of people among whom this 
information has been spread, and not to a building; thus this point alone counters the 
viability of the Caesarean hypothesis. (B) There is a specific reference to a Roman 
imprisonment in Acts. (C) Acts also suggests two years for a Roman imprisonment (Acts 
28.30). (D) The reference to an ärroA, oYia in Phil 1.7 does not require a previous specific 
defensive speech. Note that while the term does have a technical legal usage for a 
courtroom defence, 297 as in Hawthorne's reading, `the language does not appear to be 
exhausted by reference to the trial proceedings'. 298 Apart from the connotative breadth 
of the term, the simple possibility that Paul is referring to a future trial, and not one that 
has passed is, again, a perfectly viable option. 299 (E) The suggestion that the reference in 
3.2-6 is to Jews remains debatable-in this thesis I support the hypothesis that they are in 
fact Judaisers. 30° (F) The confidence represented in Philippians that Paul expected to be 
released is a matter I also discuss later. 301 In short, Rapkse has been able to demonstrate 
294 IIpaLtuSpLov is used in the Gospels in precisely this way, see Matt 27.27; Mark 15.16; 
John 18.28,33; 19.9. 
295 Reicke, 283. 
296 Reicke, 283. 
297 BAGD, 96; O'Brien, Philippians, 69; Silva, Philippians, 54. 
298 O'Brien, Philippians, 69; note Silva, 8; and the translation in, Silva, 54. 
299 O'Brien, Philippians, 69. 
300 See the general discussion on pp. 85ff., and pp. 86ff. in particular. 
301 See pp. 77ff. 
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that it is entirely reasonable for Paul to have expected to be released. The suggestion of a 
post-imprisonment visit to Philippi in Phil 2.24 is not problematic. The problem is based 
on the fact that when Paul wrote Romans he imagined that when he eventually arrived 
there, he would then go on to Spain. However, we recognise that the plain historical 
reality of the situation is that Paul did not get to Rome by the means imagined while 
writing Romans. The situation has already changed enough to suggest the possibility that 
Paul's plans themselves had been, at the very least, altered. Hawthorne clearly overstates 
his response to such a possibility when he suggests that `to assume that Paul later changed 
his mind and made plans to return east from Rome would be a most perplexing 
assumption, and one entirely without foundation in fact'. 302 Furthermore, Hawthorne 
argues that going west `loomed extremely large in his [Paul's] thinking because he 
believed that there was no more place for him to work in the east'. 303 Hawthorne's 
vigorous denial of this possibility rests upon the rather tenuous foundation of Rom 15.20, 
23,24. The use of Rom 15.20 to support this argument is problematic, since work done 
at Philippi could hardly be a reference to `another man's foundation'. Rom 15.23-24 
simply points to the fact that Paul has done what he wanted to do in the east, not that he 
did not ever want to go back there. They certainly do suggest, however, that Paul desired 
to move his mission westward to Spain. The question to be asked here is whether with a 
number of years of prison under his belt, and various forms of support from Philippi 
during that imprisonment (Epaphroditus, and the `gift'), it would not be conceivable that 
Paul would go and spend some time with them before heading off once again. One can 
hardly argue that when Paul penned Romans, he was figuring into the equation what 
appears to have been a four-year prison term. In short, things have changed enough to 
warrant the possibility of altered plans. That there is no announcement of changed plans 
in Philippians, as Carson, Moo, and Morris expect, 304 is hardly a basis for suggesting 
there was no change of plans. 
One last point on this matter needs to be made. It is that of the proposed 
journeys, since these are typically used to suggest the presence of internal evidence which 
is against the external. The matter comes down to two different sets of issues: the first is 
302 Hawthorne, xlii. 
303 Hawthorne, xlii. 
304 D. A. Carson, Douglas J. Moo, Leon Morris, An Introduction to the New Testament 
(Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1992), 320. 
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the historical critical issue of how many trips the text suggests were made between Paul 
and Philippi, the second is the plain historical matter of the distance between the two 
points and the time it would take to cover the distance. A generous reading of the 
number of journeys allows for seven journeys: one to alert the Philippians that Paul is in 
jail; a second to send Epaphroditus with a gift; a third for the Philippians to hear about 
Epaphroditus' illness; a fourth for Paul and Epaphroditus to hear about the concern of 
the Philippians. The letter is then thought to suggest three more trips: two journeys for 
Timothy to get to the Philippians and to then return (Phil 2.19), and a third journey for 
Epaphroditus to get back to Philippi (Phil 2.24). 305 
The only question is whether it is possible to make these trips within the required 
time-frame of a Roman imprisonment which has the only external evidence in favour of 
it. The answer is that it is most certainly possible for the following reasons. Concerning a 
mainly land-based journey, through the major routes of the Via Appia and the Via 
Egnatia, the distance is `more than 700 miles', 306 whereas a sea-based journey `would be 
over 900 miles'. 307 The distances, of the possible individual legs for a land journey are 
carefully laid out by Lightfoot308 using references and cross references from ancient 
writers. He then arrives at the conclusion that it would take about a month to travel one 
way between Rome and Philippi. 309 As to a sea journey, though it was a greater distance, 
it would have been covered in less time. 310 Pliny lists the time-frames of several sea-based 
trade journeys to and from various points around the Mediterranean, Egypt and Europe, 
305 So, for example, Carson, Moo, and Morris, 318. However, just why the final journey 
of Epaphroditus needs to be accounted for in the time-frame is quite beyond me, since the time 
required would be subsumed by the time it would take Timothy to get there and back. 
306 Raymond E. Brown, An Introduction to the New Testament (The Anchor Bible Reference 
Library; New York: Doubleday, 1996), 495. 
307 Brown, Introduction, 495. 
308 Lightfoot, 38, n. 1. 
309 On the rate of travel by foot, see the detailed discussion in the article by William M. 
Ramsay, `Roads and Travel (in NT)', A Dictionary of the Bible: Dealing with its Language, Literature, 
and Contents, Including Biblical Theology, 386. Ramsay sees that an average of 17 Roman miles 
(15-16 contemporary miles) per day would be normal. While this would have been a base level of 
speed, other forms of travel in varying combinations would naturally alter the travel time. 
310 Lightfoot, 38, n. 1; Reicke, 284. 
75 
all of which are done over remarkably short periods. 311 The swiftness of the journeys in 
Pliny reflect what may have been possible; though any sea-based journey from Rome to 
Philippi would naturally include land components in varying degrees. Nonetheless, a sea- 
based journey would have been quicker than the one-month land journey. 
What all this amounts to is that the slower journey time, around a month, and a 
generous reading of the number of journeys, seven, do not enable the internal evidence to 
present us with any chronological conflict. Furthermore, as Silva points, this is really a 
`pseudo-problem' and it remains `very difficult to understand why this argument against a 
Roman origin continues to be taken seriously. The matter should be dropped from any 
further consideration. If we do so, however, then the only clear argument against the 
traditional view disappears'. 312 
2. d. The Intimate Character ofPhilippians 
The intimate character of Philippians cannot be easily discarded from the 
evaluation of its general function. Indeed, it is a position of this thesis that intimacy plays 
an important role in how we ought to understand what is going on in Philippians. 313 The 
tone of intimacy is naturally set by the introduction and thanksgiving period. Thus 
O'Brien's comments that Paul's introduction is `unusually earnest', 314 and that `the 
expressions in vv. 7 and 8 show a depth not plumbed elsewhere'. 315 Beare, referring to 
letter C of a partitioned/redacted Philippians (Phil 1.1-3.1; 4.2-9,21-23) claims that `it 
is perhaps the most intensely personal of all Paul's letters'. 316 Indeed, this `impression of 
intimacy and cordiality is echoed by all commentators, and forms the most noticeable 
characteristic which distinguishes Philippians in the Pauline literature'. 317 For example, 
311 Pliny, Natural History, 19.3f. While Pliny's lists reflect swift travel, they are only cited 
here as a means of referencing possibilities for travel. Note the comments in Reicke, 284. 
312 Silva, 7. For more detailed discussions on the matter see the following: O'Brien, 
Philippians, 19-26 (and his bibliography); Bockmuehl, 25-32; Hawthorne, Zvi-xliv (and his 
bibliography); Reicke; Lightfoot, 30-46; Silva, 5-8; Kümmel, 324-32; Carson, Moo, Morris, 
319-21, and most of the major commentaries. 
313 See pp. 135ff. 
314 O'Brien, `The Importance of the Gospel in Philippians', 216. 
315 O'Brien, Philippians, 72-73; also see Fee, 93-95; Martin, Philippians (NCB), 67. 
316 Beare, 25; see also his comments on Phil 1.3-8, Beare, 52. 
317 Ralph P. Martin, The Epistle of Paul to the Philippians (TNTC; Grand Rapids: 
Eerdmans, 1987), 45. 
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Vincent sees the letter as having a generally positive and `happy' mode: `The pervading 
tone of the letter is imparted by Paul's strong personal attachment to the church'. 318 
Lightfoot claims that `the Philippian church was bound to the Apostle by closer ties than 
even the Thessalonian.... But in the epistle to the Philippians the Apostle's 
commendation is more lavish, as his affection is deeper'. 319 For Deissmann, Philippians 
is `the most gracious of all St. Paul's writing'. 320 Müller observes that the qualities of the 
letter `all bear a very personal stamp, and make it to a measure surpassing any other 
letter of the apostle-a letter, the effusion of the heart to a Church he loved'. 321 Coming 
from a Greco-Roman perspective, Stowers notes that while there are no generically pure 
letters of friendship in the New Testament, Philippians bears out the `commonplaces and 
language from the friendly letter tradition'; 322 he later notes that `the letter is ... 
densely 
packed with the motifs of friendship'. 323 Philippians would, however, remain `intimate' 
regardless of its generic features. For example, a rhetorically obvious feature is the fact 
that the asymmetrical power structure, so overt in the patron-client language of the other 
Pauline letters, is muted in this epistle. 324 
Even with such generic influences in place, the language goes beyond their 
requirements. The use of `joy' terms (xap(X and xai pw) is comparatively concentrated in 
Philippians, employed fourteen times in Philippians and only thirty-six times throughout 
the rest of Paul's work. 325 In conjunction with a list of other words indicating intimacy 
and oneness, there is a high concentration of Quv-prefixed words indicating Paul's 
318 Vincent, ziv. 
319 Lightfoot, Philippians, 66. 
320 Deissmann, Light, 230. 
321 Jac J. Müller, The Epistle of Paul to the Philippians (NICNT; Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 
1991), 20-21. 
322 Stowers, Letter Writing, 60. 
323 Stowers, `Friends and Enemies', 107. 
324 For a discussion on patron-client language see the chapter, `The language and ideology 
of patronage' in Richard P. Sailer, Personal Patronage under the Early Empire (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 1982), 8-39, especially the discussion on the language of reciprocity and social 
roles, 22-26; see also Markus Bockmuehl, The Epistle to the Philippians (BNTC; N. P. Hendrickson, 
1998), 34-35. 
325 Silva, Philippians, 12. 
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perception of their partnership: ouyKOLvwvöS (1.7); ouva8XEo (1.27; 4.3); rn . uImxoc (2.2); 
auyxaLpw (2.17,18); ouvEpy6S (2.25; 4.3); auoipaMW9tT1c (2.25); auµ4op4'(w (a reference to 
fellowship with Christ, 3.10); ouµµL4TIT S (3.17); auj*op(oq (3.21); ai (uyoS, auXXaµßävw 
(4.3); OU KOLvwvEw (4.14). 
3. Paul's Immediate Context 
There is no disputing that the epistle is surrounded by suffering on the part of both Paul 
and the Philippians. Phil 1.27-30 indicates that Paul was under the impression that the 
Philippians were experiencing suffering. Paul himself, we believe, was writing from 
prison since he refers to himself as having `bonds' (SEoµoL) in 1.7,14 and, of course, to his 
intercourse with the Praetorian Guard in 1.13.326 
On the details of Paul's imprisonment, I accept the argument of Brian Rapske327 
that Paul's imprisonment was relatively light and that he enjoyed a degree of freedom due 
to an expectation on the part of the Roman officials that his hearing would go in his 
favour, and that they expected him to be released. Furthermore, Rapske's argument 
collaborates claims made by Paul in the Philippians (1.24-26; 2.24), to the effect that 
Paul himself expected to be released. Rapske's argument, while obviously suggestive of 
the fact, does not require that Paul was released in contradiction to the tradition. His 
argument only holds that the Roman officials' estimate of the situation was that Paul 
would be released. Given the little we know of Nero, one could hardly require him to be 
consistent with this estimate. Nonetheless, considering (1) that it was the Jews who were 
bringing a case against Paul and their unfortunate reputation, and (2) that the litterae 
dimissoriae would have counted the case thus far in Paul's favour328 and, finally, (3) that if 
the account in Acts is anything to go by (27.9ff. ), Paul would have easily gained a rather 
healthy reputation among the Roman guard, then we can agree that Paul would have 
stood a good chance of gaining an expected release. 
This of course is in some contrast to the deliberation going on in Phil 1.20b-24 
which suggests that any expectation on Paul's part was qualified in his own mind by the 
fact that he was still in prison and subject to the whims of the Roman judiciary. That is, 
326 On the nature of the Praetorian Guard and the letter's provenance see the earlier 
discussion on pp. 68ff. 
327 Brian Rapske, The Book of Acts and Paul in Roman Custody (vol. 3; The Book of Acts in 
Its First Century Setting; Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1994), 174-91. 
328 See Rapske, 182-89. 
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while all seemed to bode well for his release, he nonetheless contemplated death as a real 
possibility. There is of course, the possibility that Paul was contemplating suicide which 
at the time was not entirely repulsive and often honourable. Craig Wansink has suggested 
the interesting possibility that Paul employs the language of voluntary death so as to 
indicate that he does indeed have a choice and that it is to go against what he desires ('to 
depart and be with the Lord', 1.23) for the sake of the Philippians and thus to offer 
himself as an example to the Philippians. 329 
These expectations on Paul's part are interesting because, in fact, Paul represents 
himself as being somewhat in control of his outcome. Phil 1.20-25 basically states that it 
is better for Paul personally if he dies and goes to be with the Lord, however, to remain 
alive would result in `fruitful work'; thus Paul finds a dilemma: Is it better to die or to 
remain alive? He says that he is hard-pressed between the two options, he prefers to die 
(1.23), but in the end sees that it is better for the Philippians that he should remain alive 
(1.24). For this reason, he then says, `being confident of this [that it is better for the 
Philippians], I know that I will remain and continue with you all'. Most commentators 
reject the idea that Paul had an actual choice because it is very difficult to imagine that, 
given his circumstances, he could have. However, a lot of problems develop from this 
because Paul does seem to suggest that he does have a choice. He suggests that he has 
two options and that one of them is better for him (1.23); of the two, he does not know 
which one to choose and thus has nothing to make known (Kai i1 aLprjooµaL oü yvwpLCW, 
1.22), but that he has settled on one of the choices, to continue living since this is better 
for the Philippians (1.24-26). The significant aspect of this is that Paul actively 
subordinates the power of the Roman government to the power he endeavours to 
construct with respect to his apostolic role. 
Just what Paul means by KaL i1 aiprjooµai oü yv(, )pL(w is under some dispute. It 
could be a reference to a part of the conditional sentence in which the apodosis would be 
introduced by the Kati, 33o or a separate sentence or independent clause which would 
329 See Craig A. Wansink, Chained in Christ: The Experience and Rhetoric of Paul's 
Imprisonments (JSNTSup 130; Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 1996), 125. On the possibility 
of suicide see in particular A. J. Droge and J. D. Tabor, A Noble Death: Suicide and Martyrdom 
among Christians and Jews in Antiquity (San Fransisco: Harper, 1992), 168-83; also A. J. Droge, 
`Mori Lucrum: Paul and Ancient Theories of Suicide, NovT 33 (1988): 263-86; A. J. Droge, `Did 
Paul Commit Suicide? ', BibRev 5 (1989): 14-21. 
330 Clearly a problem, often noted by those who elect this reading, such as Lightfoot, 92. 
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locate the introduction to the apodosis at ioüiö poL. 331 Futhermore, do we take oü 
yvwpýCw in its typical New Testament usage and translate it `I do not make known', since 
yvwpý(w is understood in its twenty-five other New Testament occurrences to mean 
`make known' or `reveal', 332 or do we read it this once as `I do not know'. 333 Lightfoot 
notes that while the former view here is typical of New Testament Greek, the latter is 
typical of Classical. 334 
It seems that the best way to deal with this is first to reject the reading that 
suggests Paul knew something but refused to reveal it, the `causative' reading ('I do not 
make known'335), and then to accept that Paul is representing rhetorically the fact that he 
has experienced a genuine dilemma even though he has already decided upon a choice 
and resolved his dilemma (1.23-26). Thus, however one wants to translate oü yvwp i(w, 
the fact that Paul does make it known or appear to know what choice he will make must 
be taken into consideration, and what we actually have stated in the text must have 
precedence in determining how we read oü yvwpL(w over word studies and extra-biblical 
parallels. 
It is surprising that there appears to be none who has emphasised the fact that this 
phrase is a rhetorical reconstruction of Paul's experience rather than the actual experience 
itself, the resolution of which is stated in 1.23-26. For this reason, the argument over 
whether Paul meant `I do not know', 336 or `I do not make it known', 337 is really a 
331 Also seen as a problem since it assumes an ellipsis of a predicate (µE? ) in the protasis, 
so Lightfoot, 92; Silva, 83. 
332 Or `declare', see O'Brien, Philippians, 127-28; also the discussion in Vincent, 27-28. 
333 BAGD, 163, and the list of extra-biblical attestations for this usage; Silva, 83-84; Fee, 
Philippians, 144-45. 
334 Lightfoot, 93. 
335 See, among others, Vincent, 27-28; H. A. A. Kennedy, `The Epistle to the Philippians' 
in Expositor's Greek Testament (vol. 3; London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1903), 428; William 
Hendriksen, Philippians (NTC; Grand Rapids: Baker, 1962), 77, n. 56. 
336 Lightfoot, 93; BAGD, 163; Fee, Philippians, 144-43, who seems to have misread 
O'Brien saying that `some of these (interpreters) suggest `I cannot tell' in a less colloquial sense, of 
his not being able to reveal it' and cites `esp. Lohmeyer and O'Brien' (Fee, 145, n. 28), when in fact 
O'Brien is quite clear that while such a reading cannot be excluded, it is not the one he chooses, 
O'Brien, Philippians, 127-28, n. 66, note also his translation, p. 116. 
337 Vincent, 27-28; Kennedy, `The Epistle to the Philippians', 428; Hendriksen, 
Philippians, 77, n. 56. 
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pointless one since it assumes that Paul is actually in the midst of a struggle, when it 
appears that the struggle is over. The language Paul uses to express his situation in this 
section (Phil 1.21 ff. ) is a reinforcement of a certain discourse which claims power for 
itself above all other powers. In so doing, Paul seeks to affirm the power of the gospel 
message, so central to his discourse, and which his followers, in this case the Philippians, 
have adopted. If Paul is seen as impotent against the Roman state, so does his discourse, 
and thus, so does the gospel message. 
One of the significances of Rapske's point is that one would assume that the 
Philippians would also know how the land lay regarding Paul's imprisonment, that is, that 
they may have known the estimation of the Roman officials. If so, it may speak to why 
Paul mentions nothing about his personal circumstances and points only to the well-being 
of the gospel. 338 Not a few scholars have already pointed out various reasons for Paul's 
omission of his personal circumstances which generally comes under a common and 
expected umbrella, namely that for Paul the Gospel is of the highest importance and thus 
entwined in, or even more important than, his own personal circumstances. 339 
If the Philippians were under the impression that Paul expected to be released, in 
keeping with Rapske's suggestion of the Roman officials' estimate of the situation, then 
perhaps there was no real need for Paul to go into too much detail unless there were some 
new development of his situation. In spite of this, it is still difficult to imagine why Paul, 
who is generally held to have had a close relationship to the Philippians, did not mention 
anything, unless of course he understands his epistle to be functioning on a different level 
other than simply personal communication; that he had some other, greater rhetorico- 
theological or etho-poetic purpose in mind. Indeed, this is one of the claims I wish to 
make in this project: While Paul's letter is ostensibly a communication-letter 
(VerbindungsbrieJ540), it nonetheless attempts to subvert any questioning on the part of the 
Philippians that there may have been something wrong with Paul and/or his gospel. 
338 Paul's omission of his personal circumstances has caused some surprise among 
scholars (Collange, 51). 
339 Among the many, see Collange, 51; O'Brien, Philippians, 91; O'Brien, `The Gospel', 
219,220,222; Martin, Philippians, 70-71 (who also believes that there is a `tantalising obscurity 
about these verses'); Fee, Philippians, 108 ('to reflect on how his imprisonment has furthered the 
gospel is to reflect on his life! '; and correctly, adds that Paul probably expected Epaphroditus to fill 
in any other details). 
340 See earlier comments, pp. 60f. 
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Paul is in prison. His freedom to act as he wills has been removed. He is a man 
who believes he has a divine commission, but has been forced into submission by an 
earthly power: the collision of two power structures. Yet, he converts his prison to a locus 
of the gospel's power. He inverts the situation and represents his weakness as all the 
more strength. He turns impotence into power. He engages in creating a new 
(sub)version of his circumstances (iä Kai' E4E, 1.12) . Through his epistle, he engages in 
an attempt to invert the normal expectations of Greco-Roman culture so that his readers 
are given the `correct' lens through which they must read his circumstances; that is, they 
are being persuaded to read iä Kai' E4E, the way Paul wants them to read them. 
Being in prison would have been a conventional stroke against Paul's 
reputation. 341 'Regardless of why prisoners found themselves in prison, their mere 
presence there often was seen as pointing to unscrupulous, immoral or illegal activity.... 
Regardless of whether one was actually guilty of any crime, imprisonment in itself was 
seen as a reason for shame'. 342 What Wansink has in view here is that the previously 
established social construction of the prison was of such a nature that entering into prison 
meant entering into a previously established category of shame existing within the minds 
of those within the society. Not only did one feel a sense of shame by virtue of the social 
value, but everyone else automatically and perhaps unconsciously imputed shame to that 
person by virtue of that set of social assumptions. 
It is commonly held that Greco-Roman society, particularly among the educated 
classes, operated on an economy of honour, the acquisition of which was `a constant 
social tug of war, a game of social push and shove'. 343 Imprisonment was one of the 
fastest ways to lose honour and incur shame, equally fast was the public flogging; both 
together, as in Paul's case at Philippi, were a devastating blow to any honour held by the 
subject. 344 Rapske shows that not only is honour removed from the subject of a prison 
sentence, or beating, or some other humiliating punishment, those closely associated with 
341 See the excellent and comprehensive discussion on the relationship between shame 
and prison in Rapske, 283-312. 
342 Wansink, 135. 
343 See B. J. Malina and J. H. Neyrey, `Honor and Shame in Luke-Acts: Pivotal Values of 
the Mediterranean World', in The Social World of Luke Acts: Models for Interpretation (ed. J. H. 
Neyrey; Peabody, Massachusetts: Hendrickson, 1991), 29. 
344 See the excellent discussion on this in Rapske, 283-312. Note that he discusses in 
some detail the circumstances of Paul's beating and incarceration at Philippi. 
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the subject were in danger of losing honour as well. 345 For this reason, it was rather 
common for people to abandon anyone suffering the shame of prison, and quite 
remarkable when they did not. 346 What is most significant in Rapske's work is not the 
fact of the prison-shame scenario but the intensity of it and its lingering effect on the 
subject's social status if he or she should be freed. As to the question of whether Paul 
would have been alive to these social concerns, one would simply ask how could he not 
be? Shame and honour was the real currency of the Greco-Roman world, and `Paul 
would have known that imprisonment, like exile, strained and changed the relationships 
between people', having himself imprisoned others, `he would have been conscious of the 
fragility of relationships between those in prison and those outside'. 347 
Paul's first move to compensate for his problem is, of course, to invoke a sort of 
martyr-principle: Paul is in prison for the sake of the gospel. Since this is true, it is an 
effective way for Paul to maintain his apostolic economy, insofar as his followers, those 
over whom he is positioned as a spiritual father or leader, continue to maintain both the 
social and spiritual structures which govern their relationship to Paul. However, a 
prolonged imprisonment could easily take its toll on such an economy, since it could be 
perceived that the divine power surrounding the apostle Paul was either no longer active 
or that perhaps there was some discrepancy between his claims of the gospel's power and 
the fact that he remains in prison. 
The Philippians, according to Acts, 348 have already experienced a Paul in prison 
(Acts 16.22ff. ); however, on that occasion he was freed by a QELaµöc, yet remained in 
prison along with the other prisoners which led to the conversion of the jailor as well. 
The important development in this story, however, is the honour-shame issue associated 
with Paul's beating and then incarceration in stocks in the inner prison. Most 
importantly, Paul's public and thorough humiliation also publically disgraces the gospel 
which he had been preaching, along with those with whom he had associated. 
345 Rapske, 291-95. 
346 See Wansink 133-45 
347 Wansink, 133; see also Rapske, 298. 
348 The reliability of Acts is a subject far too vast to deal with in this project. For 
discussions on the historicity of Acts, see, for example, Colin. J. Hemer, The Book of Acts in the 
Setting of Hellenistic History (ed. Conrad H. Gempf; Winona Lake, IN: Eisenbrauns, 1990). 
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Paul's experiences at Philippi, according to Acts, are an example of this tug-of-war 
for honour. As mentioned, Paul is `publicly' (ö toc'a) shamed in Philippi. The next 
morning-one assumes it was relatively early since it is to be done in `secret' (X&9pa 
contrasting ögi. ocLh, Acts 16.37)-the city officials try to eject Paul from the city and have 
the matter finished. The result of this would have been to affirm their position as men of 
power in Philippi, who can shame others at will, and to secure Paul's public shame in 
Philippi. Paul has other ideas. He is clearly aware of the problem that this secret 
expulsion poses for him and the gospel's progress in Philippi, and therefore refuses to 
leave the prison in secret and thus maintain or even validate his shame (Acts 16.35-37). 
Paul's response is to indicate that his shaming was the result of an error on the 
part of the city magistrates; specifically, he points to a lack of due process (&Kai&KpvioS)349 
in his being railroaded directly to a public flogging and to a night at the pleasure of the 
Roman government. Paul has the Philippian magistrates in a rather awkward position 
which they confirm by virtue of their subsequent actions. It appears that they also 
assumed that the trial of Paul and Silas was less than desirable, and that rather than risk a 
challenge and then possible failure and subsequent personal condemnation under Roman 
law they were willing to shame themselves to some lesser degree by agreeing to the 
demands of Paul the previously shamed prisoner. Paul and his entourage now get a public 
escort by the city magistrates, yet Paul is not so easily dispatched. He uses this honour- 
building process to its fullest and goes to Lydia's house to meet the church before he 
leaves. The honour-shame struggle is over, scars are marked on both sides. 
It would be wrong to claim that Paul felt that his honour was fully restored at this 
point. 350 It is clear, from 1 Thess 2.1-2, that Paul maintained some indignation 
regarding the episode. In his letter to the Philippians, Paul refers to his experiences rather 
obliquely. In Phil 1.20 there is the possible reference to, or at least a resonance with, the 
shame of his experiences at Philippi: `according to my eager expectation and hope, that I 
shall be shamed (aL'o vW) in nothing'. 351 Phil 1.29-30 is more explicit: `for to you it has 
been given on behalf of Christ, not only to believe in him but also to suffer (näcx(, ) on his 
349 It is not the case that Paul was claiming that it was illegal for the magistrates to mete 
out the stated punishment on a Roman citizen (Rapske, 299-300), against H. W. Tajra, The Trial 
of St. Paul: A Juridical Exegesis of the Second Half of the Acts of the Apostles (WUNT 2/35; Tübingen: 
Paul Siebeck, 1989), 28; see the summary by Rapske, 301-2. 
350 So also Rapske, 298ff. 
351 See Rapske, 298. 
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behalf, having the same sort of struggle (&ywv) you saw in me and now hear to be in me'. 
The point here is that Paul is sensitive enough to the dishonour and shame of public 
humiliation and imprisonment for it to linger around in his mind and surface in his 
subsequent writings. 352 Paul's extended imprisonment (at least two years in Caesarea, 
Acts 24.27), culminating in his voyage to Rome and subsequent imprisonment for at least 
another two years (Acts 28.30), is easily another occasion for Paul to feel the pressure of 
social shame, even if he hopes against it (Phil 1.20). As with the Philippi episode, 
however, Paul is not going to allow shame to take him so easily, and thus he represents his 
circumstances in a positive light (Phil 1.12ff. ). 
In further connection to the Philippi episode and the shame-honour issue, it 
would be correct to assume that there was enough material in this event for the church to 
make something good of it. Paul was now well-known in Philippi, more so than perhaps 
he would have been had he visited the city without incident, and there was always that 
puzzling spectacle of the magistrates escorting them out of the city for the church's spin- 
doctors to play with. The incident at Philippi would have been a rather powerful 
testimony to communicate around Philippi; it certainly would have been woven into the 
fabric of the nascent church's understanding of its identity. 
It is also worth noting the frequently observed fact that one of the `we' passages in 
Acts ends when Paul leaves Philippi the first time (Acts 16.11-13; 17.1; 20.1-7) and 
picks up again when he returns. Assuming that the `we' passages are not literary devices, 
it would seem that this indicates that Luke stayed on in Philippi. Luke is the one who 
communicates the prison story in Acts and he is also the one who, it seems, stays on in 
Philippi. It was obviously an important event, and Acts shows that Luke knew just how 
to narrate the story to generate the best effect. If Luke is left in Philippi, then one would 
expect him to integrate the story into his evangelistic work with the church. Even if Luke 
did not remain in Philippi, such a story would become well-known, and an integral part 
of the church's identity. If so, the fact that Paul is once again imprisoned, for at least four 
years, must have presented some challenge to the impression generated by stories of what 
would now be classified as `divine favour' shown to Paul while experiencing conflict in 
Philippi. Where is this divine favour now? Was it ever there? 
352 See 1 Thess 2.2; 2 Cor 7.5; 11.23ff. 
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4. The Philippians in the Context ofConfict353 
While Philippians presents conflict occurring on a number of fronts, the conflict 
represented in Phil 3 seems to have evoked the most academic interest. The state of 
scholarship regarding the identity of Paul's opponents in Phil 3 has not changed a great 
deal since Gunther's investigation into the subject revealed no less that eighteen different 
positions being put forward. 354 A more recent contribution is by Bateman, 355 in which 
he conflates an older suggestion that the opponents were both Judaisers and Gentile 
Christians, 356 and suggests that they were Gentile Judaisers. 
It is not my purpose here to deal with all the various suggestions, but the major 
trends are worth noting. Paul does not indicate that these opponents are necessarily in 
Philippi, instead it appears he is simply warning the Philippians of a potential or 
impending threat. 357 Almost all of the positions concerning identity incorporate Jews or 
proselytes of some description. That we are dealing with Jews of some sort is obvious (to 
most) from the various points made in the earlier part of Phil 3.358 What clouds the issue 
is that as we get to the end of the chapter there is a less-definable group mentioned: 
`enemies of the cross' and so forth. Are they the same group or are they different? At 
353 The issue of identity is the dominant one in the scholarly discussion of conflict at 
Philippi. This issue is, however, beyond the scope of this project. The interest in this project is the 
fact of conflict and the determining elements that outline the problem sufficiently. For more 
detailed discussion on the subject see John J. Gunther, St. Paul's Opponents and Their Background 
(NovTSup 35; Leiden: Brill, 1973), esp. p. 2, though not recent, it lists eighteen variant 
perspectives on the opponents. See also A. F. J. Klijn, `Paul's Opponents in Philippians iii', NovT 
7 (1964): 278-84; Carl R. Holladay, `Paul's Opponents in Philippians 3', RestQ 12 (1969): 77-90; 
Robert Jewett, `Conflicting Moments in the Early Church as Reflected in Philippians', NovT 12 
(1970): 362-90; K. Grayston, `The Opponents in Philippians 3', ExpT 97 (1986): 170-72; J. B. 
Tyson, `Paul's Opponents at Philippi', Perspectives in Religious Studies 3 (1976): 82-95; W. 
Schmithals, Paul and the Gnostics (trans. J. E. Steely; Nashville: Abingdon, 1972), 65-122; Mikael 
Tellbe, `The Sociological Factors behind Philippians 3.1-11 and the Conflict at Philippi', JSNT 55 
(1994): 97-121; O'Brien, Philippians, 26-35; Silva, 9-10; Hawthorn, xliv-vii. 
354 Gunther, 2. 
355 H. W. Bateman IV, `Were the Opponents at Philippi Necessarily Jewish? ' BSac 155 
(Jan-Mar 1998): 39-61. 
356 See Gunther, 2. 
357 See Fee, Philippians, 9. 
358 Paul's references to circumcision and his word play on Kaiaioµrj to slander those who 
value it, along with his account of his own Jewish heritage all strongly suggest that we are dealing 
with Jews of some sort. 
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least since Lightfoot's 1869 commentary, 359 and as recently as Robert Jewett, 360 many 
have observed that the two passages in Phil 3 seem to indicate two different kinds of 
opponents: 3.2-6 reflects a more Jewish opponent and 3.18-19 reflects a more 
Antinomian/Libertine-Gnostic opponent. Rather than attempt to encompass the two 
under one theory-a task which Jewett believes requires too much energy361-some have 
decided that it makes more sense to divide them into two groups. 
Jewett, who is representative, has pre-empted a challenge to his argument when he 
prefaces it with a long discussion of the character of the Philippian church which ends up 
claiming that the Philippians had a desire for `perfection' which formed the basis of the 
disparate appeal of the two groups: on the one hand some felt they could find perfection 
in circumcision, on the other, others felt they could achieve it though an `exalted spiritual 
self-consciousness'. 362 This last phrase of Jewett's is suggestive of how far from the actual 
evidence within the text he has strayed, since it bears little resemblance to anything Paul 
actually says. Jewett is following good historical practice by reading in the negative 
(following the hints and tips from Schmithals and Köster), and builds his argument upon 
the assumption363 that the phrase `enemies of the cross' in Phil 3.18 is closely parallelled 
to 1 Cor 1.17, which he suggests `refers to a gnostic denial of the soteriological 
significance of the cross', but which actually says, `For Christ did not send me to baptise, 
rather to evangelise, not with sophistic speech, in order that the cross of Christ may not 
be made empty (KEVÖW)'. From this, Jewett builds his arguments for the existence of a 
second, libertinistic group in Phil 3. It seems that, with respect to Jewett's complaint, 
more energy is spent on the two claims necessary for his position: that `enemies of the 
cross' refers to Gnostics and that the Philippians had a desire for `perfection' which 
formed the basis of an attraction to two opposing theologies. 
Another question which raises itself is whether those references which are clearly 
Jewish are aimed at Judaisers requiring some obedience to the law or simply Jews 
preaching their pre-Christian theology in an effort to proselytise. As to the latter, Gnilka 
359 Lightfoot, 143-44,155. 
360 Jewett, `Conflicting Movements', 362-90, esp. 378-87. 
361 Jewett, `Conflicting Movements', 362. 
362 Jewett, `Conflicting Movements', 387. 
363 Suggested by Schmithals, `Die Irrlehrer des Philipperbriefes', 331-32. 
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observes that nowhere (unless this is the exception) does Paul write against Jews who are 
posing a threat to the church. 364 While this argument from silence does not prove much, 
it demonstrates certain trends. The text itself seems to bear out that we are dealing with 
Judaisers, since Paul's argument within the text seems to make more sense when 
understood in reference to Judaisers as opposed to just Jews. 365 The brief mention of the 
kinds of circumcision suggests that what is at stake is not Judaism versus Christianity, but 
whether (some? ) Jewish rites apply to Christianity. On the one hand we have an actual 
circumcision given the label Kaiaioµrj by which Paul redirects the sign of circumcision as 
`sign of the covenant' (Gen 17.11), to be simply a sign of circumcision, to signify the thing 
itself rather than a metaphysical covenant. On the other hand we have a circumcision 
which is not an actual circumcision given the label nEpLio. nj, the intended signification of 
which is entirely metaphysical or as Paul would say, `spiritual' and therefore `real'. The 
function of the label KaiaT0[Iq only works if actual, physical circumcision is being given 
value by those so labelled. When Paul then makes the claim that the Philippians are the 
(true) circumcision because366 they worship God in spirit, his point is not to introduce a 
Jewish/Christian opposition, but a flesh/spirit opposition within the context of 
Christianity. 
Paul's letter to the Philippians makes it clear that, at the very least, he was under 
the impression that the Philippians were experiencing some conflict on account of their 
new faith. To refer again to the Acts account as discussed in the previous section, some 
confusion may have arisen among the Philippian townspeople as to just how they were 
supposed to regard Paul and his entourage. On the one hand they were clearly seen as 
deviants Jews out proselytising, a widely practised, though technically illegal, 
act367-who upset the normal rhythms of the city and were therefore justly punished-the 
364 Gnilka, Philipperbrief 211; also Joachim Gnilka, `Die antipaulinische Mission in 
Philippi' Biblische Zeitschrift 9 (1965) : 260-64. 
365 See O'Brien, Philippians, 33. 
366 The phrase in Phil 3.3, of 1TVEÜµatL 9EOÜ AatpEÜOl)tES Kai KauKWp, LEVOL 
EV XpLQTGý 'I11ooÜ 
Kai OUK ßapKL ... 
is in a causal relationship to itc yäp E%LEV 11 TrEpLionj, insofar as the former 
explains the basis for the latter. 
367 See A. N. Sherwin-White, Roman Society and Roman Law in the New Testament (Oxford: 
Clarendon press, 1963), 78ff. 
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punishment reinforces the deviant status. 368 On the other hand, they had been escorted 
out of the city by the city magistrates who no longer had the power to tell them what to 
do, indeed, Paul does the opposite of the magistrates' requirements by not leaving the city 
directly, rather via Lydia's house. The Western text's version of Acts 16.39 suggests that 
the situation may have been rather volatile and that the magistrates were anxious to get 
Paul and his retinue out of the city lest the citizens band together against them in a not 
similar to the previous day's. Given the possibility of this version of the circumstances 
and what we know of the situation as a whole, we expect that the Philippian church had a 
number of (non Jewish369) enemies from the very beginning. 370 
As mentioned, the letter itself testifies to the presence of conflict at Philippi, both 
from within the church (Phil 1.27; 4.2-3; also 2.1-16) and from without (Phil 1.27-30; 
also 2.15). The internal conflict is hard to define since it relies so much on a few scant 
references in this one epistle, whereas the external conflict is defined in light of Acts and 
other comments by Paul both in this epistle and in his other epistles; moreover, these 
tend to follow a particular pattern and come as no real surprise. It is also the case that the 
external and internal find points along their borders at which they touch each other; thus, 
Paul exhorts the Philippians to `remain steadfast (at1 KW) in one spirit, striving in one 
accord for the faith of the gospel, and not in any way being afraid of those who oppose 
you' (1.27b-28a). That is, the two participial clauses indicate the two sides of what it 
means to remain steadfast. 371 The exhortation in Phil 3.2-3 to `beware ... beware ... 
beware', because `we are the circumcision who worship in the spirit of God', if taken as a 
368 Anthropological theory has identified deviance as a status that comes into existence by 
infringing rules generated by social groups. That is, `the deviant is one to whom that label has 
been successfully applied' by previously established sociological structures (Howard Saul Becker, 
Outsiders: Studies in the Sociology of Deviance [New York: Free Press, 1963], 9). Thus, punishment 
serves to reinforce the deviant status, since it reinforces the sociological structures. See John M. G. 
Barclay, `Deviance and Apostasy: Some Applications of Deviance Theory to First-Century Judaism 
and Christianity', in Modelling Christianity: Social-Scientific Studies of the New Testament in its Context 
(ed. Philip F. Esler; London: Routledge, 1995), 114-27, esp., 122-23; Meeks, First Urban 
Christians, 94ff. 
369 It is important to note that these are non-Jewish enemies since it is almost a given in 
Paul's experience that he and his followers will acquire Jewish enemies as they progress with the 
gospel of Jesus-as-Christ. 
370 This conclusion does not rely on the validity of the Western text's account of the story, 
it is merely assisted by it. 
371 See O'Brien, Philippians, 152. 
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warning, 372 also suggests that Paul was trying to ensure that the inner state of the church 
was such that it could endure the attacks of those Paul refers to as `dogs', `evil workers' 
and the 'mutilation'. 
Paul's exhortation in Phil 3.2 serves to create an oppositional structure which 
reinforces the boundaries of the Philippian church and their distinction from those 
without the church, thereby facilitating a move to unity by virtue of defining their identity 
in terms of what they are not. Thus, `dogs', `evil workers' and the `mutilation' serve as 
indicators or examples of what the Philippians are not, but also as indicators of the 
enemy, of whom they must beware, whose presence among the Philippians would 
dissolve their difference from them and thus also Paul's work. That these are Judaisers, is 
suggested, at least in part, by the reference to them as Kaiaiolni and the subsequent 
oppositional concept TrEp Lio n! j being used of the Philippians who were obviously not 
physically circumcised. 373 
Paul is naturally inclined to the preservation of the Church's identity. For this 
reason he is most concerned about any discord and dissatisfaction, since this leaves the 
Church in a vulnerable state and open for enemies of their faith (theological and secular) 
to enter the Philippian Christian community. A challenge to the community belief system 
as established by Paul is a challenge to his authority and a challenge to his gospel, and 
Paul is always prepared to react against any alteration of, or challenge to, his gospel (see 
Gal 1.8). The reason for this is that the nature of the community is placed into jeopardy 
if its central beliefs are altered; thus Paul's reactions are designed to preserve the group's 
essential nature. Importantly, `the emphasis in Paul's paraenesis, however, is not upon 
the maintenance of boundaries, but upon internal cohesion'. 374 Paul understands the 
internal and the external conflict at Philippi to be closely related: in order for the Church 
372 There is no reason to withdraw the warning dimension from Paul's ß? 1TEtiE formula as 
suggested in G. D. Kilpatrick, `BAEIIETE, Philippians 3: 2', in In Memoriam P. Kahle [eds. M. 
Black, and G. Fohrer; BZAW 103; Berlin: Töpelmann, 1968], 146-48; also G. B. Caird, Paul's 
Letters from Prison (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1976), 131; Garland, 166; Hawthorn, 
124-23. For the opposite position, see Silva, 172; O'Brien, Philippians, 354; Wolfgang Schenk, Die 
Philipperbriefe des Paulus (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 1984), 253; BDF §149. 
373 Naturally, the ease with which these people are here pronounced as `Judaisers' has not 
been felt throughout scholarship, for a comprehensive discussion on the various positions, see 
O'Brien, Philippians, 27-35. 
374 Meeks, First Urban Christians, 100; note also the discussion in Bruce J. Malina, `Early 
Christian Groups: Using Small Group Formation Theory to Explain Christian Organizations' in 
Modelling Christianity: Social-Scientific Studies of the New Testament in its Context (ed. Phillip F. Esler; 
London: Routledge, 1995), 108-9. 
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to survive conflict from without, it must be at peace within, yet this inner stability 
requires a certain hermeneutic which enables the Philippians to read the external conflict 
in a particular way so as to affirm the difference between those outside and those inside. I 
suggest that it is the affirmation and development of this hermeneutic which forms the 
primary interest of Philippians. 
Because internal unity and cohesion around Paul's gospel is the best defence 
against threats from without the church (1.27b-28a)-both theological opposition (Jews 
and Judaisers) and secular opposition (the citizens and government of Philippi and the 
Roman legal system)-Paul includes a good deal of exhortation for the Philippians to 
conduct themselves appropriately, to be unified and of the same mind (Phil 1.9-10,27; 
2.1-16; 4.2-3,8). Moreover, it has been well-noted that Philippians has a high 
concentration of ouv- compounds and friendship terms. 375 While these are without 
question a part of the friendship theme maintained throughout the letter, it should not go 
unnoticed that they also function rhetorically to encourage the assumption that the 
Philippians are already in the same group as Paul and not in the same group as those who 
oppose Paul. So, for example, when Paul uses the first person plural personal pronoun 
(ý IELS) in 3.2, it serves as a subtle way to keep the Philippians on Paul's side and away 
from his opponents-who have now also become the Philippians' opponents. Another 
example is the way Paul represents his own suffering and the suffering of the Philippians 
as connected (1.7,29-30). 376 Paul is anxious to maintain ideo-theological solidarity with 
the Philippians, since he naturally assumes that his own belief system is the true one and 
that the Philippians will fare their best if they are in harmony with his own ideo- 
theological position. 377 Of course, this solidarity which Paul seeks is not a democratic 
common belief as such, but belief in common with Paul's own beliefs, which function as 
the point of cohesion. It is this kind of power structure which Paul seeks to generate in 
Philippians and which constitutes the structuring process in the epistle. 
375 See the list pn p. 77; also Fee, Philippians, 18-21. 
376 This also serves to prevent any wedge being driven between them with respect to the 
honour-shame issue discussed earlier, see pp. 81ff. 
377 So, for example, Phil 3.17, and note also Castelli's work, Imitating Paul: A Discourse of 
Power, the thesis of which is that `the notion of mimesis functions in Paul's letters as a strategy of 
power. That is, it articulates and rationalizes as true and natural a particular set of power relations 
within the social formation of early Christian communities'. 
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The immediate external conflict, at the time of writing, comes primarily from the 
secular quarter, the Philippian citizens and leaders, and, secondarily, 378 from theological 
interests of Judaisers, though pressure from the former group may have increased 
Philippian interest in the latter. However, it is only appropriate to focus on the theology 
of the situation, 379 if one also understands the politics of the situation to be incorporated 
into the theology. That is, while Paul's comparisons may indeed be a general struggle, 
this generality is enabled by real specifics. One cannot dismiss the possibility that Paul 
was in fact referring to some specific situation(s) at Philippi, that some of the Philippians 
were indeed suffering at the hand of the State and were perhaps in prison, simply because 
it is likely the case that äyu v also refers to the general struggle to spread the gospel. 
The reference to a common struggle on Phil 1.30 (Tov a)iöv &$ va ExovtEc) is 
most likely a reference to oppression by secular forces: 380 Phil 1.27 is referring to a 
present situation, whereas in 3.2 he is referring to a future possibility; 381 the opponents 
mentioned in 1.27 are headed for destruction (&'rwXEL(X), which in Paul is the province of 
non-Christians; 382 while one could postulate that in Phil 1.30 Paul was referring to 
Jewish-Christian oppression in Rome, it seems more probable that he was referring to the 
secular opposition that he was experiencing since there is no account of his suffering at 
the hands of the Jewish-Christians while in Philippi, when in fact there is ample evidence 
that he suffered at the hands of the Empire while in Philippi. 
Thus, it is unlikely that he is referring to any kind of theologically-based challenge 
(from Judaisers), since the common struggle is one which they themselves had previously 
observed in Paul (oLov ELSEEE Ev E[101) and which they now hear Paul is experiencing (vüv 
&KOÜETE Ev Eµoi), and we know of no point at which the Philippians saw Paul in conflict 
378 `Secondarily' because it is the threat of conflict and not the actuality of conflict which 
causes Paul concern. 
379 Gnilka, for example, argues that the point of comparison is the theological foundation 
of their struggle, see Gnilka, 101-2. 
380 Against Phil 1.28 as a reference to secular forces, and as a reference to itinerant Jewish- 
Christian preachers (or `Judaisers'), anticipating the rebuke in 3.2ff., see Collange, 75; Silva, 92; 
Hawthorn, 58-60; G. P. Wiles, Paul's Intercessory Prayers (SNTSMS 24; Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1974), 210. On the opposing position, that Phil 1.28 refers to secular opposition, 
see O'Brien, Philippians, 152-58; also see Fee, Philippians, 167, n. 50; Martin, Philippians, 15,23, 
83; Gnilka, 99-100. 
381 So also Gnilka, 99. 
382 1 Cor 1.18; O'Brien, Philippians, 153. 
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with the Judaisers. They certainly did see him in conflict with the State, and one assumes 
that this is dominant in Paul's mind as he writes of their common struggle; however, this 
does not then mean that Paul is only referring to imprisonment and public floggings, 
since one is hard pressed to exclude all the nuances of `struggle' (äyWv) in this context in 
favour of just one. We can certainly understand Paul as referring both to his present 
circumstances-a well-developed theme in the epistle thus far-and to the general 
struggle for the gospel in whatever circumstances, since this encompasses his present 
experience and that of his Philippian experience. 383 Hence Pfitzner's claim that `the 
Apostle conceived of his apostolic mission as an Agon for the Gospel or for the faith', and 
that this Agon extends `to include the activity of his coworkers, and also the members of 
an entire congregation under special duress (Phil 1: 27ff. )'. 384 
As already indicated, Paul was concerned that the Philippians would also 
experience conflict from an alternate form of Christianity-the Jewish-Christian group or 
`Judaisers'-(Phil 3.2; also 3.17-19? )385 which Paul considered to be inferior to his own 
since it required the adherent to assume the confines of the Jewish law, and restricted the 
freedom for which Paul so vigorously preached and argued. 386 This sort of conflict seems 
to bother Paul the most that is, if we take 3.17-19 to be a warning against ideo- 
theological challengers. The way he refers to the opponents in 1.28 is different enough 
from that in 3.2,17-18 for us to be confident that he is not in 1.28 referring to Judaisers 
or any other ideo-theological opponents. The Philippians are not told to `beware' the 
secular opponents, they are simply told not to be afraid (µ'j TrivpöµEVOL), and this fits an 
unsubtle and physical threat far better than an ideo-theological threat. The secular threat 
is, as mentioned, unsubtle and simple; the danger to their faith is a crude one based on 
fear. 
383 See the discussion in Pfitzner, 114-29, esp. 127-28,191-95. 
384 Pfitzner, 127, and 128 respectively. 
385 ale it is generally agreed that 3.2 is a reference to Judaisers, there is some question 
as to whether we can classify 3.18-19 also as a reference to Judaisers. On this, see the bibliography 
in n. 353, but note especially the summarising discussions in O'Brien, Philippians, 26-35, and 
Martin, Philippians, 22-34. For the purposes of this project the identity is not important, what is 
important is that Paul understands them to be an ideo-theological threat to the Philippians. 
386 See Gal 2.4. 
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The ideo-theological threat -a threat to the stability of the discourse Paul has 
established at Philippi387-is subtle and complex, entering by already-established 
discursive openings made by Paul's own work. It bases itself not upon fear but upon 
security and commonality, a sort of ideo-theological Trojan horse. The Judaisers can 
only succeed because of the discourse Paul has already given to the Philippians: they can 
enter Philippi in the belly of that gift from God, the gospel, the discourse of hope in 
Christ KATA HAYAON. The action of the Judaisers is to circumscribe the Christ event 
with a new context that will enable it to be re-read in terms of their own ideo-theological 
interests. Paul, therefore, pre-empts this move by reinforcing the discourse already in 
place with his thoroughly rhetorical biographical account in Phil 3. This account 
maintains Paul's position of superiority (superior whether Jew or Christian or both) and 
thus the superiority of his own ideo-theological position which he has established at 
Philippi. 
5. Summary 
On the basis of the preceding discussion, we can say that the historical context of Paul, 
the Philippians and the letter is as follows. Paul was in Rome when he wrote Philippians. 
He penned a single letter that was designed, among other things, to inform them of 
certain information, and thank them for the gift, to create a Christ-centred phronesis so 
that they would know how to act in certain situations, and to reassure the Philippians, 
which is the `real business' of the letter and necessarily plays a role in the other aspects of 
the letter's purpose. The letter is particularly intimate, and this assists in the 
development of ethos within the letter, enabling Paul to perform the necessary rhetorical 
manoeuvres he needs to make. Paul's immediate context was a low-level incarceration in 
Rome, the nature of which suggested that the guards in charge of Paul would have 
expected Paul to be released. His imprisonment nonetheless plays an unfortunate social 
role among the Philippians and Paul must work in his epistle to counter the problems 
suggested by his imprisonment. This is exacerbated by the fact that the Philippians 
themselves are experiencing conflict on more than one level. However, Paul attempts to 
help them see things from his own perspective and enable them to interpret the situation 
as the noble struggle of the gospel. 
387 The interesting thing is that it is not so much a threat to their faith as it is to their 
theology, and as such appears more of a problem for Paul than for the Philippians, since Paul 
would see this sort of regression as a move away from the potential of freedom secured 
by the work 
of Christ and thus an essential regression away from Christ. 
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Chapter Three 
The Socio-Philosophical Context of Paul and his Writing 
1. Introduction 
Paul is a man who is a part of his society and whose society was a part of him; naturally 
this was also true of the Philippians. While there may have been some divergent socially 
discursive features within their respective experiences, it is evident that Paul is a man who 
attempts to engage people on their own terms. Note, for example, the claims in 1 Cor 
9.19-23 where Paul describes his practice of adapting to the needs of those to whom he is 
ministering. 388 Thus, I shall discuss Paul's social location in the general philosophical 
matrix of his society-I have in view here the general social discourse of the shared 
culture of Paul and the Philippians and the set of `cognitive tools' available to Paul for use 
in his interaction with the Philippians. In addition, I shall also discuss the historical 
situation of the letter in terms of ancient letter writing practices, and the ancient 
assumptions associated with the function of language in general. The respective 
discussions on Paul's philosophical location and writing practices, are essentially attempts 
to describe some of the key cultural features which precede Paul's thought and expression 
with a view to considering the fact that such contexts not only precede Paul's thought and 
expression but constrain them. 
2. The Socio-Philosophical Situation ofPaul and the Philippians 
In the previous chapter it was noted that the major functions generally understood to be 
the complex of Paul's purposes behind Philippians are (1) to respond to their gift, (2) to 
allay fears of his own welfare, (3) to warn of false teachers ('opponents'), (4) to exhort 
them to be steadfast and unified in the face of conflict. The first two of these are 
generally contextualised in terms of an intimate relationship between Paul and the 
Philippians. 389 The latter two suggested purposes reflect the general hortatory tone of 
Paul's apostolate which pervades all of his letters. 
388 Note also Luke's telling of Paul's sermon on Mars Hill in Acts 17.22ff. in which Paul is 
presented as doing this very thing: contextualising the gospel for the people to whom he is 
communicating. 
389 See the comments on pp. 75ff. 
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Encountering this connection in Philippians between intimacy and ethical 
exhortation is not entirely serendipitous. In fact, it appears that to some degree Paul 
subscribed to the Greco-Roman psychagogic practice in which the intimate and the 
hortatory are frequently, if not necessarily, found. It is not at all an easy task to determine 
the degree of Paul's confluence with Greco-Roman moral philosophical ideals and 
practice. There is no question that Paul was influenced by the culture, 390 the question 
has been what influenced him. The search for this `what' is really the impetus behind the 
research on rhetorical and epistolary forms in the Pauline epistles, the various metaphors 
and allusions Paul employs, and anything else comprising the cultural background or 
social world of the Apostle. The enduring research on Paul is that which develops a 
contextual matrix which grants historical and cultural significance to specific features of 
Paul's life while keeping them in balance with other features of the culture. 391 
This matrix extends into the culture as a whole, and not to the elite alone. We 
cannot assume that due to the comparative lack of education and literacy392 the poorer 
members of, for example, the Philippian community were completely isolated from those 
ideals espoused among the literate twenty to thirty percent. We have to admit, 
nonetheless, that making claims about the worldview of the uneducated is `tantalizingly 
difficult', as Meeks has it, 393 for no other reason than the simple fact that their illiteracy 
prevented them from expressing their voice in the record of human history. The 
significance of this is that the majority of any population is not the elite, rather it is the 
`small community' which `has been the very predominant form of human living 
throughout the history of mankind'. 394 
While illiteracy silenced the hoi polloi, it would not have prevented them from 
having access to a largely oral-based tradition of communicating ideas. That is, while the 
390 See Malherbe's discussion on Paulus Hellenisticus in Abraham J. Malherbe, Paul and 
the Popular Philosophers (Minneapolis: Fortress, 1989), 8-9. 
391 The respective works of A. D. Nock, H. J. Cadbury, and E. A. Judge, for example. 
392 In the first century, less than ten percent of the general Empire was literate, see Wayne 
A. Meeks, The Moral World of the First Christians (London: SPCK, 1987), 62. Within the 
Hellenistic cities it may have reached as much as twenty to thirty percent, see `Literacy', 
OCD, 
869. 
393 Meeks, The Moral World, 40. 
394 Robert Redfield, The Little Community: Viewpoints for the Study of a Human Whole 
(Comparative Studies of Cultures and Civilizations; Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1955), 
3. 
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literary form of philosophical ideas certainly bears out the `great traditions' through 
history, it was `by hearing them recited, listening to public speeches, attending lectures, 
hearing sermons and homilies and exhortations that one learned the tradition'. 395 Thus, 
when we consider those to whom Paul is writing, we can affirm Malherbe's claims that 
Paul's readers can be expected to have been familiar with the philosophical traditions to 
which Paul adhered, and that there is no reason Paul should not have drawn directly from 
the popular philosophical tradition. 396 The following pages of this, and the next, chapter 
discuss what some of those philosophical traditions and conventions were, and the nature 
of Paul's potential confluence with them. An important point here is that philosophical 
language filtered down into the discursive structures of non-specialised educated, and 
possibly even uneducated, people of the Greco-Roman world and became normative, even 
required. That is, those ways of thinking which were born in the philosophical 
communities, and the ideals generated by those `ways of thinking', became common to 
the larger populace through a popularising process. Thus, someone in Paul's position 
would have had available to him philosophical ways and `tools' of thinking which he 
brought to bear upon his apostolic activity. 
2. a. Locating Paul as a Product ofhis Time 
As is the case with all of us, Paul was a product of his time. This, of course, is no 
new claim, but the depths of its significance continue to be plumbed by scholars of the 
New Testament. These depths, however, have often proved difficult to fathom, leading 
Edwin judge to remark that `the trouble with Paul has always been to put him in his 
place'. 397 Although the study of Paulus hellenisticus, to use Malherbe's term, tended to 
wane during the middle of the twentieth century, it has enjoyed a recent revival of interest 
which connects one branch of more recent Pauline studies with those typical of the 
beginning of the twentieth century. Thus, the early twentieth century comment by 
Johannes Weiss continues to ring true: `students of the New Testament should know 
Seneca, Epictetus, Plutarch, Lucian, Musonius, Marcus Aurelius, and Cicero intimately, 
and pursue the study of the New Testament with Hans von Arnim's collection of Stoic 
395 Meeks, The Moral World, 40. 
396 Malherbe, Popular Philosophers, 50. 
397 Edwin A. Judge, `St Paul and Classical Society', j7AC 15 
(1972), 19. 
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texts at their elbows'. 398 Perhaps, the only modification we would make to Weiss's 
comment is to increase the list of relevant Hellenistic writers to include the likes of 
Philodemus and Epicurus. 399 
One of the basic goals of this thesis, and Pauline studies in general, is to further 
consider Paulus hellenisticus, in order to further understand Paulus christianus-the most 
prominent figure in the foundation of Christian thought. Implied in this goal is the 
assumption that the (primarily Hellenistic) culture in which Paul lived, had a significant 
influence on the way he thought and interpreted the world around him. It easily follows 
that to understand more about his relationship with that culture is to give us a clearer 
picture of the processes behind Paul's thinking and writing. Thus, another claim is that 
Paulus hellenisticus forms an unconscious context, or `pre-text', and foundation for Paulus 
christianus. The general interest of this project, with respect to Paulus hellenisticus, is the 
language of the moral philosophers, and Paul's adaptation and use of that language for his 
own apostolic purposes. 
There is little risk in claiming that Paul can be classified as a moral philosopher or 
a psychagogue. Scholars such as Abraham Malherbe have spent much of their academic 
lives compiling copious documentation which evidences and articulates the affinity of 
Paul's activity among various churches in the mid-first century ce with the activity of the 
Hellenistic moral philosophers. 400 However, my purpose here is simply to survey some of 
the principles held by ancient philosophers which led to the popularising of philosophy 
and thus enabled philosophical concepts to enter into the social discourse of the average 
398 Johannes Weiss, Die Aufgaben der neutestamentlich Wissenshaft in der Gegenwart 
(Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1908), 4,11,55; cited in Abraham Malherbe, Popular 
Philosophers, 3. 
399 The significance of Philodemus for the study of Paul is still in its nascent stage, with 
only three works: Clarence E. Glad, Paul and Philodemus: Adaptability in Epicurean and Early 
Christian Psychagogy (NovTSup 81; Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1995); Glad, `The Significance of 
Hellenistic Psychagogy for Our Understanding of Paul', in The New Testament in Its Hellenistic 
Context (eds. Gunnlaugur A. Jönsson and Einar Sigurbjörnsson og Petur Petursson; Studia 
Theologica Islandica 10; Reykjavik: Gudfrxdistofnun-Skälholtsütgäfan, 1996); Glad, `Frank 
Speech, Flattery, and Friendship in Philodemus', in Friendship, Flattery, and Frankness of Speech: 
Studies on Friendship in the New Testament World (ed. John T. Fitzgerald; NovTSup 82; Leiden: E. J. 
Brill, 1996). 
400 See the bibliography in David L. Balch, Everett Ferguson, and Wayne A. Meeks, eds., 
Greeks, Romans, and Christians: Essays in Honor of Abraham J. Malherbe (Minneapolis: Fortress 
Press, 1990). 
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educated individual as `intellectual equipment'401 or to function as `the general 
intellectual currency'402-the sort of equipment used, or currency traded by Paul to 
establish and nurture his churches, which forms the background of his epistolary efforts, 
and which constrains his discourse. However, it is important to note that the existence of 
such `intellectual equipment' does not also mean that those who used it were conscious 
that it was anything more than the norm. It is possible that highly educated individuals 
may have been, but as these devices filtered into the popular discourse, they would have 
eventually lost their specialised opacity and become as transparent as the discourse itself. 
Yet, this does not mean that the functional features of such `equipment' were lost when it 
entered into social discourse. The point is that social discourse would be altered by its 
absorption of this conceptual equipment. 
More specifically, it is the presence of a social discourse behind the writing of Paul 
which forms the interest here, and not the philosophical discourses themselves. 
Understanding Hellenistic moral philosophy in relation to Paul is a matter of 
understanding `philosophy ... as a phenomenon of education and society'. 403 
Recognising this allows us to consider a framework according to which we can put Paul 
`in his place' as a possible participant in this social phenomenon of increased awareness 
and use of moral philosophical concepts. This means locating Paul in the context of the 
philosophical mood of the educated classes404 of Greco-Roman society in order to 
appreciate more of the nature of the social discourse according to which Paul thought, 
wrote, and taught. 
401 Miriam Griffin uses this phrase in her description of the intellectual developments of 
the Ciceronian age. It is helpful because it recognises the reality that people develop principles, 
ideas and categories of thought in order to do things with them (read `function'), in the same way 
that people develop equipment to achieve various tasks. See Miriam Griffin, `The Intellectual 
Developments of the Ciceronian Age', in The Cambridge Ancient History (vol. 9; 2n ed.; 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 728. 
402 Judge, `St Paul and Classical Society', 33. 
403 Judge, `St Paul and Classical Society', 32 (emphasis added). I emphasise this here to 
draw attention to judge's point that philosophy was a part of society, not simply education, and as 
a part of society it naturally influenced the construction of conventions within society. 
404 That Paul worked with the educated classes, see Edwin A. Judge, The Social Pattern of 
Christian Groups in the First Century (London: Tyndale, 1960), 60; See also Judge `St Paul and 
Classical Society', 28; more recently, Meeks, First Urban Christians, 51ff., and Abraham J. 
Malherbe, Social Aspects of Early Christianity (2nd ed.; Philadelphia: Fortress, 1983), 29ff., have 
both advocated and developed judge's original claims. See also Averil Cameron, Christianity and 
the Rhetoric of Empire: The Development of Christian Discourse (Sather Classical Lectures 55; 
Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994), 36-37. All this is contrary to Deissmann, Paul, 51. 
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2. b. Locating Paul among the Philosophers 
There are a number of close parallels to Paul when we think of the various groups 
of moral philosophers in the Greco-Roman world. Abraham Malherbe has presented 
Paul in terms of the gentle Cynics; more recently, Clarence Glad has suggested that the 
Epicurean parallel is preferred when one considers Paul's psychagogic activity in his 
nurturing of the early Christian communities, 405 and Troels Engberg-Pedersen has at 
times emphasised the Stoic elements in Paul's writing. 406 Of course, it is not a matter of 
choosing one over another of these parallels, as the diversity between the publications of 
these scholars demonstrates, 407 it is rather a matter of recognizing that such structures40s 
were there for the using as `intellectual equipment'409 by moral leaders-particularly 
when such leaders did not see themselves as moralists first and leaders second, and had 
no particular allegiance to a given philosophical school. 
With respect to Paul, the implication is that there were patterns or categories of 
thought in existence which were created by the philosophical schools over a period of 
time, which were subsequently integrated into the culture to the degree that someone 
with Paul's education and life experience would encounter them both unconsciously as 
cultural norm, and consciously as moral philosophy in the `class room'. 410 The result is 
that when Paul goes to think about how he should act towards those whom he is guiding 
(the Philippian Christian community, for example)-what he should say to them, how he 
should say it to them, the best ways to bring them around to his way of thinking, even his 
own sense of responsibility towards them-he will naturally be inclined to employ the 
rhetorical topics and strategies, and even conceptualise these things according to what 
seems normal to him-what I am here calling the `discourse' of his culture. This does not 
deny that Paul was innovative, or that he modified Jewish and Hellenistic values in order 
405 Glad, Paul and Philodemus, 4. 
406 Troels Engberg-Pedersen, `Stoicism in Philippians'. 
407 This is not to suggest that these scholars claim that the only way to understand Paul is 
according to one particular school, indeed, the opposite is true. 
408 By 'structures' I mean philosophical systems and structures of thought which are less 
conscious than the formal system, but are produced by that system. 
409 See above n. 401 
410 Not everything in society, of course, is encountered unconsciously. As an educated 
individual, it is probable that Paul was exposed to various moral philosophical treatises. 
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to cultivate a `Christian morality'. The important point is that his modification, 
innovation, and cultivation all begin with something which is already there and that the 
subsequent Christian discourse which developed from Paul's writings is really based on 
the social discourse of his culture. Indeed, Averil Cameron sees that the Christians are 
`reflecting and responding to the same influences that were making themselves felt on 
pagan discourse', and that even when we get a century or two beyond the first Christians 
there is still surprisingly little difference between pagan and Christian discourse and 
conceptual schema. 411 Or as Wayne Meeks has it, 
The daily practice of most church members was doubtless 
indistinguishable in most respects from that of their unconverted 
neighbours. Differences in moral judgment and practice between one 
Christian, or group of Christians, and another often seem as great as or 
greater than differences between the Christians and the `pagans'. 
Attempts to discover overt changes in those areas of public discourse, 
practice, or legislation that we would identify as morally sensitive ... turn 
up embarrassingly few examples of a clear difference that could be 
ascribed to Christian influence. 412 
An example of both this discourse at work and its content is found in Seneca. In a 
discussion on the efficacy of philosophical precepts for the person progressing towards the 
philosophical telos, 413 Seneca cites some of these `brief but weighty' precepts: 
`Nothing in excess', `The greedy mind is satisfied by no gains', `You must 
expect to be treated by others as you yourself have treated them'. We 
receive a sort of shock when we hear such sayings; no one ever thinks of 
doubting them or of asking: `Why? ' So strongly, indeed, does mere truth, 
accompanied by reason, attract us. 414 
The `shock' (ictus) to which Seneca refers is not one of incredulity towards the precepts, it 
is rather a reference to the weight of their perceived veritas. When Seneca claims that no 
one ever thinks of doubting the veritas of these precepts, he assumes the existence of a 
shared set of cultural norms, what he calls `mere truth' (ipsa veritas), without which his 
example has no currency. These precepts appear to have veritas because they are entirely 
confluent with the complex of cultural expectations and codes which made up the 
411 Averil Cameron, Christianity and the Rhetoric of Empire, 7. 
412 Wayne A. Meeks, The Origins of Christian Morality: The First Two Centuries (New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 1993), 2. 
413 Typically understood as EübaL LOVia ('happiness'), as a result of virtue. 
414 Seneca, Ep. 94.43. 
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discourse of that society. They have great effect because they summarise the ideals of the 
culture in brief but potent linguistic structures. 
3. Paul and Psychagogy 
The need for a cultural matrix to offer perspective presents Greco-Roman psychagogy to 
us as a valuable means for understanding Paul. The importance of psychagogy is that 
while we may say that it is a somewhat singular feature of Greco-Roman society, it 
nonetheless contains within it a complex of social features which have often been linked 
to Paul as separate elements of his cultural context, but not necessarily as a previously 
established, integrated structure. For example, many of the features of Greco-Roman 
philosophy and morality (such as models of friendship, pedagogy, leadership, exhortation, 
admonition, and so forth) which have frequently been noted in Paul's letters find a 
confluence in the social model of the Greco-Roman psychagogue. As we study the 
psychagogue we begin to give more context, and thus more significance, to some of Paul's 
practices which have less obviously originated in the culture of Greco-Roman philosophy. 
While the relationship between Paul and moral philosophy is not a new 
suggestion, it has not been until more recently that the connection has been as well 
demonstrated as it has been by Abraham Malherbe415 and Clarence Glad. 416 Glad 
makes the important point that `we are indeed misguided if we exclude a pedagogical 
passion from Paul's nurturing paternity'. 417 As with every attempt to locate Paul within 
his cultural environment, it is not so much that Paul is a psychagogue or a Greco-Roman 
moral philosopher, or whatever we may want to say he is, rather that such social realities 
and behavioural patterns were in place as a part of the social discourse, functioning as a 
set of options for him to utilise as the need arose on a given occasion. Thus, as Glad 
points out, `it is not important that we be able to classify Paul as a "psychagogue" but 
rather that we recognize his participation in a widespread "psychagogic" activity'. 418 
That is, it is important that we recognise Paul's adherence to the already available social 
415 E. g., Abraham J. Malherbe, Paul and the Thessalonians: The Philosophic Tradition of 
Pastoral Care (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1987) 
416 E. g., Glad, Paul and Philodemus; Glad, `The Significance of Hellenistic Psychagogy for 
Our Understanding of Paul'. 
417 Glad, `The Significance of Hellenistic Psychagogy for Our Understanding of Paul', 92. 
418 Glad, `The Significance of Hellenistic Psychagogy for Our Understanding of Paul', 60. 
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model of the psychagogue-something exemplified in the literary relationship between 
Seneca and Lucilius, in which Seneca assumes an authoritative posture and gently 
reproaches and exhorts Lucilius to spiritual and moral maturity. 419 One may even want 
to avoid suggesting that Paul was conscious of such adherence; nonetheless, it must be 
the case that when Paul understood and enacted his role among the churches, he 
understood and enacted that role in terms familiar to him as a member of that culture (to 
whatever degree we can generalise the Greco-Roman world as a unified culture), and to 
his readers as members of that culture. Hence Alexander's statement that 
if we have learned anything from the last twenty years of New Testament 
scholarship, it is that `thought' does not operate in a kind of disembodied 
noetic sphere independent of personal and social structuring. Thought is 
an activity of thinkers, and thinkers are tied in to certain patterns of 
behaviour, restricted to certain specific forms of communication, by the 
society they live in. 420 
The point to be made here is that, given his role as a spiritual and moral guide, the 
psychagogic model, or established norm, presents itself to Paul (unconsciously, at the 
very least) as a prudent path to follow in his endeavour to serve as an effective leader in 
that society. Hence Glad's claim that "`Hellenistic psychagogy" or the "guidance of 
souls" among Greeks and Romans reflects a common leadership model available to and 
appropriated by Paul, ' and was `a widespread model of spiritual and ethical guidance, 
used in one way or another by most moralists of the Hellenistic period'. 421 The 
availability of that convention is well stated by Malherbe: `it was the Epicureans who had 
developed the system of psychagogy, but what Philodemus says in the first century B. C. is 
reflected in the writings of Seneca, Paul's Stoic contemporary, and a generation later by 
the Platonist Plutarch. In short, the concerns and techniques that interest us were 
widespread at the time Paul wrote'. 422 Thus, when we speak of the `purpose' of 
Philippians, 423 the social models available to Paul play a role in both the way Paul 
419 On Seneca as psychagogue, see I. Hadot, Seneca und die griechisch-römishe Tradition der 
Seelenleitung (Berlin; de Gruyter, 1969). 
420 Loveday Alexander, `Paul and the Hellenistic Schools: The Evidence of Galen', in Paul 
in His Hellenistic Context (ed. Troel Engberg-Pedersen; Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1994), 60. 
421 Glad, `The Significance of Hellenistic Psychagogy for Our Understanding of Paul', 57. 
422 Malherbe, Paul and the Thessalonians, 84. 
423 See the previous chapter, pp. 56f. 
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construes his responsibility to his churches and the form in which that responsibility is 
manifested. 
If we were to summarise Paul's purposes as an attempt to maintain his 
relationship with the church, which assumes also the attempt to maintain the nature of 
that relationship-the maintenance of group purity, stability and progress-then we also 
summarise the basic goals of any Hellenistic psychagogue. Recognising all this, Stanley 
Stowers labels Philippians as either a `hortatory or psychagogic letter of friendship'. 424 
Stowers also notes that Paul 
describes himself as a psychagogue for the Philippians when he says `but to 
remain in the flesh is more necessary on your account.... I shall remain 
and continue with you all, for your progress and joy in the faith' 
(1: 24-25).... Throughout the letter, Paul presents himself as a model of 
one who is struggling in this process. He presses on toward the goal and 
strains forward to the prize. 425 
So why is it important to observe these psychagogic issues with respect to Paul? 
Phil 1.12-18 is typically read as a minor introductory section of the epistle and thus as 
primarily a description of Paul's historical circumstances. It is the contention of this 
thesis, however, that this section is (1) the main reason for writing, 426 and (2) is not 
simply historical data, but psychagogic/friendship rhetoric employed to rectify any 
potential perceptions of a discrepancy between Paul's word and deed. If we read this 
section of the epistle in the light of the tensions in moral discourse between the 
conventions of word and deed, and frank speech (friend and flatterer), we begin to see 
how Paul's language adheres to, and is even governed by, these well-established social 
conventions. 
3. a. What is Psychagogia? 
Psychagogia was originally a reference to the leading of souls through the nether 
world and evoking the souls of the dead. 427 It then took the more familiar, metaphorical 
424 Stowers, `Friends and Enemies', 108. 
425 Stowers, `Friends and Enemies', 108-109. 
426 See discussion on pp. 58ff. 
427 See LSJ, 2026. Note also the very interesting use of *uxaycay- cognates in Lucian. 
When Lucian discourses on contemporaneous issues, he uses it as a reference to amusement (True 
Story, 1.2; Wisdom of Nigrinus, 18,21; Double Indictment, 10), but when he discourses on the 
ancient myths he employs the ancient referent of leading the souls of the dead (Dialogues of the 
Gods, 4.1; 11.4). For a comprehensive discussion of the development of ifuxay(yEiv from being a 
reference to the leading of departed souls to the nether world, to a reference to moral exhortation, 
see Glad, Paul and Philodemus, 18ff; see also the article by Elizabeth Asmis, `Psychagogia in Plato's 
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referents of persuasion and influence through speech. Thus, Socrates defines rhetoric as 
an `entirely psychagogic art' (ö; Lov ... TExv11 1Jruxayc)yC(x) which is conducted `through 
words' not in the public courts alone but also in private. 428 Along with this came both 
the positive connotation of influencing people for good and the negative connotation of 
beguilement. In the Phaedrus, Socrates' point is to elucidate the difference between good 
and bad uses of rhetoric (Isocratean rhetoric in particular429) and thus also the difference 
between the two uses of psychagogia. 430 
Rhetoric, and thus psychagogia, had some delightfully treacherous qualities 
according to Plato (among others) : it is the art by which one thing can be presented as 
just and unjust at the same time to the same people; thus it is &VILAoyLKrj, 431 or the `art of 
opposition'; 432 it is the art of deception (&1T&t'n); 433 it is the beguilement of the appetites of 
the soul via images and phantasms. 434 Or, in Isocrates' view, it is the ability to beguile 
through poetic device. 435 In the Shepherd of Hermas the participle is used to explain the 
effects of wealth, in that it leads the soul astray. 436 
The Epicurean Polystratus has an interesting discussion on the nature of the 
philosopher which also places psychagogia in rather bad company. He urges that the true 
philosopher should not proceed with syllogisms or inductions (QuX oyio toüc Tj E1raywydc 
Phaedrus', ICS 11.1/2 (1986): 153-72. 
428 Plato, Phaedrus, 261 A-B; note also Phaedrus 271 C-D where he rather matter-of-factly 
says that the function of speech is to lead the soul (uxaywy(a). 
429 `It is evident that those who desire to command the attention of their hearers must abstain 
from admonition and advice, and must say the kind of things which they see are most pleasing to the crowd 
(Isocrates, To Nicocles, 49 [Norlin, LCL], emphasis added). 
430 See, Asmis, Psychagogia, 157. 
431 Plato, Phaedrus, 261 B-E. 
432 Asmis, Psychagogia, 155. 
433 Plato, Phaedrus, 261E-262A. 
434 Plato, Timaeus, 71A. But note that it was Plato's goal in the Phaedrus to advocate a 
positive use of psychagogia as positive moral guidance (see Phaedrus, 260E-272B; 277B-C). 
435 Isocrates, Evagoras, 10. 
436 Shepherd of Hermas, vis. 3.6.6. 
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1TEpaivoviac) nor become a peddler of sentences (prPLKOTroüviac); 437 rather to investigate 
nature straightly438 (ýuoLoXoyij aviac öp86S)439-`in so doing, one dispels the falsities 
handed down through the myths and the poets; thus one also dispels every fear and 
empty suspicion, along with the rest of the soul's affectations (irä8q) that such falsities 
produce; thereby attaining the goal of the good life'. He then points out that though 
there are those who on the one hand use syllogisms and axioms, on the other hand there 
are those who say the same things but whose motives are for the adulation or deception of 
their neighbours (npo tiov ITXIIGCov äpEQKEdaC rj (XiräirjS), 440 who contrive to gain 
momentary approval and persuasion (iuxayuyCav). Thus, we find this Epicurean 
leader441 associating psychagogia with peddling sentences, attempts to procure favour, 
deception, and other abuses of rhetoric. The duplicitous nature of psychagogia is, 
however, merely reflective of the duplicitous nature of all speech, namely its 
`pharmacological' nature. 442 
It is therefore no real surprise that we do not see Paul or his contemporaries using 
this word to refer to their own moral leadership. The negative connotations evoked by 
psychagogia, and the subsequent application of the term to the flatterer (KOM) and the 
sycophant (&pEQKOS) meant that, in the late Republic and early Empire, it was little used as 
a positive reference. 443 This, however, does not change the social reality of the 
psychagogue, it merely changes the way in which people referred to it. 
437 Polystratus, On the Irrational Contempt of the Popular Opinions, PHerc 336/1150, col. 
13.26-29; in Sul Disprezzo Irrazionale delle Opinioni Popolari (ed. Giovani Indelli; vol. 2; Istituto 
Italiano per gli Studi Filosofici: La Scuola di Epicuro; Napoli: Bibliopolis, 1978). 
438 It is interesting to consider that this reference to the necessity of the philosophical 
investigation being conducted `straightly' (6'p96S, col. 14.24) may be the necessary complement of 
1rappr1QLa, in that 1rappqß(a is, for the most part, the communication of that 
investigation. Note that 
Polystratus then uses nappqoLa soon after (in col. 16.29-17.1) as a reference to the communication 
of investigation (but see the rest of the Polystratus' discussion 
for context). 
439 Polystratus, col. 14.27-16.8. 
440 Note the possibility of both adulation ((XpEoKELac) and deception (&iTUTIIS) 
being 
generated by the one speech act. 
441 Polystratus was the third leader of the school of Epicurus and thus one of the 
founders 
of Epicureanism (see David John Furley, `Epicurus', 
OCD, 532-34). 
442 See comments on p. 110. 
443 Glad, `Significance of Hellenistic Psychagogy', 60. 
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The fact was that during the first century, referring to someone as a `philosopher' 
was tantamount to referring to that person as having the basic qualities of the 
psychagogue. Lutz, summarizing Musonius, comments that the `primary concern of 
philosophy is the care of the soul ... from our surroundings we have become morally ill. 
It is philosophy alone which can cure us by its remedy of reason'; 444 hence Seneca's 
understanding that the philosopher is `the pedagogue of the human race', 445 and 
Maximus of Tyre's understanding that care of the soul was the product of the 
philosopher's rational teaching. 446 
The desire for a moral guide is something which obviously parallels the 
popularising of moral philosophy, 447 and `ample evidence exists for the social practice of 
searching for a mature guide'. 448 Indeed, the fact that the social and moral reality of 
psychagogy was pervasive is demonstrated in part by the number of expressions of a need 
for moral guidance. 449 In fact, the degree to which people sought someone to fulfill the 
role of a psychagogue was common enough for Lucian to lend the practise some satirical 
attention. In his Hermotimus he takes great delight in poking fun at a fellow who seems to 
be forever seeking guidance and never arriving at the point to which he is supposedly 
being guided. Furthermore, looking for a guide was common enough for Seneca to set 
down guidelines for the task. 450 Seneca elsewhere cites Epicurus as suggesting that we all 
should have a person of high character in our lives who helps govern our character. 451 
Quintilian states that while virtue is somewhat natural, it `will require to be perfected by 
444 Cora E. Lutz, Musonius Rufus: `The Roman Socrates' (ed. Alfred R. Bellinger; Yale 
Classical Studies 10; New Haven: Yale University Press, 1947), 27-28, (all references to Musonius 
are from this edition). 
445 Seneca, Ep. 89.13. 
446 Maximus of Tyre, Dissertationes, 1.2.61-63. 
447 See Malherbe, Moral Exhortation, 13. 
448 Glad, `The Significance of Hellenistic Psychagogy for our Understanding of Paul', 63; 
see also Glad, Paul and Philodemus, 53; Galen, On the Doctrines of Hippocrates and Plato, 2.5.3-7; On 
the Passions and Errors of the Soul 1.1; 3.6-10; Justin Martyr, Dialogue with Trypho, 2.3-6; Isocrates, 
Antidosis, 290. 
449 E. g., Seneca, Ep. 52.2. 
450 Seneca, Ep. 52.1-9. 
451 Seneca, Ep. 11.8-10 (=Usener Frag. 210). 
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instruction'. 452 For Plutarch, one good sign that someone was progressing towards virtue 
was that the person was willing to submit to someone who would determine his problems 
and admonish him. 453 For Clement of Alexandria, the role of the psychagogue was 
common enough to be confluent with the role of the pedagogue, which was `both to lead 
and admonish the soul'. 454 
It is important to recognise that the main tool of the philosopher-psychagogue was 
speech, yet at the same time it was the main weakness, since speech bears no marks of 
veracity. Thus, a basic responsibility borne by the philosopher-psychagogue was to live in 
a manner which validated the truthfulness of his message. The easiest way for anyone to 
detect a pseudo-psychagogue was to discover that what he said and what he did were at 
odds with each other. This is typically seen in the common, fundamental requirement for 
one's deeds to be confluent with one's words. Within this word-deed complex arise the 
common moral philosophical topoi of frankness (1rapprjQLa) and flattery (KO KECa). 
Furthermore, the structural relationship with friendship conventions455 implies 
that for the genuine psychagogue to practise his art, he must assume a degree of 
responsibility towards the person(s) being guided. Without a sense of duty towards the 
patient, there is no impetus for genuine admonition. Even if the guide's duty were only 
the integrity of the philosophy, it still implies a responsibility towards the patient. 456 
452 Quintilian, 12.2.1. 
453 Plutarch, `Progress in Virtue', 82A. 
454 Clemens Alexandrinus, Protrepticus und Paedagogus (ed., Otto Stählin; vol. 1; Die 
Greichischen Christlichen Schriftsteller: Der Ersten Jarhunderte; Berlin: Akademie, 1972), 
261.23-24. 
455 Malherbe adds to this the social convention of a `father', and of a `nurse'; see the 
overall discussions in Abraham J. Malherbe, "`Gentle as a Nurse": The Cynic Background of 1 
Thess ii', NovT 12 (1970) : 203-17; Malherbe, Paul and the Thessalonians. Glad also connects the 
father and friend conventions in Glad, `The Significance of Hellenistic Psychagogy for our 
Understanding of Paul', 72. Note also the sentiments offered by Maximus of Tyre who felt that 
the guidance philosophy offered was similar to that offered by a friend, see Maximus of Tyre 1.2 
where he construes philosophical teaching in terms of the role of a true friend; also note Epictetus, 
Discourses, 3.13.18-23; 2.17.1-2; 2.22.7-10; Diogenes Laertius, Lives of Eminent Philosophers, 6.30 
where Diogenes compares himself to a helmsman or a physician. 
456 It was common among philosophers to assume that all people had a duty towards 
philosophy which incorporated the principle that others would benefit 
from it. See Musonius, 
2.36-38; 16.104.30-32; 16.106.6ff; Seneca, Ep. 90.1; Pseudo Diogenes, 21.8-9; 35; also Pseudo 
Heraclitus, 9.210.20-21; Diogenes Laertius, 10.122; 10.83,85. 
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An important aspect of this is the fact that the psychagogic process was a part of a 
larger, reciprocal process of mutual affection. 457 `Whatever the group, and however it 
might be structured, they shared a concern for each other. Those who led in exhorting 
were to do so out of friendship and a genuine desire to help'. 458 Combining this 
relational structure with the previously mentioned desire to seek out a mature guide, 
suggests that the desire itself is `not an exercise in solitude, but a true social practice', 459 
or even, an `intensification of social relations'. 460 'The care of the self appears therefore as 
intrinsically linked to a "soul service" [psychagogy], which includes the possibility of 
round exchanges with the other and a system of reciprocal obligations'. 461 
This reciprocal process producing obligation is of critical import to our 
understanding of Paul's activity in the writing of Philippians. As a psychagogue, Paul has 
a sense of responsibility or obligation to the Philippians. This obligation has naturally 
formed itself in terms of Paul's Christian gospel and manifests itself in Paul's activity as a 
literate apostle. That is, Paul has a specific task to perform in the Philippian community 
(the same specific task he has everywhere else), which is to involve them in the gospel. 
He is going to seek the completion of that task in the socially constructed conventions 
available to him; thus psychagogy presents itself as a suitable set of conventions for our 
understanding of Paul's practices within that society. Furthermore, taking our leave from 
Foucault, we should understand this practice as an intensification of social relations 
between Paul and the Philippians. As their psychagogue, Paul has a special set of 
relations to the Philippians. As the recipients of Paul's psychagogy, the Philippians have a 
special set of relations to Paul. These relationships are expressed in their sense of 
responsibility towards each other. For the Philippians it has been their submission to 
Paul's authority, and their support of his mission. For Paul it has been his devotion to 
them as an apostle through his writing to them, sending them ambassadors, writing them 
457 See Malherbe, Paul and the Thessalonians, 84. 
458 Malherbe, Paul and the Thessalonians, 88. 
459 Michel Foucault, The History of Sexuality: An Introduction (London: Penguin, 1990), 
3: 51. 
460 Foucault, 3: 53. 
461 Foucault, 3: 54. On mutual edification, see also Glad, `The Significance of Hellenistic 
Psychagogy for our Understanding of Paul', 74. 
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letters, encouraging them in general, and, not at all least, his willingness to remain alive 
when he would prefer to die. 462 
Paul's sense of obligation, both to his followers and to his apostolic assignment, 
would naturally mean that he would be willing to take up any challenges threatening 
either of those obligations. However, any question concerning the validity of his gospel, 
any questioning of the foundational sub-text of that gospel (the story of Paul and the 
gospel) will naturally take place along socially conventional lines and Paul's reactions are 
also going to be in terms of the social conventions available to him. Just how this works 
out in Philippians is the subject of the following chapter. 
3. b. Psychagogy and the Language of Truth and Friendship 
There is a close relationship between psychagogy and friendship. In distinct 
contrast to the flatterer, the psychagogue was very much a true friend. Interestingly, the 
manner in which the falsehood of the friend or the psychagogue was determined was 
primarily through the relationship between speech and action. 463 
Seneca provides for us a model for understanding this connection which we also 
see in Paul; Seneca is both a psychagogue and a friend to Lucilius in a similar way that 
Paul is both psychagogue and friend to the Philippians. Traditionally, psychagogy was 
the practice of one person, a psychagogue, guiding the life, or `soul', of others. 464 
Naturally, a psychagogue would have been a person who was perceived to be superior in 
some way so as to be worthy of imitation. 465 But placing oneself in the hands of a 
psychagogue left one open to various abuses from pseudo-psychagogues. It was 
important, therefore, to establish whether a person was a genuine psychagogue or a 
pseudo-psychagogue. 
As discussed earlier, Plato makes the point that the psychagogue conducts his 
business, the leading of the soul, through words466 (i4ruxayWyLa tic SLa ; Loywv) and this 
highlights precisely the source of the problem: words themselves bear no mark as to 
462 Note again Stowers' comment about how Paul represents himself as a psychagogue in 
Philippians, see above p. 103. 
463 See the discussion on pp. 107ff. 
464 See the discussion on pp. 101ff. 
465 On mimesis in antiquity see Castelli, 59-87. Note also Castelli 21ff. for a discussion 
on how mimesis reinscribes power structures and social hierarchies. 
466 See above pp. 103ff. and esp. n. 428. In general see Plato, Phaedrus, 260E-272B; 
277BC. 
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whether they are true or false; thus in this same work, Phaedrus, Plato constructs 
language, writing in particular, as a pharmakon, at once a remedy and a poison. 467 Of 
course, this issue of `genuine' versus `pretext', or as we find in our passage in Phil 1.18, 
aX, OELa versus npoxaa . c, was frequently the subject of philosophical and moral discourse, 
particularly with respect to such topoi as friendship, flattery, and psychagogy, not to 
mention those topoi associated with sophistry and the like. 
Such conventions developed common safeguards for, in our case, protecting 
oneself from stumbling into the semantic snares of pseudo-psychagogues. One can tell a 
genuine psychagogue from a false one by observing whether his life (deeds) matched his 
philosophical teaching (words), and a genuine psychagogue, like a genuine friend, speaks 
with ffappqo(a. 468 Thus, in moral exhortation, or psychagogic literature, one constantly 
finds claims to a continuity between word and deed, and therefore to frank speech 
(napp, q(na), for which a working definition could be: a mode of communication 
(speech/writing) intended to refer by virtue of itself to the continuity between word and 
deed. That is, frank speech was both word and deed. 
We also find these very claims in Paul. The classic example is Paul's comments in 
1 Thess 2.5ff. where he says that he and his retinue did not come with words of flattery 
(Ev Xoyw KoXaKEdaq), nor with the pretext of greed (Ev IrpO4MGEL TrAEOVE lac), nor seeking the 
glory of men. Paul goes on to remind the Thessalonians that they themselves are aware of 
his labours among them; he thereby reinforces the idea that he was a genuine and not a 
pseudo-psychagogue, thus also contributing to a validation of his gospel. Note also 1 Cor 
2.4 where Paul claims that his message and preaching were not in persuasive words of 
wisdom rather in the demonstration of the spirit and power (Ev ä1TO6E(EEL 1TVEÜ4atiOS KaL 
6uvä. EWS). 
As discussed earlier, by the time Paul entered into the Greco-Roman world, the 
term `psychagogue' appears to have fallen out of use, perhaps due to the abuses of 
pseudo-psychagogues. 469 A general skepticism had developed in Hellenistic culture 
concerning the intentions of someone who might claim to be a guide of the soul but in 
467 Plato, Phaedrus, 274C-278B, esp. 274E-275A. 
468 Although, as we see in Philippians, even Trappt oLa (bold speech) was eventually 
mimicked further compounding the problem of how to tell a flatterer from a friend, or irp4aoLS 
from &Xrj9ELa (see Phil 1.18). 
469 See the above discussion pp. 103ff. Also note again Glad, `The Significance of 
Hellenistic Psychagogy for Our Understanding of Paul', 60-61. 
111 
fact be more interested in guiding one's money into his own purse. This is the same 
suspicion that we find being directed toward the sophists, and which Paul himself affirms 
in order to create a distinct contrast to his own rhetorical activity. Nonetheless, 
psychagogic activity itself was alive and well at this time, albeit operating under various 
other labels, and offers itself as one of the cultural analogues for our interpretation of 
Paul. 470 
The well-established471 practice of psychagogy in the ancient world offers a set of 
ethico-cultural conventions according to which we could say that Paul was constrained to 
operate. As culturally accepted norms, these ideals provide an easily accessible structure 
for when one had occasion to wax eloquent on moral and ethical issues. More to the 
point, the structures or discourse associated with psychagogy had, by the time of Paul, 
entered into the wider populace as normative. Thus we hear Engberg-Pedersen suggest 
that Stoic ideals and structures became a part of the `ordinary discourse at a certain 
level'; 472 that is, a part of their particular structure of codes of significance. Thus, it is not 
necessary to say that Paul was formally a psychagogue in order for us to accept that Paul 
employed structures formally associated with psychagogy. 473 Once such a structure 
enters into the discourse of a culture it enters into a reciprocal relationship of affirming 
and being affirmed by that culture. 474 Consequently, it is difficult, if not impossible, to 
speak of the degree to which Paul was conscious of the psychagogic analogue, even 
though his language is often rather psychagogic. 475 
470 That is, as stated earlier, the social convention remained, what changed was the way in 
which people referred to it; see above pp. 105ff. 
471 See Malherbe, Paul and the Thessalonians, 84; Glad, `The Significance of Hellenistic 
Psychagogy for Our Understanding of Paul', 60; see also the earlier discussion on the widespread 
desire to seek out a psychagogue or moral guide, pp. 106ff. 
472 Engberg-Pedersen, `Stoicism in Philippians', 261. 
473 To cite Glad again: `it is not important that we be able to classify 
Paul as a 
"psychagogue" but rather that we recognize his participation in a widespread 
"psychagogic" 
activity' (Glad, `The Significance of Hellenistic Psychagogy 
for Our Understanding of Paul', 60). 
474 This subscribes to fundamental human orders. Note 
for example, Berger and 
Luckmann's discussion on social interaction and the foundation for knowledge in everyday life, 
Berger and Luckmann, 28-34. 
475 See the earlier discussion on Paul and psychagogy, pp. 101ff. 
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Genuine psychagogues, like genuine friends, assumed a certain responsibility 
toward those being led. 476 More specifically, they were interested in the ethical or moral 
outliving of their discourse (their `gospel') in the lives of their followers. As a result, we 
find that the rhetoric of the psychagogues focuses on creating within the follower an 
apologetic discourse which enables the follower to deal with potential threats to the ideals 
of the psychagogic discourse in general. We find Paul doing this very thing in Phil 1, 
although it is specifically targeted towards the Christian community and participates 
within fundamental sociological practices of group maintenance. 477 
Paul's letter is mainly about reassuring the Philippians. 478 He is in a negative 
situation and he needs to ensure that the way the Philippians interpret his imprisonment 
is confluent with the gospel/discourse he has preached to them, lest there appear some 
anomaly between the gospel he has preached and its practical ability; that is, initially at 
least, between word and deed. Thus, employing common topoi associated with 
psychagogic and friendship rhetoric (such as `progress', and `frank speech'), the discourse 
Paul inserts into the situation works to reassure the Philippians that the situation is not a 
negative comment on the adequacy of the gospel he has preached, it rather becomes a 
positive example of its power; thus, he presents a confluence between the claims of the 
gospel and its power. 479 Paul's sense of responsibility to the Philippians, his pastoral need 
to reassure them naturally affects his rhetoric. 480 The various topoi Paul employs and his 
disposition toward the various issues he encounters are naturally governed by his 
psychagogic or pastoral agenda. I would suggest that Paul's reluctance to articulate his 
usual theologically-charged rebuke of the selfish preachers in Phil 1 is due, at least in part, 
to his psychagogic agenda in this reassuring section of the epistle. 
476 See the earlier discussion on psychagogic responsibility and its relationship to 
friendship, pp. 107ff. 
477 See the discussion on pp. 89f., and the references in nn. 276,374. The goal of 
psychagogic discourse was essentially teleological, seeking to enable the student to attain the great 
goals of moral philosophy, happiness, being Good, etc. 
478 See the discussion on pp. 58ff. 
479 Note again 1 Cor 2.4: `my message and my proclamation were not in persuasive words 
of wisdom, rather in the demonstration of the Spirit and of power'. 
480 ich is interesting in light of the moral ideal to leave speech `unaffected'. See 
Seneca, Ep. 75.1; Plutarch, `How to Tell a Flatterer from a Friend', 62C, and the citation from 
Euripides, `The Phoenician Maidens', 469,472; Plutarch, `On Stoic Self-Contradictions', 
1047A-B, and the citation from Chrysippus, SVF 2.297-8. 
On frank speech and thus `unaffected' 
speech as the `new virtue' see De Witt, `Parresiastic 
Poems of Horace', 313. 
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What is of interest here in the first chapter of Philippians is that Paul's `detour'481 
into the discussion of the good and bad preachers is a way to deal with the potential 
discrepancy between word and deed in his own situation. That is, Paul's discussion of 
the two preachers, and 1.18 in particular, shows that when it comes to the gospel, the 
Philippians are to break out of the cultural norm of evaluating discourse according to this 
word-deed binary structure. 482 Paul wants them to view the gospel message as being a 
sort of self-validating discourse. But as I say, the discussion of the two kinds of preachers 
is a way of making this point which can then bracket Paul's own imprisoned situation so 
that it does not affect the Philippians' evaluation of the truth of the gospel message. At 
the same time, Paul does not discount the value of the cultural norm, and a few verses 
later (1.20) makes a claim to frank speech and continuity between word and deed with 
respect to his own integrity. Thus, we end up with Paul claiming that on the one hand, 
the truth of the gospel is not judged by human circumstances, but on the other, Paul 
recognises that humans themselves are still judged by the traditional word-deed structure. 
I shall develop this strange division in Chapter Four. 
3. c. Frank Speech, the Word-Deed Convention, and Letter Writing 
Language was the well-honed instrument of the psychagogue. 483 The 
psychagogue applied this instrument both to speech and to writing, both treatises and 
letters. This also harks back to the question of the degree to which Paul's pastoral or 
psychagogic concerns affect his rhetoric. 
Seneca, a moral philosopher, psychagogue, and Pauline contemporary, presents 
us with an interesting example of psychagogic ideals being represented in the form and 
content of his epistles. 484 In Ep. 75 he begins with a rebuke: 
You [Lucilius] have been complaining that my letters to you are rather 
carelessly written. Now who talks carefully unless he also desires to talk 
affectedly? I prefer that my letters should be just what my conversation 
would be if you and I were sitting in one another's company or taking 
481 Phil 1.12-18a is unsatisfactorily, but often, seen as an excursus by commentators (see 
above n. 132). My point would be that it is not only an integral, but a central feature of the 
function of Philippians. 
482 Note the comments on Martin's argument in n. 478; Paul's discourse is doing a lot 
more than merely conveying information. 
483 Note again Plato's comment that the psychagogue leads the soul through words, see n. 
466. 
484 Note that the letters of Epicurus also provide philosophical parallels with the letters of 
the New Testament; see the discussion in De Witt, Epicurus and His Philosophy, 32. 
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walks together, spontaneous and easy, for my letters have nothing strained 
or artificial about them. If it were possible, I should prefer to show, rather 
than speak, my feelings.... I should like to convince you entirely of this 
one fact, that I feel whatever I say, that I not only feel it, but am wedded to 
it. 485 
Lucilius is shown to be entangled in concerns about formal epistolary structure, rather 
than paying more attention to the function of Seneca's letter-writing. Lucilius may think 
he is being a superior epistolist by levelling such a critique at Seneca, but Seneca's reply 
invokes the established epistolary theorists when he says that he wants his letters to be like 
an actual conversation. 486 D. A. Russell suggests that 'Seneca's view is bound up, as the 
context shows, with his insistence that res [things] matter more than verba [words], and 
that the problem of philosophy is a matter of not only intellect (ingenium) but also of the 
soul (animus)'. 487 Or as Seneca puts it, `let it [eloquence] be of such a kind that it 
displays facts and not itself. It and the other arts are wholly concerned with cleverness; 
but our business is the soul'. 488 And later, `Are you concerned about words [verbal? 
Rejoice this instant if you can cope with things [res] '. 489 Here Seneca seemingly drives a 
moral wedge between language (or `verba') and that which it attempts to signify ('res' real 
things); but actually, he is distinguishing between two kinds of speech: artificial (in the 
technical sense, yet invoking its `figurative' sense), and plain or `frank' speech. 
The point is that although it stood apart from what Lucilius assumed to be 
normal, Seneca's deviation from standard epistolary form has its roots in the fact that he 
values the function of the communication more highly than the communication itself, 
which perhaps we might distinguish in his terms as being the priority of the soul over 
mere words which could in fact entangle the soul. This also implies that he sees language 
or communication as a two-tiered structure. Seneca's question `Who talks carefully 
unless he also desires to talk affectedly? ' is very much a reflection of standard Hellenistic 
ideals of frank speech, that is, of nappi aLa. 
485 Seneca Ep. 75.1-2 (Gummere, LCL); note the comments on affected rhetoric in n. 
480. 
486 See the discussion on letters as one side of a conversation, pp. 126ff. in particular and, 
in general, see the discussion of letters as fictionalised presence on pp. 124ff. 
487 D. A. Russell `Letters to Lucilius', in Seneca (ed. C. D. N. Costa; Greek and Latin 
Studies: Classical Literature and its Influence; London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1974), 73. 
488 Seneca, Ep. 75.5 (Gummere, LCL). 
489 Seneca, Ep. 75.7 (Gummere, LCL). 
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3. c. i. Frank Speech IIapp'qQLa took on significance in Periclean Athens as the 
symbol of freedom, since nothing symbolised personal freedom as much as the freedom 
of speech490-a point reinforced by the fact that slaves did not have this freedom. 491 
What is important for our purposes, is the fact that iTapprloi a was not restricted to a purely 
political referent. Nor did it maintain the common philosopher-versus-tyrant referent. 
The philosophers moved the idea of free speech, or Trappe oc, from the discourse of civic 
freedom to the discourse of moral freedom. 492 Schlier notes that the original political 
aspect of the iTapprlQL'a had three components: the right to say anything; that the actuality 
of things is stated; the courage of openness. 493 
The latter two of Schlier's components appear to be those which developed into 
the use employed by the philosophers for their moral interests. It is not difficult to 
imagine how `the courage to be open', could convert into the psychagogic activity and 
frankness of speech employed in the pedagogy and healing of the student/patient. The 
idea of `the actuality of things being stated' fits easily converted into philosophy by virtue 
of signifying `a close relation to truth (&Arj8ELa)'. 494 Thus, Bultmann, recognising the shift 
away from the classical usage of TrapprIoCa, notes that Paul's use of napprya a in 2 Cor 2.12 
`is not openness toward God [a common early Christian referent], but rather the apostle's 
495 openness toward his hearers in his public activity'. 
490 The reason is that it represented political openness. This of course was something in 
which the Greeks took great pride, see M. Radin, `Freedom of Speech in Ancient Athens', AJP 48 
(1927): 215; also A. Momigliano, `The Social Structure of the Ancient City', in Anthropology and 
the Greeks (ed. S. C. Humphreys; London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1978), 185. 
491 See Euripides, The Phoenician Maidens, 390ff.; also Radin, `Freedom of Speech in 
Ancient Athens', 215-20; Rudolph Bultmann, The Second Letter to the Corinthians (ed. Erich 
Dinkier; trans. Roy A. Harrisville; Minneapolis: Augsburg, 1985), 84,85. 
492 See David E. Fredrickson, `IIAPPHEIA in the Pauline Epistles', in Friendship, Flattery, 
and Frankness of Speech: Studies on Friendship in the New Testament World (ed. John T. Fitzgerald; 
NovTSup 82; Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1996), 166. For the Cynics Trappe oia was a most beautiful thing, 
a moral virtue, a property of the wise (Diogenes Laertius, 6.69). The Cynics bear out the 
relationship of TrapprloL'a to truth very well. 
493 Schlier, 1967, TDNT5: 872-73. 
494 Schlier, TDNT 5: 873. 
495 Bultmann, The Second Letter to the Corinthians, 85. Van Unnik has suggested that 
Christian Trappe oLa derives from a Semitic background. His discussion focusses on the conscious 
attempt by Christians to speak boldly, which is virtually the same as the classical philosopher- 
tyrant use of the term. I am more interested, however, in irappriaCa along the lines of the `new 
virtue'. See, W. C. Van Unnik, `The Semitic Background of HAPPHEIA in the New Testament', 
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As with Bultmann's observation, TrapprIQCa was a symbol of truth, and openness of 
the philosopher towards his audience and among philosophical friends. Initially, this use 
is most prominent among the Epicureans, for whom Trappe ca was a `corollary to their 
cardinal principle of friendship'. 496 ale prominent among the Epicureans, it was not 
exclusively Epicurean. Even Aristotle comments that friends should always use frankness 
497 
of speech towards each other. It is in this environment of friendship that the definition 
of iTappilata undergoes development, `eventually becoming a classical topic'. 498 
Contributing significantly to that development is Philodemus' own essay on 1TapprjaLa. 499 
One of the more interesting features of Philodemus' description of irappflaCa is the degree 
to which it is to be done with gentleness; 50° though there is, on occasion, still the need for 
the harsh (QKXrjpöc) form. 501 
De Witt notes that `during the Augustan age the adjective candidus, if not the 
noun candor, took on the meaning of frank, [and] unaffected.... The new virtue ... 
signified absolute openness of speech and conduct, without, however, implying the 
reproof and admonition that went with napproia'. 502 Yet, irappqa a itself has not been left 
behind. De Witt understands that the concept of TrappqoCa has also developed a similar, 
`new specialized sense'. 503 This development in the use of napprJoLa is where we begin to 
see it become a part of the psychagogic discourse. That is, the use of napp'naL'a as a mode 
in Sparsa Collecta (NovTSup 30; Leiden Brill, 1980). 
496 Norman De Witt, `Parrhesiastic Poems of Horace', CPh 30 (1935): 312. 
497 Aristotle, The Nicomachean Ethics, 9.2.9; also note Malherbe, Paul and the Thessalonians, 
42. 
498 De Witt, `Parrhesiastic Poems of Horace', 313. 
499 See either Philodemus, IIEPI IIAPPHEIAE, PHerc 1471 (ed. Alexander Olivieri; B. G. 
Teubner, 1914); or Philodemus, On Frank Criticism (introduction, translation, and notes by David 
Konstan, Diskin Clay, Clarence E. Glad, Johan C. Thom, and James Ware; Society of Biblical 
Literature Text and Translations 43; Greco-Roman 13; Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1998). 
500 Philodemus, On Frank Criticism, fr. 37-38. 
501 Philodemus, On Frank Criticism, fr. 7,10. 
502 De Witt, `Parrhesiastic Poems of Horace', 313; on the virtues of candor see Cicero, De 
Amicitia, 25.95. 
503 Exemplified by Varrus in Horace's Ars Poetica, 434-38; see De Witt, `Parrhesiastic 
Poems of Horace', 313; see also the discussion of Horace's `Ode to Licinius', De Witt, 316. 
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of interaction within philosophical-friendship communities re-introduces the issue of 
responsibility. It was not outspokenness for its own sake, it was rather designed to 
function as a benefit for the person to whom it was directed. 504 
This was in direct contrast to flatterers-those whose speech was designed to 
procure their own interests-who tended away from bold speech so as not to destabilise 
their sycophantic relationship with their benefactor(s). Yet, even this symbol of truth and 
true friendship came to be mimicked by flatterers. In fact, Plutarch is quite indignant 
over the fact that flatterers would dare to imitate frank speech: 
But the most unprincipled trick of all that he has is this! Perceiving that 
frankness of speech, by common report and belief, is the language of 
friendship especially (as an animal has its peculiar cry), and, on the other 
hand, that lack of frankness is unfriendly and ignoble, he does not allow 
even this to escape imitation, but, just as clever cooks employ bitter 
extracts and astringent flavourings to remove the cloying effect of sweet 
things, so flatterers apply a frankness which is not genuine or beneficial, 
but which, as it were, winks while it frowns, and does nothing but 
tickle. 505 
It should be made clear that this was no small issue in the ancient world. A good deal of 
philosophical and moral literature attempted to deal with the problem that speech can be 
both a poison and a remedy; 506 it can lead the soul as well as beguile it, or according to 
Seneca's Ep. 75 it can be factual or artificial. And here is the important point; Seneca 
sees his freedom from form as an expression of truth, as an example of irapprJoLa, as a way 
to demonstrate the continuity between what he says and what he does. As TrapprIQLa, 
freedom from formal epistolary structures can take on this definition I offered earlier, a 
self-reference to integrity in the attempt to become both word and deed. 507 
3. c. 11. Word and Deed The relationship between TrapprIQLa and the word-deed 
convention is an important one; thus Malherbe summarises the ancient assumption that 
`every philosopher's palresia should therefore be backed by character'. 508 Plutarch states 
it a little more colourfully: `the speech of a man light-minded and mean in character 
504 See the discussion on psychagogic responsibility and its relationship to friendship, pp. 
107ff. 
505 Plutarch, 51 C-D (Babbitt, LCL); see Plato, Phaedrus, 239. 
506 See references on Plato's use of 4äp w KOV in n. 467. 
507 See p. 110. 
508 Maiherbe, Popular Philosophers, 160. 
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% (EAtx poü SE Kal 4 zi ou to i Ooc), when it undertakes to deal in frankness, results only in 
evoking the retort: Wouldst thou heal others, full of sores thyself! '509 In his essay on 
frank speech, Philodemus assumes that the teachers (pedagogue/psychagogue) who 
employ frank speech properly will have the deeds (Epywv), and not just the words, to 
support their pedagogic and psychagogic function. 510 Furthermore, the person seeking a 
psychagogue will seek one with both the right speech and the right practice ((you) . 
511 
The word-deed complex is an important social convention to consider when we 
account for the way in which the discourse of Paul's psychagogic/apostolic activity was 
constrained. According to Musonius, the Philosopher's `treatment should consist in 
showing himself not only as one who utters words which are most helpful, but as one who 
acts consistently with them'. 512 As for the student, living out the philosophical teachings 
is the only way in which philosophy will be of any profit, 513 since after all, `philosophy is 
nothing other than knowledge (EirWT%t1) about life'. 514 Importantly, it even took on a 
theological flavour: `God is an ever present witness to our words and deeds'. 515 Note also 
the way in which the Cynic writer Pseudo-Anarchasis points out that the appropriate 
employment of the faculty is to investigate whether one's words match one's deeds while 
discussing the faculty of reason the gods have afforded to the Greeks and non-Greeks 
alike. The important point here is that Anarchasis is not actually talking about the word- 
deed convention, he simply assumes it to be of valid concern to the reader. 516 
In general, however, people simply expected that if someone was genuine, there 
would be a confluence between their words and their deeds. `This was particularly 
applied to a philosopher who justified his exhortation by his own moral progress or 
509 Plutarch, `How to Tell a Flatterer from a Friend', 7 1F. 
510 Philodemus, fr. 16. 
511 Philodemus, fr. 40. 
512 Musonius, 36.3-5 (Lutz). 
513 Musonius, 36.8-12. 
514 Musonius, 40.13-14 (Lutz). 
515 Seneca, Ep. 83.1; De Vita Beata, 20.5. 
516 See Pseudo-Anarchasis, 2 (Malherbe, Cynic Epistles, 38). 
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attainment', 517 and `was generally regarded as an index to his trustworthiness', 518 or as 
Glad puts it, as `two recurring prerequisites for being a psychagogue, namely self-scrutiny 
and consistency of word and deed'. 519 Furthermore, Glad notes that the assumption was 
an holistic one in which speech was understood to be `an integral part of conduct'. 520 For 
Cicero, knowledge completes itself in action, since the effect of knowledge upon one's life 
is the whole point of acquiring it through philosophy. 521 Indeed, Malherbe notes that 
`the philosopher's whole manner of life, extending in the case of the Cynics to their 
simple garb, could be pointed to as a deliberate demonstration of the principles they 
taught'. 522 One need only to read through the antics of Diogenes in the Cynic Epistles to 
gain a sense of the degree to which he sought to saturate his every movement (in both 
senses of the word! ) with his philosophical ideals. 523 
The Cynics were particularly interested in the idea of a philosopher's word being 
confluent with his deed. In fact, they took it so far that they practically reversed the 
problem; instead of privileging words, they tended to privilege deeds. Thus Pseudo 
Crates claims that the Cynics had found some short cut to happiness: `the way that leads 
to happiness through words is long, but that which leads through daily deeds is a 
shortened regimen'. 524 Julian, having a positive view of the Cynics, rhetorically asks: 
`Now what was the manner of Cynics' association with people? Deeds with them came 
before words', he then goes on to list a host of examples. 525 For the Cynics the 
convention usually amounted to a sense of self-confidence in putting themselves forward 
517 Abraham J. Malherbe, Moral Exhortation, A Greco Roman Sourcebook (Philadelphia: 
Westminster Press, 1986), 38. 
518 Malherbe, Popular Philosophers, 57-58. 
519 Glad, Paul and Philodemus, 21. 
520 Glad, Paul and Philodemus, 21. 
521 Cicero, De Finibus, 1.7.25; Cicero, Tusculan Disputations, 5.24f; Cicero, De Officiis, 
1.43.153 (see Cicero, Academica, 2.41.127; Cicero, Tusculan Disputations, 5.3.9; 24.69; Cicero, De 
Finibus, 4.5.12). 
522 Malherbe, Moral Exhortation, 38. 
523 Though these epistles are pseudonymous, they represent the Cynic ideals of those who 
wrote them. 
524 Pseudo Crates, 21 (Malherbe); see also 13; 16; Pseudo Diogenes, 30. 
525 Julian, Oration 7.214BCD. 
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as models of imitation. 526 Of course, the confluence of word and deed was not a 
convention peculiar to the Cynics, 527 especially since the fact that Paul also adhered to 
this well-established, and fundamental convention is all too obvious from his writings. 
While there are numerous examples, 528 note the interesting comment in Rom 2.24 where 
after listing a set of examples (2.17-24) in which Jews failed to demonstrate confluence 
between word and deed, Paul then applies the Old Testament citation: `the name of God 
is blasphemed among the Gentiles because of you'. Paul seems to employ the social 
standards of this convention to isolate their failure as a cause for public shame. 
4. c. 111. Letter Writing As mentioned earlier, Seneca represents a convenient 
example for our understanding of Paul. To draw wide uncritical formal parallels between 
Seneca's and Paul's epistles would be naive. However, we can draw parallels between the 
similar culturally constrained motives behind each writer's relative epistolary freedom. 
Both writers operate with the idea that speech has a lethal dual nature and attempt to 
employ an openness or frankness in their writing that will demonstrate the virtue of their 
communication. For example, in 2 Cor 10.9ff. Paul recites a testimony by some of the 
Corinthians that his letters are weighty and strong, which could easily be understood as 
`frank'; hence Fredrickson's suggestion that `in 2 Cor 10: 9-10 we learn that the severity 
of the so-called "letter of tears" proved to Paul's critics in Corinth that he was capable of 
nappqoIa'. 529 It was when the Corinthians detected a difference between Paul's speech in 
person and the tone of his epistles that the old problem of how to tell a friend from a 
flatterer developed; 530 that is, the issue of distinguishing between the two levels of 
language. 531 Moreover, Paul himself claims that his rhetorical conduct is characterised by 
526 Lucian, Demonax, 3; also see Pseudo Crates, Epp. 20; 21; Pseudo Diogenes, Epp. 15; 
27; 29; Pseudo Heraclitus, Epp. 4; 7. 
527 See Malherbe, Popular Philosophers, 57; Cicero, De Officiis, 1.65; Musonius, 36.8-12; 
52.8-10; Seneca, Ep. 108.35-38 (see Ep. 6.5-6); Dio Chrysostom, Discourse, 70.6; Julian 
Orations, 7.214BC; Lucian, Peregrinus, 19; Lucian, Demonax, 3. 
528 E. g., Rom 2.1; 15.18; 1 Cor 2.4; 1 Thess 2.5ff. 
529 Fredrickson, 173. 
530 See Fredrickson, 173. 
531 This reading of 2 Cor 10.9ff. may challenge the idea that the reference in 2 Cor 10.10 
to Paul's speech being `contemptible' [Eýou9Evn[L 
vOc] is a comment about his inadequate rhetorical 
style. It would rather suggest that the problem was that what the 
Corinthians took to be one level 
of language, plain and frank speech, was actually another level, affected and artificial speech. 
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Trapprlß(a (normally translated in the New Testament as `boldness' or even `confidence' 
emphasising a disposition of Paul's consciousness and unfortunately neglecting the 
rhetorical aspect of the word532), using the term itself, 533 and often simply employing the 
concept by virtue of negative reasoning; for example, in 2 Cor 2.17, Paul compares his 
activity to those who `peddle the word of God' (Ka1Ti EÜOVTES TO' V XÖYOV TOt eEOÜ) 
characterising his own activity as sincere (ELALKpLvELa). As mentioned earlier, 1 Thess 
2.5-6 is also an important example. Paul says that he and his retinue did not come with 
words of flattery (Ev ?. yQ KOMKEic S), nor with the pretext of greed (EV npoläaEL 
nAEOVEELaS), nor seeking the glory of men. 
Paul consciously represents himself as not only characterised by napprjQLa, but also 
as the opposite of a flatterer. I would suggest that this bears itself out not only in various 
references such as those I have mentioned, but that as with Seneca, Paul's structuring of 
his epistles is generated at least in part by this conscious activity. Not that Paul is 
abandoning epistolary structure, rather that he employs what is necessary in order to 
allow the function of communication to take place without the apparent artifice of form. 
He is, in short, being frank, which is confluent with being a true friend, or a genuine 
psychagogue. It might also be possible to go a step further and suggest that since, again 
in the vein of Seneca, Paul's epistles go beyond the topics typically associated with letter 
writing and the tradition of epistolary theory, that, as Russell says of Seneca's epistles, 
they `are what Pliny calls scholasticae litterae ... they 
belong 
... to the philosophical 
line 
534 of Plato and Epicurus'. 
4. Writing in the Greco-Roman World 
Writing has been the subject of philosophical inquiry for almost as long as there has been 
philosophical inquiry. While we have already discussed the relationship of letter writing 
to psychagogy, in order for us to further contextualise Paul and his epistles, it is important 
to investigate further the nature and assumptions of writing in the ancient world. The 
study of Paul in general, especially in theological contexts, has tended to neglect the 
assumptive features of ancient writing practices. While I do not intend to discuss all the 
features of ancient writing, what I do intend to discuss here is the fact that ancient writers 
532 Fredrickson, 165. 
533 2 Cor 3.12; 7.4; Phil 1.20; Col 2.15; Phlm 1.8; see also Eph 3.12; 6.19; 1 Tim 3.13. 
534 Russell, `Letters to Lucilius', 74. 
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understood their texts, and language in general, to be highly functional, as opposed to 
simply informational. 
An example of this sort of thinking is seen in the theorist Longinus' discussion on 
the sublime. 535 The real mark of good communication is `not to persuade (E'S TrEL'O(A)) but 
rather transport (E. S EKOia(YLV) them out of themselves', 536 This effect of communication 
upon the audience is what Longinus refers to as the `sublime' (ü*oc) : `a well-timed flash 
of sublimity scatters everything before it like a bolt of lightning and reveals the full power 
of the speaker at a single stroke'; more importantly he compares the sublime to `the due 
disposal and marshalling of facts'. 537 That is, it is not a benign presentation of data, but a 
crafted arrangement of the data for a particular purpose. Longinus assumes that the goal 
of the communicator is to generate an effect upon the audience, 538 and thus his entire 
work is primarily how one goes about doing precisely that539-hence Jane Tompkins' 
observation that `for Longinus language is a form of power and the purpose of studying 
texts from the past (such as Herodotus540) is to acquire the skills that enable one to wield 
that power'. 541 Thus we note, in Longinus' work, that he is clearly not interested in effect 
alone, but also the power of effect. So for example, Longinus points out that one 
particular writer has failed because he has overdone his attempts to create effect, and the 
actual resulting effect is one of `confusion' and not of `intensity'; 542 such things are 
535 Longinus is not necessarily talking about the sort of writing that Paul does, but the 
point here is to observe this sense of function that good communication is apparently supposed to 
have. 
536 Longinus, 1.4 (Fyfe, LCL). 
537 Longinus, 1.4 (Fyfe, LCL). 
538 One criterion cited for determining whether something is `sublime' is whether the 
effect lasts or not (Longinus, 7.3 [Fyfe, LCL)). Once again, this concept of an `effect' is 
understood to be the goal of the communication. 
539 See the discussion in J. W. H. Atkins, Literary Criticism in Antiquity: A Sketch of its 
Development (2 vols; New York: Peter Smith, 1952), 2: 210-53. 
540 See for example Longinus' discussion on various ancient writers in Longinus, 24ff. 
541 Jane P. Tompkins, `The Reader in History: The Changing Shape of Literary 
Response', in Reader Response Criticism: From Formalism to Post-Structuralism (ed. Jane P. 
Tompkins; Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1980), 203. 
542 Longinus, 3.1. 
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labelled as `tumours', `empty inflations, void of sincerity, as likely as not producing the 
opposite to the effect intended'. 543 
That we can treat Longinus as somewhat paradigmatic of a first century 
understanding of literary theory is in part answered by the fact that his work was not so 
much an abstract theorizing of elevated literary style but a corrective response to what he 
observed were contemporaneous (first century) excesses and failures. 544 It appears that a 
similar document produced by Caecilius of Caleacte was the impetus for the response. 545 
However, reference to yet another theorist, Theodorus of Gadara546 suggests that 
Longinus (with whom Atkins believes Theodorus had a theoretical affinity) was not 
simply responding to Caecilius alone, rather to a general debate, which extended though 
the first century, 547 between the rival schools of Theodorus, and Apollodorus of 
Pergamum. 
Going back into the tradition of communication, Tompkins further notes that `it 
is the consequentiality of poetry as a political force that explains Plato's decision to banish 
lyric and epic poets from his republic'. 548 `The equation of language with power, 
characteristic of Greek thought at least from the time of Gorgias the rhetorician, explains 
the enormous energies devoted to the study of rhetoric in the ancient world'. 549 The 
point of this is again well stated by Tompkins: `all modern criticism ... takes meaning to 
be the object of critical investigation, for unlike the ancients we equate language not with 
action but with signification'. 550 
When it comes to epistolary texts like Romans and Philippians there are additional 
comments to be made with respect to a functional view of ancient texts. The most 
fundamental element of an epistle in the ancient world is a functional one in that, before 
anything else, the epistle is an attempt to compensate for authorial absence by creating 
543 Longinus, 3.4 (Fyfe, LCL). 
544 Atkins, 213,216. 
545 Longinus, 1.1; Atkins, 213-24. 
546 Longinus, 3.5. 
547 Atkins, 214. 
548 Tompkins, 204. 
549 Tompkins, 203-204. 
550 Tompkins, 203 (emphasis added). 
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the effect of the personal presence of the writer to the recipient. Thus Berger states that 
in the ancient world `letters are a substitute for presence (Anwesenheit)', albeit an 
imperfect (unvollkommener) substitute (Ersatz). 551 Interestingly, Berger suggests that the 
friendship letter is not so much a type, rather the presence of particular topics within any 
type can make it a `friendship' letter. In particular he cites two topoi: the expression of 
friendship, and the letter as substitute for presence. 552 Thus, one might also note that the 
idea of the letter as a substitute for presence should be understood as an epistolary topos 
as well as an actual function of the letter. 
Koskenniemi suggests that in the ancient world `it is regarded as the most 
important task of letters, namely a form simply to represent this relationship 
(Zusammenlebens) during a time of spatial separation, that is, making the aiTouoia into the 
Trapouma. '553 He further understands that the idea of `presence' is not only an effect upon 
the reader, but is something that is a part of the letter's nature, since the writer writes 
while experiencing the presence of the recipient as a mental reality (geistige 
Wirklichkeit)'. 554 This concept of presence as a `mental reality' is what Stowers later 
refers to as a `fictionalized personal presence', 555 and which Robert Funk believes is a 
highly significant structural element contributing to the function of Paul's letters. 556 
Of course, this is not simply a Pauline matter, but a pervasive feature of Greco- 
Roman letters. Thraede, for example, has produced a survey of epistolary topics and 
their motifs from pre-Christian letters to fourth century letters. It appears that the letter 
as a substitute for personal presence was quite commonplace, giving currency to Paul's 
551 Klaus Berger, `Hellenistische Gattungen im Neuen Testament', ANRW 25.2: 1329. 
552 Berger, 1329. 
553 Koskenniemi, 38. 
554 Koskenniemi, 38. 
555 Stanley Stowers, `Social Typification and the Classification of Ancient Letters', in The 
Social World of Formative Christianity and Judaism (eds. Jacob Neusner, et al.; Philadelphia: Fortress 
Press, 1988), 79. 
556 See the discussion in Robert W. Funk, `The Apostolic Parousia: Form and 
Significance', in Christian History and Interpretation: Studies Presented to John Knox (eds. W. R. 
Farmer, C. F. D. Moule, and R. R. Niehbuhr; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1967), 
263-68; see also Beker, Paul the Apostle, 24. 
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attempts to invoke his authority via the letter. 557 Koskenniemi and Funk both 
understand that fundamental to the nature of the letter is the simple notion that it creates 
a way for two people or parties to compensate for the fact that they are spatially 
separated. 
It is in the nature of the letter that it represents not only a means for 
communication or a method for all that which one wants to achieve with 
its help, but at the same time a uniting bond, a form of spatial contact 
between separated people. We can also determine that the letter-writers 
were well aware of this significant component of the letter-and of course 
they needed no explanations and instructions about this on the part of the 
scholar. 558 
In other words, it was a simple matter of course that anyone who wrote a letter assumed 
this to be a fundamental reality. What we want to make of these comments is to 
introduce a general caveat that we do not allow the apparent simplicity of this assumption to 
belie its importance. 
Theorists like Demetrius tend not to refer directly to the concept of a fictionalised 
presence, but, as Koskenniemi notes, there is a definite train of thought associated with 
the idea. 559 For example, Demetrius understands the letter to be almost an `image' of the 
sender's sou1.560 In Pseudo Demetrius' example of the friendly letter he writes: `Even 
though I have been separated from you for a long time, I suffer this only in body'; 561 
later, in the letter of consolation, he writes: `Since I happened not to be present to 
comfort you, I decided to do so by letter'. 562 Pseudo-Libanius states that, when writing a 
letter, `one will speak in it as though one were in the company of the absent person'. 563 
Cicero writes to his friend Marcus concerning a recent letter: `All of you was revealed to 
557 See Klaus Thraede, Grundzüge griechisch-römischer Brieftopik (fA 1LEE iA: Monographien 
zur klassischen Alterumswissenschaft 48; Munich: C. H. Beck, 1970), esp. 95-106 where he 
analyses three uses of the `presence-motif in the New Testament; see also Koskenniemi, 
38-42. 
558 Koskenniemi, 88. Note also Funk's comment: `The letter is designed to extend the 
possibility of friendship between parties after they have become physically separated' 
(Funk, 
263-64). 
559 Koskenniemi, 38,40. 
560 Demetrius, On Style, 227. 
561 Pseudo-Demetrius, `Epistolary Types', 1.10-11 (Malherbe, AEI). 
562 Pseudo-Demetrius, `Epistolary Types', 5.16-17 (Malherbe, AET). 
563 Pseudo-Libanius, `Epistolary Styles' (Malherbe, AET), 2. 
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me in your letter'. 564 Gregory of Nazianus understands that the letter is able `to sketch 
an image of the writer's presence-. 565 Especially helpful is Seneca's comment to Lucilius: 
I thank you for writing to me so often; for you are revealing yourself to me 
in the only way you can. I never receive a letter from you without being in 
your company forthwith. If the pictures of our absent friends are pleasing 
to us, though they only refresh the memory and lighten our longing by a 
solace that is unreal and unsubstantial, how much more pleasant is a letter, 
which brings us real traces, real evidences of an absent friend! 566 
It was more common, however, for the ancient theorists to understand this sense 
of fictionalised personal presence in terms of something taking the place of personal 
conversation. Hence Demetrius notes that `Artemon, the editor of Aristotle's Letters, says 
that a letter ought to be written in the same manner as a dialogue, a letter being regarded 
by him as one of the two sides of a dialogue'. 567 Again, Pseudo-Libanius states that `a 
letter, then, is a kind of written conversation with someone from whom one is 
separated'; 568 and in his example of the friendly letter, he writes that `it is a holy thing to 
honor genuine friends when they are present, and to speak to them when they are 
absent'. 569 Julius Victor advocates that `it is agreeable to write as though you were 
conversing with the person actually present, using expressions like "you too? " and "just as 
you say" and "I see you smile"'. 570 In a letter of recommendation, Aurelius Archelaus 
closes the letter with the admonition `Look upon this letter, Sir, and imagine that I am 
talking with you'. 571 Cicero frequently refers to letters as conversations or dialogues: `I 
have begun to write to you something or other ... that I may 
have a sort of talk with 
564 Cicero, Letters to his Friends, 16.16.2 (Williams, LCL). 
565 Gregory of Nazianzus, `Epistulae', 196.3 (TLG E; University of California, Irvine: 
1999): OKLaypa4ýGOCL titiv irapouo av. 
566 Seneca, Ep. 40.1 (Gummere, LCL); note also Demetrius, On Style, 227 (Roberts, 
LCL); see also the later discussion on Seneca's favouring the function of an epistle as a corollary to 
the value of the soul, p. 114. 
567 Demetrius, On Style (Roberts, LCL), 223. Demetrius takes slight issue with 
Artemon's claim in Demetrius, On Style, 224ff. 
568 Pseudo-Libanius, `Epistolary Styles' (Malherbe, AET), 2. 
569 Pseudo-Libanius, `Epistolary Styles' (Malherbe, AET), 58. 
570 Julius Victor, `The Art of Rhetoric, 27: On Letter Writing' (Malherbe, AET), 
64.17-19/§448. 
571 Select Papyri 1: 122.31-33 (Hunt and Edgar, LCL). 
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you'. 572 In another letter he writes: `Though I have nothing to say to you, I write all the 
same, because I feel as though I were talking to you' . 
573 
Stanley Stowers, in his book on Greco-Roman letter writing, consistently points 
out that it is upon the function of the epistles that we must focus our attention. 
From the modern perspective, it is natural to think about letters in terms 
of the information they communicate. The interpreter, however, should 
resist the temptation to overlook the great multiplicity of functions that 
letters performed and to speak only of the communication of information. 
It is more helpful to think of letters in terms of the actions that people performed by 
means of them. 574 
The most important point to note here is the difference Stowers has drawn between 
contemporary preoccupation with `information' and the functional interests of the ancient 
writers. If we do have a desire to know what someone like Paul was thinking, then we are 
going to have to redress the imbalance caused by a tradition of focussing on `information'. 
5. Social Discourse as Constraint 
The significance of philosophical concepts entering the discourse of Judeo-Greco-Roman 
society is that they become an integral feature of the conditioning process which societal 
discourse or cultural code places on thought and action within that society. 575 This is 
akin to what Peter Berger is discussing when he points to a `social stock of knowledge' 
which governs social practices; once certain features are factored into that common stock, 
they are institutionalised through habitualisation and become a part of the subject's 
impression of reality. Given the nature of Greco-Roman discourse during the first 
century, it is easy to imagine that someone in Paul's position could be exposed to 
philosophical concepts and structures of thought and use them for his own ends with no 
sense of being inconsistent with an institutionalised philosophical system. Indeed, this is 
572 Cicero, Letters to Atticus, 9.10.1 (Winstedt, LCL). 
573 Cicero, Letters toAtticus, 12.53 (Winstedt, LCL). 
574 Stanley K. Stowers, Letter Writing in Greco-Roman Antiquity (LEC 5; Philadelphia: 
Fortress, 1986), 15 (emphasis added). Subsequent to Stowers' exhortation to focus on function, 
he lists nineteen specific functions ancient letters were designed to perform upon the reader. 
The 
important point to note from Stowers' list is the transitive nature of each item, see 
Stowers, Letter 
Writing, 15-16. 
575 See Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann, The Social Construction of Reality: A Treatise 
in the Sociology of Knowledge (New York: Anchor Books, 1967), esp. 47-92. 
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precisely what Paul does. 
576 Note for example Gnilka's suggestion that since a Christian 
moral structure did not exist at the time of writing, 577 Paul falls back on the use of moral 
philosophical terms/concepts and traditions already existing within his culture (Umwelt). 578 
More importantly, Gnilka points out that after Paul takes these existing concepts and 
traditions (Begriffe und Traditionen) from the culture, he moves on to use them for his own 
purposes and to assist in the development of his own, Christian system. Thus, the 
popular availability of moral philosophical structures of thought gave shape to the way 
Paul developed a Christian moral structure of thought. 579 
The presence of philosophical concepts in the discourse of Greco-Roman society 
suggests that Paul would use such terms, concepts, or structures of thought both 
consciously and unconsciously. 580 As part of the social discourse, these terms or concepts 
form part of the way Paul constructs or articulates his world; thus they necessarily form 
part of how he conveys his ideology both to himself and to others, since language is the 
means by which we articulate experience and thus `necessarily participates in ideology'. 581 
Since language is the vehicle for ideology, and since `it is a characteristic of language to be 
overlooked', 582 to remain unconscious and transparent to the subject, Paul's use of 
philosophical terminology to convey theological or ethical ideals-ideals being intimately 
tied to one's ideological structure-should not be taken to represent an entirely conscious 
act on his part. The implications of this are rather extensive. The primary implication is 
that any theological ideal being derived from Paul's writing must be qualified by an 
576 This is commonly recognised by classicists and historians, see for example, Averil 
Cameron, Christianity and the Rhetoric of Empire, 7, and Wayne A. Meeks, Origins, 2, as well as the 
discussion on pp. 100f. 
577 Perhaps we should add that it did not exist as an established authoritative system for 
Paul. 
578 Gnilka, Philipperbrief, 51. The particular terms to which Gnilka is referring are 
91 oOfloLS and iä ö 4Epovtia in Phil 1.9-10. Gnilka then goes on to suggest that Paul did ETrCyvwaLs, aL 
not remain within the sphere of Hellenistic moral philosophy but moved on to generate an 
ethic-the basis for reasoning how to act-different from both the Hellenistic and the `(Hellenistic- 
)Judaistic' ethics to create the Christian basis for reasoning about actions: äya rid. 
579 Gnilka, 52. According to Gnilka, this amounts to the principle or law of äyiin1. 
580 Note again the comments by Malherbe, Popular Philosophers, 50, where he assumes 
Paul's adherence to the resources of the philosophical traditions. 
581 Belsey, 42. 
582 Belsey, 42. 
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already existing (unconscious? ) structure of thought which governs the way Paul is able to 
think about and articulate theological ideals. 583 
The production of Pauline theology is immediately troubled if it does not take 
into consideration the presence of these underlying structures within Paul's 
communication. Moreover, the presence of these structures indicates that what we 
confront in Paul's letters, the surface level of the text, is not theology as such, but a 
construct produced by other conscious and unconscious processes. On one level we can 
simply say that in Paul's letters we confront language, not theology. But we already know 
that language is also a construct, that it cannot be reduced to the sum of its lexical parts; 
that it is, to invoke Sassure, 584 a combination of a system of potential and the realisation 
of that potential in specific communicative events. To remain with Sassure a little longer, 
the dynamic relationship between langue and parole-the former, as a system of 
possibilities, determines the latter which enables the existence of the former-is the same 
sort of relationship we find in operation between the discourse of Paul's society (langue) 
and Paul's letter writing (parole). 
This principle, or process, finds its primary significance in the discussion of how 
Paul's ideas are put into practice in the actual lives of his followers, that is, in the ethical 
ramifications of his central ideas. The reason for this is that the practical outliving of 
Paul's theology is always performed in terms of the norms and strictures of a given 
culture. This means that on a fundamental level Pauline ethics could be said to be the 
operation of one set of cultural norms and strictures (Paul's Judeo-Greco-Roman culture) 
upon another (any culture in which Paul's letters are read as authoritative). 
We already recognise this as a problem to some degree when we acknowledge 
significant cultural differences between ourselves and Paul when we read, for example, 
Paul's claim in 1 Cor 11.5 that a woman dishonours her head if she prays without a head- 
covering, since it is the same as if her head were shaved. It is commonly held that this 
was something peculiar to Paul's culture and that a contemporary woman in Western 
society would not typically dishonour her head if she prayed without a hat, let alone that 
being the equivalent of a shaved head! The moment we acknowledge this, however, we 
583 Of course, language, or the articulation of experience, will never be the same as the 
theological ideals towards which it makes gestures. To say it another way, theological 
ideals-ontological categories-cannot be reduced to the logocentric world of language. 
584 Saussure, 8-11. 
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acknowledge a fundamental structure which conditions all of Paul's discussions about 
ethical norms. 
6. Summary 
In this chapter we have continued the discussion from the previous chapter concerning 
the context of Paul, the Philippians and the letter. The particular concern of this chapter 
has been those things which precede Pauline thought and expression. The significance of 
this particular context is that it had a determinative role in the way in which Paul's 
thoughts and thus expressions were formed. Understanding what Paul said, is necessarily 
a study in how Paul came to say what he said; that is, a study in what precedes Pauline 
expression. Here I have sounded agreement with those who locate the moral 
philosophers and their culturally adapted ideas as a precedent for Paul's thought. I also 
suggested that the psychagogic model in particular presents itself to Paul as a viable, prior 
structure according to which he could have conducted his ministry in ways that would 
seem `normal' to both him and his followers. Another important feature of this context is 
the appreciation of the ancient assumptions associated with writing practices. I suggest 
here that preceding Paul's act of writing is the assumption of a priority of language's 
function, not to the detriment information, but certainly not subordinate to it. 
The fact that Paul was a product of his environment is hardly a new idea in the 
history of Pauline studies; 585 nonetheless, the consequences of this fact are still being 
brought to bear upon the ongoing development of our understanding of Paul, his life and 
works. That Paul was a product of his environment also means that he was constrained by 
his environment. 586 Abraham Malherbe's comment that Paul was at once Paulus 
hellenisticus and Paulus christianus587 is clearly a tidy way to think about this dialogue 
between theology/faith and culture operating within Paul to shape the man who wrote 
various letters of the New Testament. However, it suggests a false balance, 
since-without denying the distinctiveness of Paul's Christianity-Paulus christianus is 
preceded and enabled by Paulus hellenisticus. It was not an axiom of Christianity to 
585 Thus, note again Alexander's earlier cited statement, on p. 102; Alexander, `Paul and 
the Hellenistic Schools, 60. 
586 Note Alexander's comment in the above citation: `thinkers are tied in to certain patterns 
of behaviour, restricted to certain specific forms of communication, by the society they live in' (my 
emphasis). 
587 Malherbe, Popular Philosophers, 8-9. 
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employ Hellenistic ideas and structures of activity, by contrast, to `Hellenise' non-Greek 
ideas and structures of activity was essential to the identity of Hellenism as a 
phenomenon. 588 Paul can only understand himself and his beliefs in terms of the 
cognitive, psychological, and social structures available to him, which include any 
religious beliefs, and those structures which make up his culture, which was Hellenistic. 
Hellenistic structures provide the framework which locates Paul at a particular point in 
the fabric of human society, his structures of communication-which is that according to 
which he articulates and conveys his ideology-his theology, and thus also our ability to 
know this person. 589 
Importantly, therefore, a reference to the constraint of Paul's discourse is also a 
reference to the constraint of Paul's theology to more logocentric realities rather than 
ontological realities. Paul's pragmatic focus on the gospel and his use of proclamation as 
an ethical reference point brings logocentrism to the fore as a structuring force in how we 
should be thinking of the nature of Paul's texts. This naturally fails to satisfy the lust for a 
`theological' reading, a reading which is unconsciously metaphysical in its desires, yet 
always remains just that: desire for the grammatical apprehension of the metaphysical in 
the text, `a kind of ontological inferiority complex'. 590 Paul's concern in his epistles is 
primarily to perform the function of spreading his gospel. This also problematises the 
development of `normative' Christian practice, or ethics based on Paul's writing, since, 
traditionally, Christian ethics based on Paul's writing are structured through metaphysical 
categories. Here, I prefer to structure them along logocentric lines, by which I mean that 
I prefer to structure the form of Paul's ethical exhortations in terms of the socially 
discursive structures which constrained Paul's own discourse and thus ideology and thus 
theology. 
588 This is a generally accepted point, however see Martin Hengel, The "Hellenization" of 
Judaea in the First Century (Philadelphia: Trinity Press International, 1989); also F. W. Walbank, 
The Hellenistic World (rev. ed.; Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1993), 14-16,60ff. 
589 Hence, not simply `pre-Christian' in Hengel's sense of the term, which amounts to the 
pre-Damascus road Paul with an emphasis on his relationship to Judaism (that is, Saulus, not 
Paulus). See Martin Hengel, The Pre-Christian Paul, trans. John Bowden (London: SCM, 1991). 
590 Jameson, 4. 
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Chapter Four 
(Dis)Closure, Opening, Commentary, Sur-Prise, Failure: 
Re-reading Phil 1.12 -18 
1. Introduction 
In this chapter I now seek to re-read the text in light of the preceding discussions and 
with reference to the relevant commentary on this passage. My goal is to `defamiliarise' 
and shed new light on Phil 1.12-18, and not simply to offer a repository of prior 
learning. 591 In the following discussion, I suggest that there are forces at work other than 
those which appear on the surface of the text; indeed, Phil 1.12 has already been 
presented as an important moment in the letter which does more than what is explicitly 
obvious on, but derived from, the surface of the text. 592 I further develop that theme here 
and suggest that Phil 1.12-13 does two things. It generates a reading strategy 
(hermeneutic), for the Philippians, which seeks to reverse common assumptions about 
Paul's imprisonment; it also defines the success of Paul's programme in terms of 
proclamation. I suggest that these activities are rhetorically closed off by Paul through the 
formulaic disclosure of Phil 1.12, hence (dis)closure. 
I then consider the shift in Paul's focus in 1.14-18 to describe the effects of his 
imprisonment in terms of those within the Christian community. In 1.15, rather than 
going on to develop the discussion in the way we might expect him to, 593 Paul goes into 
further detail, with a discussion of two kinds of preachers, culminating with the 
extraordinary announcement in 1.18. Paul's reasons for going into the selfish/loving 
preacher discussion in 1.15-17 are not simply to expand the Philippians' knowledge of his 
circumstances, but to continue generating a reading strategy for the Philippians to read 
his situation, which, among other things, seeks to redefine evangelical success in terms of 
proclamation. 
591 Note N. T. Wright's comment that `recent commentaries have ... tended to be 
repositories of detailed learning rather than major theological statements' (Wright, 21). 
592 Note again that Alexander has suggested Phil 1.12 is perhaps the most important 
moment in the epistle, see pp. 58ff. 
593 A number of scholars have pointed to this section as a deviation or an aside of some 
sort (e. g., Fee, 124). German scholars typically tend towards the view that it was an excursus. 
Notable are Dibelius, 65; Barth, 29; Gnilka, 60. 
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The matter of proclamation is perhaps the most important point around which 
this discussion will cohere. While on the one hand this passage (Phil 1.14-18) clearly has 
a lot to do with proclamation, there are elements within Paul's discussion which raise 
critical eyebrows. In particular, I refer to the fact that in 1.18 Paul makes an abnormal 
claim which resonates more with the philosophy of Austin and Derrida, than with the 
traditional commentary on this passage. For this reason, I shall devote some of this 
chapter to further elaboration of those points in their work which speak to the situation. 
We find that as we then follow the textual contours of Phil 1.14-18 we arrive at an 
undecidable point within the text, where it's logic deconstructs (itself, since all 
deconstruction is already within the text). Traditional readings encounter this gaping 
crevasse of undecidability, and seek to close it over, halting its dynamic production. The 
re-reading of this passage permits the logic to fail, and the result is found to be more 
fruitful and dynamic than the glossed, closed, halted version of commentary on this text. 
2. Opening: Phil 1.1-11 
Philippians opens in a somewhat typical Pauline manner, insofar as Paul adapts the 
standard epistolary formula of his culture, intermingled with some Jewish elements, to 
suit his own purposes. 594 While studies on formal epistolary openings (the salutation and 
thanksgiving sections), are essential for our understanding of the New Testament letters, 
the most important point for issues of New Testament analysis is Paul's adaptation and 
subordination of such norms to his ideological agenda. It is in such points of difference 
that we discover the contours which distinguish Paul as a particular individual and his 
writing as a distinct object of criticism. This interest in Paul's adaptation or his difference 
provides an avenue through which I may further indicate something of the critical 
direction I wish to take in this project. 
On the one hand we have formal approaches to Paul's epistles which marry 
instances of Paul's texts with instances of other, extra-biblical texts and intend to indicate 
that by these points of commonality there opens an aperture through which `light from 
the ancient East' would flow into and illuminate Pauline studies. We may readily apply 
Foucault's language here and refer to the structure which enables and validates this 
594 See the discussion in Paul Schubert, Form and Function of the Pauline Thanksgivings 
(BZNW 20; Berlin: Töpelmann, 1939), 19; also Peter T. O'Brien, Introductory Thanksgivings in the 
Letters of Paul (Leiden: Brill, 1977); but note Jeffrey T. Reed, 
`Are Paul's Thanksgivings 
Epistolary? ' 
_7SNT 
61 (1996) : 87-99. 
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process as an `order of knowledge'595 which seeks to reveal truth concerning Paul, or 
more specifically, which constructs aspects of Pauline studies in a particular way so as to 
discuss and critique them. But of course, and on the other hand, there are various other 
`orders', processes which seek to reveal truth concerning Paul and construct him and his 
work as objects of criticism. In general, these have been combined into that large 
mechanism of truth-revelation known as historical criticism. The title `historical 
criticism' refers to a way of constructing the object of criticism and not to a method or 
even a particular set of methods. Thus, for example, one can be `doing' historical 
criticism while reading for the literary aspects of a particular text because one constructs 
that text in a particular way as an object of criticism; conversely, one may be investigating 
historical information about the New Testament and be a long way from the ordering 
processes of historical criticism. 596 
With respect to Paul's opening statements, it is clearly important to acknowledge 
and research the formulaic norms of Greco-Roman letter writing and Paul's relationship 
to those norms. The importance of such study, as mentioned, is that it shows us where 
Paul differs from his culture, or even within the domain of his own epistles. The interest 
of this project, however, is to question how Paul uses such differences to secure his own 
interests; 597 that is, to ask how alteration of epistolary form, for example, serves to 
facilitate Paul's position of power-the maintenance of his relationship to, or position 
within, a particular discourse, or set of discourses, respecting who he believes himself to 
be, namely a man with a divine commission to proclaim the gospel. Such an interest does 
not imply that the only function being performed by these epistolary introductions, or any 
passage under consideration in this project, is the facilitating of Paul's power. It is rather 
the case that this is simply one of the functions. 
The primary difference in the opening passage (Phil 1.1-11) which is of interest to 
this project is the extended thanksgiving section in 1.3-11, which differs from letters 
595 Foucault uses the phrase `order of knowledge' to refer not to an epistemological matrix 
per se, but to a discursive and dominating structure which itself plays out a role in line with 
its own 
interests. In short, it is a way in which an objective of criticism is constructed as such. See Foucault, 
1: 54-55. 
596 See for example, Stephen D. Moore and Janice Capel Anderson, `Taking It Like a 
Man: Masculinity in 4 Maccabees', JBL 117/2 (1998): 249-73. 
597 This does not imply a lack of interest in the well-being of others, rather it implies the 
simple point that if we say that Paul has the interest of others at heart, then it is within 
his 
`interests' to do so. 
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within Paul's culture598, and the section in 1.7-8 in particular which differs from other 
letters within the Pauline corpus. It has been well noted that the opening section of 
Philippians carries a tone of personal interest on the part of Paul toward the Philippians 
like none of his other letters. 599 This personal interest gives rise to the rhetorical contours 
of Philippians in ways different from the well-discussed, overt protestations of Paul's 
longing and concern for the Philippians. Paul represents himself in the epistle as having a 
very close relationship to the Philippians in a manner unparalleled in his extant epistles, 
and there is no reason to contest his sincerity. 600 
Bolstered by Paul's rather positive representation with his constant references to 
friendship and joy, some critics have then gone on to read this as the primary mode of the 
epistle, with the result that we hear such bold claims as the one noted by Shaw, that 
Philippians is `the happiest document in religious literature'! 601 Though typically less 
jubilant, such laud of Philippians abounds in the commentaries602 and this is clearly one 
of the responses that Paul was attempting to achieve. 
Many commentators have detected, however, a different side to the epistle, one in 
which all is not as well as it could be. Gnilka, for example, senses that `Despite cordial 
agreement (herzlichen Einvernehmens), all is not well in Philippi'. 603 The issue of the false 
teachers is not yet a reality, but what is a reality, suggests Gnilka, are certain events 
representing a break down of their affection (Lieblosigkeit) for one another. 604 Similarly, 
Ernst claims that Paul's letter shows that the Philippians in `no way exemplify' 
598 See Peter Arzt, `The "Epistolary Introductory Thanksgiving" in the papyri and in 
Paul', NovT 36 (1994): 28-46; also see the comprehensive discussions in O'Brien, Introductory 
Thanksgivings in the Letters of Paul; Schubert, Form and Function of the Pauline Thanksgivings. 
Prayers, wishes and thanksgivings for the good health of the recipient are more the rule than the 
exception in ancient letters similar to Paul's letters, see for example the discussion on family letters 
in J. L. White, Light from Ancient Letters (FFNT; Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1986), 196-97, but 
note also pp. 200-3. Yet, in spite of this, we note that Paul is using his thanksgivings in a way 
peculiar to him. Even Schubert, who seeks to draw close to the Hellenistic parallels, acknowledges 
that Paul is not a slave to the Hellenistic forms (Schubert, 119). 
599 See discussion on pp. 75ff. 
600 See discussion on pp. 75ff. 
601 J M. Shaw, `Philippians', ExpT 45 (1934): 204. 
602 See the discussion and references on pp. 75ff. 
603 Gnilka, 12. 
604 Gnilka, 12. 
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(demonstriert keineswegs) unity and are not exactly a `shining example of Christian 
virtuousness'; 605 furthermore, he suggests that Paul shows that the congregation has 
failings, doubts, and error. 606 Peterlin, whose position on the matter is similar to my 
own, suggests that hostile circumstances at Philippi and Paul's imprisonment forced the 
church to reconsider some issues which they had previously accepted uncritically. Two 
sides form, and their respective positions harden, thereby laying siege to the church's 
unified front and weakening it. Paul's letter is, at least in substantial part, a response to 
this threat. 607 Other commentators are far more bleak, and tend to see the negative 
aspects as the dominant mode of the epistle. Black, for example, believes the letter 
reveals that the Philippians were `diseased by strife and self-interest', 608 and Blevins, who 
follows Lohmeyer's infamously gloomy work, 609 argues that the church has been split 
apart by dissension and the formation of cliques. 610 
Gnilka's point, mentioned above, that there is an agreeable tone which seems 
contrary to some of the problems actually taking place, is a suggestion that there is a 
discrepancy between the rhetoric and the reality of the epistle. Calvin noted somewhat 
earlier that Paul expresses his particular disposition towards the Philippians `with the view 
of securing their confidence', 611 and commenting on Phil 1.8: `It was ... of advantage, 
that Paul's affection should be thoroughly made known to the Philippians. For it tends in 
no small degree to secure credit for the doctrine, when the people are persuaded that they 
605 Josef Ernst, `Anfechtung und Bewahrung: Das Bild einer Christlichen Gemeinde nach 
dem Philipperbriefl, in Das Evangelium auf dem Wege zu Menschen (eds. Otto Knoch, Felix 
Messerschmid and Alois Zenner; Frankfurt: Knecht, 1973), 74. 
606 Ernst, 74. Like Gnilka, Ernst also points out that this is `normal' and `human'. 
607 Davorin Peterlin, Paul's Letter to the Philippians in the Light of Disunity in the Church 
(NovTSup 79; Leiden: Brill, 1995), pp. 219-24; note Watson's claim that the main proposition of 
the epistle is 1.27-30 (Watson `A Rhetorical Analysis of Philippians', 79). 
608 D. A. Black, `Paul and Christian Unity: A Formal Analysis of Philippians 2.1-4', JETS 
28 (1985): 303. 
609 Lohmeyer understands martyrdom to dominate the tone of the epistle. 
610 James L. Blevins, `Introduction to Philippians', RevExp 77 (1980): 320f. 
611 John Calvin, Commentaries on the Epistles to the Philippians, Colossians, and Thessalonians 
(vol. 21 of Calvin's Commentaries; Grand Rapids: Baker, 1981), 21. 
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are beloved by the teacher'. Again, we observe a difference between the rhetoric of 
Philippians and the points being made within in it. 612 
One would be hard-pressed, however, to find support for the claim that Paul was 
faking concern in order to get his point across, but there is a degree of healthy suspicion 
to be cast on to Paul's language in Philippians. It is obvious that expressing genuine 
concern and affection does not preclude any another operation being performed by that 
very expression. Paul, like everyone else in the world, has specific goals he wants to meet 
and he achieves these goals by means stated and unstated, even if those unstated means 
are not conscious movements on his part. This does not invalidate Paul's claims of 
affection, rather it merely suggests that Paul's expressions of longing and concern do not 
cease to function as soon as he moves on to another subject, they indeed reside within all 
that follows. 
I suggest that Paul makes use of the residual effects of his expression of affection 
in order to move toward developing a way for the Philippians to understand his 
imprisonment; that is, he wants to create an interpretative framework or perhaps a new 
context for the Philippians to view his circumstances so that they read the situation the 
way he wants them to read it. Here is clearly where this element of suspicion enters the 
discussion; not an incredulous suspicion, rather a critical suspicion in which one wonders 
if there is more to Paul's comments than what appears to be the case on the surface-level 
of the text. If there is, then we may just as easily call it a `subversive movement' in Paul's 
text as we may call it a rhetorical one, since the goal of such a movement is to persuade 
the Philippian readers without actually saying so. 613 
3. (Dis) closure: Phil 1.12-13 
The rhetorical move in Phil 3, mentioned above, is indicative of an unstated function of 
Philippians as a whole. Paul's language works to mask and influence; that is, it masks its 
own rhetorical operation, it leaves unstated its most important function which is to give 
the Philippians a reading strategy which will cause them to contextualise in a manner 
612 Calvin, 30. 
613 Some may suggest that this reduces all attempts to persuade to 
being subversive. This 
would be an appropriate conclusion when applied to texts (written or spoken or signified 
in any 
fashion) in which the function of persuasion is not the immediate and superficial activity of 
the 
text. 
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confluent with Paul's own discourse any difference to that discourse. 614 One can put this 
same strategy in different and more euphemistic terms: the reading strategy will enable 
the Philippians to maintain their ideo-theological position in the face of conflict, it will 
help them to keep the true faith. 
This gift from Paul of a reading strategy is also something of a rhetorical Trojan 
horse. Paul's letter of friendship carries within the folds of its discursive form another 
message which operates on the Philippians while they enjoy the gift. Thus, the signal for 
disclosure in Phil 1.12, `I want you to know' (yLvu oKELv SE ü L&S POU'X% aL) is at once the 
signal for the opening and the `closure' of Paul's letter, the signal for its (dis)closure: 
Paul's letter is perceived as open to the Philippians, as (dis)closed and (un)covered 
information, a window into his `real' situation, but this moment of uncovering or opening 
is also the moment of closure whereby the Trojan strategy comes into operation and the 
Philippians accept both the stated and unstated. The window becomes a rhetorical lens 
through which Paul allows the Philippians to see his circumstances as he wants them to 
see them. 
Jane Schaberg, as mentioned, has noticed this same operation in the Gospel of 
Luke, 615 and for this reason she interestingly suggests, though somewhat overstating the 
case (for rhetorical purposes one assumes), that Luke is `perhaps the most dangerous 
book in the Bible'. 616 What she has noticed is that while Luke seems to be the most 
woman-friendly of the Gospels, which leads to the text's gaining a certain privilege about 
the status of women, and thus to an uncritical reading or acceptance, the Gospel itself 
uses this to `legitimate male dominance in the Christianity of the author's time'. 617 The 
point is, regardless of whether one agrees with the `danger' element which Schaberg 
suggests exists, that the Gospel of Luke, while appearing to be friendly to or even privilege 
614 Note Castelli who understands 3.15-21 to be about constructing insiders and outsiders 
while at the same time conveniently re-inscribing certain hierarchical structures that work in Paul's 
favour (Castelli, 95-97). 
615 See earlier discussion, on p. 24. 
616 Schaberg, 275,286-89. Note, however, that Schaberg speaks as though Luke the man 
consciously commits these crimes against women. This is quite difficult to 
determine, and the 
situation in the gospel seems more like Luke re-inscribing the values of 
his culture into his text and 
thus it is the text which gets away from him and operates on both the sub-surface and surface 
levels. 
617 Schaberg, 275. 
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women, 618 is not at all what it appears, and is in fact quite the opposite. Thus, the text of 
the third Gospel uses the same Trojan logic which Paul uses in Phil 1.12ff. It brings in 
the reader on a level of reassurance and uses this reassurance to enable another discourse 
to operate, hence Schaberg's descriptions of the Gospel: `extremely dangerous text', 
`most dangerous book', `it seduces the reader into uncritical acceptance of it. 619 The 
element of `danger' sensed by Schaberg is caused by the realisation that this unstated 
current flows deep within the text, particularly since this unstated flow runs counter to 
the current of the stated textual surface. 
Another point to be made here is that this Trojan strategy, in which the outside 
level misdirects what is on the inside, is not exactly an uncommon one. Matthew's Jesus 
criticised the Jewish leaders for the same thing: `Woe to you, Scribes and Pharisees, 
hypocrites, because you are like whitewashed tombs (i#oLS KEKovu thVOLc) which on the 
outside appear beautiful, but within are full of bones of the dead and all uncleanliness' 
(Matt 23.27). 620 The only difference here is that Jesus castigates the process because in 
Matthew the claim is that these hypocrites are doing it on purpose. One must ask 
whether or not they really are. They obviously do not agree with Jesus' programme, and 
they deliberately attempt to achieve their own ends through their language. So, what is 
the difference between them, and Luke and Paul? Are they not living out and trying to 
achieve what they believe to be right, and is this not the very thing Luke and Paul are 
trying to do also? The difference is, from the perspective of the New Testament, that 
they do not follow Jesus' programme, which is said to come from God, whereas Luke and 
Paul are firm adherents of Jesus' programme. But does this make the Trojan logic of 
their texts any more or less `valid'? 
Returning to Philippians, we note that the break from 1.1-11, the introductory 
material or `exordium', 621 is signalled in 1.12 by a `disclosure formula' (Y LVwGKE LV 6E 1')µk 
ßo 5Aoµai), the function of which was to introduce the primary reason for writing. 622 As 
618 See the commentators' claims listed in Schaberg, 275, which have been used to 
describe Luke as, `a special "friend" of women, portraying them in an "extremely progressive" and 
"almost modern" fashion, giving them "a new identity and a new social status"'. 
619 Schaberg, 275. 
620 See Psalm 5.9; Rom. 3.13. 
621 See, Watson, `A Rhetorical Analysis of Philippians', 61-65. 
622 See discussion, on pp. 59ff. 
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discussed earlier, 623 Alexander suggests that the disclosed reason for writing (1.12-26) is 
all about reassuring the Philippians concerning Paul's situation. It is important that we 
recognise that the idea of `reassuring' is also an unstated one. We assume that this must 
be what Paul was trying to do in 1.12ff., 624 and there is no reason at all to question that 
this is indeed a function of the disclosure formula in 1.12, yet the conditions which enable 
the function of reassurance to operate also enable differently interested625 rhetorical 
moves to operate in Philippians. 
This is a natural feature of rhetorical communication in general. Even if we were 
to assume that language is concrete and has solid connections between its signifiers and 
signified, when it aims to produce an effect-where the relationship between a set of 
signifiers and their referent(s) is `metaphorical'-such as in our text, it opens itself up to a 
radical polyvalence which is easily (if not always) exploited for ideological purposes. This 
linguistic operation is, of course, an object of critical theory and is not a matter of seeing 
Paul as deliberately or consciously out to deceive, rather of one which recognises that 
Paul's interests were not singular, but varied; that Paul was a normal, subjective writer 
whose many interests inscribed themselves in the texts he generated. As Belsey has it, 
`ideology is inscribed in signifying practices-in discourses, myths, presentations and re- 
presentations of the way "things" "are" . 
626 
What this leads to is the realisation that when we read Paul, we read Paul, since 
his bio-graphics are inscribed in everything he writes, as is the case with all of us. Paul's 
texts are naturally unconsciously constructed in accordance with ideo-theological interests 
derived from his social discourse and the terrifyingly complex psycho-social network 
which that includes. This problematises readings of Paul which are designed to generate 
Christian ethics in particular, since all such readings must account for the constraints 
which precede Paul's evaluation process and govern his reactions, what he sees as 
normative or abnormal, what is proper behaviour and improper, and so on. 
623 See discussion on pp. 58ff. 
624 I am aware of no commentator who does not try to represent this section as an attempt 
to reassure or allay the concerns of the Philippians. 
625 That is, the language of the letter is seen to operate confluently with the flow of its 
own argument and at the same time in a manner other than that argument. 
626 Catherine Belsey, Critical Practice (London: Routledge, 1980), 42. 
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A further problem that arises is the fact that it is a feature of language to escape its 
origins. 627 The result of this, to put it negatively, is that the author loses control over 
what he or she produces at the moment of production; to put it positively, the result is 
that readers produce readings of texts that are valid in and of themselves but may not 
have been what the author was thinking when he or she compiled the text. 628 The only 
question with this is not whether or not it happens, rather whether or not one would label 
as `valid' a reading other than that which is entirely confluent, even identical, with the 
conscious mind of the author at the time of writing. It is very important, however, to 
recognise that this is not a hermeneutical reality simply affecting our contemporary 
reading of Philippians, in which we experience the risk of missing the author's `intended' 
meaning, it was, of course, also a hermeneutical reality affecting the Philippians and 
forms the condition according to which both the reassuring and the subversive629 
elements can operate. Despite all the complaints to the contrary, the author's `intended' 
meaning remains a possibility. The only problems are that: (1) there is no guarantee that 
one has arrived at that reading; (2) we must assume that the author's `intended' meaning 
is the one foremost in his conscious mind, if such a distinction can be made (by 
`foremost', I only mean in the same way that a desire for salt is foremost in my mind 
when I ask for someone to pass the salt). The author has varying interests derived from 
transparent norms and values within his or her culture which consequently constrain him 
or her as a subject and thus to be subjective. As such, the author is blind to his or her 
discourse at least to some degree. Nonetheless, we can claim that the `authorial' reading 
is a possible reading even if there are other possible readings generated by a given text. 
For this reason there is no harm at all in attempting to reach Paul's `intended' meaning; 
though `intended' must remain in quotes since it is necessary to keep in mind point 2, 
above, and the question of whether we can speak of a consciously unified intention 
present to the subject. 
In Phil 1.12, Paul makes a point of explaining that his circumstances are actually 
working for the advancement (1rpoKOTr1j)630 of the gospel, which we should probably take as 
627 See the discussion on pp. 174ff. 
628 See Johnson's comments on the logic of an author's text on p. 41. 
629 By `subversive' I mean the unstated function in the letter which works to align 
(further) the Philippians with Paul's ideo-theological position. 
630 BPOKOnrj is something of a technical term in Greco-Roman moral philosophy; 
however, 
142 
a reference to proclamation; hence O'Brien's suggestion that 1rPOKOnTJv ioü EüayyE; Lyou in 
Phil 1.12 is not a reference to its content, rather a reference to the act of proclaiming 
it. 631 O'Brien also notes that Paul `goes out of his way' to show the Philippians examples 
of this advance by accumulating terms expressive of courage: 632 `the majority of the 
brethren have all the more [irEpLoaotEpWS] confidence [TrEiroLAöiaS] in the Lord by virtue of 
my bonds to boldly [io?. t&v] speak the word without fear [äýößc)S]' (Phil 1.14) . 
The 
significance of this explanation, that is, the significance of including an explanation, is that 
it serves to alleviate the `natural and reasonable'633 expectation by the Philippians that 
things do not bode well for Paul and perhaps even for the gospel itself. The contrary 
expectation of the Philippians is probably the significance of the term &; L ov (`rather'634), 
which seems best read as an attempt by Paul to point out to the Philippians that the 
4unexpected'635 has happened; that is, that their natural expectations-which Paul either 
knows from reports or assumes on the basis of cultural norms-have been confounded. 636 
As almost every commentator points out, Paul is here quite concerned to 
represent the gospel as something which transcends his own circumstances and the power 
of the Romans. A rather helpful point can be derived from a phrase used by Fee to 
describe the situation. Fee points out that Paul's `present focus is not so much on himself 
it does not appear to carry this technical sense at this point. See Foucault, 3.43ff.; Epictetus Diss. 
2.12-22; the essays in E. R. Dodds, The Ancient Concept of Progress and Other Essays (Oxford: 
Clarendon, 1973); also, G. Stählin, lTpoKoln'j, TDNT 6: 704-11; in the New Testament, only in Phil 
1.12,25; and in 1 Tim 4.15. 
631 O'Brien, `The Gospel', 223,219-24. 
632 O'Brien, `The Gospel', 221. 
633 O'Brien, `The Gospel', 220; see the discussion on pp. 81ff. 
634 For `rather', see Vincent, 16; Fee, Philippians, 110; O'Brien, Philippians, 90; Collange, 
53; Lightfoot, 87; but note BAGD which suggests `to a greater degree' for ji&Uov in Phil 1.12 
(BAGD, 489). 
635 Gnilka, 56. 
636 While Paul may have felt that the gospel had made `considerable and unexpected 
progress' (O'Brien, `The Gospel', 221), one suspects that the Philippians too would not have 
expected any advance. Indeed, they probably expected the contrary; Fee, Philippians, 111; 
O'Brien, Philippians, 90; Lightfoot, 87. 
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... as 
it is on how he views what has happened'. 637 While the phrase `how he views' is also 
emphasised by Fee, I would suggest that it might be better to emphasise only the personal 
pronoun, so as to indicate that what is important about the explanation in 1.12, from a 
critical perspective, is that it is Paul's view; in fact, I would further suggest that we take 
this as not simply how Paul views the situation, but how he wants the Philippians to view 
the situation. Hence the well-established argument in the commentaries that Paul seeks 
to show that even the antagonists further his interests. 
That is, 1.12 offers Paul's preferred `spin' on his present circumstances. There 
are a number of possible reasons for this, but the one which forms a central interest of 
this project is simply that Paul desires (POD Xoiu i) to create the impression that the gospel 
prevails in spite of bad circumstances, and that, in accordance with the norms of popular 
discourse about psychagogic activity, 638 Paul's words match his deeds. 639 Thus, `I want 
you to know' (1.12) becomes, functionally speaking, a covert way of saying, `this is how I 
want you to read the situation'. The object of Paul's desire (ßoi)XoµaL) is, therefore, not 
the Philippians' simple, unitary cognizance of the gospel's progress (irpoKOnrj) but the 
dynamic polysemy effected by the explanation. That is, the explanation in general, and 
the ötL-clause in particular, is this aforementioned rhetorical Trojan horse which 
functions purely and singularly on the surface, but on the inside there lies the discursive 
complex that Paul wants to unfold and lay over the Philippians' understanding of his 
situation. 
As mentioned, we find in 1.12-18 an attempt by Paul to counter the expectations 
among the Philippians that there was something untoward about Paul's message, which 
would be suggested by his prolonged imprisonment, and that these expectations are 
derived from the norms generated by Greco-Roman social discourse. Apart from the 
social norms of linking prison and shame, discussed earlier, 640 there is also another very 
important social expectation in place and which Paul may indeed be attempting to meet 
in Phil 1.12-18, namely the aforementioned word-deed convention. This convention was 
637 Fee, Paul's Letter to the Philippians, 108. 
638 Hence the earlier discussion on Greco-Roman philosophical conventions and 
psychagogy, see esp. pp. 101ff. 
639 Note pp. 11 3ff., and pp. 101ff. 
640 See above, pp. 8 1ff. 
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incumbent upon philosophers and psychagogues in particular, 641 but certainly as a 
standard, popular ethical convention, that one's words ought to match one's deeds. 642 
Phil 1.12, and the rest of our passage, works to demonstrate that any potential 
problem based on the word-deed convention is countered by the fact that the gospel 
continues to progress. The problem is this, if Paul has preached the gospel at Philippi 
and claimed that it was the message of God by whom he has been personally 
commissioned to tell them these very things, and then finds himself in prison for a 
number of years, what does this then say to the Philippians who are already starting to 
falter in their unity, and to new converts in particular, about the validity of Paul's claims? 
Not very much. The fabric of the Philippian Christian community's self-understanding is 
woven through with stories of God's demonstration of power through Paul, 643 and 
releasing him from jail. Paul's long-term imprisonment can threaten a retrospective 
interpretation of these previous events. Phil 1.12ff., is a bid to prevent this: if Paul's 
words were thought not to match his deeds, his `deed' in this case is his long-term 
imprisonment, then he need only point out that the gospel is still being spread while he is 
in prison. But is this enough? Perhaps Paul did not think so, because Phil 1.14-18 
continues the development of his attempt to generate the right reading of his situation. It 
is a subtle development, but it also explains what is going on in the passage as a whole 
(Phil 1.12-18a), a passage which Ralph Martin has called `tantalisingly obscure'. 644 
To take stock of the discussion, in 1.12 we find Paul sifting through the rubble of 
his socially degraded circumstances, which have probably relegated him to the lowest 
stratum of an intensely class-conscious society and which have probably stripped him of 
any semblance of honour in an equally intensely honour/shame-driven society. In spite of 
these dire straits, and contrary to the natural expectations of the Philippians, he has 
nonetheless been able to unearth from the rubble the claim that the gospel has 
progressed. In order to validate his claim, Paul begins in 1.13 to unpack the significance 
of the term `progress' (npoKOnrj) by giving an account of supporting evidence. He begins 
641 See, the discussion on pp. 99ff. 
642 See the discussions on pp. 113ff., and on pp. 101ff. 
643 See comments on p. 84. 
644 Martin, Philippians, 70. 
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with a complex infinitival result clause (WatE ... 
645), lasting through to 1.14, which 
describes or `explains'646 his circumstances in terms of the results of the coming about of 
the progress of the gospel (TrpoKO1rýv ioü EüayyEAL'ou EXr Xu6EV). 
It is difficult to say precisely what Paul's claim is in 1.13 as opposed to the rest of 
the results stated in 1.14. Is he saying that he has been able to win converts among the 
Praetorian Guard and `all the rest'? It does not appear to be the case that he is. The fact 
that he is careful to add a salutation `especially (p. &ALata) from those out of Caesar's house 
(KaLoapoc oLKLaS)'647 in 4.22 at the very last moment in the letter, before his formulaic 
closing, indicates that he was certainly interested in pointing out to the Philippians that he 
was still at work among the house churches in Rome. It is clear that there were already 
Christians in Rome before Paul arrived, and the fact that the salutations are made in the 
way they are (`especially' [. tcawia]), is perhaps indicative more of the fact that the saluters 
were already Christians of whom the Philippians were at least aware or perhaps even 
knew, than of new converts unknown to the Philippians. What the salutation does 
evidence, as indicated above, is the fact that Paul was working among the Christians in 
Rome. This is a point Paul is obviously keen to make sure the Philippians know in order 
to further develop the impression that things are going well, with respect to his ministry, 
in spite of the circumstances. 
So, what is to be made of the claimed result in Phil 1.13? An obvious point is that 
it differs from the result in 1.14, insofar as 1.13 refers to the progress of the gospel outside 
the Christian community, as opposed to 1.14 which refers to the progress within. 648 One 
thing Paul is not claiming is that he has been able to win converts; instead, he appeals to 
proclamation649 as the basis of the advance, which is also the basis of the advance in the 
second result stated in 1.14. That is, Paul points to his achievement of spreading the 
`message' throughout the Praetorian Guard and all the rest with the result that they are 
645 The use of wßtE with the infinitive could refer to either real, potential or intended 
results (BDF §391), the present context indicates that Paul refers to actual results (see Rom. 15.19; 
1 Cor. 5.1); see Silva, Philippians, 69; O'Brien, Philippians, 91, n. 18-19. 
646 On w6iE as explicatory, see Collange, 54, n. 1; also, Vincent, 16; Silva, Philippians, 
69-70; Gnilka, 56. 
647 On Kaioapoc OiKLaq, see comments on p. 70. 
648 See O'Brien, Philippians, 91. 
649 See the discussion on the definition of `gospel' (EÜayyEALov) below, pp. 148ff. 
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now aware that his imprisonment is `in Christ' (Ev Xp LQiw) . 
650 This raises two questions, 
What is meant by Ev Xp Lvt4? and What is the significance of the fact that Paul's claim of 
progress is based on proclamation and not upon conversion? 
The phrase Ev Xpwt is used seventy-six times in the New Testament, seventy- 
three of which are in Pauline literature, while the remaining three are located in 1 Peter. 
It is as common in Paul as it is ambiguous; hence the frustrated tone of BDF, `the phrase 
EV XpLat( (KupL'W), which is copiously appended by Paul to the most varied concepts, 
utterly defies definite interpretation'! 651 Here the problem has been to determine with 
what other phrase (s) in the clause in 1.13 (cAiotE TODS SEQµoiS µou )avEpoüS Ev Xp LoT4) 
yEVEß6M) one should connect Ev Xpwt4, since it leaves the word order in a rather 
awkward or at least unexpected state. 652 One option, generally rejected, 653 is to connect 
it to the phrase `my bonds' (TOI ")S 6Eaµo1 S µou). 654 The problem with this rendering is that 
it strains the Greek word order by not allowing the predicate adjective `manifest' 
(xavEpöc), which separates the two phrases, to function adequately as a modifier of the 
phrase `my bonds' (ioüS SEOµolS µou). For this reason, it appears best to take the lead 
from the Greek word order655 and render the phrase Ev XpLvic4 in such a way so as to link 
it to the entire preceding accusative construction (tioüc SEQµoüS [µou] 1(XvEpoic), 656 so that 
it renders the dative Ev Xp LOT. as indicative of the sphere in which the manifestation of 
Paul's bonds has `come about' (yEVEo9at). 657 It is not quite correct, therefore, to get 
650 This assumes a certain rendering of the word order in the infinitival clause in 1.13 
which I discuss below in conjunction with the meaning of Ev XpLwic . 
651 BDF, §219 (4); for a good summary of the interpretative situation regarding this phrase 
in Paul, see the discussion and bibliography in M. A. Seifrid, `In Christ', DPL, 433-36. 
652 Gnilka notes that one expects Ev XpLot 4 to follow yEVEO9aL (Gnilka, 56, n. 11). 
653 For example, Vincent, 16. 
654 Such as the AV: `So that my bonds in Christ are manifest in all the palace'. 
655 See Vincent, 16. 
656 Gnilka, 56, n. 11. 
657 Similarly, Dibelius, 64. 
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around the problem by rendering Ev Xptot4 as `for Christ', 658 although this certainly 
comes close to the point. Neugebauer suggests that take the phrase as an adverbial or 
circumstantial modification. This is helpful only if we see it as adding to the complexity 
of the phrase's referents, rather than excluding the metaphorical reference to space which 
is inherent in the term. For this reason, the rest of his claim, that the phrase is a temporal 
reference to Christ's saving activity and that therefore Paul's imprisonment was an 
example of that saving activity, is harder to accept. 659 Note, however, O'Brien's concern 
that `it is doubtful whether the phrase "in Christ" can really bear the weight Neugebauer 
has put on it'. 660 
The phrase Ev Xp LQiw nonetheless remains ambiguous even when we do 
determine its syntactical function, or perhaps even in spite of its syntactical function. 
While it is probably impossible to nail one referent to the phrase, we can of course 
approximate the sense of the range of referents Paul may have intended. Seifrid notes 
that the expression in Paul `probably came from earlier Jewish Christianity'. 661 As an 
example, he points to Acts 4.2,12 as indicators that `the earliest believers in Jerusalem 
proclaimed Jesus as the decisive "sphere" of God's saving action'. 662 
The signifier `in Christ', in such cases, therefore becomes the label for the context 
of work done as a result of the Messianic activity of God's son. That is, Paul assumes a 
certain metaphysical shift occurs when one is baptised which is the direct result of this 
Messianic activity in which the Christian, in this case Paul, participates. So, in Rom 
6.3-5, Paul says that those who were baptised into (EIS) Christ Jesus were baptised into 
(EIS) his death, the result of which is that the Christian's activity is now recontextualised 
so that it is performed in this sphere of Christ: `so that we walk in newness of life' (Rom 
6.4). The result of this is that everything the Christian does is in the context of `Christ', 
because `God has rescued us from out of the domain of darkness (Eýoua(. ac ioü cKÖiouc) 
658 E. g., Vincent, 16; NIV; NRSV. Some, unwilling to trouble Ev by rendering it as `for', 
have understood the phrase in an elliptical sense, rendering it as `in Christ's cause', e. g., Werner 
Kramer, Christ, Lord, Son of God (trans. Brian Hardy; London: S. C. M., 1966), 154. 
659 F. Neugebauer, In Christus: Eine Untersuchung zum Paulinischen Glaubensverständnis 
(Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1961), esp. 121; see also his more accessible, earlier article 
F. Neugebauer, `Das Paulinische "in Christo"', NTS 4 (957-58): 124-38. 
660 O'Brien, Philippians, 92. 
661 Seifrid, DPL, 435. 
662 Seifrid, DPL, 435. 
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and transferred (µE81 rr11µL) [us] into the kingdom of his beloved son' (Col 1.13, also 
1.22-23). The point I draw from this is that the phrase `in Christ', when used in 
references to activity, is merely a way of contextualising that activity. Thus, in Phil 1.13 
Paul's point is simply that his imprisonment has come to be understood by the Praetorian 
Guard and `all the rest' to be a part of his activity as someone who has adopted Jesus 
Christ as his Lord and tries to act in accordance with the fact, namely, his activity as a 
Christian. 663 
Paul claims that the Praetorian Guard and the others have been able to 
(re)contextualise his imprisonment, not in terms of the normal social expectations, the 
natural context, but in terms of his work as a servant of Christ-not as impotence, since 
he is not simply thrown in prison at the whim of the state, but as power, since his 
imprisonment is being used for a higher purpose. This throws light on to the sort of 
critical move Paul is making throughout this passage. He is attempting to give the 
Philippians a specific way of reading his situation which enables them to look favourably 
on his present circumstances, and, in keeping with the normal context with which they 
would read anyone's imprisonment, not unfavourably. 
The second question mentioned above664 concerned the significance of Paul's 
claim that progress is based on proclamation. Paul has attempted to recontextualise his 
imprisonment by claiming that his circumstances have, against normal expectations, 
brought about the progress of the gospel. As discussed earlier, Phil 1.13 is an explanation 
of the claim in 1.12. But if so, in what way does the manifestation of his bonds Ev Xp Loiw 
infer the progress of the gospel? In trying to determine just what he is claiming in his 
explanation of the claim in 1.13, we also confront the problem of defining the term 
`gospel' (Ei)ayYEXLov). 
Originally, a EüayyaLov was a reward for bringing good news665 and then, as is 
presently obvious, it eventually conflated the circumstances and was used to refer to the 
663 Note the translation in Beare, 56. 
664 See p. 146. 
665 This is the sense of the substantive in its earliest known use, Homer Odyssey, 14.152f; 
166f. Note that the word was still rooted in the sense of good news Eü + &yyE)Loc, insofar as the 
bearer brings good news which brings relief for the recipients and for that he was subsequently 
rewarded (Becker, NIDNTT 2: 107). 
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good news itself. 666 In the New Testament the noun is used seventy-six times, sixty of 
which are found in the Pauline epistles. 667 Partially on this basis, some have suggested 
that `it was Paul who established the term euangelion in the vocabulary of the [New 
Testament]'; not that Paul invented the term, rather `he was taking over phraseology 
already familiar to his readers', who were already aware of the word's content. 668 Perhaps 
Paul's most explicit description of the (semantic/kerygmatic) content of ED1XY yEALov is 
located in 1 Cor. 15.1-4: `I make known to you, brethren, the gospel ... namely that 
Christ died on behalf of our sins according the Scriptures, and that he was buried and 
that he was raised on the third day according to the Scriptures'. To say that this 
statement is fundamental to all that Paul writes rather understates the case. `The gospel' 
is the point of cohesion around which crystallises the meaning of all that Paul is and does. 
However, Becker has pointed out that the term EüayyEXLov in Paul's writing does not only 
refer to the kerygmatic content of the term, `but also the act, process and execution of the 
proclamation'. 669 
The implication of this for our problem in Phil 1.12-13 is that when Paul claimed 
that the gospel had progressed, and then points to its manifestation `in Christ' among the 
Praetorian Guard and all the rest, he was not referring to the winning of converts, but to 
this verbal, dynamic aspect of EüayyEXLov, that is, to proclamation. According to Paul, the 
criterion of progress which he meets is proclamation, re-iteration; that is, the gospel has 
advanced because he has been able to communicate basic content concerning Christ's 
salvific work. The importance of this cannot be overstated. In EüayyEALov, we have all 
that Paul considered important, we have both `theology' and practice. Perhaps more 
importantly, I suggest that the communication of the gospel, its reiteration, is not only 
central to Paul's work, but that what he says elsewhere, particularly in passages impacting 
ethics and Church polity, which I combine under the title `Christian practice', is 
subordinated to it. The content of the gospel is the information concerning Christ's 
work; the practice-that is, Christian practice because it is performed Ev Xp wt4 -is all 
that is necessary to communicate the message of Christ's work. A primary reason that I 
666 See BAGD, 317; U. Becker, NIDNTT 2: 107; Gerhard Friedrich, EÜOL'yyEA, Lov, TDNT 
2: 722. 
667 Including the disputed epistles. 
668 U. Becker, NIDNTT, 2: 110. 
669 U. Becker, NIDNTT, 2: 111, see the earlier discussion of Becker's comments on p. 68. 
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believe Phil 1.12-18 to be so important is that it develops this point like no other passage. 
Paul is willing to allow what can only be considered in normal circumstances as unethical 
or inappropriate Christian practice simply because it spreads the gospel, and thus meets 
the very criterion he holds up for his own sense of progress. The significance of this is 
that it problematises other discussions in Paul where he discourses on appropriate 
Christian practice. I submit that when we encounter other discussions on Christian 
practice, what we see is not a discussion based on a metaphysical ethic, rather a 
fundamentally pragmatic logocentric discussion which Paul believes will bring about the 
best circumstances for the gospel's progress. 
Paul has invested a great deal in the gospel and sees himself as the spiritual father 
of, and thus responsible for, the Philippians. The Philippians are in conflict, experiencing 
pressure from within and without; the church is not as stable as it should be. Some are 
worried about Paul (4.10), and some are worried about themselves (1.28). The cause of 
all this is their adoption of the gospel. `Is it worth it? ' must have been a frequent, silent, 
and perhaps quietly discussed question-Is it worth holding on to Paul's gospel? 670 or Is 
it worth holding on to any form of the gospel? Thus, Paul can not afford his present 
circumstances to detract from his work at Philippi; he therefore takes special care to 
ensure that though he may appear to be impotent and in prison (and all thus under all the 
social pressure and shame associated with that fact), the Philippians do not use his 
present circumstances as the occasion for any `retrospective interpretation'671 of his work, 
and thus his message, and degrade his status to match the perceived situation. For Paul 
this would be disaster, both for his position at the head of the Christian community in 
Philippi-and thus also his ability to maintain their ideo-theological position-and for the 
gospel he preaches. 
4. There's No Such Thing as Safe Text 
`Text' is a reference to any codified structure or semiotic system. As semiotic structures, 
texts are not the works themselves, to invoke Barthes, rather that which 
is produced when 
670 Since they could opt for the religio licita version in Jewish-Christianity. 
671 On the phenomenon of retrospective interpretation see Malina and 
Neyrey, `Conflict 
in Luke-Acts: Labeling and Deviance Theory', 106f. Basically, the point is rather simple and 
obvious, when someone comes to be seen in negative 
light, such as being in prison for several 
years(! ), that person's past, if a positive one, begins to be re-understood 
in terms of that person's 
present negative circumstances (one assumes the opposite would 
be true also). This leads the 
observers-such as, perhaps, the Philippians-to degrade the previous status of the 
individual and 
rebuild a new status which is confluent with the present reality. 
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one engages the `work', that is, the text is the `methodological field' of activity. 672 The 
problem with text, however, is that it all looks and sounds the same. Its phonetic and 
graphic marks bear no mark of truth value, no apparent metaphysic. Truth (&Xrj6ELa) and 
pretext (Trp&Ix wLc) easily, perhaps necessarily, cohabit the same text-not as permanent 
residents, though, and certainly not as innate qualities of a text's structure; they exist in 
the (un)conscious intentions, the prior structuring, of the signifying subject. The 
problem is that they remain there. The auditing subject bears the responsibility of 
inscribing the perceived text with his or her own intentions and interests. Basic 
expectations, cultural code and common social discourse work towards enabling the 
communication of ideas between two subjects to function fairly smoothly. 
Language, however, is never what it seems to be, because it all looks the same, not 
that it is not what we think it is, but rather it is always more than we think it is. It is 
always something else as well. Trouble arises. How is it possible that language is always 
more than we think it is? It is because of its iterability: its ability to be cited and re- 
situated into new contexts; that is, its ability to be recontextualised and not necessarily 
into homogenous contexts (writing for writing, speech for speech), but into heterogenous 
contexts (culture/speech, writing/ideology). Derrida has much to say about the context in 
his intercourse with Austin's How To Do Things with Words, and in the course of this 
chapter we shall have further occasion to interact with this dialogue. 673 However, we do 
not want simply to leave the dialogue situated on the pages of Derrida and Austin, rather, 
there is opportunity to re-cite the dialogue in our reading of Paul. Indeed, Paul himself 
has something to contribute to the discussion, for in his letter to the Philippians, Paul also 
saw that the problem with language was that it all sounded the same. Having recognised 
this, Paul decides not to write against the iterable nature of language, he rather decides to 
use this quality of language against itself in an attempt to halt the progress of iterability. 
That is, Paul produces a new context in which his imprisonment and relationship to the 
gospel can be re-cited and thus enable the Philippians to read his situation in a manner 
confluent with the way he himself wants them to read it. We could hardly say that Paul is 
attempting to delude his readers, it is rather the case that he necessarily seeks to persuade 
672 See Roland Barthes, `From Work to Text' in his Image Music Text (trans. Stephen 
Heath; New York: Hill and Wang, 1977), 155-64, esp. 156-57. 
673 See also the discussions on Austin's How to Do Things with Words, pp. 35ff., and pp. 
32ff. 
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his readers to believe what he believes to be true; even if `persuasion comes from what 
seems to be true, not from the truth'. 674 
At this point, we must ask Paul to rest his pen, or at least that of his amanuensis, 
the `citer' of Paul, while we take stock of the situation. The present task is to investigate a 
problem of language, namely its iterability, repeatability or citability and its relationship 
to the production of meaning; although, such critical theory often finds itself as an 
uninvited guest at the gatherings of Biblical scholars. In spite of this, we find Paul in 
Philippians posting an open invitation: to the Romans, a Roman; to the Greeks, a Greek; 
to the critical theorists, a practitioner. In his letter(s)-ypa4rj, ypäµµa(ia), EiriotoAij-to 
the Philippians, Paul pulls on his critical commentator's cloak (Eng-otoArj) and comments 
upon the (metaphysical) relationship between author and message, form and essence, 
entity and being, letter and spirit. One can hardly reject an invitation from such a man, 
so we must also don our critical attire and respond. Before we go on, however, let us re- 
read the text thus far and pre-empt where it will go. 
We have noted that Paul glides through the standard introductory citation of the 
marks of ancient epistles, offering his thanks to God for the Philippians; ma(r)king some 
comments regarding what God will do for them; citing his own affection for them; and 
concluding the introduction with his prayer for them. Following this rather conventional 
opening, Paul begins the body of the letter with a formula not altogether common to the 
New Testament: YLV OKELV SE ü t&S poü;, oµm (1.12). This turn of phrase, along with other 
literary aspects of the letter, suggests a more intimate and informal correspondence in 
which Paul communicates with good friends as opposed to a group with whom he is 
unfamiliar. 675 It is significant that Paul had a close relationship with the people of the 
Philippian church, because, as my thesis suggests, it plays a crucial role in the way in 
which he presents information to them. 
After creating a sort of `just for you' ambience, 676 he proceeds through the 
channels of his personal relationship with them in order to develop a `correct' 
interpretation of his circumstances. Paul is able to do this with a degree of ease, since the 
evidence of his close relationship with the Philippians also suggests that he had an 
established ethos (in spite of the probability that it had been damaged by virtue of his 
674 Plato, Phaedrus, 260A, (Fowler, LCL); also see 272D-E. 
675 See the comments on p. 60. 
676 See the comments on pp. 75ff. 
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imprisonment) which would have enabled him to say a great deal without challenge from 
his audience. Thus, Paul applies himself to the aforementioned task of fixing an 
interpretive perspective from which the Philippians are supposed to view the bland 
historical fact of his imprisonment. He could hardly allow the fact of his imprisonment to 
suggest that his gospel was in some way subordinate to Roman power. Thus, while it is 
quite rare for commentators to venture a discussion of Paul's attempt to create an 
interpretive perspective for this historical event, Craddock assumes that Paul's 
circumstances naturally warrant his providing an interpretative perspective to prevent 
what could otherwise be a detrimental interpretation: that Paul's gospel is not a divine 
programme. 677 Martin also comes close when he suggests that Paul is trying to 
communicate that the imprisonment does not invalidate his status as an apostle, or 
perhaps the power of apostleship in general, as well as the fact that the gospel continues 
to advance in spite of various obstacles; rather Paul's `interest focuses on giving a 
statement of personal vindication of his apostleship and on announcing the progress of 
the gospel'. 678 
There is no way to know just what the Philippians thought of Paul's 
circumstances, apart from the fact that they must have had some concern for him. 679 But 
it is not so difficult to determine what Paul thought of the Philippians at this time; he was 
obviously concerned about them. This concern of Paul's for the Philippians is generally 
acknowledged to be two-fold: his concern for the personal opposition experienced by the 
ecclesial community in Philippi (see 1.27-30), as well as the threat to Paul's established 
set of beliefs and principles or theology brought on by false teachers or leaders (see 1.27; 
2.1-4; 3.1-3,17-19; 4.9), which may have been the cause of some unrest. 680 
As the spiritual father of this group, and in keeping with the nature of his 
apostolate, Paul is naturally compelled to recontextualise681 the situation so as to alleviate 
their distress and any danger that he might perceive they are in. His main tool is his 
677 Fred B. Craddock, Philippians (Interpretation; Atlanta: John Knox Press, 1985), 24. 
678 Martin, Philippians (NCB), 71. 
679 This is evidenced by Epaphroditus' presence as their 
`apostle' who meets Paul's needs 
on their behalf (2.25), as well as by their gifts to him (4.10,13-18). 
680 See the discussion of these two concerns in Fee, 29-34. 
681 Echoes of Entstellung resound through this movement, see the 
discussion of 
Hinterfragen on pp. 17ff. 
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rhetoric through which he `bring [s] into existence a discourse of such a character that the 
audience, in thought and action, is so engaged that it becomes a mediator of change'. 682 
That is, his epistle serves as a potential `mediator of change' by virtue of its ability to 
`alter' the way in which the Philippians view various circumstances. 683 Paul exhorts them 
to `stand firm' and `strive together' in the things that they already know, and to beware of 
certain ones who might threaten what they know. It just so happens that the two issues 
going on at Philippi are similar to two issues with which he is also dealing in his 
imprisonment: personal suffering for his faith, and self-oriented preachers. It is 
reasonable to assume that a probable reason for Paul's foregrounding these two issues in 
Phil 1 is due to the fact that they reflect something of what the Philippians themselves are 
experiencing. Paul can demonstrate his own situation as a potential model for their 
own. 684 But he must present his imprisonment in such a way so that it really does 
function as a positive model and not an ominous death knell for both Paul and the power 
of the gospel or worse, for those at Philippi who have thrown their lot in with Paul and his 
gospel. After all, the power of the gospel does not appear to be all that powerful while 
Paul seems to be humbled by the Roman state. So, it is incumbent upon Paul to 
(re)present his situation to the Philippians in a way that is positive (`acceptable'685), so 
that it can slip past the Censor. He needs to persuade them to see that such opposition 
does not, as might be supposed or even suggested by some among them, subordinate the 
power of the gospel, which is the power of God to act in this world. That is, Paul must 
re-create their own sense of the world. 
But here, in the attempt to create a new discourse to resolve a problem, in the 
attempt to persuade the audience to adopt a new perspective, a fissure between the bland 
historical event and its interpretation is exposed. The very possibility of persuasion 
('interpretation') exposes an already existing split between, or a demarcation of, every 
event and its interpretation, an opening that never permits closure. That is, an 
interpretation can never achieve complete identity with its object. There is only always a 
cite of on-going (re)production, because this possibility of persuasion is also the 
682 Bitzer, 4. 
683 In this particular case, Paul is seeking to strengthen internal cohesion. 
Note again the 
discussion on pp. 89f., and the references in n. 276,374. 
684 Indeed, it has been suggested that models are the `core' of the letter and the `key' to 
the `architecture' of Philippians (Stowers, `Friends and Enemies', 117). 
685 Note the idea of `acceptable' on pp. 17ff. 
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possibility of the continual citing and grafting of new iterable or repeatable structures into 
the context of that space. 
Every event is a text open for (re)production, thus all of history is a text open for 
(re)production, and so, as Derrida suggests, il nya pas de hors-texte; 686 there is nothing 
which escapes text, nothing which escapes mediation. 687 As stated earlier, 688 the result, 
in short, is that interpretation changes with new information. Again, the possibility of 
change prevents closure from ever taking place, and this possibility is also continuous 
because context itself is continuous. Thus to cite Derrida again `no meaning can be 
determined out of context, but no context permits saturation'. 689 That is, meaning 
requires a point of reference, but there can never be a final decision regarding what that 
point of reference might be. Thus, the context of any event is always beyond every 
description of it. 
In Paul's discussion of his imprisonment in Phil 1, the rhetorical gestures 
inscribed in his letter simply offer the Philippians new information to add to their 
interpretive processes, their perception of a context, so that they might not perceive or 
interpret that his imprisonment has signalled the overpowering of the gospel, but rather 
that the gospel transcends even the power of the Romans, thereby providing them with a 
perspective from which to view their own circumstances. This information comes as the 
object of YU/Ü OKELV in 1.12-14, specifically the summary in 1.12 that `my circumstances 
have turned out for the greater progress of the gospel', in spite of what appears to be a 
negative situation for him and his work, namely, his imprisonment. Immediately 
following this statement, Paul seeks to qualify his positive account in 1.15-18. In so 
doing, he exposes his assumptions about the relationship of authors to intention and 
meaning. This qualification consists of Paul's description of two opposing kinds of 
people who preach the gospel with respect to his imprisonment. He notes that on the one 
hand there are those who preach the gospel `through good will' and `out of love', knowing 
686 Derrida, 158: `There is nothing outside of the text [there is no outside-text ... 
1'. 
687 Hart takes Derrida's comment, il n'y a pas de hors-texte, to infer a virtual given 
in 
poststructural critical theory, that `there is no knowledge of which we can speak, which 
is 
unmediated' (Kevin Hart, The Trespass of the Sign: Deconstruction, Theology and 
Philosophy 
[Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989], 26. 
688 See pp. 28f. 
689 Jacques Derrida, `Living On: Border Lines, ', 81; see also Derrida, SEC, 327; Culler, 
123. 
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that he had been appointed for the defence of the gospel (1.15b-16). On the other hand, 
says Paul, there are those who preach through envy 490'vov) and strife ('Ep LV) (1.15), out 
of selfish ambition (EpL9E(. ac) and without purity (oüx äyvwS), imagining (oL04EvoL) that 
they are causing Paul further grief in his imprisonment (1.17) . 
On the contrary, says 
Paul, they cause him to rejoice (1.18). But, historically speaking, Paul does not rejoice in 
their attitude or intentions, of which he clearly disapproves. 
After suggesting to the Philippians that the latter group of preachers is a mob of 
sophistic, preaching-for-profit ingrates whose association with the gospel message is 
dubious, 690 Paul makes an interesting move. In 1.18 he suggests that whatever the 
motive or intention behind the preaching of this bad group, his only concern is `that in 
every way, whether in pretext (lTpö#C«LS) or in truth (&Arj6ELa), Christ is proclaimed'. 
A couple of questions pose themselves at this point: What is the nature of the 
hierarchical relationship Paul creates between the two different kinds of preachers? or, 
what is the nature of the relationship between the opposing terms Trpö jaonS and &Xi! jeE La? 
and, what are the implications of Paul's suggestion that the gospel message performs a 
function beyond the boundaries of what he claims are the intentions of some who preach 
the gospel message? 
5. The Good, the Bad, and the Undecidable 
Paul's discussion of the two kinds of preachers in 1.15ff. finds its inception in a complex 
of events and social roles which created within him a sense of lack, that is, a `want' or 
`desire' (ßouXoµaL, 1.12) that the Philippians have a certain kind of knowledge. When this 
absence presents itself to Paul, when he perceives his desire, he seeks satisfaction in the 
production of his discourse which might enable the Philippians `to know' (yLVW(JKELV). 691 
He desires them to have the correct perspective on the circumstances surrounding his 
imprisonment (1.12), a desire he hopes to actualise through his description of his 
circumstances, and the rhetoric that presents it. Paul thus sets out to describe the 
advance (1TpoKO1r1j) that has come about through his imprisonment, since, as mentioned 
690 They do not accept Paul's authority, they preach for personal profit. See the 
discussion on pp. 182ff.; note also the use of Trp64 Lc in 1.18 as a reference to a 
`pretext for greed' 
and compare 1 Thess 2.5; see also BAGD, 722. 
691 This perception of an actual or potential exigence 
is by no means unique to Paul, it is 
analogous to any rhetorical situation. Note again 
Bitzer's description of the rhetorical situation in 
n. 186. 
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earlier, it is important for him to demonstrate that his imprisonment does not herald a 
weakness on the part of the gospel's ability to move forward in the face of adversity. As 
he works toward developing the perspective the Philippians are to have, Paul makes the 
claim that `the majority of the brethren in the Lord have been persuaded by my bonds to 
dare all the more to speak the word boldly' (Phil 1.14) . 
Yet Paul knows that the progress which he suggests his imprisonment has enabled 
has already stumbled, since some of the people who gain boldness are not only 
antagonistic toward him (Phil 1.15,17), but they in fact only (ab)use the gospel to secure 
their own gain. These people employ the gospel in a manner quite distinctly other than 
that which is suggested by the very gospel being proclaimed; they do it for self-oriented 
reasons and have an attitude quite other than the one which Paul says Christ had and 
which Paul calls for his Philippian readers to have (Phil 2.5ff. ). 692 
The very thing which Paul says has occasioned the possibility of progress, has also 
created the occasion for regress. Paul finds himself on the defense, and seeks to re- 
present the situation so that his circumstances appear to be working for the advancement 
of the gospel. The issue here is not whether or not Paul's situation actually was 
advancing the gospel, it is rather how Paul's rhetoric attempts to create a particular kind 
of perspective, and thus not necessarily a pure and unmediated image of reality. He 
attempts this by drawing a line of division between the two groups in order to clarify what 
has happened. Then, instead of embarking on a thorough condemnation of the anti-Paul 
group in order to render their message as invalid-as he is wont to do with other 
members of the Christian group who have a perspective different from his own-he 
proceeds to demonstrate that the difference which constitutes this group does not in fact 
invalidate the gospel which they preach. The happy result is that the potentially weak 
point in Paul's earlier claim-that his incarceration has worked not against but for the 
advancement of the gospel-is now reinforced, since even these roguish sophists can be 
said to preach the gospel and thereby contribute to the advance of the gospel. Paul takes 
a situation in which people are preaching in a manner that he believes is contrary to the 
purpose of the gospel, a situation that he cannot control, and uses it as a way to gloss over 
and re-contextualise the impotence of his own position in prison and his inability to 
control the citation of the gospel by whomever desires to employ it for whatever reasons. 
692 This is yet another example of why Philippians is sometimes seen as cohering around 
the presentation of good and bad models of behaviour; see n. 684; but also see the Fowl who does 
not think of the Christ hymn as a `model', Fowl, The Story of Christ, 85-92; also the earlier 
discussion on pp. 61ff. 
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By validating the preaching of the selfish preachers, Paul validates his own claim to the 
gospel, but at what cost? 
Paul has often made overtures to possess and master the re-citation of the gospel 
message; yet, language's iterability has proven too slippery for him to maintain his grip. 
Paul discovers that Plato's problems with writing have extended to speech as well. 693 For 
example, in Galatians Paul attempts to persuade the Galatian Christians that what they 
have received from the Judaisers is not a gospel at all (Gal 1.6-7). Paul believes that his 
contextualisation of the Jesus' death, burial and resurrection is the Gospel and that other 
contextualisations of that message are only perversions. However, what makes the one a 
`perversion' (µEiaoipExx) and the other `truth' is the same thing: contextualisation or 
recitation of an iterable text. 
Paul's desire and lack of fulfilment is the same as Socrates' because the problem 
with writing is also true of speech. This is one of the insights Derrida has contributed to 
the philosophy of language though his critique of Western metaphysics in general, and of 
Plato's oppositional structure of speech and writing in particular. 694 Speech and writing 
meet in some primordial structure which is their common origin. Derrida refers to this 
structure as `archewriting' in order to represent that part of language which is at once 
both inside and outside of language by virtue of being prior to language. It both 
constitutes and signifies language. This is that quality which makes language work. 695 
That is, because language can be signified and constituted by the same structure, 
language can therefore be repeated and thus it enables the communication of (the 
father's) ideas. In short, the essence of language is communication, and communication 
relies upon iterability, and iterability is a quality of language which precedes both speech 
(phoneme) and writing (grapheme) and which is named by Derrida as this 
`archewriting'. 696 
It is the iterability of the gospel which enables it to be communicated in a manner 
confluent with Paul's own ideo-theological position, but it is also iterability which enables 
693 See the comments on p. 19. 
694 The most thorough discussion of Plato's opposition of speech and 
language in 
Derrida's oeuvre is `Plato's Pharmacy' in Derrida, 
Dissemination, 61-172. 
695 Derrida chooses archewriting over archespeech since 
it is in writing that the iterable 
quality of language is most evident. 
696 Derrida discusses this at length in the chapter entitled `Linguistics and Grammatology' 
in Of Grammatology, 27-73, but see especially 44-70. 
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it to be used in a different manner. The citation of the gospel has escaped Paul's mastery 
and is now in the hands of other would-be masters, who can control it no better than he, 
though they may re-cite it in whatever context they wish and thus for whatever purposes 
they wish. Paul seems to have realised this and thus also the impotence of his position. 
Therefore, instead of condemning what he sees as a misuse of the gospel, scheming a 
kidnapping, and risk exposing his impotence, he gives it his blessing. Paul thus makes a 
Socratic bid for paternal power over the re-citation of the gospel, but he does it in a way 
that masks its violence; he uses a Freudian Entstellung to slip it past the Censor, disguising 
its unacceptability. 
Paul's bid for patronage of the re-citation of the gospel is a slippery one. It also 
causes institutional problems for the keepers of the commentaries since it creates a gap in 
the construction of a `Pauline theology'. This in turn leads commentators to frequently 
take note of the fact that he stops short of the strong, excommunicative language he 
normally employs for such people and refer to his attitude as `large-heartedness'-the 
commentators do not have a problem with Paul's comments in Phil 1.15-17, where the 
language is typical of Pauline invective, 697 it is the `large-heartedness' of Phil 1.18 which 
pumps confusion back into the preceding verses. 698 This break from the `norm' 
problematises the assumption that Paul's ethics are based on something radically external 
to his own desires. Even if Paul's imperative were non-immanent, his behaviour is 
governed by a cohering, immanent 'principle'-proclamation of the gospel in this 
world-and thus his ethics are constructed as non-metaphysical and rather based on a 
certain kind of desire. 
The very act of labelling Paul's treatment of these people as `large-hearted' reflects 
the idea prevalent in biblical studies that Paul seems to break away from an assumed 
normal practice. Paul's `normal' behaviour is to label or describe antagonists in such a 
way so as to place them firmly outside the group, in order to maintain the stability of the 
(Pauline) group's identity, since such people threaten the theological boundary Paul 
has 
drawn which subsequently threatens to alter the dogma and praxis of the people within 
the group. Any group, in order to remain as a group, must maintain the 
difference 
between itself and the rest of the world. This is a complex process of affirming and re- 
affirming rules and practices consistent with the basic tenets of the group. 
As a leader 
697 One the use of 4Aövoc, EpLc, and EPLeE(a see pp. 182ff. 
698 See the discussion on `sur-prise' on pp. 188ff. 
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who desires to perpetuate the group, Paul must make sure subordinate members within 
the group know just where the boundaries of acceptable beliefs and behaviours lie, in 
order that the group's members act accordingly and the group maintains its purity or 
difference from the rest of the world. If some within the group act and/or think like those 
without the group, then, the group has lost its purity or radical difference from the rest of 
the world. 
699 
This practice of Paul is also evident in Phil 3, where Paul exhorts the Philippians 
to beware of people he describes as `dogs', `evil workers', `false circumcision' (3.2); and in 
the latter part, as `enemies of the cross of Christ, whose end is destruction, whose god is 
their stomach, and whose glory is in their shame, whose minds dwell on earthly things' 
(3.18-19). This is harsh language whose function is excommunicative, insofar as it places 
such people outside of the Pauline group. 700 Thus, through the use of such language, 
Paul creates for the Philippians a well-defined category for them to interpret accordingly 
the actions of those who differ from himself. If, from the perspective that Paul has given, 
there be any selfishness, if there be any shame, if any dwelling on earthly things, then 
consider such ones as outside the group. 
While Paul's comments are descriptive to some degree, they perform the function 
of setting up the one group as clearly other than Paul and the church at Philippi; 
furthermore, these comments re-mark the boundary between the inside and outside of 
the Christian group in general, or at least, the boundary of the Pauline Christians. So 
Barclay, who points out that Paul is not averse to making `proto-sociological' statements 
which, in our present terms, serve to `give the Christian community definition and 
identity' by `creating distinctions between the "genuine" (dokimoa) and the "spurious" 
(adokimoz)'. He then comments that throughout Corinthians Paul creates `insiders and 
outsiders on his own terms.... He identifies deviants in order to establish boundaries 
and solidify the identity of the Corinthian community.... It is easy to recognize here [in 
Corinthians]... that "deviant" labels are being applied as part of a power struggle, here a 
701 fundamental battle for control of the Christian tradition'. 
699 For fuller discussion on groups and the Pauline community, see the chapters 
`Formation of the EP&RWA' and `Governance' in Meeks, First Urban Christians, 74-140. 
700 Hence Fee's comment that `this language ordinarily refers to those outside Christ 
altogether' (Fee, 371). 
701 Barclay, `Deviance and Apostasy', 124. 
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Thus, Paul's comments are to be read as performative, especially since they do not 
really fall into a positivistic true/false dichotomy. This performative aspect of language is 
located within the philosophy, or speech act theory, of J. L. Austin discussed earlier. 702 
The present benefit of speech act theory is that it exposes the functional quality of 
language, even language thought to be purely descriptive. More importantly, it exposes 
that functional quality to be the primum mobile of all `meaningful' statements. So for 
example, the rhetorical value of calling people `dogs' transcends the question of its 
propositional truth; that is, the act of doing so is what is important. And this does not at 
all mean that it is `wrong' or philosophically ineffective to use such metaphoric language. 
These comments are there to act upon the Philippians. They perform this action by 
showing the Philippians that these people to whom Paul refers are not the kind of people 
whose example they ought to follow. These `dogs', therefore, stand in stark contrast to 
Paul himself (who, in the eyes of his Philippian readers, one imagines, is clearly not a dog) 
whose example, it is suggested, the Philippians are to follow (see 3.17; 4.9). 703 
We note here that Paul's conclusion in Phil 1.18 is, by contrast to the diatribe of 
Phil 3, suspiciously restrained. It is necessary, then, to observe some of the differences 
and similarities between the two groups which may perhaps explain the difference in 
treatment. The group discussed in 3.2ff. is most likely a Judaistic one which accepts the 
work of Christ but only within the confines of Jewish custom, 704 hence Paul's testimony 
and subsequent rejection of his boast in the flesh. However, the foil for Paul's handling of 
the non-Pauline preachers in Phil 1 is really the latter group in 3.18-19. The description 
in 3.18f, in particular, is rather broad. The phrase iobq Exepoüc ioü otiaupoü ioü Xp Lotioü 
is, again, more performative than propositional and is qualified by a series of broad claims 
which contribute to the basic rhetorical function of the phrase: Paul equates their tEXoS 
with `destruction' (än(SXEia), and says that they are selfish or serve their own desires (c vö 
6EÖS 1j KOOL a), that their glory is their shame, and that their minds dwell on earthly things 
(as opposed to heavenly things). This description of what constitutes an enemy of the 
cross is quite generic and could be made to fit almost anyone; 
705 indeed, the girth of this 
belly-worshipping category easily encompasses the kind of selfish preachers discussed in 
702 See discussions on pp. 32ff. 
703 Note Castelli, 96. 
704 See the discussion on identity on pp. 85ff. 
705 Similarly, O'Brien, 454. 
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Phil 1. That these descriptions are more performative than descriptive is what 
Hawthorne is trying to say when he states that they are `short, verbless sentences; 
constructions that are broken off without proper completion; clipped phrases whose 
meaning defies precise explanation; strong words, whose force lies not in lexical definitions, 
but in the sound and suddenness with which they come'. 706 
Given the nuances that cross through Paul's use of the word otaupöc in Phil 3, 
there is much debate about the identity of those whom Paul labels tioüs ExOpoüý toi 
ßiaupoü ioü Xp iotoü. 707 It is possible that these people either never were or no longer are 
members of the Christian community; thus, the label ioüS Ex8poüc ioü oiaupoü Tob 
Xpw'roü would refer to a cosmic difference between these people and those within the 
general Christian community. It is also possible that they are Judaizers who are not, in 
Paul's view, crediting the cross of Christ with all that it achieved. Typically, however, 
these people are identified as Christians (and possibly teachers) of some sort. 708 
Whatever the case, it seems that Paul's problem with this group was with the way they 
conducted themselves: noAXoL y&p 1rEpvlTaioOQLv ... 
(3.18). And this is also very close if 
not identical to Paul's problem with the non-Pauline preachers in Phil 1. Paul does not 
mention whether he has a problem with the theology or message of the group in Phil 3, he 
simply focuses on their conduct as a contrast to his own conduct and that of others like 
him (3.17); thus, as Fee suggests, they serve their performative purpose by `standing in 
sharp relief to Paul's own "walk ...... '709 Indeed, one would be hard-pressed to find an 
occasion in which Paul criticises someone else without his own ideas or conduct being 
thrown into exemplary relief. This, in fact, seems to be a given when dealing with Paul: 
as an apostle, he wants his followers to imitate him-710 Criticism is therefore quickly 
served by Paul to those who might present themselves as an example (iü'iroc) other than 
706 Hawthorne, 163 (emphasis added). 
707 Note the list of suggestions in O'Brien, Philippians, 453. 
708 Note, for example, Martin (NCB), 143. 
709 Fee, 375. 
710 For example, 1 Cor 4.16; 11.1; Phil 3.17. See also, 
Phil 1.30 and 2.18 where the idea 
of immitatio is also present. For comprehensive discussion on the 
debate regarding the definition of 
OU LLL Lflt(X iOU yI VEaOE in Phil 3.17, see O'Brien, 
Philippians, 444-47. For a general description of 
mimesis in antiquity relevant to the present discussion, see 
Castelli, 74-78; on mimesis in Paul, 
see, Castelli, 89ff.; also see Fowl's discussion on mimesis and the concept of the exemplar 
in Fowl, 
`Christology', 148-49. 
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the one he has set, particularly when his own followers are concerned. 711 It also seems 
that this serves as the point of difference in Paul's treatment of the antagonists in Phil 
3.18f and Phil 1. As mentioned earlier,? 12 Paul has a keen desire to serve and protect his 
own group of people. Some of whom, to be sure, may dispute this-the cause of a great 
deal of Paul's troubles-but the important thing is that Paul himself senses a psychagogic 
responsibility to a particular group. 713 
The significance of Paul's sense of responsibility is that it is fundamental to the 
fact that he feels the need to respond to certain circumstances with whatever discourse he 
believes may solve any exigencies he perceives. Paul's responses, however, will always be 
attempts to help his audience to view things from his perspective. If there were some 
issue about which he thought a particular group might have the wrong interpretive 
perspective, then his discourse will re-present the situation in such a way so as to favour 
the presentation of his own position. This assumes, of course, that Paul, as the rhetor 
responding in epistolary form, believes that his perception of reality is superior to the 
audience's. His epistolary discourse will therefore attempt to bring their perception of 
reality into line with his. Again, this is not peculiar to Paul, it is what anyone does when 
he or she attempts to inject a discourse into a situation in order to resolve any perceived 
problems. 
In Phil 1, Paul has something at stake that is not at stake in Phil 3: the reputation 
of the power of the gospel. Paul has to re-present the circumstances surrounding his 
incarceration in such a way that the power of the gospel does not appear to be 
diminished. Given the antagonism that the Philippian Christians were apparently 
experiencing,? 14 and Paul's own sense of responsibility to them, it was necessary for Paul 
to comfort them, since the continued imprisonment of their spiritual father would have 
been most disconcerting. However, though he may be in prison, the power of God is still 
greater than any other powers, implies Paul when he describes the `advancement' of the 
gospel in spite of what might appear to some to be a defeat. Thus, Paul presents to them 
711 Commentators frequently observe this; note, for example, Martin (NCB), 143; Jewett, 
376. 
712 See the discussion on pp. 152ff. 
713 Evidenced not only by the fact of his correspondence but throughout the 
Pauline 
corpus (e. g., Gal. 2.7), see the discussion on, pp. 107ff. 
714 See the discussion on pp. 85ff. Paul also seems concerned (Phil 3.17-21, vüv ö Kai 
KXaiWv) that the Philippians are open to corruption by enemies. 
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a positive interpretive perspective of his circumstances, contrary to what they might have 
expected. 715 Presenting this perspective to the Philippians also serves as an example of 
how to act while experiencing conflict. Insofar as the Philippians are able to see that 
Paul's suffering for the gospel leads to the advance of the gospel, they are then able to 
attribute to their own sufferings such an interpretation. Indeed, Paul attempts to create 
this perspective when in Phil 1.30 he suggests that their conflict is the `the same' as his. 716 
Paul even presents his opponents in a similar light; the kind of people who in Phil 
3 are labelled `enemies of the cross of Christ', in Phil 1 have their motives reprimanded 
but their practice praised. How is it that such people can cause Paul to rejoice when 
everywhere else he has only contempt for them? Phil 1.18 is a climax and a summarising 
of Paul's development of the perspective from which he wants the Philippians to view his 
circumstances. Yet it is an odd sort of a climax, and perhaps an unexpected one on 
behalf of the Philippians, since Paul takes the unusual step of not castigating those whom 
he earlier suggests are charlatans; he rather focuses on what good they do. By doing this, 
Paul introduces into his discourse on the non-Pauline preachers a division which glosses 
over itself. Moreover, his discourse in general confidently draws a line between the two 
kinds of preachers, but by the time we finish reading the passage 1.12-18, the line has 
been effectively erased and the effects of the division have gone. 
What prompted Paul to say what he does about the two kinds of preachers only to 
end up saying that the difference is ultimately irrelevant? Perhaps it has to do with his 
desire to create models and demonstrate the power of the gospel in the face of adverse 
circumstances. This means that the passage exists for reasons other those immediately 
apparent by virtue of the discourse itself, and that what we are ultimately dealing with is a 
rhetorical construct which incorporates historical events to support its rhetorical 
designs. 717 Thus, the operation of another division within the passage is made apparent: 
the division between the rhetorical argument and the discourse which presents it. What 
we end up with is, on one level, a play between `valid' and `invalid', within the 
presentation of the self-centred preachers; that is, Paul denounces their activities and 
attitudes early on in the passage, but in 1.18 reaffirms the gospel they preach as valid. 
On 
715 O'Brien, Philippians, 36 
716 On the exhortation in 1.27ff., see pp. 66ff.; note also comments on 
Phil 1.30, p. 91. 
717 However, it is not the fact of the historical events recounted which is in dispute, rather 
the assumption of their primary status within the discourse. 
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yet another level, there is play between `valid' and `invalid' with respect to the Paul- 
centred preachers and the self-centred preachers; that is, the two groups are set up as 
opposites in 1.15-17, but in 1.18 the oppositional structure falters as Paul unites them 
with regard to their evangelistic activities. On another level, there is play between the 
argument and the discourse; that is, the passage is both metaphoric and historic, it is an 
attempt at both immediacy-an attempt to recount the historical situation-and 
mediacy-an attempt to use the historical situation to achieve purposes beyond it. 
These lines of division which work their way through this discourse find their 
epicentre at a fracture operating within the word npöXaOLS (1.18). To investigate this 
fracturing, we must first note that the words np&lxwtc and &XTj9Eua in 1.18 serve to 
summarise Paul's description of the two groups of which he has been speaking in 
1.15ff. 718 They sum up what Paul thinks of the various speakers' relationship to the 
gospel which they have been proclaiming. The signifieds of these labels are not only open 
to semiotic influence by Paul's discussion thus far, but also by their syntagmatic 
relationship to each other in 1.18. Paul positions irpöýaaiS in an oppositional structure 
with &Arj9ELa; thus, the signifieds of these two labels feed off the relationship of the labels 
(signifiers) within the statement itself. One apparent effect of this is to suppress or 
regulate a certain polysemy, or fracture, operating at the cite of iipöxaoLS, since the word 
opposes within itself at least two differing concepts or possibilities for 
translation/substitution: it can refer to a valid motive or excuse, or it can refer to a invalid 
motive or excuse. 719 Thus, npödawLS is a signifier of both truth and falsehood, the cite of 
the intersection of mutually exclusive signifieds, a rupture in the established continuum 
between signifier and signified, the point at which the 1rpoKOTrrj begins to falter, the 
epicentre of the text. 
This fracturing, however, is far from being a negative aspect of the discourse as it 
may at first appear. Indeed, it is crucial to the discourse, if Paul's rhetoric is to work at 
all. The argument in 1.12ff. stretches from a typically Pauline castigation of the selfish 
preachers to a rejoicing of their actions. But the discourse which presents the argument 
does not flow so continuously and folds along the line between that which is valid and 
that which is invalid-the motives of the preachers are invalid but the product of those 
718 That the terms represent two respective groups, see Hawthorne, 36; Fee, 124; against 
Collange, 58. 
719 BAGD, 722. O'Brien recognises this, see O'Brien, Philippians, 106; see also John 
15.22 and compare 1 Thess 2.5. 
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motives is valid. Thus, there is also a discontinuity between the motives and that which 
the motives produce. If it were not for this fracture, or space, or differance, or whatever 
else it may be called, preventing the continuous flow of presence from speaker to text in 
Paul's discourse, his presentation of the advancement of the gospel would already be 
defeated by the presence of the speaker's motives/intentions becoming present also in the 
text, thereby invalidating their gospel and thus also Paul's claim to progress. The success 
of Paul's argument, its design to comfort the Philippians and to present the overcoming 
power of the gospel in the face of adversity, depends upon this fracture. However, we 
note that a fracture is no more than a gap, a point of non-regulation and endless play, it 
(is) nothing. We discover once again that for all our talk about the discourse Paul creates 
to relieve tensions and alter perspectives at Philippi we are dealing with just so much 
rhetoric. 
Mark Brett has presented a discussion on the author's motives and intentions 
which attempts to delineate a difference between the two. 720 Brett seeks to tie authorial 
intention to content (the `what') and locate them together under the title `communicative 
intention'. 721 From this communicative intention, he separates out the `motives' of an 
author. Commenting on and summarising Clines, 722 he suggests that `any given author 
could be driven to write by the desire for prestige or by some psychological need'. He 
then suggests that these features of the author's psyche `apply only to the level of 
motives, '723 as opposed to the author's intentions. The reason for this is that motivation, 
as opposed to intention, `in no way resolves the question of what was being said'. 724 
Brett's project here is classificatory. 725 He is working towards creating classes of 
information so that we can speak of the results in more precise terms. According to Brett, 
in this project we are concerned with Paul's motivations which is something we arrive at 
720 Mark G. Brett, `Motives and Intentions in Genesis 1',, 7TS 42 (1991): 1-16. 
721 Brett, 5. 
722 D. J. A. Clines, `Theme in Genesis 1-11', CBQ 38 (1976): 483-507. 
723 Brett, 5 (emphasis added). 
724 Brett, 5. 
725 Note his comments, Brett, 6. 
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not merely by analysing surface level of the text, but also through `wider historical 
contexts'. 726 
While Brett's proposal is quite helpful for classifying our analytical activities with 
the material text, one must wonder if Brett's dichotomy can endure the metaphysical 
strain it relies upon. I have in mind the proposed discontinuity between motive and 
intention. Brett seems to be implying, though he does not state it, that there is a causal 
relationship here. A motive causes me to communicate; my communication then, though 
caused by, does not have a form determined by that motive. Thus, in Brett's view, an 
author's desire to amuse, using his example, has no bearing on `what' the author says 
when the author attempts to amuse, so that one cannot simply look at the material form 
of the communication and arrive back at an original motivation. I agree with Brett up to 
this point. 
The trouble begins when we ask why intention is not also subjected to the same 
spacing that motive is: how is it that an `intention' and a `what' can be joined in a way 
that a `motive' and a `what' cannot? What is the essential difference between a motive 
and an intention? There does not appear to be any explanation of this problem. Brett 
suggests that they are `separate interpretative goals', 727 but what we actually find in the 
text of Brett's analysis is not a separation of motive and intention, but a separation of 
motive and `what'. Thus, the difference between motive and `communicative intention' 
appears to be determined by which one is more explicit, or what `the text actually says' as 
opposed, one imagines, to inferences about the text. 728 
The implication is that what the author intends and what the material text actually 
says are the same thing. Brett himself states that `motives lie behind and are prior to 
communicative intentions. Motives may not come to explicit expression at all'. 729 
However, Brett has already opposed motives to intentions, thus the implication of this 
claim is that while motives are prior and may not be explicit, intentions are not prior and 
are explicit. What Brett is seeking to achieve is to be able to question analyses that make 
claims about the `Why? ' of a text. He simply wants to say that we have to talk about two 
different things when we read texts: what the material text actually says, and then what we 
726 Brett, 6. 
727 Brett, 5. 
728 See comments on Brandon, Brett, 6. 
729 Brett, 5. 
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think an author wanted to generate that material text. However, again, what the text 
actually says is an assumption already and the very point of critical analysis. While we can 
see which material words are being used, we cannot at the same time see the conscious 
intentions of the author, we infer them. How do we infer them? By the very means Brett 
suggests we infer motives: through analysis of `wider historical contexts'. 730 
So, while I affirm Brett's distancing of motives from having a presence within the 
text, I also suggest that intentions are equally distanced, and that both are determined by 
the same means. However, I also suggest that while distanced, an author's intention is 
responsible for the form of the text. Hence Derrida's statement that `the category of 
intention will not disappear; it will have its place, but from that place it will no longer be 
able to govern the entire scene and system of utterance'. 731 Thus intention, while a 
structural part of the material text, does not function as a determining force in its 
reproduction. Hence a major point of this thesis: the activity of the material text of the 
gospel message is not enabled by the respective reproductive intentions/motives of the 
good and bad evangelists in Phil 1.12-18, it is rather enabled by a fracture. 
As mentioned, the cite of this fracture is located at the word np&xwLS. The play 
between its references of valid and invalid motives732 enables the text to create a line of 
difference within the selfish preachers themselves by severing what they do from their 
motives (or `intentions') for doing so. In addition, this same fracturing works its way 
through the text, deconstructing one level of the oppositional structure set up within the 
passage by distancing the selfish preachers from Paul at the same time that it brings them 
closer to him. That is, on the one hand, the text maintains a distance from those whose 
example is not to be followed by describing their intentions as 0övoS, Epic, Epi6ELa; 733 on 
the other hand, the text denies the ability of those intentions or motives to be present to 
the actions of the subject which enables Paul to claim the proclamation of this group as 
being a part of the progress which has come about though his imprisonment. And this is 
perhaps the most significant contribution of the fracture operating in this passage, since 
without it Paul cannot make the claim that the gospel is advanced by the preaching these 
730 Brett, 6. 
731 Derrida, SEC, 326. 
732 For the referents of iip4aaLS, see BAGD, 722. 
733 Coupled with ýAövoc and preceded by the Sßä and used in comparison with EüSacia, it is 
easy to see why EpLc could refer to an intention or the general motivational sphere of activity. 
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ill-motivated preachers perform. Thus, we begin to find that the very thing which makes 
the argument of this text possible is the fracture between the presence and the absence of 
the intentions of these speakers. And, again, a fracture (is) nothing. 
What happens when we apply the text's fractured treatment of the selfish 
preachers to its presentation of the preachers who love Paul? 734 That Paul relies on a 
discontinuity between the intentions or motives of the selfish preachers and their actions 
undermines the ontological stability735 of the oppositional structure set up in the passage 
between EüöoKCa/4AövOS, &yä1r1j/EpLAEda, and äX1j6ELa/Trpö#CoLS, and even, as some have 
suggested, between otöa/ot4aL. 736 This is because Paul's use of the term &Xrj9ELa, when 
opposed to npöjaoLS, suggests a continuity between the motives of the good preachers and 
that which they preach. Thus, a conflict arises between continuity on the one hand and 
discontinuity on the other. If, on the one hand, we privilege continuity, then Paul cannot 
say that the gospel which the bad preachers proclaim is valid which subsequently 
undermines the quality of his claim in 1.12 that the gospel is advanced by his 
imprisonment. If, on the other hand, we privilege discontinuity, then Paul has no basis 
(other than the straightforward desire to discredit those of whom he does not approve), 
for saying that one group proclaims by truth while the other by pretext. It is this 
confusion between discontinuity and continuity, along with the other factors mentioned 
in this discussion, that works to unsettle the stability of the oppositional structure 
operating in this passage. And, in so doing, it questions the ease and definiteness with 
which Paul can define the boundaries of Christian practice and thus identity. 
Interestingly, the purity of the presence of a unified significance, and the continuity 
desired by the term äArj9ELa cannot be said to be present within our text. What in fact we 
have in this text is a reflection of the undecidable tension between valid and invalid found 
at the cite of Trpojamq. 
As with all signifiers, irpöýaoLS simply points to a concept (an excuse, reason, or 
motive), and the value of that concept, (valid or invalid), must somehow be related to 
734 See Phil 1.16 (Eý äy&ii c). That the object of the love is Paul and not Christ is not a 
disputed issue, see, for example, Hawthorne, 37; Fee, 120. 
735 Maintenance of the Platonic continuity between the sign and its idea that dominates 
Western thought and theology. 
736 For the suggestion that Paul plays on the opposition between EdbötES (1.16) and 
Ot%LEVOL (1.17) see, for example, Collange, 57; 
Fee, 120; O'Brien, Philippians, 101 (note also his n. 
14). 
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those conventions to which the observer conforms. So, here in Philippians, the value of 
Trp4aoLS is dependent upon Paul's observations, thus, by extension, upon his personal 
ideology and everything else that goes into constructing his theology. It is not hard to see 
what sort of value Paul wants to give iTpo jwnL , since he places it into an oppositional 
structure with &A1j0ELa in 1.18. The syntagmatic or spatial relationship of these two words 
is subsequently intended to establish their ontological relationship, since Paul places 
7p4aaLS into an oppositional structure with ft)L jOELa, which has the effect of np4aoLS 
becoming the signifier of the absence of &XIjeEUa, and aXI10ELa the absence of np64aoiS. 
Thus, Paul's argument relies on clean lines between presence and absence operating 
within the two words. From the very start, however, this line has already gone under 
erasure and appears as a mere trace, since npöxaaLS already opposes within itself these 
same structures of true and false, valid and invalid, which already throws into question 
the stability of the ontological framework giving npöýaoLc and &? 8ELa their respective 
values as opposites. As a small example, one would simply note that npö4aoLS does not 
signify a radical or non-modified737 absence of &Arj9ELa, since npöjaaLS also refers to a 
valid motive, or, to be more relevant to this discussion, it also signifies its own opposite. 
More importantly, however, we find that the line of difference is already fading 
when we consider just what the text requires to be true-when we take the opposition in 
1.18 between npoxamq and &Arj6ELa at face value-in order for the argument to be 
persuasive. On the one hand, the term Trpöx wc foregrounds the operation of personal 
motives in the proclamation of the non-Pauline group. On the other hand, we have a 
group of preachers whose motives are glossed. This group is simply said to proclaim in 
truth (& j9E La) . 
738 While Paul does not explicitly suggest that one group has motives for 
preaching and another group does not, the text itself, by virtue of the term npojaoiS, 
argues that the motives of the non-Pauline group employ the gospel message as a cover 
for their underlying intentions as opposed to the Pauline group whose motives for 
proclaiming the gospel are not foregrounded. The one group preaches from `ulterior' 
motives as opposed to the other group whose motives 
do not seem to affect the presence 
737 On `radical' and/or `non-modified' absence/presence, see pp. 46ff. 
738 The dative case of iTpo4&QEL and &XIi8ELa alerts us to the accompanying circumstances of 
the proclamation of Christ; thus, one set of circumstances 
is equivalent to truth while the other is 
equivalent to falsity. 
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of aXyjkta. Yet earlier in this passage, Paul seems to put both groups on equal footing by 
appearing to describe their motives. 
The issues of motives requires some attention. After pointing out that one kind of 
preaching used the gospel as a mask for selfish ends, O'Brien says that `over against this 
there was a preaching without any unworthy personal motives whatever, and which was 
concerned only with the truth (&Ai 8ELa)'. 739 Thus, he acknowledges that there were 
indeed motives behind the preaching of the Pauline group, but he plays down any 
potential problems this might suggest through the rhetoric surrounding the word 
`motives': `without any unworthy personal motives whatever'. They have motives, it is just 
that they are not deemed `unworthy'. In addition, their preaching is presented as having 
an undiluted (perhaps ayv6S, see 1.17) relationship with the `truth'. Just what is assumed 
by O'Brien's comments here? First of all, it does not matter what value is given to the 
motives (worthy or unworthy), or how many qualifiers we place on the word, motives or 
intentions still mediate between the subject (evangelist) and object (gospel) and thus 
prevent an unmediated continuity between the subject and the object, which means that 
opposing one group to another on the basis that one group has a direct and unmediated 
connection to &A, rj9ELa while another does not is problematic from the very start. 
Secondly, the difference between `unworthy' and `worthy' suggested here by O'Brien is a 
difference dependent upon the dominance of Paul's own theological system over other 
systems built on the basic premise of the gospel. Paul simply mentions that there is such 
a difference, and O'Brien is here affirming that difference as an hierarchical one. 
However, O'Brien attempts to make this hierarchy more pronounced by stating that the 
Pauline group has as the sole object of its evangelistic activity `Christ and his glory', 740 
but this goes beyond what the text indicates: the differences between the motives find 
their exigence with respect to the evangelists' relationship to Paul. 
To be sure, both groups of speakers have `motives' or `reasons' (npoýaoEtc) for 
proclaiming Christ; thus, ultimately, both groups have as a part of the accompanying 
circumstances of their proclamation, a reason to speak, a motive for proclaiming Christ; 
thus both operate in a sphere of np4aoLc. Moreover, as mentioned, it seems that it is the 
preachers' relationship to Paul which establishes the value of the np61aoic of his or her 
proclamation. Those who proclaim Christ through envy and strife (1.15), out of selfish 
739 O'Brien, Philippians, 106. 
740 O'Brien, Philippians, 106. 
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ambition (1.17), and by pretext (irpö f (XwLS) (1.18) are said to be doing so by Paul because 
they conflict with him: they imagine (oto. tai) that they raise up tribulation for him in his 
imprisonment (1.17) . 
Likewise, those who proclaim Christ through goodwill (1.15), out 
of love (1.16), and by truth (&Xi 9E La) (1.18) are labelled so because they confer with Paul: 
knowing (otöa) that he has been appointed for the defence of the gospel (1.16) . 
Thus, the 
classifications of Trp61aoLS and &? 8e are dependent upon who Paul is and not upon who 
Christ is or what the gospel means, which consequently undermines the theological 
privileging of Paul's use of &Aj9Eia in 1.18 as the opposite of np6xwni . 
Thus, again, the 
line of difference which Paul's argument has intended to draw between the two groups 
has been blurred by the text upon which it was drawn. The underlying ontological 
structures upon which Paul's theological argument rests are not confluent with that 
argument. What we are left with in Philippians are simply individuals who proclaim 
Christ for their own purposes, not metaphysical categories determining and dominating 
legitimacy. 
6. Severing the Tie that B(l)inds 
Phil 1.12ff. draws an ironic picture: Paul is bound, but his gospel message advances 
freely. The perspective of the text, however, is that it is Paul's tethered circumstances 
that have untethered the gospel: `my "imprisonment" has turned out for the greater 
progress of the gospel'. The grain of the text is to present Paul as maintaining a position 
of influence-that is, maintaining his presence, and thus authority and power, with 
respect to the evangelists. The Philippians text suggests that the various products of the 
gospel text (at least two are mentioned) are linked back to Paul, and that Paul is still 
having an influence on the text by virtue of his absence. The evangelists are said to speak 
because they have gained boldness by Paul's imprisonment (1.14), some because they 
love Paul (1.16) and others because they imagine they will cause Paul strife in his 
imprisonment (1.17) . 
The implications of this are interesting, since what is analogically 
true of Paul and his gospel in these circumstances, is metaphysically true of authors and 
their texts in general. While Paul is forced into absence from the gospel text, the text 
itself is free to produce things he would prefer it did not produce. Every author is forced 
into absence by the mark of signification, since what 
Derrida labels differance functions as 
a metaphysical barrier imprisoning the presence of the author's consciousness. 
Metaphysics is a reference to any system that employs a fundamental separation of 
the sensible and the intelligible and subsequently relies on the priority of the 
intelligible. 
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Classically, the idea of an object has been understood as prior or superior to the thing 
itself which is a representative of the idea. The notion that the thing itself (the sensible) is 
a representation of the idea (the intelligible) which is also that which has come to be 
understood as presence, is fundamental to philosophy. Derrida's project, however, seeks 
to intervene in the difference between the sensible and the intelligible, questioning the 
assumed priority of the intelligible or what has come to be known as presence. Spivak 
therefore notes that, for Derrida, metaphysics is `shorthand for any science of 
presence'. 741 
Thus the operation of Derrida's differance and the phenomenon of iterability, 
fundamental axioms of Derrida's philosophical project, prevent the author's presence or 
conscious will-to-communicate, or will-to-mean from occupying the text. The intentions 
of the author's consciousness remain forever just that, the intentions of his or her 
consciousness; they cannot escape into and occupy the iterable marks of his or her text. 
Hence Barthes' claim that `linguistically, the author is never more than the instance 
writing, just as I is nothing more than the instance saying I. language knows a "subject", 
not a "person"'. 742 Once the signifying mark materialises, a space between the mark and 
the one who made the mark also materialises both spatially and chronologically. This 
spacing is, of course, a part of the structure of the mark without which there could be no 
mark, a space that is irreconcilable and without which the mark could not signify. 743 It is 
this space, and thus `absence', as a necessary part of the structure of every signifying 
mark, which enables the possibility of text to operate in the first place. And this 
possibility created by absence marks also the impossibility of the presence of the author's 
consciousness to occupy the text. This does not then suggest that absence now functions 
as the dominant category within the oppositional hierarchy absence/presence, but that the 
two infect, efface, and displace each other, calling into question the oppositional structure 
itself. 
The forced absence of every author severs the text from its tether and thus enables 
it to be cited in various productive contexts; that is, forced absence enables the text to go 
741 Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, `Translator's Preface', in Derrida, Of Grammatology, xxi. 
742 Roland Barthes, `Death of the Author', in Image Music Text, 145. 
743 See comments on pp. 32ff., 43. 
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beyond the bounds of the tether of univocality or even regulated polysemy744 which the 
author's presence would attach to the text. As Barthes would say, this absence enables 
the text to become `writerly' (scriptible), to become productive rather than product, `not a 
line of words producing a single "theological" meaning (the "message" of the Author- 
God) but a multi-dimensional space in which a variety of writings, none of them original, 
blend and clash'. 745 Barthes' semiotic theory, in part, works upon the difference between 
readerly (lisible) and writerly (scriptible) texts. Readerly texts are consumer orientated; 
whereas writerly texts are typically understood to be producer orientated. Ultimately, the 
distinction is not between two different kinds of texts, but different ways of constructing 
the text. The readerly approach is to subordinate the text to metaphysical significance or 
representation, the writerly approach is to disrupt the ease of generating metaphysical 
connections by acknowledging the resident textual folds and aporiae and seeking their 
logocentric performance. 746 In Philippians, Paul is caught in the difference between the 
gospel as writerly and as readerly. 
In Philippians, it is never assumed that the text cannot continue to produce what 
Paul used it to produce. Even though Paul's hands are tied, he suggests that the hands of 
those citing the gospel are equally bound; they cannot control the text either. As far as 
Paul is concerned, the gospel text can continue to produce what he used it to produce 
regardless of the intentions of those who cite it. The only problem for Paul (though he 
does not mention it) is that the gospel text produces that and more. Again, this is true of 
authors and texts in general, and it is a particularly important point because the 
metaphysical disjunction between author and text is not a nihilistic phenomenon; indeed, 
it is quite the opposite. Orphaned texts (that is, all texts) are not doomed to a poverty of 
meaning, rather their orphaned status places them in a position for continual abundance 
of meaning; indeed, the very possibility of meaning is founded on the possibility of a text 
being able to break free from its parent, its `origins', and become iterable. To tether the 
text absolutely to the consciousness or will of the author would prevent communication 
in 
the first place, since it would force texts to be subjective in the extreme, preventing them 
744 Regulating polysemy is the attempt to denote the semantic variation 
by naming specific 
semic units, in order to regulate the polysemy of the text and thus retard, or prevent, 
textual 
(re)production. 
745 Beres, `Death of the Author', 146. 
746 For more on this see Barbara Johnson, 
`The Critical Difference', Diacritics 8 (1978): 4; 
also Barthes' extended treatment in 
Roland Barthes, S/Z (trans. Richard Miller; New York: Hill 
and Wang, 1974). 
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from being re-iterated in the experience of the reader/hearer. Again, for the text to 
operate, it must do so by being apart from the author, and thus by being re-produced or 
re-inscribed in the wor(l)ds of other subjects. 747 
Communication or meaning is only possible by virtue of our ability to re-cite the 
marks of a message in terms of our own horizon of life-experience. So, unless the marks 
of communication can be severed from the author and his or her own subjective world, 
they cannot even begin to mean. Thus, every attempt to communicate or to mean, is an 
act of disownment whereby the author disseminates, by virtue of a text, the seeds of 
signification in order that they might find purchase in the soil of some other subject. 
Thus, it is by no means a nihilistic move to acknowledge the orphaned status of texts, it is 
rather the acknowledgment of a text's ability to produce beyond the expectations of the 
author, but not necessarily instead of them. 
In Phil 1.18, Paul actually invokes this metaphysical separation of the message 
from the messenger; with his own chains he unlocks the bonds which bound intention to 
meaning. But can Paul have his meaning and keep it? On the one hand he attempts to 
inject his controlling presence into the proclamation of the gospel by claiming the various 
kinds of preachers preach by virtue of his own circumstances. On the other hand, he 
claims that the gospel message is free of the intentions of those preachers. 
The graphematic gospel, the iterable mark(s) of an apostle, finds a new cite of 
production in the contexts brought into being by the acts of different preachers. Paul says 
that the message spoken by the aforementioned preachers performs, or has the potential 
to perform, a function or a meaning either exterior to the speaker's intention, or at least 
not defined by or tethered to those intentions. There are several important points to 
make about this critical move. We shall begin with an observation, introduced in Chapter 
One, of language performance in the vein of J. L. Austin, since Austin addresses the 
distinction between language used in normal circumstances, that is, `serious' language 
(requiring the comprehensive presence of the speaker's intentions) and abnormal 
circumstances, that is, `non-serious' language (requiring that intentions are other than 
that which would be present in the same text in normal circumstances). 
A question to begin with is, do utterances performed under duress or in `non- 
serious' contexts have the same performance value or `meaning' (if we can call it that) as 
utterances performed in serious contexts? If an actor in a play says to another actor, `I 
747 Note Derrida, SEC, 317. 
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love you' is it an expression of truth? Most people would follow Austin and answer, 
No. 748 
If it seems to us that `no' is the correct answer on both of the above accounts, why 
is it, then, that Paul seems to think that an utterance spoken in a `non-serious' mode (that 
is, from ý9övoS and EpLS, With EpLAEL'a and oDX äyvwS, and later characterised by Paul as 
Trp6 xwLS) has the same value, or can mean the same thing as one spoken in a `serious' 
(that is, through EüöoKia, out of äy(Xn% and in/by &? 8ELa)? Asking this question leads us 
to discover that Paul is bound to a rather unexpected cellmate: Jacques Derrida. Derrida 
has also re-written the distinction between the performative value of serious and non- 
serious language. Moreover, as we go along, we shall find that Paul has more in common 
with Derrida than most would care to admit. I shall deal with these issues in the 
following section. 
7. (Re)iteration, (Re)citation, Sur prise, Commentary 
The category of intention will not disappear; it will have its place, 
but from that place it will no longer be able to govern the entire 
scene and system of utterance. 
Jacques Derrida749 
I suggested above that Paul and Derrida had in common a willingness to accept a non- 
difference between utterances made in serious and non-serious contexts. 750 At this point, 
I would like to investigate that suggestion and begin to read Philippians in light of the 
previous discussion between Austin and Derrida about contexts and intentions, 751 and in 
light of the earlier discussion on Hinterfragen. 752 
Before going on, it may be helpful to reiterate the basic point Paul makes in 
Philippians 1: 18. Paul is in prison and he believes this ignited two kinds of reactions 
among two kinds of preachers. One kind of preacher of the gospel gains boldness because 
of Paul's imprisonment and preaches the gospel message from truth and love. The other 
kind of preacher also gains a boldness, but one that causes him to preach for his own gain 
748 Austin 22. 
749 Derrida, SEC, 326. 
750 See above pp. 175ff. 
751 Note also pp. 32-47. 
752 See pp. 17ff. 
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while Paul is in prison, a sort of `while the cat's away the mice will play' scenario. Paul 
also takes pains to point out that the preaching or intention of the latter group is self- 
oriented, impure and false. Yet he does not suggest that these intentions infect the 
message or utterances of the gospel with their presence, rather, he indicates that the series 
of marks which constitute the gospel message act on their own. As discussed earlier, 
these marks `constitute a kind of machine that is in turn productive, that ... [an author's] 
future disappearance in principle will not prevent from functioning and from yielding, 
and yielding itself to, reading and rewriting'. 753 
It is important to recognise that the value system governing the description and 
distinction of these two kinds of preachers is a construct made with reference to Paul 
himself. 754 He labels those supportive of him as good willed (EÜSoKM) and those who 
preach from truth (&Arj6Eua), but those whom he believes are not supportive of him are 
selfish and impure (EpLAEM Ka. oüx ayvwc), and preach from falsehood (npöjaoLS). Since 
Paul raises the issue, I shall later follow through the logic of his text and ask what the 
relationship is between the message and these messengers, and then what the relationship 
is between the two opposing kinds of messengers. For now, I turn to the treatment of this 
text by the commentaries on Philippians. 
7. a. (Re)citation: Erasing the Contours of the Cite 
Commentary on our passage has not really taken Paul's remarks `seriously'. The 
tendency is to trace their discussions along the textual contours, but glossing over the 
metaphysical chasms. They fall precisely in line with the traditional discourse of Western 
metaphysics. This leads the commentaries to focus on the dynamics of the historical 
relationship between Paul and the preachers to whom he refers. Thus, for the 
commentaries, the primary critical issue associated with Phil 1.18 is the question of the 
identity of the bad preachers. 755 This is naturally followed up by an intense interest in 
the situation from which Paul wrote, since most theories of identity depend, to varying 
degrees, on determining whether Paul was in Caesarea, Ephesus or Rome, and in or out 
753 Derrida, SEC, 316. See also the earlier discussion on pp. 46f. 
754 See comments on p. 171. 
755 See, for example, J. Hugh Michael, The Epistle of Paul to the Philippians (The Moffat 
New Testament Commentary; London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1928), 44-45; Beare, 26; Martin, 
73-74; Collange, 9-10,58; Hawthorne, 35-38 (esp. 37); Fee, 121-24. See also the lengthy 
discussion in Jewett, `Conflicting Moments', 363ff. 
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of prison. 756 Generally, the commentators wonder why Paul does not articulate some 
polemical diatribe against the selfish preachers in accordance with what is thought to be 
his normal practice. In other words, they see Paul's `soft' approach as abnormal. Jewett, 
who stands in contrast to the content of the general trend, suggests that Paul is not being 
soft on his antagonists, since he does cast dispersions upon the bad evangelists. The 
softness of Paul's comments may, suggests Jewett, derive from the confusion over the fact 
that Paul does not label them outrightly as heretics. 757 
It is no surprise to see this interest in the historical relationship between Paul and 
the other preachers, since it appears to be the simple perspective of the text. Paul is, after 
all, the one who is writing and he naturally sees the world with respect to his own 
experiences. Yet the `abnormality' of Paul's comments is not derived from an historical 
issue, but from a critical issue: the separation of author and text, intention and message, 
the subordination of the metaphysical to the logocentric. Furthermore, these 
mechanisms are hidden within the text itself, they are not brought to bear upon the text. 
What we find, however, is that to write about the text while glossing these aporiae is to 
bring something else to bear upon the text, to introduce to the text something foreign, to 
`distort' it, and finally to replace it, in order to make it acceptable. 
To recite the text: Phil 1.13-14 is a complex result clause. 758 The first part of the 
clause (1.13) focusses on the progress of the gospel outside the Christian community, the 
second part (1.14) refers to the situation within the Christian community. As a part of 
the same clause, Phil 1.14 continues to express the object of Paul's desire (Poi oµaL, 
1.12). He wants them to know that `the majority of the brethren have all the more 
confidence in the Lord759 by virtue of my bonds to boldly speak the word without fear'. 
Once again, Paul's focus is upon the re-citation of the gospel in new contexts, or 
`proclamation' ('to boldly speak the word760 without fear'), 761 which he cites as evidence 
756 See discussion on provenance, pp. 68ff 
757 Jewett, `Conflicting Movements', 365-66. 
758 On the clause as an explanation, see references in n. 646. 
759 I have rendered Ev KU QQ as a reference to the object in which the confidence is placed, 
and treat 'rots SEßµotc as the means by which the confidence 
is placed. As noted in O'Brien, adding 
`in the Lord' to &&Ax 2v is somewhat superfluous (O'Brien, Philippians, 94-95). 
760 The assumption here is that ibv Xoyov refers to the gospel. Apart from the fact that this 
is a classic New Testament reference to the message received from God (see, 
Gal 6.6; 1 Thess 
1.6-8; but note `the word of God' in Paul, 1 Cor 14.36; 2 Cor 2.17; 4.2; in early Christian use, for 
A 
of the gospel's progress-762 Thus, as with 1.13,763 1.14 is an important contribution to 
Paul's rhetorical agenda to create a way of reading his situation so that the Philippians 
will not perceive some lack in either himself or his gospel. 
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As mentioned, Paul is now addressing the effect his imprisonment has had upon 
the interior of the Christian community. One of those effects has been to engender 
courage within the Christian community, and it is well noted among the commentaries 
that Paul is stressing this effect by piling up words which reflect this courage: iwEnoL6öiaS, 
TrEpwootEpc, )S, ioXµäv, #op(, )S. But of course, the effect is not singular, it is divided along 
two lines of interest, suggested initially by the comparative adjective, iiA dovaS 
(`majority'764), the point at which the story of another set of interests-that of the 
'minority'-becomes manifested within the text. One cannot help but wonder why Paul 
decided to volunteer this second story, a story of dissent and faction. The great interest 
of the commentaries appears to be the historical identity of the opponents; 765 however, I 
suggest that the `why' here is much more important than the `who', simply because what 
Paul is trying to do by mentioning this story of dissent is much more important to Paul as 
he writes Philippians than who is or is not dissenting. Fee is one of the few who attempt to 
deal with the `why'. 766 He concludes that it anticipates the exhortations of 1.27-2.16 and 
4.2-3. Hawthorne, somewhat defeated and more typical, states: `Why Paul felt it 
necessary to disclose to the Philippians the weaknesses of some of the brothers who were 
with him in Caesarea is a mystery'. 767 
example, Acts 4.29; 6.2,7; 8.4; 11.19; 13.5,7,44,46; 16.32), there is a strong tradition clarifying 
the referent of tiöv )Lo ov: x, A, B, (`D*), P, W, et al., insert the modifier ioü AEOÜ; however, the more 
likely readings of P4°3 D2, et al., omit the phrase. 
761 See the discussion on p. 145. 
762 See the discussion on progress being validated by proclamation on pp. 148ff. 
763 See the discussion on (dis)closure, pp. 137ff. 
764 See BAGD, 689. 
765 An important problem which actually assists in determining the `why', though it is 
rarely treated as such. 
766 Fee, Philippians, 123. 
767 Hawthorne, 38; note that the various arguments (e. g., n. 593) suggesting that this 
section is an excursus are by virtue of that suggestion attempting to answer the `why' of Paul's 
comments. 
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7. a. i. Identifying the Division The more substantial reference to division 
comes in 1.15 with the indefinite pronoun tu'E ('certain ones'), which here refers to 
those other than the previously mentioned `majority'. These `certain ones' preach Christ 
(Xp LQiöv KfplkaoUQLv) through envy (ýOovov) and strife (p Lv); they proclaim Christ (iöv 
Xpwthv KaiayyEX, AouoLv) out of selfishness (Eý EpL8EhhS), without pure motives (oüx ayvwS), 
supposing (o 4tEVOL) to raise up trouble while Paul is imprisoned. There are a number of 
interesting terms here, none of which, one imagines, would find a place on Paul's 
favourite `fruit of the Spirit' list. 
In addressing the historical question of identity, the important task is to establish 
at the very least, what kind of people they are. In fact, Fee asks this very question: `But 
who are these people, or at least what kind of people are they? '768 The commentaries tend 
to suggest two certainties: they are brethren, 769 and they are brethren whose doctrine is 
no problem for Paul. 770 It is this latter claim which has the greatest interest for this 
project, for now we can certainly acknowledge that these preachers are indeed brethren, 
after all they preach and proclaim Christ (1.15,17), and they are the `certain people on 
the one hand' (TLvES 4Ev) of `the majority of the brethren' who have gained confidence. 
It is worth noting that involved in the discussion is Phil 2.20-2 1, where Paul 
seems to lament the fact that no one seems to be concerned about the interests of Christ. 
They all seem to be preoccupied with their own interests. 771 Jewett, among others, 772 
768 Fee, Philippians, 121. 
769 There are many kinds of &&A4 oL. The suggestions include: the seemingly ubiquitous 
`Judaisers' (e. g., Lightfoot, 88); people who were not actually opponents of Paul, but anti- 
imperialist Christians seeking the (eschatological) glory of persecution and martyrdom (Hawthorn, 
316-17); a set of circumstances based on the personal rivalry among the Roman Christians which 
extends itself to Paul (Oscar Cullman, Peter: Disciple, Apostle, Martyr: A Historical and Theological 
Essay [trans. Floyd V. Filson; New York: Meridian Books, 1958], 104-9); Gnostics (e. g., 
Schmithals, Paul and the Gnostics, 65-122); Christian missionaries with a Greco-Roman divine man 
view of apostleship (Jewett, `Conflicting Moments', 366-71); finally, there is the suggestion that 
they were simply Christians in Rome who did not like 
Paul, who were `downright antipathetic' (F. 
F. Bruce, Paul: Apostle of the Heart Set Free, 390). 
770 Among others, see Bockmuehl, 77-78; O'Brien, Philippians, 103; Collange, 55-56; 
Fee, 118-23. 
771 T& Eauiwv CITObaLv, in Phil 2.21, is easily understood as the equivalent of EpL8ELa in 
Phil 1.17. 
772 See the general acceptance in, e. g., Fee, Philippians, 268; 
O'Brien, Philippians, 321-22; 
Bockmuehl, 166; Meyer, Philippians, 127; contra, e. g., Gnilka, Philipperbrief, 159, and note that a 
detailed description of the relationship between the two texts is found in Wolf-Henning 
Ollrog, 
Paulus und seine Mitarbeiter: Untersuchungen zu 
Theorie und Praxis der paulinischen Mission 
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argues that we have here in Phil 2.20-21 a reference to the same group of people 
mentioned in Phil 1.15-17.773 If this is in fact the case, we have a delightful example of 
Paul's underlying disposition towards the `selfish' preachers surfacing only briefly, but 
long enough for us to begin to suspect even further the operation of 1.12-18. 
7. a. 11. Identifying Activity On historical grounds, I would suggest that the most 
productive way to consider the issue is deciding what these people are actually doing, or 
perhaps more subtly, how one phrases what they are doing. Bockmuehl and Silva 
represent two of the important positions on the matter: Bockmuehl states that these self- 
centred preachers `smell an opportunity for self-advancement, even at the expense of 
causing the captive Paul distress'; 774 Silva states that these people `merely pretended ... 
to be concerned for the gospel when their real desire was to aggravate Paul's 
sufferings'. 775 The difference between these two scholars is how they have reconstructed 
the intentions of the self-centred preachers. 
Bockmuehl has focussed almost entirely on their personal `selfishness' (EPL9ELOG, 
1.17). In fact, Bockmuehl has focussed on the EpL8ELa so much that the issue of deliberate 
antagonism towards Paul is phrased in such a way so as to suggest that it was not at all a 
deliberate activity but a mere byproduct of seeking their own interests. In contrast, Silva 
has focussed on their proactive antagonism, their `envy' (ýOovov), `strife' ('Ep LV), and, 
primarily, their `supposing to raise up trouble' for Paul (oL6 tEVOL 6), L1IJLv E'ELpELv tioiS 
SE(Jµotc µou). What this means is that Bockmuehl is going to end up saying that these 
people were not really opponents in the classical sense, rather Christian preachers whose 
real problem is their selfish ambition, and who do not mind rubbing salt in Paul's wounds 
as they seek their own interests. 776 It also means that Silva is going to cast these fellows in 
a much more sinister light. He asks `would it really occur to anyone that one way of 
hurting the apostle was to preach precisely what Paul himself had been preaching, 
(Neukirchen-Vluyn: Neukirchener, 1979), 193-200. 
773 Jewett, `Conflicting Moments', 369. 
774 Bockmuehl, 76. 
775 Silva, 72. 
776 See Bockmuehl, 78,80,81. 
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especially when such an activity would brand them as "Pauline" and thus bring danger to 
them? '777 
Silva supposes that `some issues of doctrinal significance must have been at stake'; 
in spite of the fact that people were indeed being brought to a saving knowledge of Christ, 
which gives Paul occasion to rejoice. 778 So where lies the problem? Silva suggests that it 
lies with this very success, that these fellows use their evangelistic success `to subvert the 
apostle's authority and to establish a form of Gentile Christianity that was friendlier to 
Judaizing influences'. 779 Silva's position is most certainly aligned with the text's derision 
of these bad preachers to a greater degree than is Bockmuehl's; since Paul, `does not treat 
these persons mildly at all, but casts aspersions on their tactics as well as their 
attitudes'. 780 To clarify the distinction between Bockmuehl's text and Silva's text, let us 
consider the language Paul employs to perform the derision. 
7. a. iii. Identifying Language The terms 400vos and EpLS when paired together 
make a potent pair of adjectives indicating `a need to tear down the rival teacher, to 
whom one feels inferior'. 781 The two terms are found partnered in biblical and extra- 
biblical vice lists. 782 In 1 Tim 6.4, the two terms are again partnered in a classic Pauline 
vice list. What is interesting about this list is that it is specifically developed to describe 
the kind of person who teaches a different doctrine (1 Tim 6.3); still more interesting is 
the fact that as the discussion develops we find that these people are also the sort of 
people who `think that godliness is a means of gain' (1 Tim 6.5). This text bears out 
some interesting similarities to our Philippian passage. In Timothy we have people who 
are labelled with ýOovov and 'EP LV, who are using `godliness' (EÜ(YE3ELa) as a means to profit 
(nopw[wS), and yet are labelled as teaching a different doctrine (EtEpoäLSaoKaXEu ). In 
Philippians 1.15-17 we have people who are labelled as ýOovov and 'EP LV, who are using 
the proclamation of Christ (iöv XpLoiöv KaiayyEAAouoLv) for selfish gain (EpL8Ed(X). 
777 Silva, 73. 
778 Silva, 73. 
779 Silva, 73. 
780 Jewett, 365. 
781 Neil J. McEleney, `The Vice Lists of the Pastoral Epistles', CBQ 36 (1974): 211; 
782 See the references in Siegfried Wibbing, Die Tugend- und Lasterkataloge im Neuen 
Testament; und ihre Traditionsgeschichte unter besonderer 
Berücksichtigung der Qumran-Texte (BZNW 
25; Berlin: Alfred Töpelman, 1959), 17,21, n. 54,37,82,77-108,87-88. 
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In Titus 3.3ff. the author develops an ethical section in which he categorises the 
former (pre-Christian) foolishness and unprofitability as ý9övoq (Titus 3.3) and EpLS 
(Titus 3.9). In Rom 2.29, those people who have failed to acknowledge God and have 
been handed over to a depraved mind to do improper things (K(Xe7jKW)783 are described as 
being filled with 49övoS and Epic, among other things. The famous vice list in Gal 5.19 
lists Ep LS and ý9övoS as `deeds of the flesh', and since the `flesh desires what is against the 
Spirit' (Gal 5.17), `those who practice such things will not inherit the kingdom of God' 
(Gal 5.21). 
Even outside their partnership, the two terms are used in other contexts to 
describe the seedier side of life. "EpLS, for the New Testament use of which `Paul virtually 
holds the copyright', 784 in Rom 13.12-13 is catalogued as one of the `deeds of darkness' 
which is not the sort of activity in which one is supposed to engage during the `day' in 
preparation for salvation. In 1 Cor 3.3 (also 1.11), the presence of Ep Ls reflects the fact 
that they are still `fleshly' (oapKLKÖS). In 2 Cor 12.20, EpLS is listed with a set of all the bad 
characteristics that Paul fears might exist in the Corinthian church. 
cOövoq is found less often on its own. It is located in the Gospels with respect to 
jealousy of the Jerusalem leadership (Matt 27.18; Mark 15.10), 785 and in 1 Pet 2.1 
Christians are called to `put off' ýOovoS and other like characteristics. Perhaps more 
importantly d00voc is described in classical literature in specific contrast to simple jealousy 
(CýXoq), which focusses on a particular object of desire. 186voS appears to remove the 
focus from the self and represent the desire to prevent or subvert the successes or 
acquisitions of another person; 786 hence Aristotle's remark: `envy is a kind of pain at the 
sight of good fortune in regard to the goods mentioned ... and not 
for the sake of a man 
getting anything, but because of others possessing it'. 787 
783 Cranfield notes that the nominal form `is especially associated with the Stoics, for 
whom it was an ethical technical term' (C. E. B. Cranfield, The Epistle to the Romans (2 vols.; ICC; 
Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1975), 1: 128-29. Thus we find both Zeno and Panaetius authoring 
treatises entitled TrEpL tioü Ka8! jKOVioc. The use here in Romans clearly employs this sort of moral 
nuance (e. g., Cranfield, 129; Moo, 118, n. 142; also see BAGD, 389). 
784 John Howard Schütz, Paul and the Anatomy of Apostolic Authority (SNTSMS; 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975), 161. 
785 It is also listed in James 4.5 as a way to describe God's desire for us. 
786 See R. C. Trench, `Envy', NIDNTT 1: 557. 
787 Aristotle, The Art of Rhetoric, 2.10.1 (Freese, LCL). 
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The final important term employed by Paul to classify his opponents is EpL8ECa 
(selfishness/selfish ambition788). The term is relatively new in the ancient world, and 
found only in Aristotle prior to the New Testament period-in which case it described 
`the self-seeking pursuit of political office by unfair means'. 789 In the New Testament it is 
located in many of the same places we find ýAövoS and Ep LS, though some interesting 
differences exist. In Jas 3.16, we are told that wherever there is EpLAEUa so can be found 
`disorder' (&Kaiaoiao(. a) and `every vile thing' (näv #aO? ov np&yµa). In Jas 3.14 it is 
associated with arrogance and lying against the truth, and we find the same idea in Rom 
2.6-9 where EpL8ELac is coupled with `disobey' (änEL8Ew) as the source of behaviour which 
receives a strong condemnation: `God will render to each person according to his or her 
deeds ... to those who are 
Eý EpLAEL'aq and disobey the truth, but pay heed to 
unrighteousness, wrath, and rage, (there will be) tribulation and calamity upon every soul 
of those who do evil'. 
Considering the nature of the language Paul employs, we can hardly take 
confidence in the notion that the only problem with these preachers was their bad 
attitude. Furthermore, we cannot sustain the implication of Bockmuehl's commentary 
that the antagonism towards Paul was simply a by-product of their own selfish agenda. 
Rather, at the very least, we need to understand that the activity of these antagonists was 
designed to deliberately hurt Paul. Thus, in Paul's mind, such behaviour, despite what 
he actually says about it (since that is the point in question), is tantamount to hurting or 
opposing Christ. After all, the people who `know' (Phil 1.16), as opposed to `suppose' 
(Phil 1.17), who Paul really is, know that he has been `appointed (KdµaL790) for the 
defence of the gospel'. The important point to be noted about Paul's appointment is the 
identity of the subject of the `appointing', namely God. There is a natural positive 
correlation between this point and the one Paul makes in Gal 1.1 where he takes pains to 
point out that he is sent through Jesus Christ and God the father and not from 
humans-on the basis of which he can anathematise his opponents. 
Both of the accounts by Bockmuehl and Silva reflect the fact that Paul 
understands himself to be doing God's work. To oppose Paul is to oppose that work 
788 See BAGD, 309. 
789 BAGD, 309. 
790 Serves as the passive of tW ii. ti (BAGD, 426): to lie, recline, etc. It has the figurative 
sense of `appointed, set, destined' (BAGD, 426) which 
is clearly the sense here. 
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which God is doing. Thus again, it is unlikely that Paul would construct any person 
deliberately opposed to him as merely having a bad attitude. 
7. a. iv. Examples from Corinthians A helpful discussion on the issue of 
identity is the one found in 2 Corinthians where Paul is dealing with people who are 
clearly involved in some sort of Christian mission. According to Paul, these fellows want 
to be regarded as apostles, and they seek opportunity among the Corinthians to be so 
regarded (2 Cor 11.12). These men are `pseudo-apostles', who `disguise themselves as 
apostles of Christ' (2 Cor 11.13). How does one disguise oneself as an apostle? 
Primarily, though not exclusively, through language; these men talk the talk, probably 
better than Paul does. In fact, we note that in 2 Corinthians Paul thrice appeals to the 
essentials of the word-deed convention (2 Cor 3.12; 10.10; 11.6), and on two of those 
occasions Paul is referring to an apparent lack in his speech, perceived by the Corinthians, 
which he seeks to counter by representing himself as more substantial in knowledge and 
deeds. 791 By contrast, these pseudo-apostles are not what their words make them out to 
be, a fact that Paul drives home when he points out that their `end will be according to 
their deeds' (2 Cor 11.15). Importantly, Paul highlights the separation of word and deed 
operative within the pseudo-apostles by virtue of the verb 4EiaoxrftarL'Cw, 792 which he uses 
three times in three verses: they disguise themselves as apostles of Christ (2 Cor 11.13), 
Satan disguises himself as an angel of light (2 Cor 11.14), they disguise themselves as 
servants of righteousness (2 Cor 1.15). 
It would be a mistake, however, to assume that these fellows merely pretended to 
be apostles. It is rather more likely that they assumed that they were, which is not really a 
problem for Paul until the Corinthian church members also assume that they are apostles. 
Thus, Braumann, pointing to the inadequacy of the English word `disguise', notes that 
they were doing more than just pretending . 
793 Hence Bultmann's comment on 2 Cor 
11.13 that i. Eiaox%UatL(öµEVOL ELS äiroa' OXO1)c XpLQioü `certainly need not describe their 
subjective intent, as though these persons really did not desire to work for Christ at all; it 
is merely stated that they actually do not do so'. 
794 The probability that these fellows at 
791 Thus invoking the word-deed convention, see discussion on pp. 113ff. 
792 The main concern of this word rests upon external form, rather than essential 
substance, see G. Braumann, `Form, Substance', 
NIDNTT 1: 708. 
793 Braumann, NIDNTT 1: 708. 
794 Bultmann, The Second Letter to the Corinthians, 208. 
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Corinth assume they are apostles, and that some Corinthians assume that they are, 
presents us with an interesting parallel to Phil 1, which is made all the more pertinent by 
their identification as the `super-apostles' (üTrEpX(av äiroat6) w, 2 Cor 11.5). 795 
Thus again, it is too simple to dismiss Paul's magnanimity in Philippians on the 
basis that he is merely dealing with people who have a bad attitude. Those at Corinth 
who assume an apostolic posture but are in fact `pseudo', who disguise themselves as 
servants of righteousness in the same way that Satan disguises himself as an angel of light, 
represent a similar category of preacher to the one found in Philippians. That is, 
preaching the word does not automatically infer orthodoxy, or that these preachers are 
not disguising themselves. The language of the Philippians account goes too far to let 
these fellows be understood as merely emotionally and socially deficient, but the fact that 
this behaviour receives severe condemnation in 2 Corinthians and only magnanimous 
indifference in Philippians, a `particularly striking' contrast, 796 is precisely the problem. 
2 Corinthians provides us with yet another way to view Paul's opponents in Phil 1. 
Jewett raises the possibility that in Philippians Paul may be reacting to a `divine man' 
assumption about apostleship similar to the one suggested for 2 Corinthians. 797 The 
existence of a divine man theology within the culture is not really in dispute; 798 thus, the 
possibility that Paul encounters a divine man ideal operative within Christian groups 
(both Jewish and Gentile) remains a possibility. This works for Jewett because he believes 
that Paul is experiencing opposition precisely because he is in prison, 799 since 
imprisonment is hardly a demonstration of God's power. Thus, Paul's reference to the 
progress of the gospel while in prison is a counter to this accusation. 
795 On the matter of whether the pseudo-apostles of 2 Cor 11.13 are also the super- 
apostles of 11.5 and 12.11, it appears to me that Paul is talking about the same people based on 
the fact that the entire argument from 10.12-12.13 is a discussion about the same thing: that Paul 
is not inferior to the newcomers. See, Paul Barnett, The Second Epistle to the Corinthians (NICNT; 
Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1997), 523; also the supportive discussions in Ralph P. Martin, 2 
Corinthians (WBC; Waco, TX: Word Books, 1986), 349-50; Philip Edgcumbe Hughes, Paul's 
Second Epistle to the Corinthians (NICNT; Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1962), 380,392-93; Schütz, 
167-68. For the contrary position, see Bultmann, Corinthians, 199. For a comprehensive 
evaluation, see C. K. Barrett `Paul's Opponents in II 
Corinthians' NTS 12 (1971): 233-54. 
796 Schütz, 168. 
797 For example, see Dieter Georgi, The Opponents of Paul in Second Corinthians (Studies of 
the New Testament and Its World; Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1987), 230-38. 
798 See Georgi, 390-422. 
799 Jewett, `Conflicting Moments', 367. 
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Jewett's position here is very close to my own. The text appears to represent this 
sort of concern on Paul's part (a concern for an accusation of some kind of lack); 
however, the very points which Jewett uses to argue for why people at Ephesus800 would 
be accusing Paul of weakness, I have understood to be true of the Philippians. That is, 
the historical situation appears to me to be one in which Paul is arguing in Philippians for 
the sake of the Philippians, and not for the sake of people in his present locale. Jewett 
argues that `the letter repeatedly makes the point that the suffering for Christ is the 
epitomy [sic] of Christian experience'. 801 But we must ask why Paul would want to 
thread such an argument throughout an epistle which is not going to be read by the 
people in question. Thus, I would rather suggest that the apparent theme of suffering, 
along with Paul's points made in the early section of Philippians (especially Phil 1.12-18) 
is indicative of a problem Paul is attempting to resolve among the readers of the epistle, 
and not among people who would probably never read it. However, again, I would 
suggest that what Jewett has observed operating within the letter, a defence against an 
assumption that his imprisonment suggests that there is something wrong with him or 
even his gospel, is certainly a valid observation and one to which I myself hold, and one 
which is deeply implicated in my reading of Philippians. 
7. a. v. An Insidious Summary Returning to the issue of identity, I would 
suggest that these people in Phil 1.15-17 are people who in a different set of 
circumstances would receive the full weight of Paul's invective, but for overarching 
rhetorical reasons this does not present itself to Paul as the most expedient course of 
action as he writes Philippians, if he is to produce within the Philippian church the 
manifestation of his own desires. If there is any patience in Philippians, it is not with the 
self-centred preachers, as is typically assumed. The situation is rather that Paul is 
`carefully measuring' (Entstellung? ) his response so that in the end he maintains his 
position within the life of the Philippian church. 
On the matter of whether these `selfish' preachers were Christian, I simply say that 
the text bears out the very fact with little or no ambiguity. As to the matter of whether 
they were pure in their doctrine or whether they simply had a bad attitude, the bulk of 
scholarship assumes the latter. This assumption is naturally based upon historical 
800 Jewett begins with an argument for an Ephesian provenance (Jewett, `Conflicting 
Moments', 363-64). 
801 See Jewett, `Conflicting Moments', 367-69. 
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conjecture, 802 which follows a line of argument that bases itself on an idea of the Paul we 
have come to know everywhere else, and which assumes Paul simply would never have 
been so magnanimous with questionable doctrine. It is therefore necessary to raise the 
question, the Hinterfrage, What if their doctrine was other than Paul's? What if Paul has 
in fact allowed questionable doctrine to pass by unchecked? Why would he do that? 
What would he be hiding? What would he be distorting in an effort to by-pass the 
Censor? 803 
Of course, these Hinterfragen are equally applied to the commentaries. Why make 
the assumption that Paul would simply not allow impure teaching to get past him? The 
grain of the text is well-testified among the commentaries to be a surprising one, because 
the Paul we experience in the New Testament is not one to be so magnanimous about 
opposition of any sort, let alone appear to lend some approval, as we find in Phil 1.18. 
Commentary which argues for the assumption, even on its own terms, fails to relate 
Paul's description of the preachers to the larger Pauline corpus; 804 it also tends to 
forget805 that Paul specifically states that these fellows were not preaching from pure 
motives and that their teaching was a pretext for something else. 
7. b. Sur prise806 
Lurking within Phil 1.18a is the element of `sur-prise'. Phil 1.18a is an assault, 
but not so much upon the text itself (Phil 1.12-17) as it is upon the presentation of that 
text by its readers. The fractures generated by Phil 1.18a run through the `text', as the 
802 To be precise, it really is based on a way of reconstructing that history with respect to 
the ideological framework of the person doing the reconstructing. 
803 I think this goes beyond Silva's suggestion, because ultimately Silva is satisfied with 
Paul's rejoicing and sees it as pure and unaffected. It is probably the case that Paul can isolate 
positive points about which he can be happy, but his saying so, the reason he decides to point out 
his rejoicing has more to it than the fact of his `rejoicing'. 
804 Baur is so indignant towards the text's lack of confluence with Paul in general, that he 
dismisses it as altogether non-Pauline (Baur, 2: 65). 
805 Commentary is the art of forgetting. 
806 'sur- /sel pref. [Fr. (earlier so(u)r- f. as super-. ] Used in wds adopted f. Fr. and rarely 
as a productive Eng. pref., in senses of HEI-' (OED, 
3155). 
... 
[(O)Fr., use as n. of fem. pa. pple of prendre take seize... ]' (OED, `prise /prniz, pri: z/ n. 
1 
2358). 
`prise /prnizl n. 
2 
... 
[f. as prec. cf. eIf4 n. 
4] 1 An instrument used for prising or levering 
something off; a lever.... 2 The action of prising something; 
leverage' (OED, 2358). 
`prise /prnrz/ v. 
1t.... 1 Raise, move, or open by force of leverage' (OED, 2358). 
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`methodological field' of activity. 807 The experience of sur-prise is well-attested among 
the commentaries, albeit in various ways. However, the most unfortunate way in which 
this is treated is to forget it; a review of the index in Dunn's The Theology of Paul the 
Apostle reveals that this particularly problematic statement (Phil 1.18a), which has 
significant implications for Pauline theology, is in fact one of eleven verses of Philippians 
not cited or referenced in any way in this attempt to `write' the theology of Paul the 
apostle. 808 This is a delightful presentation of commentary as the art of forgetting. 
So how does this sur-prise come about? Fee provides us with an excellent 
introduction: `The surprise comes in his large-heartedness about this-not that he [Paul] 
could not be large-hearted, but that he could be so toward people of a kind whom he elsewhere 
seems to inveigh so strongly against. 809 A little closer to the textual production of this sur- 
prise we find Gnilka observing that Paul creates a fracture between Phil 1.17 and 18 by 
`interjecting a question' (dazwischengeworfenen Frage) between them; he effectively `breaks 
off the discussion' (bricht ... 
die Erörterung). 81 ° Thus Gnilka notes that Paul is heading in 
one direction but suddenly, when he arrives at Phil 1.18 he sur-prises our thoughts on 
where we imagined the discussion to be going. It is very important for us to note that the 
sur-prise here, Gnilka's sense of 811 only has currency with respect to our reading; 
that is, it is our impressions formed by the earlier stages of the text that make Phil 1.18 a 
sur-prise. 
Bruce detects a difference between Philippians and other readings of Paul's 
epistles and notes that `Paul has mellowed' and has become more like Christ. 812 
Importantly, Bruce's sense of difference is based upon his Hauptbriefe experience. 813 
Bockmuehl understands the whole passage to be `unexpected' and refers to the Phil 1.18a 
807 Barthes, `From Work to Text', 155-64, esp. 156-57. 
808 Dunn Theology, 794-96. 
809 Fee, Philippians, 118 (emphasis added); also 125. 
810 Gnilka, Philipperbrief, 63. 
811 Bricht is a 3rd person singular present tense form of brechen (to break). I am anglicising 
it here as something of a noun, invoking `it breaks' within the nominal use. 
812 Bruce, Philippians, 47. 
813 He begins the discussion with a reference to Paul's attitude among the Galatians, as 
well as comparing Paul's attitude in Philippians to 2 Corinthians (Bruce, Philippians, 47). Note the 
earlier discussion on Hauptbriefe and reading Paul, pp. 12ff. 
190 
section as demonstrating a `new attitude' and a `remarkable spirit of generosity', and that 
Paul's `tone does seem to have mellowed'. 814 In other words, Bockmuehl has been sur- 
prised and notices something at odds with the way he typically assumed Paul to work, 
which just so happens to be based upon a reading of Hauptbriefe such as Galatians. 815 
Barth sees a change in the apostle: `one may venture the biographical remark that we have 
here to do with an insight that has grown and matured in comparison.... ' From what 
standard of Pauline literature can Barth say that Paul has deviated? `... say, II 
Corinthians' of course. 816 
Collange reveals that the problem has `often intrigued commentators', and he 
himself notes a difference between the `intransigence of ... [Paul's] other epistles' and 
the "`liberal" attitude' in the Philippians passage. 817 Schütz, 818 along with Martin, 819 
detects a difference in Paul's demonstration of `indifference' and labels it `curious'. 
Hawthorne is awed by a display of `splendid magnanimity', 820 and Michael by an 
`amazing magnanimity'. 821 Silva warms to `a remarkable passage in which the apostle 
lays his heart bare and reveals the deepest motives of his life'. 822 
Gnilka, after observing the textual bricht, recites the apparent trend among 
scholars to ask why Paul was willing `to overlook' (hinwegzusehen) the agitators `so 
generously' (so großzügig), and notes the common reference made by commentators on 
this verse is that Paul displays Seelengröße, a generous spirit. 823 Dibelius sees in the 
passage a `wonderful objectivity' (großartige Sachlichkeit) in which all the previous 
814 Bockmuehl, 76,81,77, and 81 respectively. 
815 Bockmuehl bases his comparisons on what he believes to be true of Galatians, 
Bockmuehl, 81. 
816 Barth, 33. Again, Barth's expectations of Paul are dependent upon a privileging of 
Hauptbriefe over Philippians. 
817 Collange, 58. 
818 Schütz, 164. 
819 Martin (NCB), 74. 
820 Hawthorn, 38. 
821 Michael, 42. 
822 Silva, Philippians, 74. 
823 Gnilka, Philipperbrief, 64. 
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`reservations' (Hintergedanken) become `confounded' (zuschanden). 824 Similarly, 
Lohmeyer sees in Phil 1.18 a `beautiful testimony' (schönes Zeugnis) to Paul's `unselfish 
objectivity' (selbstloser Sachlichkeit). 825 
One of the more remarkable commentaries on this re-markable passage comes 
from Michael. In an excellent demonstration of how reading turns into writing, Michael, 
encountering the aporia of Phil 1.18a, delves into speculation about Paul's temperament. 
In commenting upon Phil 2.21, he brings Phil 1.15-17 into the discussion and claims 
that Paul had lost control of his temper ('temporary annoyance'), thus, `we must not 
attach to the words too literal and strict a meaning. Paul does not quite mean all that his 
words seem to mean, anymore than when he condemns the preachers in 1: 15fß. 826 
Returning to his commentary on Phil 1.18: `Paul is hurt. Words escape him which in a 
calmer mood he would scarcely have uttered. He charges them with a deliberate desire to 
annoy him! '827 Paul has been royally irritated, in Michael's view, and thus when he 
decides to suppress his true feelings `his magnanimity is no whit less magnificent; it is 
even more amazing'. 828 Indeed, `the irritation has produced a pearl! '829 
There is one more comment from Michael to note. He sees that there is indeed a 
sur-prise operating in this text which is prising our readings out of position, seizing them, 
opening them. He notes that `the splendid magnanimity of ver. 18 has blinded us to the 
signs of annoyance in vers. 15 and 16'. 830 This is indeed the nature of the sur-prise, yet 
we find that the sur-prise is suppressed in the final reading of the passage. What Michael 
does somewhat consciously, most do unconsciously, they re-cite the text so as to generate 
a hierarchy between Phil 1.15-17 and 1.18. 
The bricht operating between the two passages fractures the metaphysic imposed 
upon the text through commentary and is necessarily dispensed with in the final 
presentation of the text. That is, while there is apparently a hierarchy operative within 
824 Dibelius, 66. 
825 Lohmeyer, 47. 
826 Michael, 115. 
827 Michael, 45. 
828 Michael, 45. 
829 Michael, 45. 
830 Michael, 45 (emphasis added). 
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the text, this hierarchy is reversed by commentary to provide conscious acceptability of 
the text. Commentary on this activity follows: 
7. c. Commentary 
The remarks of surprise and cries of magnanimity are contingent upon how one 
understands Phil 1.18 to relate to Phil 1.15-17. The problem is simply this, Phil 1.15-17 
appears perfectly normal and consistent with how we typically read Paul, but then we 
read Phil 1.18. At that point, an interpretative and institutional crisis develops, its 
resolution is `commentary'; 831 that is, the crisis must be removed and (re)presented and 
(de)formed in a way that allows it to fit comfortably, safely, acceptably into our conscious 
impressions of Paul. The mechanism for this is almost always a re-reading of Phil 
1.15-17 which (re)presents these verses as not what they appear to be. 
When this (re) presentation is performed on Phil 1.15-18, an important and ironic 
decision is masked: Phil 1.18 is allowed to govern Phil 1.15-17. In other words, what at 
first appears to be `normal' in Phil 1.15-17 is suddenly reconstructed in the face of Phil 
1.18. Hinterfrage: Why? Well, if Phil 1.15-17 is allowed to pass for what it typically 
appears to be, then Paul in Phil 1.18 is subordinating the metaphysical (theology) to 
something a little more earthly: words, proclamation, logocentrism. 
Further: the commentary performed through Phil 1.18 upon Phil 1.15-17 
implicates itself in its own critique. It seeks to replace the text with writing, or more 
importantly, to fill up the logical fracture in Phil 1.15-17 caused by the shock of Phil 1.18 
with more writing so as to (re)create a textual grain along the lines of which a theology 
can be developed. It thus also fails to generate a metaphysic of the text, making a 
theology reductio ad verbum, logocentrism, logotheology. Thus, commentary participates 
in the very thing that is shocking about Phil 1.18 by becoming the very thing it seeks to 
displace. 
Further still: this (e)strange(ed) movement creates a hierarchy within the text: Phil 
1.18 over 1.15-17. It thus reads against the logical grain of the text, and imposes upon it 
a supplemental logic, without which, it is apparently assumed, the text fails to cohere. 
Let us briefly consider this supplement. `Supplement' (supplement) 
is an important word 
for Derrida, developed and derived from his interaction with Rousseau's Essay on the 
Origin of Languages. Rousseau consigns writing to a supplemental role 
in language, but 
fails to maintain the difference between writing and speech allowing 
Derrida to perform 
831 Again, note the previous discussion on pp. 17ff. 
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one of his most erudite deconstructions of Western metaphysics. 832 The importance of 
this here is that the logic of supplementarity comes to bear upon the idea of the 
commentary: `Supplementarity, which is nothing neither a presence nor an absence.... It 
is precisely the play of presence and absence, the opening of this play that no 
metaphysical or ontological concept can comprehend'. 833 And this is not to suggest that 
commentary is nothing, rather that its supplemental logic and the `play' invoked by it 
precedes the object of its force: the text. 834 Thus, like the supplement, commentary is a 
point of metaphysical undecidability; it seeks to be both a part of and an addition to the 
text, it wavers between presence and absence, never quite one or the other, never quite 
the text, never quite theology. 
The hierarchy in Phil 1.15-18 created by commentary is supplemented to the text 
in order `to compensate'835 for an apparent lacuna within the text. What is this omission? 
Is it power? In which case, one could say that ensuring Paul remains antagonistic to 
difference, through `commentary' on Phil 1.15-17, is nothing less than ensuring the 
institutional stability of the whole nature of Western Christian theology. Failure at this 
point would send shockwaves throughout the entire structure. Yet we find that all this 
relies upon the logic of supplementarity, which is really nothing at all. Unable to escape 
the text, commentary invokes Entstellung so that other experiences of the text are not in 
fact of the text at all, rather of the transcription of one logocentric system in the place of 
another. 
7. d. More Commentary 
As discussed earlier in this chapter, what makes meaning and thus commentary 
possible is iterability. Yet the possibility of (re)citation already problematises the 
fundamental desire of biblical commentary for the metaphysical, or as Bruner puts it, 
832 See'. .. 
That Dangerous Supplement ... 
' in Derrida, Of Grammatology, 141-64; 
which is merely a supplement to `Genesis and Structure of the Essay on the Origin of Languages', in 
Derrida, Of Grammatology, 165-268. 
833 Derrida, Of Grammatology, 244. 
834 See Derrida's comments on the property of man in Derrida, Of Grammatology, 244. 
835 From Compensare (OED, 458), infinitive of compenso `To balance, make good, offset (a 
debt, deficit ... 
). 2 To counter balance, make up for (a deficiency), etc. ), make good in another 
way, offset.... 3 To balance mentally, weigh (against). 4 
To save, secure, obtain (at the expense 
of or by sacrificing something else) b. to get rid of 
(by exchange)' (P. G. W. Glare, ed., Oxford 
Latin Dictionary [Oxford: At the Clarendon Press, 1982], 374-75). 
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`rummaging in the thoughts and words of God'. 836 It does so because the moment of the 
iter, in which the mark comes into existence enabling the question of meaning in the first 
place, is the same moment it is permanently divided from the presence which it 
represents, 837 since that which representation represents more than anything else is 
absence. The struggle with this absence is that which invokes the need for interpretation 
and commentary; it invokes the desire for a metaphysical presence within biblical texts, 
that is `theology'. As we shall see, the final resting place is an undecidable point between 
presence and absence, never quite the text, never quite theology. 
As we have seen, commentary seeks to overcome its metaphysical lack by re-citing 
the text in such a way so as to enable the metaphysical to maintain its dominance. In 
fact, commentary is entirely and radically (re)citation, unable to prevent the relocation of 
the text into one contextual frame or another, thus never able to present the text as 
something in itself; it must always take the place of the text. 
Apart from the possibility of commentary and the contemporaneous impossibility 
of presence, the issue of iterability is invoked once more in the analysis of the Philippian 
passage. However, this requires an extension of the logic required to generate the 
metaphysical reading of our passage into the historical activity being represented by the 
text. That is, as mentioned earlier, commentary on our passage attempts to reverse a 
hierarchical structure operating within the text. It attempts to locate Phil 1.18 over Phil 
1.15-17. 
I suggested earlier that the reason for this binary relocation was that if Phil 
1.15-17 is allowed to dominate Phil 1.18, then Paul is subordinating the metaphysical 
(theology) to something a little more earthly: words, proclamation, logocentrism. Such 
an activity by commentary should be no surprise to us, since it is in its nature to attempt 
to maintain, thus '(re) create' presence within the text. Yet, the act of (re) creation is a 
divine act; thus, as with Watson's `theological hermeneutics', 838 commentary is a 
theological activity in which the commentator must become a god in order to achieve it. 
This particular attempt by commentary to maintain the metaphysical within the text, is 
actually something of a problem for the solution arrived at by that same activity. That is, 
when Phil 1.18 is relocated to the dominant position over Phil 1.15-17, the purpose is to 
836 Bruner, 401. 
837 See Derrida, SEC, 5. 
838 See above comment on p. 26. 
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ensure that doctrine remains fixed to a transcendent point of reference outside the 
logocentric world by making sure that Paul does not allow an erasure of the most 
important line of distinction, that between &Arj9ELa and np4aWLS. 
But what are the consequences? If the selfish preachers are said to preach the 
truth (äa. rJAEL(X), what of iipojaoiS? If Phil 1.18 is made to dominate Phil 1.15-17, then the 
result is that the metaphysics of presence are retained within the text of Philippians, but 
only if at the same time the metaphysics of presence is removed from the selfish preachers 
of the gospel. That is, the main way in which commentary seeks to compensate for bad 
intentions while assuming the bad preachers preach aX. OELa, 839 is to point out that Paul 
`rejoices' in it (hence the dominance of Phil 1.18). But for the graphematic gospel to be 
re-cited and thus operate apart from the bad intentions of the selfish preachers means that 
the gospel is required to perform an autonomous activity. 840 In order for Paul, then, to 
be able to `rejoice' at this recitation of an approved gospel, the assumption must be made 
that this graphematic structure bears within itself the presence of the original speaker's 
intentions (&? 8EL(X? ), but not the intentions of those who cite it. 
The result is that there is a decision to be made, albeit an entirely undecidable 
one: (1) accept that Paul allows for an alternative version of the gospel , 841 and thus 
remove the distinction between &A, rj6ELa and npö4aoLS and the range of possibilities that 
depend upon the structure; (2) allow the division of &ATjeELa and 1Tpöx cJLS to work its way 
back through the text and require the intentions of the preachers to be absent from the 
recitation of the gospel, while at the same time requiring a previous author's intentions to 
be present. The text remains open.... 
S. Failure to Close: A (Non)Serious Reading ofPhil 1.12-18 
What must we do to be saved? I suggest that it is precisely the failure of the text to close 
that is our salvation. The aperture opened by this text provides readers and scholars of 
Paul with access to the logocentric mechanisms, or indeed, the `machinations' and 
agenda that comprise the substructure of what passes for Paul's `theology'. Is this the 
839 Which could only ever be a Pauline version. 
840 Not a few authors argue the point that the gospel has its own `objective force', e. g., 
Collange, 58; Gnilka, 64. There are others who simply argue that it is God's message and thus 
imply that God's presence is a part of the gospel text, e. g., Fee, 125-26. 
841 For example, Silva suggests a version is being preached in which the preachers are 
presenting a more Jewish friendly version (Silva, 73). 
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same as Dunn's reference to `The' theology of Paul? I do not believe that it is, primarily 
because it relegates Pauline theology away from metaphysical categories, which are simply 
inventions of writing, and towards a productive, logocentric, ethical reality. It is even 
different, although much less so, from those who refer to Paul as `theologiser'842 as 
opposed to `theologian', since in this case writing about theologising is still creating a 
metaphysic for the text. It still seeks to produce a totalisation, or saturation of presence 
which subsequently is thought to govern the entire reading and recitation of the product. 
Does the aperture allow us to escape those things? No, because `any theology, whatever 
else it is, must also be a semiology'. 843 
Pauline theology is troubled when it fails to take into consideration the presence 
of underlying social and ideological structures because Paul's text is already constrained 
by them. 844 At this point a significant crisis develops in the dependence upon the text for 
metaphysical significance, since socially and ideologically constrained structures of 
thought precede the text, indeed they themselves are the means by which the author 
conceives of a text. Thus, as stated in Chapter Three, in Paul's letters we confront not 
theology but a construct produced by a complex of conscious and unconscious processes, 
namely language. 845 Bringing this to bear upon our reading of Paul is more than simply 
acknowledging the need for background information on Paul's text, it means that we 
subordinate our reading of Paul to the cultural constraints present to him. These 
constraints are `present' because they were a part of who Paul was; they are a part of both 
his unconscious and conscious mind and thus they precede and are required by the 
iteration of his thought. 
In Chapter Three, 846 I suggested that there is an important need for a cultural 
matrix to grant us the necessary dynamic context. This need presents Greco-Roman 
psychagogy to us as a viable social structure, since this one social structure contains 
within it a much larger complex of the relevant social structures that have been used to 
842 Note especially Roetzel, 93-134, who has an excellent description of the questions this 
raises for such things as the privileging of Romans, see 
Roetzel, 93, and the above quote on p. 30. 
843 Hart, 7. 
844 See above pp. 4,127ff. 
845 See above p. 129 
846 See comments on p. 101. 
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identify features of Paul's thought and practice. 847 A couple of key features stand out: the 
cultural requirement for a confluence of word and deed, 848 and the psychagogic sense of 
responsibility. 849 In addition to these cultural precedents to Paul's thinking, I have also 
already discussed in both Chapter One, and the present chapter, the problematic nature 
of commentary's habit of glossing the text as it seeks the metaphysical within it. 850 The 
problem here is located in that which prevents the metaphysical from operating within the 
text, namely the citationality, or iterability of text as discussed in Chapter One. 851 
If we bring all those things to bear upon the present conversation we discover an 
interesting, and I think highly productive reading, of Phil 1.12-18. We start back in Phil 
1.12. Paul begins with a disclosure: the gospel has progressed during his imprisonment. 
Paul affirms this by pointing to a couple of successes: (1) the guards know that he is there 
for the sake of the gospel, and (2) people have been emboldened to preach the gospel. At 
this point, as mentioned earlier, 852 success for Paul is measured by the gospel's progress 
(yet another social ideal). Interestingly, this did not mean acceptance of the gospel, 853 
progress was, instead, contextualised by the activity of proclamation, that is, of re- 
iteration. 854 Already we can see Paul starting to displace certain traditional hierarchies by 
virtue of relegating evangelistic success ('progress') to the deeply logocentric activity of 
proclamation, thereby resting it upon iterability. 
The importance of the gospel is its ability to be reiterated. Thus the next thing we 
encounter in Philippians is that very thing: a story about reiteration, yet one which divides 
itself along the contours of two different contextualising forces operating upon that 
reiteration; contextual forces which fail to totalise or saturate the iterable gospel text with 
their presence and thus fail to govern its usage (a point of success for Paul, but failure for 
847 See the whole discussion on pp. 101ff. 
848 See discussion on pp. 113ff. 
849 See discussion on pp. 107 and 109ff. 
850 See discussion on Hinterfragen, pp. 17ff., and discussions on Commentary on pp. 
192ff.. 
851 See pp. 43ff. 
852 See comments on p. 149. 
853 See the discussion on, pp. 146ff. 
854 See discussion on pp. 146ff. 
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commentary). In the face of these two sets of evangelistic iterations, and with respect to 
Paul's claim of success, we cite Derrida: `what is a success when the possibility of 
infelicity855 continues to constitute its structure? '856 This is the very question that comes 
to bear upon commentary on Philippians which elects to privilege Phil 1.18 over Phil 
1.15-17. When the possibility of communication in general-namely 
iterability-permanently divides the speaker and text, and at the same time erases any 
metaphysical marks from the text, what is it that makes one evangelistic re-iteration be 
considered successful or aXilOELa, if the other is said to forestall the presence of the 
speakers' intentions by the activity of iipöxami ? Nothing at all. And Paul seems to have 
recognised this, or at least he invokes it. Thus the logic of our text is one that disrupts 
itself, and prevents metaphysical commentary. 
Is this disruption deliberate? In Chapter Three, I argued that the disclosure 
formula is ultimately (dis)closure; it appears to be the avenue through which one can 
experience Pauline presence, but the moment in which that is accepted by the reader the 
text is suddenly closed. I referred to this as a sort of `Trojan logic' which was placed into 
operation by Paul to achieve goals not immediately apparent to his Philippian readers. 857 
I suggested that the need for such a logic is represented by both the text and the standard 
social norms. 858 Essentially, the reason amounts to Paul's attempt to alleviate the socially 
constructed, `natural and reasonable' expectations of the Philippians that there is a 
problem with Paul (due to his imprisonment) and thus also with his gospel. This is also 
suggested by the grammar of p. &) ov in Phil 1.12 which suggests that Paul is attempting to 
counter the `natural and reasonable' expectations by arguing that the unexpected has 
occurred. 859 What has in fact occurred is then constructed as wholly positive: evangelistic 
reiteration, presented as `progress', as opposed to the expected `regress'. 
The natural expectation that his imprisonment demonstrates that there is 
something fundamentally wrong with Paul is something against which the full 
855 By 'infelicity', Derrida refers to Austin's idea of the `parasitic' use of language, that is, 
the abnormal use of language such as in movies and plays which requires the existence of normal 
use in order to work (see Austin, 14ff. ). 
856 Derrida, SEC, 15. 
857 See the discussion on (dis)closure on pp. 137ff.; also see the comments on this `Trojan 
logic' on pp. 138,139,143. 
858 See the discussion on pp. 141ff. 
859 See p. 142. 
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complement of his social faculty rises. Paul's apostolically charged psychagogic 
disposition, which extends its activity to both Paul and the Philippians, requires him to 
engage the Philippians at least at first, on the very grounds which cause this `natural and 
reasonable' expectation. That is, Paul has to engage the Philippians on entirely socially 
constructed grounds. Since Paul's letters are all radically logocentric, constrained by the 
discursive structures of his culture, this should not be a surprise. It appears that Paul 
calls upon a certain cultural ideal to demonstrate his personal validity and thus also the 
validity of his gospel. Paul's commentary on his experience provides a way for the 
Philippians to reconstruct his situation in terms which are acceptable to their social 
sensibilities. The first and primary way in which he seeks to achieve this is through a 
demonstration that his gospel (words) is in no way compromised by his imprisonment 
(deeds). 860 In so doing, Paul conforms to the most basic of psychagogic ideals. 
Paul's desire to demonstrate success in the standard social terms, which I am 
suggesting is by virtue of his employment (conscious or unconscious) of psychagogic 
ideals, means that he specifically argues for a performance of language which manifests 
both of the ideals embedded within the word-deed convention. It is on the basis of this 
that Paul then tells a story of two (re)iterations in Phil 1.15-17, and then deliberately 
problematises the two stories when, in Phil 1.18, he suggests that, whether the 
evangelistic reiteration is labelled as äXrj6ELa or as iTpö1aaLS, he remains happy. 
This final manoeuver (which ultimately becomes the `first' manoeuver), is a 
crucial process to Paul's own activity in his apostolate and the subsequent development of 
`Pauline theology': Paul deliberately writes himself out of the gospel. That is, Paul 
dislocates the gospel from the presence of the speakers with his disruption of the 
&A1j6ELa/1rp6O4aoLS opposition in Phil 1.18, effectively rendering the gospel a radically 
logocentric structure, open for re-citation. If the gospel is not subordinated to the 
presence of the speaker, then whatever is going on with Paul's imprisonment, whatever 
natural and reasonable expectations that people may have had about Paul, can no longer 
be said to be present in the (graphematic) gospel. 
Paul has done two things and in the process masterfully salvaged the gospel from 
potentially devastating circumstances. First Paul went about representing himself in 
cultural terms as above-reproach with his claim to progress and his adherence to basic 
expectations placed upon psychagogues. Second, Paul removed himself, and everyone else, 
860 It is important to note that I am confining myself to this particular aspect of Paul's 
attempt to use Philippians in this way. 
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from the re-citation of the gospel so that whatever might be said about the speaker, the 
gospel remains absent from that person's presence and thus intentions. 
After the text's self-deconstruction, through the flotsam rises a single, intact 
ethical imperative: proclamation. While the gospel for Paul is merely language, entirely 
semiological, it is also a device, an apparatus, which he employs to bring about the 
manifestation of his ideological agenda. The precise nature of that agenda is another 
story altogether. I will, however, suggest this: proclamation as an activity can be argued 
to be the central point of reference for everything that we read in Paul. That is, what has 
come through this text is that which is central to Paul's own sense of the world, and the 
suggestion is that perhaps this needs to be a critique of how we have read Paul. It may be 
necessary to radically subject all of Paul's statements to the performative logic of 
proclamation and in the process uncover a different Paul: Paul the pragmatic proclaimer. 
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BIBLIOGRAPHY 
Abel, Lionel. `Jacques Derrida: His "Difference" with Metaphysics'. Salgamundi 25, 
(Winter 1974): 3-21. 
Aland, Kurt. `Die Entstehung des Corpus Paulinum'. In Neutestamentliche Entwürfe. TB 
63 Munich: Kaisen, 1979,302-50. 
Aland, Kurt, and Barbara Aland. The Text of the New Testament: An Introduction to the 
Critical Editions anal to the Theory and Practice of Modern Textual Criticism. Trans. 
E. F. Rhodes. 2na ed. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1989. 
Alexander, Loveday C. A. `Hellenistic Letter-Forms and the Structure of Philippians'. 
, 
JSNT 37 (1989): 87-101. 
. `Schools, Hellenistic'. ABD (1992): 5.1005-11. 
. `Paul and the Hellenistic Schools: The Evidence of 
Galen'. In Paul in His Hellenistic 
Context. Ed. Troels Engberg-Pedersen. Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1994. 
Arzt, Peter. `The "Epistolary Introductory Thanksgiving" in the Papyri and in Paul'. 
NovT36 (1994): 28-46. 
Asmis, Elizabeth. `Psychagogia in Plato's Phaedrus'. ICS 11 (1986): 153-72. 
Atkins, J. W. H. Literary Criticism in Antiquity: A Sketch of its Development. 2 Vols. New 
York: Peter Smith, 1952. 
Austin, J. L. How to do Things with Words. 2nd ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1976. 
Balch, David L., Everett Ferguson and Wayne Meeks, eds. Greeks, Romans, and 
Christians: Essays in Honor of Abraham J. Malherbe. Minneapolis: Fortress, 1990. 
Barclay, John M. G. `Deviance and Apostasy: Some Applications of Deviance Theory to 
First-Century Judaism and Christianity'. In Modelling Christianity: Social-Scientific 
Studies of the New Testament in its Context. Ed. Philip F. Esler. London: Routledge, 
1995. 
Barnett, Paul. The Second Epistle to the Corinthians. NICNT. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans. 
Barrett, C. K. `Paul's Opponents in II Corinthians'. NTS 17 (1971): 233-54. 
Barth, Karl. The Epistle to the Philippians. London: SCM, 1962. 
Barthes, Roland. S/Z. Trans. Richard Miller. New York: Hill and Wang, 1974. 
`From Work to Text' In Image Music Text Trans. Stephen Heath. New York: Hill 
and Wang, 1977. 
202 
`Death of the Author' In Image Music Text Trans. Stephen Heath.. New York: Hill 
and Wang, 1977. 
. Image Music Text. Trans. Stephen Heath. New York: Hill and Wang, 1977. 
Bateman, Herbert W., IV. `Were the Opponents at Philippi Necessarily Jewish? ' BSac 
155 (Jan. -Mar. 1998): 39-61. 
Baur, F. C. Paul, the Apostle of Jesus Christ: His Life and Work, His Epistles and His Doctrine. A Contribution to the Critical History of Primitive Christianity. 2 Vols. 2nd 
Ed. Trans. Eduard Zeller, Rev. A. Menzies. London: Williams and Norgate, 
1875-76. 
Beare, F. W. A Commentary on the Epistle to the Philippians. HNTC. New York: Harper 
& Brothers, 1959. 
Beare, Gordon C. F. `Derrida Dry: Iterating Iterability Analytically'. Diacritics 25 (Fall 
1995): 3-25 
Becker, Howard Saul. Outsiders: Studies in the Sociology of Deviance. New York: Free 
Press, 1963. 
Beker, J. Christiaan. Paul the Apostle: The Triumph of God in Life and Thought. 
Philadelphia: Fortress, 1984. 
Belsey, Catherine. Critical Practice. London: Routledge, 1980. 
Berger, Klaus. `Hellenistische Gattungen im Neuen Testament'. ANRWII. 25.2: 
1031-432. 
Berger, Peter and Thomas Luckmann. The Social Construction of Reality: A Treatise in the 
Sociology of Knowledge. New York: Anchor Books, 1967. 
Bitzer, Lloyd F. `The Rhetorical Situation'. Philosophy and Rhetoric 1 (1968): 1-14 
Black, D. A. `Paul and Christian Unity: A Formal Analysis of Philippians 2.1-4'. JETS 
28 (1985): 299-308 
Blevins, James L. `Introduction to Philippians'. RevExp 77 (1980): 311-25. 
Bloom, Harold et al. Deconstruction and Criticism. New York: Continuum, 1979. 
`From J to K, or the Uncanniness of the Yahwist'. In The Bible and the Narrative 
Tradition. Ed. Frank McConnell. New York: Oxford University Press, 1986. 
Bloomquist, Gregory L. The Function of Suffering in Philippians. JSNTSup, 78. Sheffield: 
Sheffield Academic Press, 1993. 
Bockmuehl, Markus. The Epistle to the Philippians. BNTC. N. P.: Hendrickson, 1998. 
203 
Bormann, Lukas. Philippi: Stadt und Christengemeinde zur Zeit des Paulus. NovTSup 78. 
Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1995. 
Bornkamm, Günther. Paul. Trans. M. G. Stalker. New York: Harper & Row, 1971. 
. `The Letter to the Romans as Paul's Last Will and Testament'. In Karl P. Donfried, Ed. The Romans Debate. Rev. Ed. Peabody, MA: Hendrickson, 1995. 
Brett, Mark G. `Motives and Intentions in Genesis 1', JTS 42 (1991): 1-16. 
Brewer, Raymond R. `The Meaning of POLITEUESTHE, in Philippians 1 _', , 
BBL 
(1954): 76-83. 
Brown, Colin., ed. New International Dictionary of New Testament Theology. 3 Vols. 
Michigan: Zondervan, 1978. 
Brown, Raymond E. An Introduction to the New Testament. The Anchor Bible Reference 
Library. New York: Doubleday, 1996. 
Bruce, F. F. Paul: Apostle of the Heart Set Free. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1977. 
. 
`St. Paul in Macedonia 3. The Philippians Correspondence'. Bulletin of the John 
Rylands University Library of Manchester 63 (1981) : 260-84. 
. Philippians. New International Biblical Commentary. Peabody, MA: Hedrickson, 1989. 
Bruner, F. Dale. `The Why and How of Commentary'. ThTo 46 (1990): 399-404. 
Bultmann, Rudolph. Theology of the New Testament. 2 Vols. Trans. Kendrick Grobei. 
New York: Scribner's, 1951. 
. 
The Second Letter to the Corinthians. Ed. Erich Dinkier. Trans. Roy A. Harrisville. 
Minneapolis: Augsburg, 1985. 
Caird, G. B. Paul's Letters from Prison. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1976. 
Calvin, John. Commentaries on the Epistles to the Philippians, Colossians, and Thessalonians. 
Vol. 21 of Calvin's Commentaries. Grand Rapids: Baker, 1981. 
Cameron, Averil. Christianity and the Rhetoric of Empire: The Development of Christian 
Discourse. Sather Classical Lectures 55. Berkley: University of California Press, 
1994. 
Carson, D. A., Douglas J. Moo, and Leon Morris. An Introduction to the New Testament. 
Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1992. 
Castelli, Elizabeth A. Imitating Paul: A Discourse of Power. Literary Currents in Biblical 
Literature. Louisville, Kentucky: Westminster/John Knox Press, 1991. 
204 
Cavell, Stanley. Philosophical Passages: Wittgenstein, Emerson, Austin, Derrida. Oxford: 
Blackwell, 1995. 
Chaplin, J. P. Dictionary of Psychology. 2nd Ed. New York: Laurel, 1985. 
Collange, Jean-Francois. The Epistle of Saint Paul to the Philippians. Trans. A. W. 
Heathcote. London: Epworth Press, 1979. 
Cook, D. `Stephanus Le Moyne and the Dissection of Philippians'. , 
STS 32 (1981): 
138-42. 
Craddock, F. B. Philippians. Interpretation. Atlanta: John Knox, 1985. 
Cranfield, C. E. B. The Epistle to the Romans. 2 Vols. ICC. Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 
1975. 
Culler, Jonathan. On Deconstruction: Theory and Criticism after Structuralism. London: 
Routledge, 1982. 
Cullman, Oscar. Peter: Disciple, Apostle, Martyr: A Historical and Theological Essay. Trans. 
Floyd V. Filson. New York: Meridian Books, 1958. 
Dalton, W. J. `The Integrity of Philippians'. Biblica 60 (1979): 97-102. 
Deissmann, Adolf. Licht vom Osten: Das Neue Testament und die neuentdeckten Texte der 
hellenistisch-römischen Welt. Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck), 1909. 
. Light from the Ancient East: The New Testament 
Illustrated by Recently Discovered Texts 
of the Greco-Roman World. Translated from the 1909 2nd German edition by 
Lionel R. M. Strachan. New York: Hodder and Stoughton, N. D. 
. `Zur ephesinischen 
Gefangenschaft des Apostels Paulus'. In Anatolian Studies 
Presented to Sir W. M. Ramsay. Ed. W. H. Buckler and W. M. Calder. 
Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1923. 
. 
Paul: A Study in Social and Religious History. 2nd ed. Trans. W. E. Wilson. New 
York: Harper, 1957. 
Derrida, Jacques. Of Grammatology. Trans. Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak. Baltimore: 
Johns Hopkins University Press, 1976. 
`Living On: Border Lines'. In Harold Bloom et al., Deconstruction and Criticism. New 
York: Continuum, 1979. 
. Dissemination. 
Trans. Barbara Johnson. London: The Athlone Press, 1981. 
. Positions. 
Trans. Alan Bass. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1981. 
. Ear of the 
Other: Otobiography, Transference, Translation. Trans. P. Kamuf and A. 
Ronell. Ed. C. V. McDonald. New York: Schoken Books, 1985 
205 
. `Signature 
Event Context'. In Jacques Derrida. Limited Inc. Evanston, IL: 
Northwestern University Press, 1988. 
. Limited 
Inc. Ed. Gerald Graff. Trans. Samuel Webber and Jeffrey Mehlman. 
Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1988. 
`Letter to a Japanese Friend'. In Derrida and Differance. Eds. David Wood and 
Robben Bernasconi. Trans. David Wood and Andrew Benjamin. Evanston, IL: 
Northwestern University Press, 1988. 
De Saussure, Ferdinand. Course in General Linguistics. Eds. Charles Bally and Albert 
Sechehaye, with Albert Reidlinger. Trans. Wade Baskin. New York: 
Philosophical Library, 1959. Repr. New York: Mcgraw-Hill, 1966. 
De Witt, Norman. `Parrhesiastic Poems of Horace'. Cph 30 (1935): 312-19. 
. Epicurus and His Philosophy. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 19 54 
Dibelius, Martin. An die Thessalonicher I, II; an die Philipper. Handbuch zum Neuen 
Testament 11. Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck), 1937. 
Dodds, E. R. The Ancient Concept of Progress and Other Essays. Oxford: At The 
Clarendon Press, 1973. 
Droge, A. J. `Mori Lucrum: Paul and Ancient Theories of Suicide'. NovT 33 (1988): 
263-86. 
. `Did Paul Commit Suicide? '. BibRev 5 (1989): 14-21. 
Droge, A. J., and J. D. Tabor. A Noble Death: Suicide and Martyrdom among Christians 
and Jews in Antiquity. San Fransisco: Harper, 1992. 
Dunn, James D. G. The Theology of Paul the Apostle. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1998. 
`Whatever Happened to Exegesis? In Response to the Reviews by R. B. Matlock and 
D. A. Campbell'. JSNT (1998): 113-20. 
Engberg-Pedersen, Troels. `Proclaiming the Lord's Death: 1 Corinthians 11: 17-34 and 
the Forms of Paul's Theological Argument'. In Pauline Theology: 1&2 
Corinthians. Vol 2. Ed. David M. Hay. Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1993. 
. Paul 
in His Hellenistic Context. Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1994. 
`Stoicism in Philippians'. In Paul in His Hellenistic Context. Ed. Troels Engberg- 
Pedersen. Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1994. 
Ernst, Josef. `Anfechtung und Bewahrung: Das Bild einer Christlichen Gemeinde nach 
dem Philipperbrief. In Das Evangelium auf dem Wege zu Menschen. Ed. Otto 
Knoch, Felix Messerschrnid and Alois Zenner. Frankfurt: Knecht, 1973. 
206 
Fee, Gordon. Paul's Letter to the Philippians. The New International Commentary on the 
New Testament. Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdmans, 1995. 
Foucault, Michel. The History of Sexuality. 3 Vols. Trans. Robert Hurley. London: 
Penguine, 1986. 
Fowl, Steven E. The Story of Christ in the Ethics of Paul: An Analysis of the Function of the 
Hymnic Material in the Pauline Corpus. JSNTSup36; Sheffield: Sheffield Academic 
Press, 1990. 
. `Christology and Ethics in Philippians 2: 5-11'. In Where Christology Began Eds., Ralph P. Martin, and Brian J. Dodd; Louisville, KY: Westminster/John Knox 
Press, 1998. 
Fredrickson, David E. `IIAPPHEIA in the Pauline Epistles'. In Friendship, Flattery, and 
Frankness of Speech: Studies on Friendship in the New Testament World. Ed. John T. 
Fitzgerald. NovTSup 82. Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1996. 
Freud, Sigmund. `Wenn Moses ein Ägypter war .... 
' Imago: Zeitschrift für 
Psychoanalytische Psychologie, Ihre Grenzgebiete und Anwendungen 23 (1937): 
387-419. 
Moses and Monotheism. Trans. Katherine Jones. The International Psycho- 
Analytical Library 33. London: Hogarth, and the Institute of Psycho-Analysis, 
1951. 
Friedrich, Gerhard. `Der Brief an der Philipper'. In Jürgen Becker, Hans Conzelmann, 
and Gerhard Friedrich. Die Briefe an die Galater, Epheser, Philipper, Kolosser, 
Thessalonicher und Philemon. NTD 8. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 
1990. 
Funk, Robert W. `The Apostolic Parousia: Form and Significance'. In W. R. Farmer, C. 
F. D. Moule, and R. R. Niehbuhr, eds., Christian History and Interpretation: Studies 
Presented to John Knox. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1967. 
Furnish, Victor Paul. `The Place and Purpose of Phil III'. NTS 10 (1964/64): 80-88. 
. `Pauline 
Studies'. In Eldon Jay Epp and George W. MacRae, Eds. The New 
Testament and its Modern Interpreters. Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1989. 
Gadamer, Hans-Georg. Truth and Method. New York: The Seabury Press, 1975. 
Garland, David E. `The Composition and Unity of Philippians: Some Neglected Literary 
factors, ' NovT 27 (1985): 141-73. 
Georgi, Dieter. The Opponents of Paul in Second Corinthians. Studies of the New 
Testament and Its World. Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1987. 
Glad, Clarence E. Paul and Philodemus: Adaptability in Epicurean and Early Christian 
Psychagogy. NovTSup 81. Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1995. 
207 
. 
`The Significance of Hellenistic Psychagogy for Our Understanding of Paul'. In The 
New Testament in Its Hellenistic Context. Studia Theologica Islandica, 10. Eds 
Gunnlaugur A. Jönsson and Einar Sigurbjörnsson og Petur Petursson. Reykjavik: 
Gudfraedistofnun-Skälholtsütgäfan, 1996. 
. `Frank Speech, Flattery, and Friendship in Philodemus'. In Friendship, Flattery, and Frankness of Speech: Studies on Friendship in the New Testament World. Ed. John T. 
Fitzgerald. NovTSup 82. Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1996. 
Gnilka, Joachim. `Die antipaulinische Mission in Philippi'. Biblische Zeitschrift 9 (1965): 
258-76. 
. Der Philipperbrief. HTKNT 10.3. Herder: Freiburg, 1968. 
Goldenson, Robert M., ed. Longman Dictionary of Psychology and Psychiatry. New York: 
Longman, 1984. 
Grant, Robert M. Second-Century Christianity: A Collection of Fragments. London: 
S. P. C. K., 1946. 
Grayston, K. `The Opponents in Philippians 3'. ExpTim 97 (1986): 170-72. 
Griffin, Miriam. `The Intellectual Deelopments of the Ciceronian Age'. In The 
Cambridge Ancient History. 2"' ed. Vol. 9. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1994. 
Gunther, J. J. St. Paul's Opponents and Their Background. NovTSup 35. Leiden: Brill, 
1973. 
Hadot, I. Seneca und die griechisch-römishe Tradition der Seelenleitung. Berlin: de Gruyter, 
1969. 
Hart, Kevin. The Trespass of the Sign: Deconstruction, Theology and Philosophy. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1989. 
Hawthorne, Gerald F. Philippians. The Word Biblical Commentary. Vol. 43. Waco, 
Texas: Word Books, 1983. 
Heidegger, Martin. Being and Time. Trans. John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson. 
New York: Harper & Row, 1962. 
Hemer, Colin. J. The Book of Acts in the Setting of Hellenistic History. Ed. Conrad H. 
Gempf. Winona Lake, IN: Eisenbrauns, 1990. 
Hendriksen, William. Philippians. NTC. Grand Rapids: Baker, 1962. 
Henge!, Martin. Judaism and Hellenism. Trans. John Bowden. 1974 Repr. London: 
SCM, 1981. 
The Hellenization of Judaea in the First Century after Christ. Trans. John Bowden. 
Philadelphia: Trinity Press International 1989. 
208 
. The Pre-Christian 
Paul. Trans. John Bowden. London: SCM, 1991. 
Holladay, Carl R. `Paul's Opponents in Philippians 3'. RestQ 12 (1969): 77-90. 
Huggins, Ronald, V. `Alleged Classical Parallels to Paul's `What I Want to Do I Do Not 
Do, but What I hate, That I Do' (Rom 7: 15)'. W77 54 (1992): 153-161. 
Hughes, Philip Edgecumb. Paul's Second Epistle to the Corinthians. NICNT. Grand 
Rapids: Eerdmans, 1962. 
Iser, Wolfgang. The Act of Reading: A Theory of Aesthetic Response. Baltimore: Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 1978. 
Jameson, Fredric. `Metacommentary'. In Situations of Theory. Vol. 1 of The Ideologies of 
Theory: Essays 1971-1986. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1988. 
Jewett, Robert. `Conflicting Moments in the Early Church as Reflected in Philippians'. 
NovT 12 (1970): 362-90. 
. `The Epistolary Thanksgiving and the Integrity of Philippians'. NovT 12 (1970): 40-53. 
Johnson, Barbara. `The Critical Difference'. Diacritics 8 (1978): 2-9. 
Judge, Edwin A. The Social Pattern of Christian Groups in the First Century. London: 
Tyndale, 1960. 
. 
`St. Paul and Classical Society'. JAG 15 (1972): 19-36. 
Kamuf, Peggy, ed. A Derrida Reader: Between the Blinds. New York: Columbia University 
Press, 1991. 
Käsemann, Ernst. `A Critical Analysis of Phil 2: 5-11'. JTC 5 (1968): 45-88. 
. New 
Testament Questions of Today. New Testament Library. Trans. W. J. 
Montague. London: SCM, 1969. 
Perspectives on Paul. London: SCM, 1971. Kennedy, George A. New Testament 
Interpretation Through Rhetorical Criticism. Studies in Religion. Chapel Hill: 
University of North Carolina Press, 1984. 
Kennedy, H. A. A. `The Epistle to the Philippians'. In Expositor's Greek Testament. Vol 3 
London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1903. 
Kilpatrick, G. D. `BAEIIETE, Philippians 3: 2'. In In Memoriam P. Kahle. Eds. M. 
Black, and G. Fohrer. BZAW 103. Berlin: 
Töpelmann, 1968: 146-48. 
Kim, Young Kyu. `Palaeographic Dating of P46'. Biblica 69 (1988): 248-57. 
Klijn, A. F. J. `Paul's Opponents in Philippians iii'. NovT7 (1965): 278-284. 
209 
Koch, Dietrich-Alexander. Die Schrift als Zeuge des Evangeliums: Untersuchung zur 
Verwendung und zum Verständnis der Schrift bei Paulus. Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr 
[Paul Siebeck], 1986. 
Koester, Helmut. `The Purpose of the Polemic of a Pauline Fragment (Philippians III)'. 
NTS 8 (1961-62): 317-332. 
Koperski, V. `The Early History of the Dissection of Philippians'. , 
STS 44 (1993): 
599-603. 
Koskenniemi, H. Studien zur Idee und Phraseologie des griechischen Briefes bis 400 n. Chr. 
Annales Academiae scientiarum fennicae: Series B, vol. 102.2. Helsinki: 
Suomalaisen Kirjallisuuden Kirjapaino, 1956. 
Kramer, W. Christ, Lord, Son of God. Trans. Brian Hardy. London: S. M. C., 1966. 
Kümmel, Werner Georg; Paul Feine and Johannes Behm. Einleitung in das Neue 
Testament. Heidelberg: Quelle & Meyer, 1965. 
. 
Introduction to the New Testament. Rev. Ed. Trans. Howard Clark Kee. Nasville: 
Abingdon, 19 7 5. 
Le Moyne, Etienne. Notae et Observationes, Varia Sacra. 2 Vols. Leiden: Daniel 
Gaesbeeck, 1685. 
Lightfoot, J. B. Saint Paul's Epistle to the Philippians. Rev. Ed. Grand Rapids 1953 
(Reprinted, London: MacMillan, 1913). 
Loh, I-Jin, and Eugene. A. Nida. A Translator's handbook on Paul's Letter to the 
Philippians. Helps for Translators. Stuttgart: United Bible Societies, 1977. 
Lohmeyer, Ernst. Der Brief an die Philipper, an die Kolosser und an Philemon. MeyerK. 
"Beiheft. " Werner Schmauch. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1964. 
Lutz, Cora E. Musonius Rufus: `The Roman Socrates'. Yale Classical Studies 10. Ed. 
Alfred R. Bellinger. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1947. 
McEleney, Neil J. `The Vice Lists of the Pastoral Epistles'. CBQ 36 (1974): 203-19. 
Malherbe, Abraham J. "`Gentle as a Nurse": The Cynic Background of 1 Thess ii'. 
NovT 12 (1970): 203-17. 
. Cynic 
Epistles. SBLSBS 12. Missoula, Montana: Scholars Press, 1977. 
. `Self-Definition among 
Epicureans and Cynics'. In Jewish and Christian Self- 
Definition. Self Definition in the Greco-Roman World 3. Eds. Ben F. Meyer and 
E. P. Sanders. London: SCM, 1982. 
. 
Social Aspects of Early Christianity. 2nd ed. Philadelphia: Fortress, 1983. 
. `Antisthenes and 
Odesseus, and Paul at War'. HTR 76 (1983): 143-73. 
210 
. `Exhortation 
in First Thessalonians'. NovT 25 (1983): 238-56. 
. `Paul: Hellenistic 
Philosopher or Christian Pastor? ' Summary Proceedings of the Thirty-ninth Annual Conference of the American Theological Library Association 
(1985): 86-98. 
. Moral Exhortation, A Greco Roman Sourcebook. Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1986. 
. Paul and the Thessalonians: The Philosophic Tradition of Pastoral Care. Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1987. 
. Paul and the Popular Philosophers. Minneapolis: Fortress, 1989. 
Malina, Bruce J. `Early Christian Groups: Using Small Group Theory to Explain 
Christian Organizations'. In Modelling Christianity: Social-Scientific Studies of the 
New Testament in its Context. Ed. Philip F. Esler. London: Routledge, 1995. 
Malina, B. J., and J. H. Neyrey. `Honor and Shame in Luke-Acts: Pivotal Values of the 
Mediterranean World'. In The Social World of Luke Acts: Models for Interpretation. 
Ed. J. H. Neyrey. Peabody, Massachusetts: Hendrickson, 1991. 
Marrow, S. B. `Parrhesia and the New Testament'. CBQ 44 (1982): 431-46. 
Marshall, John W. `Paul's Ethical Appeal in Philippians'. In Rhetoric and the New 
Testament: Essays from the 1992 Heidelberg Conference. Eds. Stanley E. Porter and 
Thomas H. Olbricht. JSNTSup 90 Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 1993 
(357-74). 
Martin, Ralph P. Philippians. New Century Bible. London: Oliphants, 1976. 
.2 Corinthians. WBC. Waco, 
TX: Word Books, 1986. 
. `The Center of Paul's 
Theology'. In DPL 92-95. Matlock, R. Barry. `Sins of the 
Flesh and Suspicious Minds: Dunn's New Theology of Paul'. j7SNT 72 
(1998): 
67-90. 
Meeks, Wayne A. `The Social Context of Pauline Theology'. Interpretation 36 (1982): 
266-277. 
. The First 
Urban Christians: The Social World of the Apostle Paul. New Haven: Yale, 
1983. 
. The 
Moral World of the First Christians. London: SPCK, 1987. 
. `The 
Circle of Reference in Pauline Morality'. In Greeks, Romans, and Christians. 
Eds. Daivd L. Balch, Everett Ferguson, and Wayne Meeks. Minneapolis: 
Fortress, 1990. 
211 
. 
`The Man from Heaven in Paul's Letter to the Philippians'. In The Future of Early 
Christianity: Essays in Honor of Helmut Koester. Eds., Birger A. Pearson; also A. 
Thomas Kraabel, George W. E. Nickelsburg, and Norman R. Petersen. 
Minneapolis: Fortress, 1991. 
. The Origins of Christian Morality: The First Two Centuries. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1993 
Mengel, Berthold. Studien zum Philipperbrief Untersuchungen zum situativen Kontext unter 
besonderer Berücksichtigung der frage nach der Ganzheitlichkeit oder einheitlichkeit eines 
paulinischen Briefes. WUNT 2.8. Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck), 1982. 
Meyer, H. A. W. Critical and Exegetical Handbook to the Epistles to the Philippians and 
Colossians. Trans. J. C. Moore and W. P. Dickson, with supplementary notes by 
T. Dwight. New York: Funk & Wagnalls, 1885. 
Meyer, P. W. `Pauline Theology: Some Thoughts for a Pause in Its Pursuit'. In Society 
of Biblical Literature 1995 Seminar Papers. Ed. Eugene H. Lovering, Jr. Atlanta: 
Scholars press, 1995. 
Michael, J. Hugh. The Epistle of Paul to the Philippians. The Moffat New Testament 
Commentary. London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1928. 
Momigliano, A. `The Social Structure of the Ancient City'. In Anthropology and the 
Greeks. Ed. S. C. Humphreys. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1978. 
Moore, Stephen D. and Janice Capel Anderson. `Taking It Like a Man: Masculinity in 4 
Maccabees', JBL 117/2 (1998): 249-73 
Muller, Jac J. The Epistle of Paul to the Philippians. NICNT (1955 The Epistles of Paul to 
the Philippians and to Philemon). Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1991. 
Müller-Bardorff, J. `Zur Frage der literarischen Einheit des Philipperbriefes'. WZUJ 7 
(1957-58): 591-604. 
Mullins, T. Y. `Disclosure. A Literary Form in the New Testament'. NovT7 (1964): 
44-50. 
Neugebauer, F. `Das Paulinische "in Christo". NTS 4 (1957-58): 124-38. 
Neugebauer, F. In Christus: Eine Untersuchung zum Paulinischen Glaubensverständnis. 
Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1961. 
Nietzsche, Friedrich. The Joyful Wisdom. Trans. Thomas Common. Vol. 10 of The 
Complete Works of Nietzsche. Edinburgh: T. N. Foulis, 1910. 
Dawn of the Day. Trans. J. M. Kennedy. Vol. 9. The Complete Works of Friedrich 
Nietzsche. Edinburgh: T. N. Foulis, 1911. 
. Werke 
in drei Bänden. Ed. Karl Schlechta. 3 Vols. Munich: Carl Hanser, 1954-56. 
212 
Norris, Christopher. Deconstruction Theory and Practice. New Accents; London: 
Routledge, 1982. 
O'Brien, Peter T. Introductory Thanksgivings in the Letters of Paul. NovTSup 49. Leiden: 
Brill, 1977. 
. `The Importance of the 
Gospel in Philippians'. In God Who is Rich in Mercy: Essays 
Presented to D. B. Knox. Eds. Peter T. O'Brien and David G. Peterson. Grand 
Rapids: Baker, 1986. 
. The Epistle to the Philippians. The New International Greek Testament Commentary. Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdmans, 1991. 
O'Brien, Peter T., and David G. Peterson, eds. God Who is Rich in Mercy: Essays 
Presented to Dr. D. B. Knox. Ed. Peter T. O'Brien and David G. Peterson. Grand 
Rapids: Baker, 1986. 
Ollrog, Wolf-Henning. Paulus und seine Mitarbeiter: Untersuchungen zu Theorie und Praxis 
der paulinischen Mission. Neukirchen-Vluyn: Neukirchener, 1979. 
Patte, Daniel. `Speech Act Theory and Biblical Exegesis'. Semeia 41 (1988): 85-102. 
Perkins, Pheme. `Commentaries: Windows to the Text', ThTo 46 (1990): 393-98. 
Peterlin, Davorin. Paul's Letter to the Philippians in the Light of Disunity in the Church. 
NovTSup 79. Leiden: Brill, 1995. 
Peterman, G. W. Paul's Gift from Philippi: Conventions of Gift-Exchange and Christian 
Giving. SNTSMS 92. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997. 
Peterson, Eugene, H. "`Preface": Symposium: On Writing Commentaries'. ThTo 46 
(1990): 386. 
Pfitzner, V. C. Paul and the Agon Motif. NovTSup 16. Leiden: Brill, 1967. 
Plevnik, Joseph. `The Center of Pauline Theology'. CBQ 51 (1989): 461-78. 
Pollard, T. E. `The Integrity of Philippians'. NTS, 13 (1966): 57-66 
Postmodern Bible, The. Newhaven: Yale University Press, 1995. 
Radin, M. `Freedom of Speech in Ancient Athens'. Aj7P 48 (1927): 215-20. 
Rahtjen, B. D. `The Three Letters of Paul to the Philippians'. NTS 6 (1959-60): 
167-73. 
Ramsay, William M. `Roads and Travel (in NT)'. A Dictionary of the Bible: Dealing with 
its Language, Literature, and Contents, Including Biblical Theology. Extra Volume. 
Ed. John Hastings. New York: Scribners, 1912,375-402.. 
213 
Rapaport, Herman. `Deconstruction's Other: Trinh T. Minh-ha and Jacques Derrida'. 
Diacritics 25.2: 98-108. 
Rapske, B. The Book of Acts and Paul in Roman Custody. The Book of Acts in Its First 
Century Setting. Vol. 3. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1994. 
Redfield, Robert. The Little Community: Viewpoints for the Study of a Human Whole. 
Comparative Studies of Cultures and Civilizations. Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1955. 
Reed, Jeffrey T. `Are Paul's Thanksgivings Epistolary? ', 7SNT 61 (1996): 87-99. 
.A Discourse Analysis of Philippians: Method and Rhetoric in the Debate over Literary Integrity. JSNTSup 136. Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 1997. 
Reicke, Bo. `Caesarea, Rome, and the Captivity Epistles'. In Apostolic Histry and the 
Gospel: Biblical and Historical Essays presented to F. F. Bruce on his 60t'4 Birthday. 
Eds. W. Ward Gasque, and Ralph P. Martin. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1970, 
277-86. 
Ricoeur, Paul. `Two Essays by Paul Ricoeur: The Critique of Religion and The 
Language of Faith'. USQR 28 (1973): 202-224. 
Roetzel, Calvin. Paul: The Man and the Myth. Minneapolis: Fortress, 1999. 
Russell, D. A. `Letters to Lucilius'. In Seneca. Greek and Latin Studies: Classical 
Literature and its Influence. Ed. C. D. N. Costa. London: Routledge & Kegan 
Paul, 1974. 
Russell, R. `Pauline Letter Structure in Philippians'. JETS 25 (1982): 295-306. 
Sailer, Richard P. Personal Patronage under the Early Empire. New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 1982. 
Schaberg, Jane. `Luke'. In The Women's Bible Commentary. Eds. Carol A. Newsom, and 
Sharon H. Ringe. Louisville, KY: Westminster/John Knox, 1992. 
Schenk, Wolfgang. Die Philipperbriefe des Paulus Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 1984. 
Schleiermacher, Friedrich. Hermeneutics: The Handwritten Manuscripts. AARTTS 1. Ed. 
Heinz Kimmerle. Trans. James Duke and Jack Forstman. Missoula: Scholars 
Press, 1977. 
Schmithals, Walter. `Die Irrlehrer des Philipperbriefes'. ZThK 54 (1957): 297-341. 
. Paul and the 
Gnostics. Trans. John E. Steely. Nashville: Abingdon, 1972. 
Schubert, Paul. Form and Function of the Pauline Thanksgivings. BZNW 20. 
Berlin: 
Töpelmann, 1939. 
214 
Schütz, J. H. Paul and the Anatomy of Apostolic Authority. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1975. 
Schweitzer, Albert. The Mysticism of Paul the Apostle. Trans. William Montgomery. 
London: Adam & Charles Black, 1967. 
Scott, E. F. `The Epistle to the Philippians'. In The Interpreter's Bible. Vol. 11. Ed. G. A. 
Buttrick, et al. New York: Abingdon, 1955. 
Searle, John. `Reiterating the Differences: A Reply to Derrida'. Glyph I (1977): 
198-208. 
Shaw, J. M. `Philippians', ExpT 45 (1934): 204. 
Sherwin-White, A. N. Roman Society and Roman Law in the New Testament. Oxford: 
Clarendon, 1964. 
Sherwood, Yvonne. The Prostitute and the Prophet: Hosea -s Marriage in Literary-Theoretical 
Perspective. JSOTSup 212; Gender, Culture, Theory 2. Sheffield: Sheffield 
Academic Press, 1996. 
Silva, Moises. Philippians. BECNT. Grand Rapids: Baker Book House, 1992. 
Sontag, Susan. `Against Interpretation'. In Aesthetics. Eds. Susan L. Feagin and Patrick 
Maynard. New York: Oxford University Press, 1997. 
Staten, Henry. Wittgenstein and Derrida. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1984. 
Stirewalt, M. L. Jr. Studies in Ancient Greek Epistolography. SBLRBS 27. Atlanta: 
Scholars Press, 1993. 
Stowers, Stanley K. Letter Writing in Greco-Roman Antiquity. LEC 5. Philadelphia: 
Fortress, 1986 
`Social Typification and the Classification of Ancient Letters'. In The Social World of 
Formative Christianity and Judaism. Eds. Jacob Neusner, et al. Philadelphia: 
Fortress Press, 1988. 
`Friends and Enemies in the Politics of Heaven: Reading Theology in Philippians'. 
In Pauline Theology I: Thessalonians, Philippians, Galatians, Philemon. Ed. Jouette 
M. Bassler. Minneapolis: Fortress, 1991. 
.A Rereading of 
Romans: justice, Jews, Gentiles. New Haven: Yale University Press, 
1994. 
Swift, R. C. `The Theme and Structure of Philippians'. BSac 141 (1984): 234-54. 
Tajra, H. W. The Trial of St. Paul: A Juridical Exegesis of the Second Half of the Acts of the 
Apostles. WUNT 2.35. Tübingen: Mohr (Paul Siebeck), 1989. 
215 
Tellbe, Mikael. `The Sociological Factors behind Philippians 3.1-11 and the Conflict at 
Philippi'. JSNT 55 (1994): 97-121. 
Thraede, Klaus. Grundzüge griechisch-römischer Brieftopik. zetemata: Monographien zur 
klassischen Alterumswissenschaft 48. Munich: C. H. Beck, 1970. 
Tompkins, Jane P. `The Reader in History: The Changing Shape of Literary Response'. 
In Jane P. Tompkins, Ed. Reader Response Criticism: From Formalism to Post- 
Structuralism. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1980. 
Tyson, J. B. `Paul's Opponents at Philippi'. Perspectives in Religious Studies 3 (1976): 
82-95. 
Van Unnik, W. C. `The Semitic Background of IIAPPHEIA in the New Testament'. In 
Sparsa Collecta. NovTSup 30. Leiden Brill, 1980. 
Vincent, Marvin R. Critical and Exegetical Commentary on the Epistles to the Philippians and 
to Philemon. ICC. Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1897. 
Walbank, F. W. The Hellenistic World. Rev. Ed. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 
1993. 
Wansink, Craig S. Chained in Christ: The Experience and Rhetoric of Paul's Imprisonments. 
JSNTSup 130. Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 1996. 
Watson, Duane F. `A Rhetorical Analysis of Philippians and its Implications for the 
Unity Question'. NovT 30 (1988): 57-88. 
Watson, Francis. `The Scope of Hermeneutics'. In The Cambridge Companion to Christian 
Doctrine. Ed. Colin E. Gunton. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997. 
Weiss, Johannes. Die Aufgaben der neutestamentlichen Wissenshaft in der Gegenwart. 
Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1908. 
White, John L. The Form and Function of the Body in the Greek Letter: A Study of the Letter- 
Body in the Non-Literary Papyri and in Paul the Apostle. SBLDS, 2. Missoula, MT: 
Shcolars Press, 1972. 
. Light 
from Ancient Letters. FFNT Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1986. 
Wibbing, Siegfried. Die Tugend- und Lasterkataloge im Neuen Testament; und ihre 
Traditionsgeschichte unter besonderer Berücksichtigung der Qumran-Texte. BZNW 25. 
Berlin: Alfred Töpelman, 1959. 
Wiles, G. P. Paul's Intercessory Prayers: The Significance of the Intercessory Prayer Passages in 
the Letters of St Paul. SNTSMS 24. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 
1974. 
Winter, J. G. `In the Service of Rome: Letters from the Michigan Papyri'. 
CPh 22 
(1927): 237-56. 
216 
Witherington, Ben, III. Friendship and Finances in Philippi: The Letter of Paul to the 
Philippians. The New Testament in Context. Valley Forge, PA: Trinity Press 
International, 1994. 
Wittgenstein, Ludwig. Philosophical Investigations. Trans. G. E. M. Anscome. New 
York: Macmillan, 1953. 
Wrede, William. Paul. Trans. Edward Lummis. Lexington, KY: American Theological 
Library Association Committee on Reprinting, 1962. 
Wright, N. T. What Saint Paul Really Said: Was Paul of Tarsus the Real Founder of 
Christianity? Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1997. 
217 
ANCIENT AUTHORS, TEXTS, AND TRANSLATIONS 
Alciphron. The Letters of Alciphron, Aelian and Philostratus. LCL. Trans. Allen Rogers 
Benner and Francis H. Fobes. Cambridge: Harvard University press, 1990. 
Aristotle. The Art of Rhetoric. LCL. Trans. John Henry Freese. Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1991. 
Cicero. De Finibus. LCL. Trans. H. Rackham. London: William Heinemann, 1971. 
Cicero. Letters to Atticus. LCL. 3 Vols. Trans. E. 0. Winstedt. London: William 
Heinemann, 1918. 
Cicero. The Letters to His Friends. 4 Vols. LCL. Trans. W. Glynn Williams. London: 
William Heinemann, 1972. 
Cicero. De Natura Deorum; Academica. LCL. Trans. H. Rackham. London: William 
Heinemann, 1933. 
Cicero. De Officiis. LCL. Trans. Walter Miller. London: William Heinemann , 1975. 
Cicero. Tusculan Disputations. LCL. Trans. J. E. King. London: William Heinemann, 
1971. 
Clement of Alexandria. Clemens Alexandrinus: Protrepticus und Paedagogus. Die 
Griechischen Christlichen Schriftsteller: Der Ersten Jahrhunderte. Otto Stählin. 
Berlin: Akademie, 1972. 
Pseudo-Demetrius. `Epistolary Types'. In Abraham J. Malherbe. Ancient Epistolary 
Theorists. SBLSBS 19. Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1988. 
Demetrius. On Style. Trans. W. Rhys Roberts. LCL. Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press, 1982. 
Diogenes Laertius. Lives of Eminent Philosophers. LCL. Trans. R. D. Hicks. London: 
William Heinemann, 1925. 
Epictetus. Epictetus. LCL. 2 Vols. Trans. W. A. Oldfather. Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1985. 
Euripides. Euripides. 4 Vols. LCL. Trans. Arthur S. Way. Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1978. 
Gregory of Nazianzus. `Epistulae'. TLG E. University of California 
Irvine: 1999. 
Horace. Satires, Epistles, and Ars Poetica. Trans. H. Rushton Fairclough. LCL. 
Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1991. 
Hunt, A. S. and C. C. Edgar, Trans. Select Papyri. 5 
Vols LCL. Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1959. 
218 
Isocrates. Isocrates. 3 Vols. LCL. Trans. Larue Van Hook. Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 1986. 
Josephus. Jewish Antiquities. LCL. Trans. Ralph Marcus. Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1958. 
Julian. The Works of the Emperor Julian. 3 Vols. LCL. Trans. Wilmer Cave Wright. 
Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1980-93. 
Longinus. On the Sublime. Trans. W. Hamilton Fyfe. LCL. Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1982. 
Lucian. Lucian. Trans. K. Kilburn. 8 Vols. LCL. Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press, 1968. 
Malherbe, Abraham, ed. The Cynic Epistles: A Study Edition. SBLSBS 12. Missoula, 
Montana: Scholars Press, 1977. 
. Ancient Epistolary Theorists. SBLSBS 19. Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1988. 
Maximus of Tyre. Maximus of Tyre: The Philosophical Orations. Trans. and Annot. M. B. 
Trapp. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997. 
Maximus of Tyre. Maximus Tyrius: Dissertationes. Ed. M. B. Trapp. Stuttgart and 
Leipzig: B. G. Teubner. 1994. 
Musonius Rufus. In Cora E. Lutz. Musonius Rufus: `The Roman Socrates'. Yale Classical 
Studies 10. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1947. 
Philodemus. IIEPI IIAPPHEIAE. (PHerc 1471) Ed. Alexander Olivieri. B. G. Teubner, 
1914. 
Philodemus. On Frank Criticism. Introduction, Translation, and Notes by David 
Konstan, Diskin Clay, Clarence E. Glad, Johan C. Thom, and James Ware. 
Society of Biblical Literature Text and Translations 43. Graeco-Roman 13. 
Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1998. 
Plato. Euthyphro, Apology, Crito, Phaedo, Phaedrus. LCL. Trans. Harold North Fowler. 
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1982. 
Plato. Timaeus, Critias, Ceitophon, Menexenus, Epistles. LCL. Trans. Rev. R. G. Bury. 
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1981. 
Plutarch. Moralia. LCL. 17 Vols. Trans. Frank Cole Babbitt. London: William 
Heinemann, 1927. 
Polybius. Polybius: The Histories. 6 Vols. LCL. Trans. W. R. Paton. Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 1979. 
Polycarp. Philippians. In Apostolic Fathers. LCL. 2 Vols. Trans. Kirsopp Lake. New 
York: G. P. Putnam's, 1919. 
219 
Polystratus. On the Irrational Contempt of the Popular Opinions. Pherc 336/1150. In 
Giovani Indelli. Ed. Sul Disprezzo Irrazionale delle Opinioni Popolari. Istituto 
Italiano per gli Studi Filosofici: La Scuola di Epicuro. 2nd Vol. Napoli: 
Bibliopolis, 1978. 
Quintilian. The Institutio Oratoria of Quintilian. 4 Vols. LCL. Trans. H. E. Butler. 
London: William Heinemann, 1968. 
Select Papyri. 5 Vols. LCL. Trans. A. S. Hunt, and C. C. Edgar. Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1959. 
Seneca. Ad Lucilium Epistulae Morales. 3 Vols. LCL. Trans. Richard M. Gummere. 
London: William Heinemann, 1930. 
Seneca. Moral Essays. 3 Vols. LCL. Trans. John W. Basore. London: William 
Heineman, 1970. 
Shepherd of Hermas. In The Apostolic Fathers. 2 Vols. LCL. Trans. Kirsopp Lake 
Cambidge: Harvard University Press, 1965. 
Thucydides. Thucydides. 4 Vols. LCL. Trans. Charles Forster Smith. Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 1975. 
